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ABSTRACT
This  thesis  analyses  the  political  and  artistic  development  of  the  Valencian  painter,
editor,  and montage artist  Josep Renau (1907-1982) during the years of the Spanish
Second Republic (1931-1939). Renau was a pioneering representative of a politically
progressive  vanguard  in  1930s  Spain,  and  his  multifaceted  work  offers  a  valuable
insight into contemporary perceptions concerning the theoretical  as well  as  practical
intersections of politics and art. Investigating these intersections, the thesis argues that
artistic and political activities were equally formative aspects of Renau's progressive
project, which sought to configure a cultural vision for a modern Spain. This project
was clearly informed by Renau's affiliation with the Spanish Communist Party and the
particular threat posed at the time by fascism. But his project was also strongly coloured
by conceptions associated with the artistic avant-garde, conceptions which led Renau to
emphasise the importance  of  radical  cultural  renewal  as  a  pivotal  ambition  of  anti-
fascist politics. The second part of the thesis explores how the civil war opened up new
cultural possibilities which might potentially have favoured further practical elaboration
of  Renau's  vision  had  not  the  critical  military  situation  facing  the  Republic  also
exacerbated its internal tensions. As the social and political revolution triggered by the
conflict raised the stakes of cultural politics too, Republican cultural producers had to
balance increasingly urgent  artistic and political  demands.  Renau,  who occupied the
post of General Director of Fine Arts from September 1936 to April 1938 and was thus
a prominent figure in the cultural mobilisation process, indicated how such demands
could  be  reconciled.  More  problematic,  however,  were  the  ambivalent  attitudes
displayed by both artistic and political vanguards towards the grass-roots revolutionary
situation  allowing   unprecedented  power  to  the  'people'.  In  this  regard,  Republican
cultural strategies would echo the radical principles advocated by Renau while reducing
their democratising potential.
3
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION___________________________________________________6
1. THE MAKING OF AN AVANT-GARDE ARTIST (1907-1930)________21
2. THE TURN TO POLITICS (1930-1933)__________________________40
3. ETHICS THROUGH AESTHETICS: 
            THE POLITICS OF CULTURAL REFORM (1931-1933)____________58
4. ART TO GUIDE THE MASSES: 
            ORTO AND ESTUDIOS (1932-1934)____________________________69
5. CREATING A CULTURAL POPULAR FRONT: 
            NUEVA CULTURA (1935-1936)_________________________________97
6. MOBILISING FOR SURVIVAL: 
            RENAU'S EARLY WAR POSTERS (1936)_______________________122
7. RADICAL NATION-BUILDING: 
            'POPULAR CULTURE' IN WAR (1936-1938)____________________157
8. EPILOGUE: 
            PROPAGANDA AGAINST ALL THE ODDS (1938-1939)__________201
CONCLUSION___________________________________________________212
ILLUSTRATIONS________________________________________________219
BIBLIOGRAPHY_________________________________________________244
4
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AEAR – Asociación de Escritores y Artistas Revolucionarios
AGA – Archivo General de la Administración
AHPCE – Archivo Histórico del Partido Comunista de España
AIA – Alianza de Intelectuales Antifascistas
AIDC – Alianza de Intelectuales para la Defensa de la Cultura
CDMH – Centro Documental de la Memoria Histórica 
CEDA – Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas 
CNT – Confederación Nacional del Trabajo
FUE – Federación Universitaria Escolar 
GDFA – General Directorate of Fine Arts (Dirección General de Bellas Artes)
ILE – Instituto Libre de Enseñanza
PCE – Partido Comunista de España
PSOE – Partido Socialista Obrero Español
UEAP – Unión de Escritores y Artistas Proletarios
UGT – Unión General de Trabajadores
5
INTRODUCTION
'I feel nostalgic for the future', said Josep Renau on a visit in the late 1970s to his native
Valencia, one of the first since the Spanish Republic's defeat in the civil war of 1936-
1939 had condemned him to nearly 40 years of exile.1 The phrase – to be 'nostalgic for
the future' – may be read in several ways. The death of General Francisco Franco in
1975 meant that  Spain looked set  to emerge from the 36-year-long dictatorship that
resulted  from  the  war,  and  it  is  likely  that,  despite  his  advanced  age,  Renau  was
signalling a firm desire to look ahead, to continue to work towards the future that from
an early stage in his career had inspired his artistic production. The term nostalgia even
suggested that it was in this future he would ultimately feel at 'home'. Renau always saw
himself  as  a  representative  of  an  artistic  and  political  vanguard.  He  never  stopped
seeking new forms of expression, new ideas, new insights. He probably never stopped
hoping for a new world, which he considered a prerequisite for the establishment of true
artistic  freedom.  Yet  Renau's  'nostalgia  for  the  future'  may  also  be  understood
historically. For the words were pronounced upon his return to a city inextricably linked
with the foundational influences of his artistic and political vision. It was a vision that
experienced its first and greatest defeat under the bombs of Hitler and Mussolini, the
dictators who secured General Franco's victory in the civil war, and was then buried,
along with all positive acknowledgements of the Second Republic, under multi-layered
psychological,  social,  and  institutional  censorship  devised  by  the  Franco  regime.2
Nostalgia could, in other words, refer to a former time and place when another future –
brighter and more audacious – seemed possible. It is the ambition of this thesis to say
something about how that future was imagined, and to enrich our understanding of the
historical  conditions  and  languages  by which  it  was  shaped.  Even if  Josep Renau's
vision can hardly be seen as representative of Republican politics as a whole, it was
1
Various authors. Nostàlgia de futur: Homenatge a Renau (Valencia: Vetges Tu i Mediterrània, 2009), 
7.
2 After the civil war, the Franco regime sought to consolidate itself through the use of various means of 
direct as well as discursive violence, which ultimately generated as a pervasive atmosphere of fear. 
There is now large literature on Francoist repression, but for a recent social and cultural overview of 
the legacy of war during Francoism and after, see Graham, H. The War and its Shadow: Spain's Civil 
War in Europe's Long Twentieth Century (Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2012).
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inextricably tied to the Republican experience. Ultimately, it was both nourished and
destroyed by the same historical forces that sealed the Republic's fate. 
A study focusing specifically on the intersections of art and politics in the work
of Josep Renau during the Republican period is justified for a number of reasons. Renau
was a prominent critic and polemicist who commented on virtually all artistic trends
shaping Spanish cultural life in the 1930s. In many cases, his arguments represented one
of two extremes and thus showed with particular clarity what was at stake in Spanish
cultural  debates.  Renau  also  made  significant  contributions  to  national  cultural
developments by 'importing' to Spain artistic techniques and ideas developed elsewhere
in Europe. He thus serves as an ideal starting point for studies investigating how such
techniques and ideas were adapted to a specific national context. This is of particular
importance when the ideas in question are originally associated with the cultural politics
of international  communism, which has been characterised as an inflexible monolith
that was simply applied to a multitude of situations without much, if any, modification.3
As we shall see, this was not the case in Spain, where debates about the political value
of realism as well as modernism developed within specific national parameters. This
meant that key concepts like realism could give rise to nationally formed associations,
which must in turn affect the way we map cultural commentators' ideological positions.
From this perspective, then, a study of Renau and his influence offers important insight
into the lines along which political  relations were established within the Republican
cultural  sphere.  But  a  study  of  Renau  must  also,  like  Renau  himself,  ask  more
fundamental questions regarding art's social role and responsibility. This was something
of a  leitmotiv  in Renau's  artistic  development,  and here too his  contributions to the
national  debate  can  be  seen  as  a  logical  point  of  departure  for  a  wider  analysis  of
shifting trends in Spanish cultural producers' relation to their social environment during
the volatile 1930s. 
Renau's  overall influence  on  cultural  life  in  Replican  Spain  is  difficult  to
ascertain  with any exactitude,  but  his  participation in  national  cultural  and political
organisations, and, above all, his appointment as General Director of Fine Arts, grant his
work an undeniable national dimension. As we shall see, his high position in official
cultural politics during the war was not used to exercise strictly prescriptive control over
Republican cultural  production, but the radical  ideas advocated by him found wider
3 The notion that Renau, for example, led a group of orthodox Stalinists who sought to impose a 
uniform socialist realist doctrine in Spain appears most clearly in Trapiello, A. Las armas y las letras: 
literatura y guerra civil (1936-1939) (Barcelona: Destino, 2011), 217. 
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resonance in the particular circumstances that the war engendered, and  his leadership
reinforced in this sense a development driven by a multitude of actors.4 On the local
level, however – that is, within the progressive cultural scene of Valencia – it is clear
that Renau's influence was crucial throughout the Republican period. Here his role was
above all that of a cultural entrepreneur, a person who launched a series of initiatives
and  possessed  a  great  talent  for  securing  his  colleagues'  support  for  new projects.
Insofar as Renau could continue to work through personal contacts also during the war,
these abilities would, of course, have a direct impact on the national level too. In such
cases we must further underscore the importance of Renau as part of the reason why the
cultural politics of the wartime Republic took the form it did.
Before we examine how the work of Renau has been assessed in the existing
literature, it will be useful to furnish a short character portrait, not least because it will
help us understand why he was so influential at a local level. First of all, there is little
doubt that Renau was a very charismatic, warm, and energetic figure who impressed
colleagues  and  scholars  alike.  The  Valencian  art  historian  Francisco  Agramunt  has
described him as a person of 'enormous vitality' – a compulsive talker, sometimes a bit
'cheeky' in familiar conversation, but nonetheless exhibiting the most 'perfect kindness'
and the most 'unpretentious manners' that one could imagine.5 Such eulogising words
may not have resonated with everyone who met him, but many were certainly struck,
especially at the early stages of his career, by his immense energy. An interview with the
artist  published in 1929, just  after  he had mounted his first  solo exhibition to great
critical acclaim, described him as a youthful rebel who stuttered, not because of any real
speech impediment, but as a result of 'excessive speed', out of sheer 'dynamism'.6 In
addition to his animated spirit, Renau also impressed his contemporaries with his acute
intelligence. One of his two younger brothers, Juan, wrote in his 1953 memoirs that he
had  never  come  across  anyone  gifted  with  such  capacity  for  learning.7 An  almost
identical  judgement  was  passed  in  an  1979  interview  by  Josep  Renau's  personal
secretary during the civil war years, Antonio Deltoro, who called Renau an exceptional
'natural talent', the like of whom he had not seen since the end of the civil war.8 Such
4 See Chapter 8.
5 Agramunt Lacruz, F. La vanguardia artística valenciana de los años treinta: arte y compromiso 
político en la II República (Valencia: Generalitat Valenciana, 2006), 184.
6 Miñana, F. ' Biografía de un hombre de veintiún años (Renau Beger, dibujante, baja, 48)' La Semana 
Gráfica, 30 March 1929. Also quoted in Forment, A. Josep Renau: Historia d’un fotomuntador 
(Catarroja: Editorial Afers, 1997), 58.
7 Renau, J. Pasos y Sombras: Autopsia (Mexico: Coleccion Aquelarre, 1953), 206, 347.
8 CDMH (Salamanca), Fuentes_Orales-Mexico, no 32.
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claims may seem hyperbolic but were not without foundation. Having been taken out of
school before the age of 10, Renau became an autodidact of unconventional but wide-
ranging erudition.9 He was  never  a  great  or  profoundly innovative  theorist,  but  his
ability to synthesise acquired knowledge, combined with his explosive energy, made
him formidable  opponent  in  intellectual  and  political  debates.  His  writing,  strongly
coloured by a style often seen in avant-garde manifestos, moreover showed effective
command of rhetorical  techniques used to enhance the presentation of his ideas and
build dramatic tension. His vivid prose holds the attention of the reader and constituted
in itself a great part of his overall ability to engage and inspire his audiences.
Yet the most important among Josep Renau's personality traits was, no doubt, the
fact that he combined intellectual and creative talent with an indomitable enthusiasm
and confidence. He 'radiated optimism', according to the Valencian painter and sculptor
Rafael  Pérez  Contel,  who was a close friend of  Renau's  throughout  the Republican
period.10 This disposition would naturally have boosted Renau's enterprising drive, his
readiness to take initiatives, and his ability to gain support for his ideas. It also helps to
explain some of his remarkable achievements, not least during the war, when he took on
a series of complex tasks – crucial among them protecting Spain’s artistic heritage from
war-related damage – with significant success.11 But Renau's positive outlook was not
unproblematic. The more reserved view of Alejandro Renau – the second of the three
brothers – regarding his elder sibling indicates that Josep at times allowed his optimism
to cloud his judgement on everyday matters and skew his view of immediate reality.
There was, according to Alejandro, a 'lack of balance' in his character that sometimes
made family life and relations suffer.12 Even his admiring younger brother Juan points to
the price of Josep's extraordinary artistic and political drive when suggesting that he was
9 According to Renau's own account, he was taken out of school at the age of eight or nine, as his father
wanted him to focus on his artistic training. See Renau's introduction to the facsimile version of 
Nueva Cultura, 'Notas al margen de nueva cultura', which apart from appearing in the first facsimile 
edition (Vaduz: Topos Verlag, 1977) is available in digitalised format from www.faximil.com and 
reproduced in its entirety in Brihuega, J. (Ed.) Josep Renau (1907-1982): Compromís i Cultura 
(Valencia: Universitat de Valéncia, 2007), 458-486. As the first facsimile edition is relatively difficult 
to find, and the digital version missing page numbers, all subsequent references to this text will 
include page numbers corresponding to the catalogue edited by Brihuega. The reference to Renau's 
school leaving age can be found on 460f.    
10 Pérez Contel, R. Artistas en Valencia 1936-1939 (Vol. 1-2) (Valencia: Conselleria de Cultura, 
Educacció i Ciència, 1986), 268.
11 The measures taken to protect the heritage were later copied by other countries in the Second World 
War, for example. For a detailed overview of this aspect of Renau's work, see Cabañas Bravo in Josep
Renau: Arte y Propaganda en Guerra (Salamanca: Ministerio de Cultura, 2007). 
12 Bellón, F.  Josep Renau: la abrumadora responsabilidad del arte (Valencia: Institució Alfons el 
Magnànim, Diputació de València, 2008), 89f.
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prepared to sacrifice everything – career, family, even himself – to realise his ideals.13
Ultimately,  then, Josep Renau was an artist  guided by his dreams and, above all,  a
burning desire to give these dreams a tangible materiality. Indeed, Renau's audacity and
strength suggested to his admirers that such achievements may not have been beyond
him. 'If life were not so short', Juan wrote regarding his oldest brother, 'he would have
turned into reality the whole fantasy of the Arabian Nights.'14 Such words offer an apt
and perhaps – from the perspective of the twenty-first century – suitably ambiguous
description of a man who dedicated his art to the struggle for a future communist utopia.
Strengths and limitations of existing scholarship
The  starting  point  for  scholarly  investigations  into  the  work  of  Renau  was  his
participation in the Spanish contribution to the Venice Biennale in 1976, which provided
an  overview  of  the  Spanish  avant-garde  from  1936  up  to  that  year.15 The  interest
generated by Renau's involvement led two years later to his first solo exhibition in his
native country since he had been forced into exile, thirty-nine years earlier.16 The death
of Franco in 1975 and the gradual dissolution of his dictatorship allowed for renewed
critical  interest  in  Renau's  work,  and  even  inspired  the  artist  himself  to  return
periodically  to  Valencia  and  Madrid,  where  his  talks  and  lectures  attracted  great
attention from both academics and media. His definitive return to Spain would never
become reality,  though,  even  if his  private  papers  and  archive were  donated to  the
people of Valencia through the creation of the Josep Renau Foundation in 1978.17 
While Renau seems to have come into focus in  the latter half  of  the 1970s,
historical research on the early Spanish avant-garde more generally began to take shape
somewhat earlier, in the late 1960s and early 1970.18 Among the wealth of literature that
emerged over  the subsequent  decades,  works  by Jaime Brihuega and Miguel  Ángel
Gamonal Torres remain foundational to studies of visual arts in the Republican period.19
13 Renau, J. Pasos y Sombras, 345.
14 Ibid.
15 See the catalogue Bozal, Valeriano (Ed.) España. Vanguardia artística y realidad social: 1936-1976 
(Barcelona: Gustavo Gili, 1976). 
16 There is also a catalogue from this exhibition: Josep Renau (Madrid: Ministerio de Cultura, 1978). 
17 Renau died and was buried in East Berlin, the city where he had lived since 1958.
18 In this regard Jaime Brihuega has highlighted the role of Vicente Aguilera Cerni, one of the major 
figures in contemporary Spanish art criticism and art history. See Brihuega's introduction to Arturo 
Angel Madrigal Pascual's Arte y Compromiso: España, 1917-1936 (Madrid: Fundación de Estudios 
Libertarios Anselmo Lorenzo, 2002). Another important early study was made by Manuel Tuñón de 
Lara. See Medio Siglo de Cultura Española 1885-1936 (Barcelona: Buguera, 1970).
19 Two foundational books by Brihuega are Las vanguardias artísticas en España 1909-1936 (Madrid: 
Itsmo, 1981) and La vanguardia y la República (Madrid: Cátedra, 1982). The most relevant work by 
Gamonal Torres is Arte y Política en la Guerra Civil Española. El Caso Republicano (Granada: 
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The  writings  of  Manuel  Aznar  Soler  have  contributed  greatly  to  the  history  of
progressive political engagement among Spanish interwar intellectuals.20 The works of
these historians provide indispensable background material for any study of Renau, and
more recent publications have continued to enrich our understanding of the Spanish
avant-garde.21 Yet while the literature as whole has thus grown in both quantitative and
qualitative  terms,  there  are  still  relatively  few  works  that  successfully  combine
biographical  empiricism with theoretical  analysis.22 One contribution that  this  thesis
hopes to make is to reduce this lack by offering an investigation where the significance
of  the  empirical  detail  of  a  particular  case  study  is  illuminated  by  an  integrated
theoretical approach.
The literature on Renau specifically took longer to form. Despite his prominent
presence in public debates after the Venice Biennale and his 1978 Madrid retrospective,
and despite the creation of the Josep Renau Foundation, academic interest following his
'rediscovery' produced only shorter articles, catalogue essays, and preliminary thoughts
to inspire further investigation.23 A book-length biography did not appear until 1997,24
Disputacion Provicial de Granada, 1987).
20 Manuel Aznar has had a very prolific career but a key work remains his Literatura española y 
antifascismo (1927-1939) (Valencia: Generalitat Valenciana, 1987)
21 See bibliography for a full list of relevant works. Among the titles that are particularly relevant for the 
visual arts we may highlight: Albaladejo Mayordomo, T. et al. Las vanguardias (Madrid: Ediciones 
Júcar, 1992); Pérez Bazo, J. (Ed.) La Vanguardia en España: arte y literatura (Paris: Cric & Ophrys, 
1998); Madrigal Pascual, A. A. Arte y Compromiso: España, 1917-1936 (Madrid: Fundación de 
Estudios Libertarios Anselmo Lorenzo, 2002); Various authors. Arte Moderno y Revistas Españolas, 
1898-1936 (Madrid: Ministerio de Cultura, 1997); and Mendelson, J. Revistas y Guerra, 1936-1939 
(Madrid: Ministerio de Cultura, 2007).
22 Many key works in Spanish cultural history, including aforementioned titles by Brihuega, Gamonal 
Torres, and Aznar, tend to provide thematic or chronological overviews that encompass a great 
number of individual figures. Individual case studies are in their majority purely empirical, while 
theoretical works generally contain little empirical data.
23 See early essays by Manuel García García, Tomas Llorens and Valeriano Bozal in the catalogue for 
the 1978 exhibition Josep Renau. Generally, scholarly interest in Renau seems to have faded in the 
1980s – which, in the view of Brihuega, can be seen as a symptom of the unfashionable status 
accorded political art during that decade. Another factor may well have been the generally poor 
reception of the 1978 solo exhibition. See the first chapter of García García M. et al. Josep Renau: 
Fotomontador (Valencia: IVAM, 2006). The only longer academic article on Renau to be published in 
the 1980s was ‘Los fotomontajes de Josep Renau’ by artist and critic Carole Naggar (Photovision 1, 
July-August, 1981).
24 Only three monographs to appeared before the 1990s. The first was Eva-Maria Thiele's short José 
Renau (Dresden: VEG Verlag der kunst, 1975, 31pp), which I have unfortunately not been unable to 
consult. The second was really a longer poem dedicated the artist and his work (Andrés Estellés, V. 
Lletra al pintor valencià Josep Renau. Valencia: Eliseu Climent, 1978) and the third an exhibition 
catalogue published in Mexico (Fontcuberta, J. Josep Renau, fotomontador. Mexico: Fondo de Cultura
Económica, 1985). 
During the 1990s, interest in Renau gradually returned. In 1994, Doro Balaguer published her 
Renau. Política y obra (Valencia: Germania), which posed important questions but was constrained, at
least in terms of its potential reach beyond a specialist and/or Valencian readership, by a constant 
emphasis on her personal relation with the artist and the concerns they shared, particularly with the 
regards to the cultural world of 1970s and 1980s Valencia. Before this monograph new work had 
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when Albert Forment published Josep Renau: Història d’un fotomuntador.25 Since then
several studies have expanded on previous research by focusing on more specific areas
of the artist's career, not least the work undertaken by Renau as General Director of Fine
Arts26 and his contribution to the design of Republican Pavilion at the Paris Expo of
1937.27 A new biography, Fernando Bellón's voluminous Josep Renau: la abrumadora
responsabilidad del arte, was published in 2008.28 After a much publicised return and a
recent  expansion  of  historical  research,  then,  there  is  now  a  considerable  body  of
literature on the personal and artistic trajectory of Josep Renau.29 But even so there are
still key aspects of his life and work which remain to be satisfactorily analysed. This is
true both for empirical detail and also, even more importantly, for the theorisation of his
work.
appeared by José Luis Alcaide, Raúl Durá Grimalt, and Albert Forment, who presented individual 
papers on the artist at the Primer Congreso de Historia del Arte Valenciano in May 1992 (published in
Primer Congreso de Historia del Arte Valenciano, Mayo 1992, Actos. Valencia: Generalitat 
Valenciana, 1993). There is also an unpublished thesis on the graphic design of Nueva Cultura at the 
University of Valencia, accepted in 1992: Revert Roldán, J.M. Disseny gràfic en revistes valencianes: 
Gràfica i retòrica en Nueva Cultura (1935-1937).
25 Forment's book, which offers a thorough analysis of the artistic influences and tendencies that shaped 
Renau's creative career as a whole, remains the starting points for historians interested Renau's work 
today. It does not, however, contain any illustrations, and is thus best read together with the Catálogo 
Razonado (2004), also by Forment. This volume contains an analytical categorisation and high-quality
colour prints of most of the artist’s known works.
26 The most extensive work in this respect has been undertaken by Miguel Cabañas Bravo. See 
especially Josep Renau: Arte y Propaganda en Guerra (Salamanca: Ministerio de Cultura, 2007). 
There are also several shorter articles by the same author. See 'Renau y el Pabellón Español de 1937 
en Paris, con Picasso y sin Dalí.' in Brihuega, J. (Ed.) Josep Renau (1907-1982); 'El recuerdo de Josep
Renau y su actuación ante el Guernica' in Laberintos no 8-9, 2007; 'Josep Renau, Director General de 
Bellas Artes' in Cabañas Bravo, M., López-Yarto Elizalde, A., Rincón García, W. (Coords.) Arte en 
tiempos de guerra (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2009); and 'Josep Renau,
un joven director general de Bellas Artes para los tiempos de guerra' in Aznar Soler, M. (Ed.) 
Valencia, capital cultural de la República: congrés internacional (Valencia: Universitat de Valencia &
Generalidad Valenciana, 2008). For an article on how Renau, in his capacity as General Director of 
Fine Arts, also contributed to Spanish music, see Bodí, F. 'Renau y el arte de la música' in Brihuega, J.
(Ed.) Josep Renau (1907-1982), 170-193.
27 The two main works here are Mendelson, J. Documenting Spain: Artists, Exhibition Culture, and the 
Modern Nation, 1929-1939 (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2005) and Rosón, M. 
'Fotomurales del Pabellón Español de 1937. Vanguardia artística y misión política' GOYA 319-20 
(2007), 281-299.
28 Mindful of the work already done by Forment and other art historians, Bellón, a journalist rather than 
an academic, opted virtually to exclude theoretical analysis in favour of new details concerning the 
artist’s private life.
29 This also includes several recent exhibition catalogues. The 2006 catalogue edited by Jaime Brihuega 
is particularly impressive and contains interesting theoretical essays that investigate the relevance of 
Renau to the art world of today.  Other publications and catalogues to appear were García García, M. 
Josep Renau: Fotomontador (Valencia: IVAM, 2006), two catalogues simply entitled Renau 
(Valencia: Quaderns de l’Escola, Facultad de Bellas Artes, 1998 and Valencia: Universitat Politécnica 
de Valencia, 2000, respectively) and an exhibition, referenced above, of new work inspired by the 
precedent set by Renau, Nostàlgia de futur: Homenatge a Renau. Relatively new empirical material 
concerning Renau's photographic practice has also been presented by José Ramón Cancer Matinero in 
'Tras la huella de Renau' Archivo de Arte Valenciano (Valencia: Real Academia de Bellas Artes de San 
Carlos, 2006), 153-161.
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Empirical  investigation  has  naturally  been  the  focal  point  of  much  initial
research on Renau. His  oeuvre as an artist  has been systematically mapped out and
chronological  data  carefully  established,  and  taken  as  a  whole  it  appears  as  if  the
biographical literature has left relatively few questions unanswered, at least with regards
to  his  artistic  activity.  Yet  by focusing almost  exclusively on  art  historical  aspects,
historians have paid too little attention to the critical  influences that  were linked to
Renau's political engagement. In this regard we are still missing a lot of empirical data.
Few have addressed questions relating to the operational relations between Renau and
the Communist Party, for example. Little is also known with regards to Renau's last year
in  Spain,  when  he  occupied  the  role  of  Director  of  Graphic  Propaganda  in  the
Republican Popular Army.30 To be sure,  these gaps in our knowledge are, to a large
extent, consequences of the fact that a lot of documentation has been lost, or moved to
unknown locations.31 But the relative shortcomings in the existing literature, especially
in connection with Renau’s political dimension, have not only resulted from archival
scarcity, but are also products of the specific interpretative frameworks being used to
understand Renau's art. To better elucidate the political aspect of his art and clarify its
relation  with  its  broader  social  environment,  we  need  to  rethink  the  focus  of  our
theoretical and contextual analysis.
The fundamental fact that Renau was a politically engaged artist who wanted to
use his work to 'educate' and mobilise the working classes has not, of course, escaped
anyone. That his adoption of photomontage was politically motivated and followed a
pattern established by artistic colleagues within the international left – above all  the
German avant-garde pioneer John Heartfield (born Helmut Herzfeld) – has also been
widely known ever since interest in Renau resurfaced in the 1970s. Yet so far no one has
published an extensive piece of work analysing Renau's visual and written work within
the social  and political  context of the Second Republic  and, in more general  terms,
interwar Europe.32 This despite the fact that there are eminently good reasons to do so,
30 The dearth of documentation with regards to the latter area is noted by Cabañas Bravo in Josep 
Renau, 218.
31 Renau himself stated in a manuscript entitled 'Albures y cuitas con el Guernica y su madre' – used by 
Cabañas Bravo but in itself published only in part in Cimal: Cuadernos de Cultura Artística, 13, 1982,
20-27 – that he was involved with extensive destruction of documentation before crossing the border 
into France. See Cabañas Bravo, M. 'Renau y el pabellón español de 1937 en París, con Picasso y sin 
Dalí' in Brihuega, J. (Ed.) Josep Renau (1907-1982), 167. My own searches in the archives of the 
Spanish Communist Party, as well as the CDMH in Salamanca produced hardly any material on 
Renau, and the Renau Foundation's archive, based on the artist's personal papers, contains mostly 
material relating to his life in exile.
32 The possible exception to this rule would be Jordana Mendelson's chapter on Renau in Documenting 
Spain, 124-183.
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since  a  socially and politically orientated  analysis  is  necessary to  give  an adequate
description of what it was that ultimately motivated Renau in his work. Relatedly, there
is  a  need for  theoretical  analyses  that  focus  less  on the purely artistic  environment
giving birth to his work and more on the social environment for which it was destined.
What is missing is not, in other words, an analysis that charts the stylistic or technical
origins of Renau's art, but rather one that explicates its social function. That this aspect
has escaped academic scrutiny is somewhat surprising, not least because Renau himself
constantly  emphasised  how  the  function  of  art  was  the  decisive  criterion  in  any
evaluation of art's social and cultural value.33 According to Renau, artworks could not be
properly analysed with reference to form and content only, but had to be inscribed in a
social context.34 Indeed, to deduce the political significance of an artwork solely from its
form and  content  was  to  ignore  a  dimension  that  was  generative  of  its  historically
specific meaning.
Aims and method
What this thesis seeks to do is to adopt an analytical method that has at its focus Renau's
own  artistic  conceptions  in  order  to  paint  a  more  exact  picture  of  the  relationship
between his art and his politics. How exactly did he imagine that art should contribute
to the construction of a new society? What techniques – aesthetic and rhetorical – did he
use to mobilise the population around specific political goals? Why these techniques
and not others? To provide a satisfactory answer to such questions it is not enough to
note,  without  further  comment,  the  overt  political  content  communicated  through
symbols and slogans, or point to common formal characteristics in works by communist
and  other  left-wing  artists  across  the  continent  (as  if  identifying  a  correspondence
between  formal  language  and  ideological  affiliation  in  itself  serves  as  an  adequate
explanation).35 An analysis must try to say more about what it was in the social and
cultural  environment that  informed these formal choices;  that is, what it  was in this
environment that demanded a response. Only then will we be in a position to understand
33 See, for example, Renau, J. ‘Homenage a John Heartfield’ Photovision, 1, (July-August, 1981), 11-16.
Reproduced in  Brihuega, J. (Ed.) Josep Renau (1907-1982), 453-458 (for point made here, see esp. 
457). See also Fajardo, J. M. 'Entrevista con Josep Renau: “La publicidad ha creado un idioma 
universal”' Mundo Obrero (28 May 1980), 21; and Hormigón, J. A. 'Un día con Renau' Trunfo (14 
August 1976), 39.
34 Ibid. See also Renau's analysis of mural painting: 'Sobre la forma más democrática de la pintura' in 
Arte contra las élites Madrid: Debate, 2002.
35 This tends to be the extent to which Renau's political commitment is explored in the work of Forment,
for example.
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how Renau  and  his  colleagues  perceived  the  efficacy  of  their  work,  and  how that
perception related to other ideological commitments.
Such a history can be placed within a number of familiar discursive frames, not
least those pertaining to debates concerning the relative merits of overtly political art, or
the politics of modernism more generally. There exist relatively few published histories
focusing on the socio-political dimension of artistic activities in interwar Spain.36 This
may partly be due to the fact that the ideological ambitions of politicised art movements
– Surrealism in the late 1920s and through the 1930s stand as the central example here –
were rarely fully appreciated by artists and writers in Spain.37 Within literature there
were thus  few who made the link between Surrealism's formal experiments  and the
French founders'  more utopian aspiration to 'change life.'38 In  this respect,  however,
Renau was from an early stage in his professional career one of the exceptions, at least
insofar as he perceived artistic and aesthetic production to contain an important social
dimension  (and  not  only,  say,  a  form  of  individual  self-expression  and/or  private
appreciation of Beauty). Yet it must also be stated at the outset that limited ideological
awareness  did  not,  by the  mid-1930s,  preclude  an increasing number  of  artists  and
writers from using their work to comment on topical social issues. Indeed, the traumatic
and disruptive experience of the civil war led, as we shall see, many progressive cultural
producers to participate actively in the attempt to create a new Spain.39 To understand
the ambition of Renau and his colleagues, international debates regarding the politics of
modernism  may  still  be  useful,  even  if  it  is  necessary  to  remain  alert  to  national
specificities. 
Careful contextualisation is particularly important when considering questions of
cultural innovation. Artists' political engagement in Republican Spain did not always
engender experiments with new art forms. Art historian Miguel Gamonal Torres is one
36 The clearest examples are to be found in literature and Anglo-American cultural studies. See, for 
example, the work of Manuel Aznar Soler, especially Literatura española y antifascismo (1927-1939) 
(Valencia: Generalitat Valenciana, 1987). See also Fuentes, V. La marcha al pueblo en las letras 
españolas, 1917-1936 (2nd ed.) (Madrid: Ediciones de la Torre, 2006); and Salaün, S. 'Las vanguardias
políticas: la cuestión estética' in Pérez Bazo, J. (Ed.) La Vanguardia en España, 209-225. See also 
Graham, H. and Labanyi, J. (Eds.) Spanish Cultural Studies (Oxford: OUP, 1995); Larson, S. and 
Woods, E. (Eds.) Visualizing Spanish Modernity (Oxford and New York: Berg, 2005); Mendelson, J. 
Documenting Spain ; and Basilio, M. M. Visual Propaganda, Exhibitions, and the Spanish Civil War 
(Farnham: Ashgate, 2013).
37 Salaün, S. 'Las vanguardias políticas'. Cf. Cano Ballesta, J. La poesía española entre pureza y 
revolución (1920-1936), 117-168; and Brihuega, J. ‘The Language of Avant-Garde Art in Spain: A 
Collage on the Margin’ in Harris, Derek (ed.). The Spanish avant-garde (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1995), 84-93.
38 Salaün, S. 'Las vanguardias políticas', 212f.
39 See Chapters 6-8 below.
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of several scholars to have highlighted the fact that Spanish artists who were positively
disposed  towards  the  revolutionary  changes  brought  by  the  war  failed  to  enact
correspondingly radical changes in their aesthetic practice.40 But we should be careful
not to judge the progressive value of Spanish cultural initiatives on the basis of formal
criteria only. If we examine these within their social and political context we may still
discern a progressive value where existing – even traditional – forms were used before a
new audience and from this perspective given a new function. As the Italian Communist
leader and thinker Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937) pointed out, to disseminate existing
knowledge  among an  ignorant  majority,  to  'socialise'  it  and  make it  part  of  a  new
intellectual  and  moral  order  extending  across  the  whole  of  society,  was a  more
important 'philosophical' fact than any discovery of truths that remained the preserve of
a  minority or elite.41 Such ideas should clearly be kept in mind when we evaluate the
cultural politics pursued by the Second Republic, which essentially sought to advance,
before as well as during the war, an ambitious programme for cultural democratisation.
Adequate contextualisation should also help us resist the temptation to dismiss
war-time art  as  simply propaganda.  Debates  concerning the artistic  value of  overtly
political art were common during the war, and have also been revived in later scholarly
literature,  sometimes in  a  more  Manichean  form.42 The question of  what  should  be
classified as art and what as propaganda is not an easy one to settle,  however. Sure
enough,  one  may  propose  general  definitions  that  appear  to  make  the  distinction
relatively clear. Works of art, it may be said, do not seek straight-forward responses.
They address subjects in a way that transcend the immediate historical moment from
which they emerge. Works of propaganda, by contrast, aim to elicit a reduced range of
responses  which  displace  alternative  points  of  view  and  directly  serve  historically
specific interests.43 But in most individual cases it is difficult to classify works as either
art  or propaganda. Individual images tend rather to sit somewhere on a spectrum, in
40 Gamonal Torres, M. Arte y Política en la Guerra Civil Española, 53. Gamonal seems to have in mind, 
although he does not state so explicitly, something like the constructivist art of revolutionary Russia, 
and is certainly right in suggesting that Spain did not produce a comparable equivalent. However, his 
claim that there were no future and/or utopian visions formulated in cultural circles is, it seems to me, 
a less than accurate description of progressive cultural activity during the war. For a discussion around
this question, see Chapter 8 below.
41 Cited in Aznar Soler, M. ‘La revista Nueva Cultura y la construcción del Frente Popular cultural', 14 
42 At times Gamonal Torres, for example, writes as if there were clearly definable 'camps' supporting or 
opposing propagandistic art, even though most actors took a rather ambiguous position on the matter 
and collaborated with magazines of various tendencies. See Arte y Política en la Guerra Civil 
Española, 57. 
43 The definition of propaganda used here draws on that proposed by T. J. Clark in Farewell to an idea: 
episodes from a history of modernism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 292.
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which all artworks are interested to some degree. The question of what is seen as art and
what is dismissed as propaganda depends on the extent to which this interestedness is
visible, which in turn depends on the extent to which it jars or harmonizes with the
already existing interests of the beholder. In the simplest terms, what is art for one may
be propaganda for another. 
To engage in further definitional exercises would, however, distract us from a
more important question – and one that lies at the heart of the analysis presented here.
For debates regarding the artistic value of propaganda are essentially debates about the
role of politics in art. This role must take one form or another whenever art makes a
claim to social relevance. The question for artists like Renau – indeed, the question that
preoccupied much of the European interwar avant-garde – was not so much whether
artistic production should engage with politics but how. In this regard the present-day
theorist Jacques Rancière has usefully described the interwar relation between art and
politics as a negotiation between two different conceptions of the avant-garde. The first,
rooted in the aesthetic philosophy of German Idealism (especially the work of Schiller),
is  concerned  with  the 'aesthetic  anticipation  of  the  future'  and  promotes  a  global
subjectivity  that  stresses  'the  potentiality  inherent  in  innovative  sensible  modes  of
experience.'44 The second is  based on a military and topographical  notion, which in
politics becomes linked to the party, representing itself as an advanced detachment able
to 'read and interpret the signs of history' and to sum up the essential conditions for
change.45 Both conceptions described a path to a new social order, and throughout the
Republican period, Renau, like many other progressive Republican producers, would
oscillate between the two. To make categorical distinctions between art and propaganda
is to blind oneself to the nuances and tensions that this vacillation entailed.
Finally the analysis in the thesis seeks always to address questions of reception.
To come to any solid conclusions about  reception is  of course notoriously difficult.
Besides the sheer complexity that surrounds all communication processes, historians'
work  is  further  complicated  by  the  often  acute  scarcity  of  empirical  material  for
analysis. With this in mind, the ambition to study reception must first and foremost find
expression in an analytical perspective, not the empirical establishment of psychological
'facts'. A realistic aim is not, in other words, to say with any exactitude how a specific
image was interpreted by a specific audience, but rather to suggest a set of plausible
44 Rancière, J. The Politics of Aesthetics, 29f. 
45 Ibid. 
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interpretative possibilities when a specific image is inserted into a specific environment.
The key is  once again adequate contextualisation.  In  most cases  this  study will  not
address reception directly, but the conditions which determined an artwork's historically
specific meaning. 
Empirical scope of thesis
To explore issues concerning the function and social meaning of art it is also necessary
to  conduct  close  readings  of  the  individual  works  themselves.  As  Renau  was  an
exceptionally prolific artist, it has not been possible to present a detailed study of  all
interesting artworks and illustrations that he produced during the 1930s, but rather to
make a representative selection. The selection has been informed, in the first instance,
by the need to highlight the specific formal and symbolic aspects linking Renau's artistic
practices  to  his  politics.  The  focus  thus  falls  on  artworks  that  may  be  considered
representative of Renau's cultural activism at a particular time, as well as artworks that
indicate important changes in Renau's formal and/or political strategy. The majority of
the works I analyse are quite well known – indeed many are considered cornerstones of
Renau's political oeuvre. 
The possibility of tracing change across a complex and busy era also forms an
important part of the decision to base this thesis on one person instead of a group or a
specific  artistic  trend.  Groups  and  trends  are  of  course  present:  the  artistic  circle
gathered  around  Renau  is  often  central  to  the  analysis  below,  and  among  Renau's
multifaceted visual production the focus is above all  on his social realism, which is
analysed  from  a  broader  European  perspective.  Yet  apart  from  the  fact  that  a
biographical  framework  helps,  in  this  case,  to  grant  the  historical  narrative  an
overarching unity,  the focus on an individual is valuable as it  allows us to see how
shifting historical forces had a concrete impact on individual life experiences. Such a
perspective clearly helps to deepen our understanding of the relevant historical period,
even if the chosen individual cannot necessarily be seen as 'exemplary' or 'typical' in any
quantifiable sense.
Lastly, it should be noted that the specific analytical focus adopted for this thesis
means that several important aspects of Renau's work during the Republican years have
been excluded from the exposition below. One area that is barely touched on at all is
Renau's work in advertising. This is not to deny that his advertising formed a large and
important part of Renau's artistic life; the exclusion is rather a logical consequence of
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the fact that the main interest for this thesis is Renau's development as a political and
cultural activist. Another area that could be the subject of an entire thesis in itself, yet is
only briefly addressed here, concerns Renau's contribution to national efforts to protect
the artistic heritage from war damage. The decision not to explore this area is based on
the  fact  that  his  work  in  this  regard  was  mainly administrative  and  only indirectly
related to his own artistic and cultural-political project. As such, its ramifications, great
as  they were in many other respects,  are not directly relevant to the themes of  this
thesis.46 Finally, it should also be noted that relatively little will be said about Renau's
contribution to the Republican pavilion at the international exhibition in Paris in 1937.
This  is  partly  because  Renau's  responsibilities  were  once  again  predominantly
administrative, partly because there are already several excellent works published with
regards to the one significant artistic contribution he did make, that is, the framing of
two of the five main sections of the pavilion's exhibition space with a complex series of
photomurals.47 These murals certainly constitute a important part of Renau's political
oeuvre,  but  as  they have been extensively analysed elsewhere,  they are only briefly
commented on in this thesis. 
Structure of the thesis
The main body of the thesis is divided into eight chapters: five covering the pre-war
Republic, and three that focus on Renau's work during the war. More space has been
dedicated to  the pre-war  years  because  this  was when Renau's  artistic  and political
vision acquired its  defining form,  which  also makes it  a  logical  focal  point  for  the
conceptual analysis in the thesis. For the war period itself, the main question posed is
how Renau's project was modified as a result of radically new social conditions. The
thesis also asks to what extent  Renau saw his cultural  ideas implemented Republic-
wide. The war section is more concise, first because Renau had less time for his own
46 For Renau's work as General Director of Fine Arts, see Cabañas Bravo, M. Josep Renau: Arte y 
Propaganda en Guerra. For recent studies regarding the safeguarding of the heritage, see also 
Colorado Castellary, A. (Ed.) Partrimonio, Guerra Civil y Posguerra (Madrid: Universidad 
Complutense de Madrid, 2010); Colorado Castellary, A. (Ed.) Arte salvado: 70 aniversario del 
salvamento del patrimonio artistico español y de la intervencion internacional (Madrid: Sociedad 
Estatal de Conmemoraciones Culturales, 2010); Cabañas Bravo, M., López-Yarto Elizalde, A., Rincón
García, W. (Coords.) Arte en tiempos de guerra (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones 
Científicas, 2009); and Argerich, I & Ara, J. (ed) Arte protegido. Memoria de la Junta del Tesoro 
Artístico durante la Guerra Civil (Madrid: Ministerio de Cultura, 2003). For first-hand accounts 
written by protagonists, see, for example, León, M. T. La Historia Tiene la Palabra (Noticias Sobre el
Salvamiento del Tesoro Artístico)(2nd Ed.) (Madrid: Hispamerica, 1977 [1944]); Vaamonde, J. L. 
Salvamento y protección del tesoro artístico español durante la guerra (Caracas: [no publ], 1973); 
and Renau, J. Arte en Peligro, 1936-1939 (Valencia: Ayuntamiento de Valencia, 1980) .
47 Mendelson, J. Documenting Spain, and Rosón, M. 'Fotomurales del Pabellón Español de 1937'. 
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work,  or  to  develop  his  own  ideas,  and  also  because  the  available  empirical  data
becomes much less plentiful – except in areas that fall outside of the scope of this thesis.
Even if  Renau was able to return to more creative tasks after  April  1938, when he
became responsible for visual propaganda production in the Republican Army, there is
still a problem with documentation, probably because much paperwork pertaining to the
last stages of the war was destroyed or transported out of the country. In any case, the
epilogue could not be anything but an epilogue since the positive and innovative vision
that  Renau  had  propagated  was  in  the  war's  final  stages  increasingly  replaced  by
concerns centred on pure survival.
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1. THE MAKING OF AN AVANT-GARDE ARTIST   
(1907-1930)
Josep  Renau  was  born  in  Valencia  on  7  May,  1907,  the  first  child  of  José  Renau
Montoro and Matilde Berenguer Cortés,1 The family was of relatively modest means,
but as Renau Montoro taught at the San Carlos School of Fine Arts (Escuela de Bellas
Artes de San Carlos)  and moreover attracted wealthy clients through his restoration
business, they were obliged to keep up appearances of a more comfortable middle-class
life.2 From the beginning it seems Renau Montoro had clear plans for Josep, who he
hoped would fulfil the artistic dreams he himself had been unable to realize. The young
boy was accordingly introduced to the classical masterpieces at an early age and given
all the technical training necessary to commence his journey as a successful artist. As he
proved to be a gifted and talented student, Josep was also called to help out with his
father’s restoration business. Such detailed and technical work did not interest him at all
and to some degree only alienated him from the world of painting. Indeed, it seems the
monotonous experience of restoration work strongly came to influence his early view
that the art of the old masters represented, despite their undeniable value, a dead legacy
in the modern world.3
In September 1920, when he was thirteen years of age, Renau enrolled in the art
school  where  his  father  taught.  Strict  teaching methods  and  the  particular  aesthetic
direction of the school soon clashed, however, with the independent ideas of the young
man. Following a rebellious outburst Renau was expelled. His father punished him by
making him work in a print shop instead, a position which he kept even after he was
invited to resume his studies and complete his degree.4 By the time he graduated in
1927  he  had  acquired  a  solid  technical  and  theoretical  base  from  which  he  could
continue his artistic career, as well as a close group of friends who, with some additions,
would come to constitute the nucleus of Valencia's artistic avant-garde in the 1930s.
Among these were Manuela Ballester, a painter and Renau's future wife; her brother, the
1 Renau Montoro and Berenguer Cortés would have six children in total – José, Alejandro, Lolita, Juan, 
Tildica, and Apolo. The latter died very young, however. See Rose Martínez Montón's introduction to 
the recent re-edition of Juan Renau's Pasos y Sombras (Valencia: Editorial Renacimiento, 2011), 13. 
All subsequent references to Pasos y Sombras will give the page number of the original 1953 edition. 
2 This entailed considerable everyday sacrifices, from the mother endlessly washing and repairing his 
one shirt and suit to the father regularly opting for cheaper, if much less pleasant, forms of public 
transport. Renau, J. Pasos y Sombras, 13f.
3 Forment, A. 'Josep Renau. Vida y Obra' in Brihuega, J. (Ed.) Josep Renau, 39.  
4 Ibid., 40.
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sculptor  Antonio Ballester;  Francisco Badía, also a sculptor; and Francisco Carreño, a
painter with whom Renau would  collaborate particularly closely with in the coming
years.5
Commencing his working life, Renau found his main inspiration in the multitude
of international magazines available in the print shop (Jugend Kunst,  Valori Plastici,
Nouvelle  Revue  Francaise,  and  The  Studio,  among others).6 His  work  was  already
dominated in many respects by the influences of Art Deco, and simplified geometric
forms and vibrant colour depicting elegant men and women clearly signalled a greater
interest  in  urban  modernity  than  traditional  landscapes  [Fig.1].7 His  formal
experimentation  had  no  stated  goal,  yet  it  clearly  signalled  a  desire,  shared  by his
friends,  to  escape  the  stultifying  conservatism  permeating  Valencia's  cultural
environment.8 According to Renau himself, they avoided the pastoral style associated
with local master Joaquín Sorolla like 'the devil shuns blessed water',  and on popular
holidays, suffused with folklore, they simply left the city.9 Neither did Spanish painting
on  a national  level offer  much  in  the  form  of  spiritual  or  creative  nourishment,
according to the artist's autobiographical notes.10 Only magazines and print culture seem
to have brought new ideas and would thus constitute a predominant influence on his
formation as an artist. Indeed, his interest in this regard would continue to inform his
artistic development for the greater part of his life.
Renau's first exhibition
In autumn 1928, one year after his graduation, Renau went to Madrid to further his
career  and seek new inspiration.  A visit  to  an  acquaintance  of  his  father's,  Dr José
Francés  –  an  influential  member  of  the  Royal  Academy of  San  Fernando  and  the
probable reason why Renau chose Madrid over Barcelona – led to the organisation of
his first exhibition.11 It would take place in one of the city's most prestigious galleries:
the Círculo de Bellas Artes.
5 In his autobiographical notes written for the facsimile edition of Nueva Cultura, Renau described how 
he and his friends would have regular meetings where cultural and later political literature would be 
analysed and discussed. See ‘Notas al margen', 458ff. 
6 Forment, A. 'Josep Renau. Vida y Obra', 40.
7 See also the celebrated poster for 'Exposición Guillot' (1927) and other early works reproduced in 
Brihuega, J. (Ed.) Josep Renau, 73-76.
8 Cf. Francisco Agramunt's description of the artistic environment in 1920s Valencia as provincial and 
dominanted by tradition and mediocrity. La Vanguardia artística, 44.
9 Renau, J. 'Notas al margen', 461. 
10 Ibid., 462.
11 See Renau, J. 'Notas al margen', 462f.
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Immediately  upon  its  opening  on  17  December  1928,  the  exhibition  was
declared a huge success. The press hailed him as an exceptional talent, and a succession
of notable members of Madrid high society, princess Isabel among them, came to see
his refined and 'elegant'  works.12 Critics spoke of an illustrious future, and evenings
were spent, in response to rapidly forthcoming dinner invitations, in the company of the
capital's  cultural  and  political  elite.13 At  a  stroke,  it  seemed,  Renau  had  won  the
recognition that most of his peers could only hope to get after a lifetime of hard work. 
What  fascinated  the  critics  above  all  was  Renau's  modernist  yet  restrained
formal language. José Francés, who generally championed a rather conservative outlook
with regards to the arts,14 wrote in his own published review of the exhibition that the
artist  represented  'modernity  without  extravagance.'15 Similarly,  ABC's  weekly
supplement Blanco y Negro approvingly stated that Renau knew how to 'displace a line'
without 'jeopardising the solidity of the form.' Laudably, he had taken from cubism only
what was 'good and useful'. The reviewer concluded that Renau did not 'stylize' out of
'snobbism', but out of 'a passion for modern expression.'16
Renau's adoption and mastery of a modernist aesthetic appeared all the more
impressive (and surprising) when critics considered his provincial origin. With this fact
in  mind,  Blanco  y  Negro's   reviewer  suggested  that  the  artist's  striving towards  an
entirely modern expression even gave rise to a paradoxical consequence, as the disparity
between form and content could be such that the finalised canvas appeared completely
estranged from the context providing its original inspiration:
Llibris  Vermells  –  Valencian  peasant  women –  urgently  requires  a
change of title. These peasants have lost all their countryside air, and
would not seem out of place in the hall of a modern hotel. The fact is
that this young artist, with his somewhat rustic looks, as if arriving
from  the  villages  of  Levante's  heartland,  has  acquired  a  stylistic
cosmopolitanism that  now impedes  his  understanding of  his  native
environment.17 
This  judgement,  part  of  a  positive  review,  is  clearly double-edged,  and  points  to  a
problem that would be central to Renau's later decision to give his artistic practice a new
12 Ibid. Cf. ABC, 18 Dec 1928, 24.
13 Ibid.
14 Forment, A. Josep Renau, 51. 
15 La Esfera, 12 Jan 1929, 44. 
16 Blanco y Negro, 6 Jan 1929, 22.
17 Ibid., 23.
23
orientation. But it also clarifies what his art at this stage set out to do. Renau effectively
used formal techniques to transform traditional subject matters and adapt them to an
imagined modern sensibility.  Through his art,  he attempted to modernise his cultural
heritage, if in ways which would later seem to himself to be mainly cosmetic.  
The fact that 'modernity'  was here something imagined rather than experienced
is key to its significance for Renau's work. Modernity represented an aspiration, a goal
to which he strived; a desire for renewal and accelerated progress. As suggested by the
Introduction above, Renau's later use of the phrase 'nostalgia for the future' stand as an
elegant  encapsulation of  what  it  was that  impelled his  artistic  production.  It  is  also
important to note that this aspiration did not only harbour a temporal but also a spatial,
or  geographical,  dimension.  Modernity,  as  imagined  by Renau,  was  always  located
elsewhere. This elsewhere, as we shall see, would correspond to different locations at
different stages of Renau's career. The most notable shift in focus would occur when he
turned away from the centres of cosmopolitan capitalism to instead draw inspiration
from the heart of a new socialist world, the USSR – a shift which would also change
what  he  perceived  to  be  modernity's  chief  characteristics.  At  the  time  of  his  first
exhibition, the journey that would lead him to this shift  in perception had only just
begun.
Renau's critical triumph in the national capital did not, as far as the artist himself
was concerned, bring about a desired confirmation of his talents, but rather marked the
beginning of a profound and eventually life-changing crisis. The praise heaped upon his
work seemed inauthentic;  'too conventional  and cold,'  as he later  described it.18 His
father  had  always  told  him that  he  would have  to  work  long and  hard  before  any
recognition  could  be  expected,  yet  success  had  now  arrived  so  easily,  almost
effortlessly.19 His paintings suddenly seemed emptied of meaning. Commentators spoke
of him as  a  skilled draughtsman with a  keen eye for  new visual  trends,  but  hardly
anyone treated his work as serious art. His achievement, even if remarkable, was in a
greater cultural context largely superficial and insignificant.
This contrast was particularly clear in the guarded admiration expressed by Dr.
José  Francés,  who  according  to  art  historian  Albert  Forment  had  previously  been
fiercely opposed to any promotion of avant-garde art.20 As noted by Forment, the terms
used  by  Francés  to  describe  Renau's  work  –   'illustration'  and  'magazine  art'  (arte
18 Renau, J. 'Notas al margen', 463.
19 Ibid., 463f.
20 Forment, A. Josep Renau, 51, 53f.
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editorial)  produced  by  a  'draughtsman'  and  'poster  artist'  –  unequivocally  defined
Renau's work as belonging to a (lesser) commercial form of artistic creation.21 These
terms can be contrasted with those used for a neighbouring exhibition, reviewed in the
same  article.  That  exhibition,  showing  works  by  Catalan  painter  Juan  Cardona,
presented traditional  motifs painted in a academic style,  which despite  their lack of
originality  were  described  as  containing  real  artistic  value.22 Put  simply,  Cardona's
academic painting was art; Renau's modern painting a form of fashionable commercial
illustration.  It  would  seem,  then,  that  Renau  was  welcomed  into  the  artistic
establishment as long as his work did not make any artistic claims beyond that of being
tasteful  decoration.  His  'modern  expression'  was  acceptable  as  long  as  it  remained
inconsequential and transient.
The politics of the avant-garde
That Renau wanted to achieve more with his art became evident in the so-called Yellow
Manifesto, a text that was printed and distributed among Valencia's artists and students
six months after the exhibition at the Círculo de Bellas Artes.23 The manifesto, actually
entitled 'Regarding the Exhibition of Art of the Levante = Valencia, 1929,' formulated a
critical response to a local exhibition of the same name and in process gave expression
to Renau's far-reaching artistic vision. As made clear in the manifesto's introduction, the
critique was not in the first instance directed at the work of the older generation (indeed,
Renau's father, José Renau Montoro, was one of the contributing artists) but rather at the
art of 'inert youth,' described as lifeless egoists enjoying comforts that other epochs had
created through 'fighting and suffering.'24 Rather than aiming to take painting further,
these young artists had filled the exhibition in question with sterile landscapes and dull
conventional scenes. Attacking his peer's lack of ambition, Renau, writing in first person
plural, blasted: 
We want to feel the emotion, not of the form and the colour, but of the
soul  of  the  form  and  the  colour.  We want  a  dynamic  sensitivity,
emotional moisture, passionate colour, voluptuous madness.25 
21 Ibid. The specific terms appear in La Esfera, 12 Jan 1929, 44. 
22 Ibid., 43f.
23 Thus called after the colour of the paper on which it was first printed. Art historian Vicente Aguilera 
Cerni claims, however, that the name was never really used at the time, and instead calls it 'Manifesto 
de Arte de Levante'. See Agramunt Lacruz, F. La vanguardia artística, 76.
24 The manifesto is reproduced in its entirety in Aguilera Cerni, V. Tonico Ballester (Valencia: 
Ayuntamiento de Valencia, 1986), 35-37 [fn 9].
25 Ibid., 36.
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Art had to go beyond material appearance, not only to offer a more truthful and vivid
image of human experiences, but also to better reflect the historical moment in which it
was created. Renau demanded that it aspire to portray the spirit of the times – or, to use
his own phrase, 'the moral physiognomy of an era'. Such a reflection of reality would
not  only  reverberate  in  the  present:  by  revealing  the  truth  about  a  contemporary
environment,  the  artist  would  also  participate  in  the  shaping  of  times  to  come.  To
conclude his incendiary pamphlet, Renau turned to the future with an uncompromising
proposal:
'The  future  […]  lies  before  us,  it  is  ours  and  we  can  mould  it
according  to  our  sense  [moldearlo  a  nuestro  sentir].  Let  us  move
towards it,  and when our today is yesterday,  should our works not
reflect  our  present  concerns,  should they be inconsequential  to  the
people of tomorrow, let  them be destroyed, burned, and their ashes
thrown to the wind.'26
As well as a comment on the works of the Levante exhibition, this could well be read as
a response to his disappointing and frustrating experiences in Madrid.
Renau's Yellow Manifesto was never published in any newspaper or magazine,
and therefore could not, in art historian Francisco Agramunt's view, have had a great
impact on Valencian society in general.27 Neither was Renau’s unpublished manifesto
the first calling for a new orientation in art; only eleven months before, in July 1928, the
poet Juan Lacomba had read his 'Manifesto of Young Art', which similarly advocated
artistic changes the better to reflect  contemporary times.28 Nonetheless,  Renau's  text
contained  a  new  tone,  at  once  aggressive  and  optimistic,  which  distinguished  his
manifesto  from  local  predecessors.  Never  before  had  art  adhering  to  traditional
academic standards  been criticised in such terms. According Rafael  Pérez Contel,  a
painter who would  later  work closely with Renau, this tone explains in large part the
text's  significant influence,  if  not  among the Valencian public  at  large,  then at  least
among the city's  progressive cultural  circles,  formed above all  among the bohemian
middle-class students of San Carlos art school.29 Indeed, in his first-hand account of the
Valencian art scene in the 1930s, Pérez Contel suggested that the very existence of such
circles in Valencia must, to a large degree,  be ascribed the inspirational  presence of
26 Ibid., 37.
27 Agramunt Lacruz, F. La vanguardia artística, 79.
28 Ibid., 75. Read at the Exposición de Arte Joven in the Sala Emporium on 23-31 July 1928.
29 Pérez Contel, R. Artistas en Valencia 1936-1939 (Vol. 1-2) (Valencia: Conselleria de Cultura, 
Educacció i Ciència, 1986), 268f.
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Renau,  a  presence which became even more prominent with the distribution of this
passionate plea for artistic renewal.30 
The Yellow Manifesto  is,  in  many respects,  a  typical  avant-garde  document.
With its combative language and disdain for outdated tradition, the text clearly takes
inspiration from the first of all avant-garde declarations: the Futurist Manifesto, written
by  Filippo Tommaso Marinetti  (1876-1944)  as an incendiary exhortation to embrace
modern sensibilities and first published in the French daily  Le Figaro in 1909. Renau
and  his  friends  had  read  Marinetti's  text  –  'under  the  moonlight,  as  its  author
recommended'  – some years  earlier,  and had been profoundly impressed by its  bold
propositions.31 What fascinated the group was no doubt the audacity and intensity of the
writing – adopted, as we've seen, by Renau in his own authorial debut – as well as its
call  to  poetic  courage  before  the  new  creative  possibilities  of  the  machine  age.32
Furthermore,  in  his  own  visualisation  and  faintly  eroticised  description  of  these
possibilities,  of  art  capturing  'emotional  moisture'  and  'voluptuous  madness,'  Renau
appeared to draw on the language of Surrealism. The latter influence is not surprising,
as Surrealism was the dominant international avant-garde movement at the time. 
Yet to see the deeper theoretical significance of the Yellow Manifesto's content,
attention should not only be paid to rhetorical affinities but also to its defence of two
key ideas concerning art, ideas which were not only present in Futurism and Surrealism
but arguably lay at the heart of twentieth-century avant-garde ambitions more generally.
First, it called for vivid and sensuous artistic expressions, which would guide audiences
towards  more  'complete'  life  experiences.  Second,  it  expressed  an  artistic  desire  to
participate  in  the  formation  of  future  ways  of  life.  Both,  by extension,  entailed  an
indirect, if not direct, engagement with questions concerning social development and
politics broadly construed. Before returning to Renau's artistic development, more needs
to  be  said  about  this  particular  dimension  of  avant-garde  practice,  which,  at  heart,
provided the theoretical foundation informing, consciously or not, modern ideas of what
art was and what it was capable of. 
The political gesture of avant-garde art can, in the first instance, be conceived as
a gesture of protest – a protest against the monotony of established art and the dead
rationality of  its  guardian  class,  as  well  as  against  art's  institutional  relegation to  a
30 Ibid. Cf. Various authors. Historia del Arte Valenciano, Vol 6: El siglo XX hasta la guerra del 36. 
(Valencia: Consorci d’Editors Valencians, 1988), 14-21.
31 Renau, J. 'Notas al margen', 462.
32 The link between the Yellow Manifesto and the Futurist Manifesto is also made by Forment. See 
Josep Renau, 62. 
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separate, 'decorative' sphere.33 This is evident in the Yellow Manifesto, but can also be
glimpsed in most avant-garde tendencies from the Futurist Manifesto onwards. In its
Surrealist  manifestations,  which  perhaps  embody this  attitude  most  explicitly,  such
protest  often  took  the  form of  playful  subversion,  seeking  to  question  cultural  and
epistemological hierarchies through a mixing of 'high' and 'low' art forms,34 as well as
celebrations  of  the  fortuitous,  irrational,  and  instinctive  as  categories  conveying
valuable knowledge.35 In this subversive mode, humour – ironic and sarcastic above all
– was seldom far from the surface.36 Sarcasm would also later be apparent in some of
Renau's  political  art,  if  typically  with  a  dark  twist,  but  would  also  go  beyond  the
confines of the art work to inform attitudes and modes of sociability among his circle of
colleagues  and  friends.  Pérez  Contel  highlighted  this  in  his  description  of  the  only
gallery and meeting place for progressive artist in 1930s Valencia, the Sala Blava:   
In  the  Sala  we  debated  everything  between  heaven  and  earth,  we
argued without insults, but with sarcasm and jokes, and we celebrated
successes  without  that  kind  of  pedantry,  that  stupid  seriousness  so
prevalent among young people.37 
While the artists themselves doubtlessly saw such sarcasm as part of a wider rebellion
against an ossified society, it appears the Valencian conservative art establishment was
also quick to politicise the subversive behaviour of recalcitrant groups. According to
Pérez  Contel,  local  defenders  of  academic  art  traditions  would  typically  refer  to
progressive artists, regardless of political affiliation (if any), as 'bolsheviks'.38 
However,  while  the  protest  as  such  signalled  an  attempt  to  break  free  from
oppressive conventions and institutions, there is also a deeper sense in which art can be
33 The most extensive and by now classic analysis of this dynamic can be found in Bürger, P. Theory of 
the Avant-Garde (Manchester: MUP, 1984). For another analysis that likewise places the rebellion 
against academicism at the heart of a definition of modernism, while also linking this to the prospect 
of social revolution, see Anderson, P. 'Modernity and Revolution' New Left Review no 144 
(March/April 1984), 96-113.
34 Cf. Butler, C. Modernism: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford, OUP, 2010), 1-14. The mixing of 'high' 
and 'low' forms has also been highlighted by Jacques Rancière. See, for example, 'Contemporary Art 
and the Politics of the Aesthetics' in Hinderliter, B., Kaizen, W., Maimon, V., Mansoor, J., & 
McCormick, S. (Eds.) Communities of Sense: Rethinking Aesthetics and Politics (London: Duke 
University Press, 2009), 43.
35 This is particularly clear in the importance attached to 'chance' and irrational behaviour in Surrealism, 
as well as Surrealist experiments in automatism, designed to give free expression to the unconscious. 
See, for example, 'Death and Desire: The Surrealist Adventure' in Nicholls, P. Modernisms: A literary 
guide (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 1995), 279-300.
36 José Ortega y Gasset also include irony among the defining characteristics of avant-garde art. Ortega y
Gasset, J. La deshumanización del arte. Ideas sobre la novela Madrid: Castalia, 2009 [1925], 80. See 
discussion below for more details.
37 Agramunt Lacruz, F. La vanguardia artística, 187.
38 Pérez Contel, R. Artistas en Valencia, 41.
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linked to politics and questions of emancipation. Precisely by offering an alternative
mode of politics,39 art has been seen, especially in the influential tradition emerging out
of  German Idealist  writings on aesthetics,  to carry a  potential  to realise the utopian
promises of a new community that politics proper fails to deliver.40 Renau may well
have been familiar with such aspects of the German philosophical tradition, not least
since he won school prizes for his essays on art theory.41 But even if he did not have any
detailed  knowledge of  German aesthetic  philosophy,  it  is  nonetheless  clear  that  the
proclamations of the 'Yellow Manifesto' rest on a series of assumptions which all have
their roots in this intellectual tradition. To understand fully the implications of Renau's
manifesto,  then, as well  as to gain a comprehensive view of debates concerning the
relation  between  art  and  politics  in  interwar  Spain  and  elsewhere,  we  must  briefly
examine some of the foundational developments of aesthetics as a philosophical subject.
At the heart of this subject lies, according to all standard accounts, the notion of art's
autonomy, first elaborated in the work of German philosopher Immanuel Kant.42
The autonomy of art and its political implications
Kant established the basis for the autonomy of art in his Critique of Judgement (1790),
where  he  was  concerned  with  the  conceptually  distinct  character  of  aesthetic
judgements, or, in his words, judgements of Beauty.43 Aesthetic judgements are formed,
according to Kant, in the 'free play' of the faculty of the intellect with the faculty of
perception. An object is not examined in order to find out 'what it is', but is perceived as
something uniquely particular, which through its particular qualities shows something
general.  To  recognise  this  interconnectedness  aesthetic  judgements  must  be
39 Jacques Rancière calls the politics of aesthetics a 'meta-politics' to indicate that it is a politics of 
representations rather than institutional influence, coercive power, etc. 
40 See below for a more detailed discussion. According to Jacques Rancière, the starting point for such 
notions can be found in Schiller's Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Mankind (1794). See The 
Politics of Aesthetics, 20-30, esp. 27. See also, by the same author, 'The Aesthetic Revolution and its 
Outcomes' New Left Review, 14 (March-April, 2002), 133-151.
41 Forment, A. Josep Renau, 36f. According to Forment, Renau later remembered having read, among 
others, Solomon Reinach (Apollo: A General History of the Plastic Arts, 1906), Heinrich Wolfflin 
(Principles of Art History, 1914) and Wilhelm Worringer (Form in Gothic, 1911). Even if these do not 
relate directly to the thinkers referred to below, it must be considered likely that Renau, who was by 
all accounts a voracious reader and interested in art theory, came across their ideas at some point in his
early career. An undated note in his personal archive shows that he was, at any rate, familiar with the 
aesthetic theories of German Idealism later in life. Archivo Josep Renau (Valencia), 'Apuntes sueltos 
manuscritos o mecanografiados (El Quijote, Ideologia del Arte, Abstracion y realismo)', 2/6.10.
42 For a good introduction, see Harrington, Austin, Art and Social Theory: Sociological Arguments in 
Aesthetics (Cambridge: Polity, 2004).
43 Here Kant built, in a sense, on the aestheticism founded by Baumgarten in 1750, seeking to elevate a 
notion of the beatiful that was free of social concerns. Harrington, Austin, Art and Social Theory, 13.
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disinterested, necessary, final, and universal.44 Aesthetic judgements are, in other words,
autonomous in the sense that  they stand apart  from other forms of rationality.  They
possess a rationality of their own, where what is experienced is the same as what is
known, and consciousness is at one with the world.
A  number  of  German  philosophers  followed  the  idea  that  the  aesthetic
experience occupied a special and elevated place in human understandings of the world.
In  the 'Oldest  Systematic  Programme of German Idealism' (1797),  signed by Hegel,
Hölderlin, and Schelling,  art  was proclaimed to comprise all  ideas;  hence 'truth and
goodness  are  fraternally  united  only  in  beauty.'45 The  autonomous  character  of  the
aesthetic  judgement  became  the  autonomy  of  art,  and  Hegel,  in  his  Lectures  on
Aesthetics (1820-29) stated that 'art has the vocation of revealing the truth in the form of
a sensuous artistic shape.'46 
While thinkers like Schopenhauer and Nietzsche would be more inclined to see
the aesthetic experience as providing vital, if momentary, relief from brute reality, the
notion of art as potential bearer of truth was retained, as we have seen, by many avant-
garde artists, as well as many critics affiliated with Marxism or the Frankfurt School of
critical  theory.  Here a  dividing line soon appeared between those who saw art  as a
means of explicitly communicating the truth of social relations under capitalism and
those who saw above all a potential for subversive protest, not so much describing, but
rather intimating, by virtue of its form, an alternative existence or mode of being in
society.47 Though  the  Yellow Manifesto  would  appear  to  fall  in  the  latter  category,
Renau's subsequent development as an artist-activist would entail rapid shift towards
more overtly political modes of relating art to truth.
In  order  to  appreciate  the  real  significance  of  either  strategy,  however,  it  is
necessary to refer briefly to another foundational but slightly different elaboration of
aesthetic  autonomy:  that  appearing  in  Friedrich  Schiller's  Letters  on  the  Aesthetic
Education of Mankind (1794). In this treatise, conceived as a response to the failures of
the French Revolution, Schiller advanced the view that aesthetic experience, conceived
in  terms  of  Kantian  'free  play',  can  be  instrumental  both  in  the  moral  elevation  of
44 Ibid., 85. To be more precise, aesthetic judgements need to be free from considerations of use-value; 
they need to be free from contingency; they need to consider the object as being its own purpose; and 
they need to be universal in the sense that to declare something beautiful is to declare that all human 
beings should find it beautiful.
45 Ibid., 118.
46 Ibid., 121.
47 Ibid., 121-167.
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humanity and the successful establishment of a free social community.48 As suggested
by the contemporary philosopher Jacques Rancière, the key to this assertion must be
sought in the fact that 'play' was here conceived as an experience where oppositions
between subject and object, activity and passivity, will and resistance, were effectively
cancelled out.49 The social significance of the aesthetic experience was in other words
based  on  a  particular  conceptualisation  of  co-existence  that  dissolved  any  logic  of
domination. On the basis of this conceptualisation, it was possible to envision a new
form  of  equality.  While  the  potential  inherent  in  this  equality  would  appear  to  be
entirely theoretical,  Schiller included in his exposition some comments regarding an
Ancient Greek statue which arguably provided a sense of what such equality might look
like in practice. He described the statue as a perfect expression of idleness and in this
sense  a  natural  product  of  a  society  where,  in  his  imagination,  there  were  no  real
distinctions  or  oppositions between art,  politics,  and life.50 It  seemed,  then, that  the
internal dynamics of the aesthetic experience could underpin an entire social order – an
order where all constituent parts contributed equally to an integrated and harmonious
whole.
On this reading, Schiller clarifies several characteristics of the legacy of German
Idealism  in  modernist  conceptions  of  art.  First,  as  the  reference  to  Ancient  Greece
suggests,  art  is  never  simply  art  but  always  constitutes,  in  Rancière's  words,  an
'autonomous  form  of  life.'51 Moreover,  Schiller  indicated  that  art  was  not  only  an
expression of life but 'a form of its self-education.'52 The social importance of this fact
was  discerned  in  the  aforementioned  'Oldest  Systematic  Programme  of  German
Idealism' too. Here Hegel, Hölderlin, and Schelling maintained that art must provide the
basis on which a common world is constructed and create a fabric of experience shared
by the elite and by the common people. According to this model, the construction of a
new society was not necessarily undertaken in opposition to existing power structures
but through the formulation of a new collective ethos which would ultimately replace
politics with universal consensus. The relevance of such dreams to interwar Europe is
clear, as we shall see, when increasingly interventionist states and collectivist ideologies
48 For a highly sophisticated analysis of the place of Schiller's Letters in the western artistic imagination,
see Rancière, J. 'The Aesthetic Revolution and its Outcomes'. For a shorter summary of the main 
points, see Rancière, J. The Politics of Aesthetics, 27. On Schiller, see also Harrington, Austin, Art and
Social Theory, 119.
49 Rancière, J. 'The Aesthetic Revolution and its Outcomes', 136.
50 Ibid., 136f.
51 Ibid., 137. 
52 Ibid., 137.
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of the 1930s employed all means of aesthetic production to mobilise their populations
around vaguely defined visions of a future community.53 In a time characterised by the
entry of the 'masses' into politics, all politics became, to some extent, aestheticised. And
whether  or  not  artists  were  directly  involved  in  political  movements  –  which  they
increasingly were during the 1930s – their aesthetics became a part of politics. This is
particularly true of the multifaceted projects launched by the interwar avant-gardes. 
In Spain, the most influential interwar analysis of avant-garde aesthetics, José
Ortega  y  Gasset's  The  Dehumanization  of  Art, published  in  1925,  would  reinforce
certain aspects of the German Idealist conception of art while clarifying the potential
social  significance of artistic innovation. To explain and justify his analytical  effort,
Ortega y Gasset suggested that 'pure art and science', precisely for being the activities
that are 'most free and least affected by the social conditions of each era', provided 'the
first instances where one can glimpse a change in the sensibility of the collective.'54
With  this  idea  in  mind,  Ortega  y  Gasset's  essay  aimed  to identify  the  defining
characteristics  of  what  he simply termed 'new art',  or  'the  new style'  (by which  he
appeared to have meant, broadly, art that departs from naturalistic representation). In so
doing he attributed to this art a number of intellectualised qualities making it not only, in
his terms, 'dehumanized,'55 but also profoundly transformative. The most important of
these was that 'new art' aimed to explore a world beyond the charted fields of human
experience, an exploration which could potentially expand our realms of perception. In
a sense, Ortega y Gasset argued, the avant-garde poet begun his work where 'ordinary'
human reality ended: 
His destiny is to live his human itinerary; his mission is to invent what
does not exist. In this way the poetic vocation is justified. The poet
augments  the  world,  adding to  the  real,  which  is  already there  by
itself, a continent of the unreal. Author comes from ”auctor”, he who
augments.  The Latinos used that  word to describe the general  who
53 See chapter 2 below for a more detailed discussion of these links.
54 Ortega y Gasset, J. La deshumanización del arte, 112. Cf. Saint Simon: artists must 'serve as a 
vanguard in the great enterprise of establishing the public good', and  'proclaim the future of the 
human species.' Lorenzo, J. 'Ciencia y Vanguardia' in Albaladejo Mayordomo, T. et al. Las 
vanguardias, 34. 
55 More will be said about these qualities on pages 75-77 below. At this stage it suffices to say Ortega y 
Gasset's term was based on the idea that 'dehumanised' art could not, because of its abstracted form, 
be understood by everyone, and that its intellectualised approach to representation produced artworks 
with which it was impossible to engage emotionally. See Ortega y Gasset, J. La deshumanización del 
arte, 69-73, 81ff.
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gained new territory for the fatherland.56
Ortega y Gasset,  in other words,  conceived of the nature of  artistic invention as an
opening up of new psychological possibilities, or a conquest, to continue the colonial
metaphor, of new imaginary territories. Art could thus participate in the formation of the
future  insofar  as  it  redefined  the  structural  boundaries  within  which  individual  and
collective subjectivities were transformed. The unreal, once uncovered, became but a
new real.
That said, in the view of Ortega, avant-garde art could not be an instrument to
realise the Idealist dream of a common humanity. On the contrary,  its  'dehumanized'
nature made such transcendental claims inherently impossible. Neither, he wrote, did
'new artists' show any interest in demanding such a role for their art. Their irreverent
and ironic attitude towards canonical artistic creation was also directed towards their
own production, which, in Ortega's analysis, pretended to represent no more than its
own intrinsic reality.57 In the final analysis, it wished to carry no greater social weight
than that associated with games or sports.58 
This, as we have already seen, was not the case with Renau, nor with many of
his artistic colleagues. Ortega y Gasset's conclusions exercised a formative influence on
the cultural environment in which they worked, as seen not least in the fact that the very
notion  of  'dehumanized'  art  often  became  obligatory  starting  points  for  theoretical
discussions about art.59 But for Renau, as for the Idealist philosophers discussed above,
the artwork in itself should seek to communicate a transcendental truth of some kind
('the  moral  physiognomy of  an  era,'  in  Renau's  words).  If  he  also  saw  a  need  to
experiment and to develop new forms of expression, it was because this truth had to
correspond to  the continuously changing conditions  of  history.  Innovation was  thus
important, but should not be understood as an exploration of the unreal as pure fantasy.
Rather the unreal must here be seen as consisting of hitherto unrealised possibilities,
made visible by art's intervention at a particular historical conjunction. Defined in such
terms, Ortega's  description of the artist's  work succinctly illustrates the fundamental
logic  of  Renau's  ambition,  and  puts  into  clearer  terms  the  task  described  in  his
manifesto.
56 Ibid., 100.
57 Ibid., 107f, 120-123. Cf. Butler, C. Modernism, 17-18.
58 Ibid., 121.
59 This will become clear in the analysis below, especially in chapters 2 to 4. See also the introduction by
Gloria Rey Faraldos in Ortega y Gasset, J. La deshumanización del arte, 6-55, esp. 41.
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The search for a new artistic direction
If Renau's programmatic pamphlet seemed impatient for resolute action to renovate art,
his  own artistic  development  at  the  time  of  his  writing  the  Yellow Manifesto  had,
however, ground to a virtual halt. He had returned to Valencia in March 1929, where he
had been received as a successful artist and instant local celebrity. Critics continued to
hold  his  work  in  high  esteem,  and  his  professional  career  was  undeniably given  a
significant boost as local and national clients asked for original cover designs, posters,
and illustrations in ever greater numbers.60 Yet in his autobiographical account, Renau
emphasised  another  aspect  of  his  experience  during  these  years.  Events  had
overwhelmed him, and he had gone along with the air of 'youthful euphoria', he wrote,
while  hiding  a  growing  sense  of  disorientation  and  insecurity.61 Thus,  beneath  the
surface, commercial success was paralleled by creative stagnation, and after a while he
almost  entirely  ceased  to  paint.  Such  assertions  are  particularly  striking  when  read
against the confident and aggressive tone of his manifesto produced at the same time.
Perhaps that too was part of the feigned euphoria; perhaps it voiced the frustration of
someone feeling trapped.62 Either way he needed new inspiration, which for the moment
eluded him whatever he did.
In  this  inner  crisis,  Renau  would  come  question  not  only  his  own  artistic
practices, but also the social environment and audience for which it had been produced.
Here again the protagonist's  retrospective account  of  1977 appears  to  contradict  the
outward signs of contemporary sources.  To some extent this may well be because his
autobiographical  narrative  was been  rationalised,  consciously or  not,  to  explain  the
trajectory leading him to Marxism and political art. Yet there are no primary sources to
directly contradict  the  details  of  his  accounts,  so  it  would be  perfectly plausible  to
consider this  a period when work commitments and public persona contradicted inner
desires –  a situation which  in itself is  far from uncommon.  Either way, according to
Albert Forment, popular and widely distributed national magazines like Nuevo Mundo
and La Esfera, fashionable general interest publications which had begun to publish his
work, may in many respects be indicative of the social as well as professional alliances
maintained by Renau at this time.63 La Esfera is particularly significant, as it was one of
the principal promoters of Art Deco illustration in interwar Spain and a characteristic
60 Forment, A. Josep Renau, 56, 59f. See also Bellón, F. Josep Renau, 131.
61 Renau, J. 'Notas al margen', 464f. 
62 Renau himself did not (as far as I know) comment on the manifesto himself at any point in his later 
life.
63 Forment, A. Josep Renau, 56, 67.
34
forum  for  'the  frivolity  and  eroticism'  typical,  in  Forment's  view,  of  the  'roaring'
(joiosos)  twenties.64 Considered  in  combination  with  first-hand  accounts  and
contemporary interviews, where Renau, impeccably 'suited from top to toe,'65 was said
to  like  the  'aristocratic  life'  (if  only  'on  the  surface')  and  described  as  someone
'frequently seen dancing at social gatherings,'66 this collaboration clearly suggest that his
artistic identity remained one associated with the modern fashions of the affluent urban
middle  class.  Insofar  as  a  rebellious  side  was acknowledged,  it  was  described  as  a
youthful protest against academic art traditions only.67 
But this image may be complemented by Renau's later insistence that his Madrid
experience had caused disappointment in more ways than one. He had not only lost faith
in his painting, but also felt deeply ambivalent about the social circles he had striven to
enter. Among extravagant dinner receptions and distinguished people who could help
his career,  he had found  no one  who could offer what he really sought as an artist.
Moreover, his insight into the lifestyle of Madrid's cultural establishment had generated
little  respect  for  the  authority  and  'refinement'  it  was  supposed  to  represent.68 If
outwardly a champion of a commercial aesthetic of urban fashion, then, privately he
grew increasingly disillusioned with the social  classes with which this aesthetic was
primarily associated. 
His  quest  for  inspiration  would  consequently  take  various  forms.  First  it
involved more  organised  engagement  with the  local  avant-garde,  gathered primarily
around the small gallery Sala Blava, which had opened in July 1929 (that is, the same
month  that  Renau  distributed  his  Yellow  Manifesto).69 Founded  by  a  ceramics
manufacturer and bohemian intellectual 'seeker', Fernando Gascón Sirera, Sala Blava
was  modelled  on  Barcelona's  Els  Quatre  Gats,  a  café  attracting  many of  the  city's
progressive artists.70 In the conservative cultural climate of 1920s Valencia, Sala Blava
64 Ibid., 56.
65 Rafael Pérez Contel quoted in Forment, A. Josep Renau, 57. Cf. description of Renau's love of the 
American way of life at the time in Bellón, F. 'Manuela Ballester, hija, hermana y esposa de artista' 
Laberintos: revista de estudios sobre los exilios culturales españoles No 10-11 (2008-2009), 149.
66 Miñana, F. 'Biografía de un hombre de veintiún años'.
67 In his interview ('Biografía de un hombre de veintiún años'), Federico Miñana characterised Renau as 
a 'bad student' on the basis of his rebellion at San Carlos School of Fine Arts. 
68 Renau, J. 'Notas al margen', 463. Renau later reiterated this claim in a stronger version, hinting at 
decadence and sexual promiscuity. See Bellón, F. Josep Renau, 121.
69 Agramunt Lacruz, F. La vanguardia artística, 173. See also, by the same author, 'La Sala Blava, 
núcleo de la vanguardia valenciana de los años treinta' in Cimal, 19-20 (1983), 19-24. 
70 Though it did organise notable exhibtions too. Two of the earlier ones were 'Primera Manifestación 
Artística' in 1930 and Exposició de Pintura, Escultura i Dibuix in March 1931. The latter included 
contributions from Renau and his colleagues. See Agramunt Lacruz, F. La vanguardia artística,180f. 
See also Aguilera Cerni, V. 'Valencia Años 30: notas sobre ideología y compromiso' in Aguilera Cerni,
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became one of the few places where less conventional spirits could gather  and find
mutual support.71 According to Pérez Contel, Renau's friend and colleague, it was a kind
of island, where 'shipwrecked' artists could find refuge; a 'chapel' for the youth devoted
to modern artistic creeds.72 Its opposition to dominant cultural preferences did not go
unnoticed,  as  testified  by  the  widely  publicised  debates  surrounding  its  opening
exhibition. Inaugurated on 3 July, 1929, the exhibition featured the unconventional and
expressionistic  works  by  one  of  Renau's  favourite  painters,  José  Gutiérrez  Solana
(1886-1945).73  As  the  exhibition  organisers  were  aware  (the  Sala  Blava  proudly
announced that they would exhibit 'the painter of so-called ugly things'74), many found
the  sombre  mood  and  sometimes  macabre  subject  matter  of  Solana's  work  highly
disagreeable.  Yet  the  real  controversy  was  caused  when  one  of  Spain's  foremost
champions of vanguard art and later fascist sympathiser, Ernesto Giménez Caballero,
hurt local sensibilities by suggesting that Solana's dark vision depicted nothing less than
the essence of contemporary Valencian society.75 Whether Renau agreed with the latter
statement is unclear, but, as we have seen, he was definitely anxious to depart from the
pastoral aesthetic held up by Giménez Caballero's critics as the only acceptable code for
depictions of Valencia: that is, the aesthetic associated above all with Joaquín Sorolla. 
In addition to alternative artistic formulas, Sala Blava would also establish links
with  regional  Valencian  nationalism.  The  founder  of  the  gallery  was  forced  for
economic reasons to give up ownership in 1930,  and the venue was bought by the
Agrupació  Valencianista  Republicana,  a  nationalist  groupuscule  founded  that  same
year.76 As  a  political  phenomenon,  Valencian  nationalism  was  relatively  weak,
especially  compared  with  corresponding  movements  in  Catalonia  and  the  Basque
Country,  even  though it did enjoy cautiously boosted confidence around 1930, when
widespread  protests  against  the  Restoration  Monarchy  (1875-1931)  made  political
change seem imminent.77 Its impact on cultural life was stronger. At the Sala, the change
V. (Ed.)  Arte Valenciano. Años 30 (Valencia: Generalitat Valenciana, 1998),  9-37.
71 Another place were they gathered was the studio belonging to the painter Francisco Carreño. See 
Agramunt Lacruz, F. La vanguardia artística, 176.
72 Rafael Pérez Contel in Agramunt Lacruz, F. La vanguardia artística, 178.
73 Ibid., 178-180. Date for opening from El Mercantil Valenciano 3 July 1929, 3. Renau expressed his 
liking for Gutiérrez Solana in his interview with Federico Miñana (also in Forment, A. Josep Renau, 
59). 
74 El Mercantil Valenciano 3 July 1929, 3.
75 See, for example, El Mercantil Valenciano 7 July 1929, 4. For other contemporary criticism, see El 
Mercantil Valenciano 9 July 1929, 3; La Libertad, 2 Jan 1930, 3. For a slightly later review, see 
Mirador 3 May 1934, 7. 
76 Under this regime, the Sala Blava came to represent a broader cultural wing of this movement, which 
took the organisational name Acció d'Art. See Agramunt Lacruz, F. 'La Sala Blava', 22.
77 Historian Manuel Aznar has described the outlook of Valencian intellectuals at this time as one of 
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meant that the spectrum of activities was broadened, and until the gallery’s closure in
the summer of 1936,78 it organised events related to literature, poetry, and theatre, as
well as visual art, and became a meeting place for progressive intellectuals in general. 
The reinforced presence of nationalism no doubt  influenced Renau,  who had
been raised in a Valencian-speaking family and now found a discursive framework to
distance himself from 'cosmopolitan' Madrid. This influence was first of all evident in
his change of signature – from a 'Frenchified' Renau Beger to the more Valencian Pepet
Renau. But he also collaborated with initiatives, especially the publishing series Nostra
Novel·la, that hoped to expand the influence of vernacular literature and arts.79 The aim
of such ventures was intimately connected with a more ambitious avant-garde project
which  saw efforts to democratise vernacular letters as a strategy for regional cultural
regeneration. Again, this was seen as intrinsically linked to politics, as the poet Carles
Salvador, writing for the literary publication Taula de Lletres Valencianes (1927-1936),
explained: 'we choose to write in Valencian because of politics and being conscious of
the responsibilities we have as citizens. Literature, for us, is a means, not an end.'80 In
reality,  the  aspiration  to  popularise  Valencian  literature  largely failed  to  materialise,
however. This was, in the view of the cultural historian Manuel Aznar Soler, largely
because  of  the  absence  of  a  sufficiently  large  vernacular  readership.81 Still,  the
conception of the project as such is important as it would have suggested to Renau the
possibility of avant-gardes tied to alternative sites of modernity.82 
Yet, even if Renau had thus taken an interest in the culture of his native region,
the hope of finding inspiration or guidance in more cosmopolitan centres remained with
him, and around September 1929 he went back to Madrid to work and to explore new
artistic ideas. Again he would return disheartened. He had set about 'eagerly “seeking
the  light”  among Madrid's  intellectual  tertulias',  and  'got  to  know closely the  most
prestigious cultural environments of Spain's capital' as well as 'a good part of the most
'moderated euphoria' and 'prudent optimism.' See Aznar Soler, M. & Blasco, R. La política cultural al 
País Valencià (1927-1939) (Valencia: Institució Alfons el Magnánim, 1985), 40.
78 Without offering any further detail Francisco Agramunt suggests that the problem was a lack of 
committed collaborators. See La vanguardia artística, 188.
79 Ibid., 76f. See also Luis Alcaide, J. 'La ilustración gráfica valenciana en la década de los años 30' in 
Aguilera Cerni, V. (Ed.)  Arte Valenciano, 91-124; and Aznar Soler, M. & Blasco, R. La política 
cultural al País Valencià, 59.
80 Quoted in Aznar Soler, M. & Blasco, R. La política cultural al País Valencià, 32f.
81 Ibid., 21.
82 Questions concerning the possibility of alternative sites of modernity were explicitly addressed by the 
Taula's editors, who asked in the January 1930 issue whether it was possible to form a 'provincial 
avant-garde'. For a disussion of this idea, see editors introduction in Geist, A. L. & Monleón, J. B. 
(Eds.) Modernism and Its Margins: Reinscribing Cultural Modernity from Spain and Latin America 
(London: Taylor and Francis, 1999).
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famous writers and artists of the era […].' Yet in the end he had not found 'even a drop'
of  what  he  was  looking  for.83 What  this  would  be,  he  could  not,  according  to  his
autobiographical writings, define with any precision, but by reflecting on the nature of
his second trip as soon as he had returned once more to Valencia, he would nonetheless
arrive at  an important  clarification  bringing him nearer  to a solution to his creative
problem. 
According to Renau's autobiographical account of 1977, the one thing that was
clear  upon  their  return  home  in  November  or  December  1929  was  that  his  travel
companion,  the  sculptor  Francisco  Badía,  was  entirely  content  with  his  visit  to  the
capital. In contrast to his own experience, Badía had familiarised himself with Madrid's
ordinary  residential  areas,  as  well  as  its  grand  museums  and  exhibitions,  and  this
difference made Renau re-evaluate the way he had used his time. How come it had
never struck him to take a stroll down working-class neighbourhoods? Why had he not
even considered these parts of the city as a possible source of inspiration? He began to
think back, and remembered the generosity of the peasants of a small village where his
family had spent several summers. He remembered that it was precisely in this village
that he had painted several of the works later exhibited in Madrid. Yet he had never even
thought about showing any of the friends he had there the paintings that he was working
on; for some reason, he was convinced (as indeed one of exhibition's reviewers would
be) that  they  would  not  understand.  While  returning  to  these  memories,  then,  the
nebulous question that had troubled him since the exhibition – why do I paint? – now
crystallised into a much more concrete and pressing one:  for whom do I paint?84 His
answer – that the primary audience for his work should be the broad working classes –
would entail great changes both in the form and content of his artistic production. 
To complete the picture of how Renau came to this decision, a picture which at
this stage relies heavily on the protagonist's  own retrospective testimony,  and which
should thus be seen as provisional, it is necessary to briefly return, once more, to the
Madrid  exhibition  of  December  1928,  and  consider  another  outcome  of  Renau's
experience; namely, his growing interest in anarchist literature. Probably as a result of a
sensed disagreement with his benefactors among Madrid's cultural elite, he had spent
his  days  rummaging in  the city's  bookshops  for  radical  writers  like Eliseo  Recleus,
Malatesta,  Bakunin,  etc.  –  names  he  had  first  come  across  at  a  conference  in  the
83 Renau, J. 'Notas al margen', 464. 
84 Ibid.
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Valencian  ateneo some  years  earlier.85 His  choice  of  anarchism over  other  political
directions  was  never  explained  by  Renau  at  any  length,  but  seems  to  have  been
conditioned  by  the  fact  that  it  represented  the  only  revolutionary  movement  with
significant  popular  support  in  the Levante,  especially after  the previously numerous
socialists had seen their union leadership discredited as a result of collaboration with the
Primo de Rivera dictatorship (1923-1930).86 Returning from the capital in spring 1929,
he had made initial contacts with the anarcho-syndicalist union CNT, at the same time
as he had seen political awareness slowly spreading among other members of his closest
circle.  Now,  in  the  spring  of  1930,  returning  from his  second  stay  in  Madrid  and
determined to turn his new political consciousness into practice, he found that most of
his artistic colleagues were similarly reconsidering their work, starting from the same
overarching observation: that the cultural modernisation conceived as their fundamental
goal could not be realised without a social revolution.87  
85 Ibid., 463.
86 Renau mentions in his memoirs that the socialists were seen as discredited in Valencia. Ibid. 466. For 
a succint analysis of the relations within the left in the first decades of the 20th century, see Graham, H.
The Spanish Republic at War, 1936-1939 (Cambridge, CUP, 2002), 1-21. See also Ben-Ami, S. The 
Origins of the Second Republic in Spain, 104-127.
87 Ibid., 465.
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2. THE TURN TO POLITICS (1930-1933)
In formulating their conclusion on the cultural necessity of revolution, Renau and his
companions effectively aligned themselves with a growing group of artists and writers
who from the end of the First World War had maintained that art should express an overt
political  commitment  and  contribute  to  social  change  through  collaboration  with
progressive political movements. As such, the idea of art conveying a social message
was by no means a novelty of the 1914-1918 war; antecedents can be found at least as
far back as the French Revolution, while in Spain the so-called Generation of 1898 had
reacted to perceived symptoms of national decline by infusing their work with social
critique.1 Yet the unprecedented destruction of the Great War, the profound and many-
sided crisis it generated across the continent, shaking the very foundations of European
self-perceptions, brought a new tone to such rhetoric.2 In the eyes of most progressives,
as well as the majority of people suffering the war's immediate consequences, the old
regime  and  its  ruling  elites,  who  were  seen  to  be  responsible  for  –  if  not  also
profiteering from – the bloodshed of the trenches, were irrevocably de-legitimised as a
result  of  the  conflict.  Calls  for  social  change  acquired  a  new  urgency,  and  while
established  power-holders  were  determined  to  defend  their  privileges,  mass-
organisations on both the left and the right began to mobilise with increasing intensity.
The  Bolshevik  revolution  of  October  1917  further  sharpened  conflicts  across  the
continent, as it offered a concrete example to follow and constant reminder that radical
change – social, political, and cultural – could be effected without delay.
One of the first attempts to gather progressive 'intellectuals' in an international
organisation came from a French group led by anti-war novelist Henri Barbusse. Taking
the name Clarté, they hoped to create an International of Thought to operate alongside
the International of Workers, and published a rousing manifesto appearing in Spanish
translation in the cultural magazine  Cosmopolis on 27 September 1919.3 The material
1 See Albaladejo Mayordomo, T. et al. Las vanguardias, 7-13. See also Tuñon de Lara, M. Medio Siglo 
de Cultura Española (1885-1936) (3rd ed) (Madrid: Tecnos, 1984) and Fusi, J. P. Un Siglo de España 
One of Valencia's most renowned writers, Vicente Blasco Ibáñez had gone further than most of his 
literary contemporaries by stating, in 1905, that art must offer a path to revolution. Álvarez Junco, J. 
'Racionalismo, romanticismo y moralismo en la cultura política republicana de comienzos de siglo' in 
Guereña, J.-L. & Tiana, A. Clases Populares, Cultura, Educación. Siglos XIX-XX (Madrid: Casa de 
Velázquez, 1989), 366.
2 For a powerful analysis of the impact of the Great War on the European psyche, see Eksteins, M. The 
Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age (New York: Houghton Mifflin 
Harcourt, 1989). 
3 Originally published in Le Populaire de Paris on 17 January 1919. For an overview of the initial 
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conflict of the World War had given way to a deeper and even more fateful conflict of
ideas, the authors began, forcing people to choose 'either to maintain, or totally rewrite,
from one end  of  the  world  to  the  other,  the  statutes  of  communal  life.'  From their
perspective,  the choice was obvious,  as the war had effectively invalidated the first
option.  It  had  'shattered  appearances',  had  'put  into  sharp  relief  the  lies',  the  'old
mistakes', and the 'habitually maintained fallacies' that had been a result, in the past, of a
'long martyrdom of justice.' The time had come, in other words, to depart from this
disorder and organise social life 'according to the laws of reason.' In this task, 'thinkers
and artists',  as  'spiritual inventors',  had to play a leading role.4 They could not form
isolated elites preoccupied solely with aesthetic pleasure, but had to face 'their human
duty,' which meant that those concerned with Beauty had to 'introduce it into life, and
impart on it the truth'. Only by accepting this responsibility would they contribute to the
formation of the 'moral accord' necessary to guarantee lasting peace. 
Although  the  movement  never  advanced  beyond  plans  and  proclamations,5
Clarté's manifesto is important here, partly because figures like Barbusse would later
exert great influence on like-minded writers and artists in Spain – Renau included6 –
and partly because its political goals were described in terms strongly reminiscent of
German Idealist  philosophers' vision of aesthetics and art.  The idea of  creating new
sensibilities  and,  ultimately,  new forms  of  life,  making possible the realisation of  a
united humanity, was here transposed to the sphere of politics proper and presented as a
political proposal. The initial step of this transferral was not, of course, taken in the
manifesto itself,  but in a particular conception of revolution that  first  appeared with
Marx. As Jacques Rancière has pointed out, this is evident in the Paris  manuscripts,
where Marx declared that the coming revolution will not be merely 'formal' or 'political',
but 'human'. The 'human' revolution would make possible a free political community
where men and women could realise their fullest potential while still pertaining to a
social  organisation  characterised  by  harmony,  integration,  and  totality.  This  idea
provided,  according to  Rancière,  the  basis  on which  the  political  vanguard and  the
development of the movement, see Racine, N. 'The Clarté Movement in France, 1919-21' Journal of 
Contemporary History, Vol. 2, No. 2, Literature and Society (Apr., 1967), 195-208. Subsequent quotes
are translated from the Spanish version. 
4 As some contemporary critics noted, this was of course at odds with the materialist orientation of 
Marxism, to which  founders like Barbusse professedly adhered. See Eastman, M. 'The Clarté 
Movement' The Liberator, Vol. 3, No. 4 (April 1920), 40-42.
5 Racine, N. 'The Clarté Movement in France', 208. 
6 Barbusse's writings would frequently be reproduced in Nueva Cultura. It should be said, however, that
there are no evidence of Renau actually having read the original Clarté manifesto.
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artistic avant-garde collaborated in the 1920s and 1930s. As he puts it, 'each side was
attached to the same programme: the construction of new forms of life, in which the
self-suppression  of  politics  would  match  the  self-suppression  of  art.'7 It  was  a
programme that in general terms sought to replace a morally bankrupt social order – an
order which in the eyes of many progressives showed definite proof of its continued
post-war decline by allowing the emergence fascism – with a society where humanist
concern  for  individual  self-fulfilment  would  triumph  over  cold  calculations  of
economics  or  utility.  As in  Schiller's  vision of  Greece,  such  a society required  that
political practices and artistic practices would no longer belong to separate spheres but
constitute  a  single expression of  life's  self-formation.  Initial  steps  towards  this  goal
would  be  taken  in  the  cultural  project  Renau  developed  towards  the  middle  of  the
1930s, in which politics and art  were also understood as continually reinforcing and
renewing each other.
In Spain, such ideas would begin to take shape in the late 1920s, but the years of
the Great War, and in particular 1917, had also been critical in staging a new social
dynamic to which Spanish artists  and writers responded in increasingly direct  ways.
Both internal and external factors were at play, as Spain's neutrality in the war did not
make the country immune to its repercussions. A war-related export boom was followed
by an economic crisis marked by high inflation and unemployment, which in August
1917 prompted socialist and anarchist unions to declare a general strike.  Even if the
strike was bloodily suppressed with the help of the army, it nonetheless signalled, in the
view of Marxist historian Manuel Tuñon de Lara, an important shift whereby political
mass-organisations emerged not as organs of anarchic protest but as credible contenders
for state-power.8 Combined with  simultaneous expressions of discontent among both
military officers and  Catalan parliamentary  deputies demanding greater autonomy for
Catalonia, the events of 1917 represented a severe political and ideological challenge
for the Restoration Monarchy.9 The news of the Bolshevik Revolution then triggered a
period of intense social unrest: in the agrarian south among impoverished day labourers
7 Rancière, J. 'The Aesthetic Revolution', 138. Cf. the Surrealist poet Louis Aragon's claim that: 'There 
is nothing more poetic that the revolution.' Various authors. Fotomontaje de entreguerras, 1919-1939 
(Madrid: Fundación Juan March, 2012), 120. For the collaboration between Clarté, seeing itself as a 
political vanguard, and the Surrealists, representing the artistic vanguard, see Lewis, H. Dada Turns 
Red: The Politics of Surrealism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1988), 37-54, esp. 42.
8 Tuñon de Lara, M. Medio Siglo de Cultura Española…, 188f.
9 Events of 1917 have been seen as a crisis of hegemony, in which the elite lost its ability to direct and 
dominate civil society through ideological consensus. Aguado, A. & Ramos, M. A. La modernización 
de España (1917-1939): Cultura y vida cotidiana. (Madrid: Síntesis, 2002), 18f.
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who  suffered  immense  hardships  under  a  quasi-feudal  social  system,  and  also  in
Barcelona  where  deadly  labour  conflicts  pitting  intransigent employers  against
increasingly  radical  unions.  Altogether  this created  an  atmosphere  seen  by
contemporaries  as  verging on undeclared civil  war.10 Failure to resolve the unstable
situation, further aggravated by political pressure resulting from military set-backs in
colonial Morocco, led General  Miguel Primo de Rivera to stage a coup in 1923 and
impose, with the King's consent, a dictatorship that would last the rest of the decade.11
Overall, then, a series of seismic changes, most of which were fundamentally products
of Spain's uneven process of industrialisation and urbanisation, converged to produce in
the post-First World War period new realities that changed the stakes of politics and
generated social conflicts of an unprecedented scale and intensity. 
Corresponding to  these  changes,  there  was,  as  indicated,  a  shift  in  attitudes
among  Spain's  cultural  producers.  If 1898  gave  rise  to  writers  concerned  with
contemporary  problems,  the  years  following  1917  saw  the  emergence  of  public
intellectuals  committed  to  the  construction  of  a  new  society.12 Whatever  form  that
commitment  took, it  inevitably had to respond to the dynamics  of burgeoning mass
politics. The most prominent example was perhaps Ortega y Gasset's advocacy of a new
meritocracy, where 'a select minority' rather than the 'rebelling masses' would replace
the lethargic oligarchy of the old regime. Yet others, especially on the progressive left,
tied  their  opposition  to  the  status  quo  to  the  promotion  of  equality  and  popular
sovereignty.13 
Cultural efforts to engage with egalitarian politics took a variety of forms. Early
attempts to create a proletarian culture, tentative and largely unsuccessful, could be seen
in Ángel Pumarega's Unión Cultural Proletaria, founded in 1922.14 Later in the decade,
new radical magazines like Post-Guerra  (1927-1928), inspired by the proclamations of
Henri Barbusse, similarly sought to lay the bases for a political alternative by creating
common ground between young 'intellectuals' and workers. As an essential part of the
10 For images of the Bolshevik Revolution in Spain, see Cruz, R. '!Luzbel vuelve al mundo! Las 
imágenes de la Rusia Soviética y la acción colectiva en España.' in Cruz, R. & Pérez Ledesma, M. 
(Eds.) Cultura Y Movilización En La España Contemporánea (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1997). For a
social history of class conflict in early 20th century Barcelona, see Ealham, C. Class, Culture and 
Conflict in Barcelona, 1898-1937 (London: Taylor and Francis, 2004).
11 For an extensive analysis of the politics of the Primo dictatorship, see Quiroga, A. Making Spaniards.
12 Aguado, A. & Ramos, M. A. La modernización de España, 30.
13 This perhaps found its most extreme formulation in playwright Ramón del Valle-Inclán's anwer to a 
1920 survey posing Tolstoy's question, 'What must we do?'. 'What must we do?', replied Valle-Inclán,  
'Not art. We must not make art now, since to play in these times is immoral, detestable [una 
canallada]. First we must achieve social justice.' Fuentes, V. La marcha al pueblo, 50.
14 Salaün, S. 'Las vanguardias políticas: la cuestión estética', 214.
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democratisation process, it  also encouraged the emergence of collective art.15 But in
general terms, it was printed mass-media, together with radical book publishing, that
was recognised as a principal means to have an impact on an increasingly literate and
socially mobile population. As the turn of the decade saw intensified protests against the
Primo dictatorship, Post-Guerra's successor, Nueva España (1930-1931), called on 'the
young' to found 'organs of opinion that bring the need for a new politics of democracy
and of intervention in public life to the most remote towns.'16 Artists and writers were
but  a  small part of the dynamic of mass-politics, yet they would find it increasingly
difficult to remain impassive before the events taking place in the next decade.  
Renau's discovery of Marxism
After returning from his second trip to Madrid in spring 1930, politics rapidly became a
primary concern for Renau. He felt that his earlier purely theoretical explorations in
anarchism had reached their limit, and, unlike his artistic colleagues, he sought practical
involvement in Valencia's libertarian circles. He became active in the Ateneo Libertario
on Camí del Grau, and participated in various forms of direct action in opposition to the
dictatorship and monarchy. The results of this soon left him disillusioned, however. The
outcome of  libertarian activism, he deduced, was almost always negative, and Renau
later  described  how the  discrepancy between  the  'benevolent  audacity'  exhibited by
fellow anarchists and the 'terrible naiveté' (terible infantilismo) of their practical strategy
soon  became  apparent  even  to  an  'nascent'  and  'petit-bourgeois'  revolutionary  like
himself. Given the lack of focus and organisational rigour, it seemed to him that these
'self-sacrificing'  activists  were  engaged  in  a  form  of  revolutionary  gymnastics  that
showed no concern for efficacy or results. Similarly, he found anarchist approaches to
cultural questions plagued by inconsistencies and even ignorance.17 In short, anarchism,
as Renau had experienced it, did not appear an effective vehicle for the social revolution
he had in mind. 
The open-ended journey of self-education and discovery being undertaken by
Renau and his artistic circle of friends was underwritten to a degree by professionally
15 Fuentes, V. La marcha al pueblo, 56, 38. See also Gómez, M. El largo viaje. Política y cultura en la 
evolución del Partido Comunista de España, 1920-1939. (Madrid: Ediciones de la Torre, 2005), 
chapter 3.
16 Quoted in Medelson, J. with de Diego, E. ‘Political Practice and the Arts in Spain, 1927-1936’ in 
Marquardt, V. H. (Ed.) Art and Journals on the Political Front (Gainesville: University Press of 
Florida, 1997), 189. 
17 Renau, J. 'Notas al margen', 466f.
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advancing careers and increased income. For Renau especially, this had been a positive
side to his second stay in Madrid:
In terms of work, I had no problems at all, [my employers] paid me
well  and  I  had  more than  enough to  live  on,  even  enough to  buy
books, lots of books, which I leafed through anxiously. With those we
plugged important gaps in our knowledge, particularly regarding the
latest 'isms': Cubism, the Dadaist movement – which we knew hardly
anything about – and Surrealism. The two last ones fitted very well
with my anarchic positions back then.18
The  books  and  magazines  informing  Renau's  cultural  and  political  rebellion  were
usually  purchased  from  a  kiosk  in  Valencia’s  main  square  or  in  the  International
Bookshop  (Librería  Internacional)  located  on  Calle  Pintor  Sorolla.19 Having  no
experience  of  international  travel,  or  personal  contacts  outside  of  Spain,  bookshops
were the main portal through which Renau and his collaborators could access the new
ideas then traversing the continent. With regards to socio-political literature, they read
and  discussed  The  New  Russia  (1926),  a  travelogue  and  political  'best-seller'  by
prominent  socialist  writer  and  politician  Julio  Álvarez  del  Vayo,  as  well  as  Diego
Hidalgo’s A Spanish Notary in Russia (1929), another immensely popular account of the
same genre.20 Even so, Renau later claimed that their attitude towards the Soviet Union
at this stage rarely went beyond 'eager curiosity', and that their knowledge of Marxism
was  virtually  nil.  In  his  own  analysis,  this  ignorance  was  in  large  part  due  to  the
'conspicuous absence' of communists within their immediate intellectual environment at
that time.21 
Still, at some point during this period, Renau came across a short text by one of
the founders of the Russian Social Democratic Party, Georgii V. Plekhanov, entitled Art
and Social Life (1912/13). Its impact on Renau was profound. More will be said about
18 Ibid, 464f. Josep Renau's youngest brother, Juan, also mentioned in his memoirs that Josep would 
spend all he earned on political literature. See Pasos y Sombras, 258.
19 The importance of the kiosk is highlighted by Bellón. Josep Renau, 110. Reference to the Librería 
Internacional is made in Agramunt Lacruz, F. La vanguardia artística, 24. Perhaps there is a certain 
irony  in the fact that they would nourish their artistic rebellion with books bought on a street named 
after the conservative art establishment's local icon.
20 The daily El Sol called The New Russia the most successful book of recent times. See Fuentes, V. La 
marcha al pueblo en las letras españolas, 37. Diego Hidalgo's book was also, as mentioned, immensly
popular: its first edition sold out in 45 days, and by 1931 it was in its fourth edition. See the 
introduction by Henri Barbusse in Hidalgo, D. Un notario español en Rusia (4th ed) (Madrid: Cenit, 
1931). These readings coincided with a general increase in popularity of political literature, which will
be discussed on page 74 below. See Ribas, P. La introducción del marxismo en España (1869-1939): 
Ensayo bibliographico (Madrid: Ediciones de la Torre, 1981)
21 Renau, J. 'Notas al margen', 467.
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Plekhanov's argument below, but his central propositions – stating that progressive art
must  give  expression  to  the  greatest  emancipatory  ideas  of  its  time,  and  that  the
abstracted styles associated with the avant-garde were incapable of fulfilling this task –
provided  a confirmation as  well  as  a  corrective for  Renau.  (In  his  autobiographical
account, he admitted to blushing from embarrassment when reading the book, not least
because his latest initiative, a very short lived magazine called  Proa, had completely
gone  against  Plekhanov's  insights.22)  The new ideological  perspective  he  took from
Plekhanov led Renau to search for more literature within the Marxist tradition. At its
forefront stood, of course, The Communist Manifesto, which Renau believed made such
a strong impression on him that it would determine his political orientation for the rest
of his life.23  
What  was  it  in  Marxism that  Renau  found  so  convincing?  One  part  of  the
answer, provided by the artist himself, relates to his disillusion with anarchism, and the
fact  that  his misgivings regarding anarchist  tactics – centred, as mentioned, on their
organisational naiveté and apparent disregard for efficacy – were echoed in the anti-
anarchist  criticisms  Renau  read  in  Engels’  own  series  of  articles  entitled 'The
Bakuninists  at  Work.'24 For  Renau,  there  appeared  to  be,  in  other  words,  direct
correspondence between Marxist ideas and his own experience, a shared perspective
that  pointed to a new political home. Yet what impressed Renau above all were the
foundational  propositions  of  Marxist  theory  –  'the  complexities  of  historical
materialism' and 'the intricate problem of the dialectic method', as he described them.25
These concepts  seemed to  provide  tools  to  explain  historical  and  social  phenomena
whose inter-connections had previously eluded him. Once he had overcome the initial
challenge of comprehension, he said, 'clarity' became the 'primordial sign' of his world,
and 'confused aspects' of his life were immediately illuminated. The discovery seemed
to have been akin to an epiphany, a secular revelation that was probably all the more
powerful for occurring in opposition to a deeply catholic environment. His discoveries
not only alleviated his complexes for being an 'illiterate' autodidact – something which
22 Ibid., 468. No one seems to have seen a copy of Proa and José Ramón Cancer Matinero has even 
suggested, for a series of relatively intricate reasons, that the magazine may never actually have 
existed and that the work Renau remembered in this regard was that appearing in Murta (1931-1932). 
Either way, the issue of which of the two short-lived magazine should be referred is not of any 
substantial consequence here.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid. These articles, published in 1873, analysed the activities of Mikhail Bakunin's Spanish followers 
during the short-lived First Spanish Republic, 1873-1874.
25 Ibid.
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allegedly did him 'so much good' that he found himself walking around Valencia as a
'happy child in new shoes'26 – but also gave his political and artistic activities a firm
sense of direction. The grand narrative of Marxism, encompassing a total world-view,
allowed him to grasp  the  nature of  historical  development  and attach his  vision of
modernity to a cosmological truth. It allowed him, in short, to concretise the ambition
expressed in his own manifesto. Through the insights of Marxism, he believed he could
glimpse the future, prepare for it, and play an active part in its unfolding.
The proclamation of the Second Republic 
The year of 1930 was a  decisive year for Renau, as it was for Spanish society as a
whole. The artist later remarked that, compared to any other period in his life, the hours
at that time had 'three times as many minutes and the months three times as many days,'
and that the consequent confusion was not only in his head but also, in good part, in the
very  air  of  those  'vertiginous  times.'27 In  January,  as  a  result  of  mounting  popular
pressure,  the King persuaded Primo de Rivera to  step down, after  which a military
government under General Dámaso Berenguer was formed.28 Rather than pacifying the
population,  this  only  galvanised  support  for  further  change,  and  critique  was
increasingly directed at  the King himself.  On 17 August  leading republicans  united
against the monarchy in the 'Pact  of San Sebastián.'  The planned general strike and
military rising,  intended  to  overthrow the regime,  eventually failed,  but  widespread
support  for  arrested republican politicians,  as  well  as  the two captains  executed for
leading  the  military  coup  attempt,  nonetheless  indicated  the  extent  to  which  they
represented the popular mood.29 In November, a funeral march attended predominantly
by  workers  suffered  brutal  police  intervention,  leaving  two  dead  and  forty-nine
wounded, while Ortega published an influential article calling on the Spanish people to
conquer  and  reconstruct  the  state.30 In  the  middle  of  February,  the  King  replaced
General Berenguer with Juan Bautista Aznar, who formed a government together with
the old monarchist parties. In an attempt to provide the regime with renewed legitimacy,
municipal elections were called in April 1931. Monarchist candidates suffered heavy
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid., 466.
28 An important part of these protests were driven by students and intellectuals. See Ben-Ami, S. The 
Origins of the Second Republic in Spain, 36-44.
29 Ben-Ami, S. The Origins of the Second Republic in Spain, 68-103.
30 For an account of the funeral march, see El Sol 15 November 1930, 3. Ortega y Gasset's famous attack
on the dictatorship, entitled 'El Error Berenguer' was published on the front page of the same issue.
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defeats in urban centres, where, in contrast to the politically 'controlled' countryside, the
vote was taken to be a true reflection of the popular will. King Alfonso XIII abdicated,
and left for France. On 14 April 1931 the Second Republic was proclaimed, prompting
widespread scenes of jubilation. 
The fall of the monarchy brought promise of new social possibilities, and fired
the  hope  of  the  multitude  who  had  seen  their  ambitions  thwarted  by  the  rigidly
hierarchical structure of the old traditional order. More than merely a formal regime
change,  the Republic  came to signify progression, a  vehicle to  realise the ideals  of
democracy and justice.31 Yet once the initial euphoria had faded, the broad alliance that
had  brought  the  Republic  into  being,  including  republican  conservatives,  liberal
reformists and socialists of various hues, would be severely tested, both before and after
the initial provisional cabinet was succeeded by an elected republican-socialist coalition
government  on  15  December  1931.  Not  only  were  conservative  elites,  comprised
primarily  of  large  landowners  allied  with  various  clerical,  political,  and  industrial
powers,  as  well  as  sectors  of  the  military establishment,  determined  to  oppose  any
reform initiative that would compromise their interests, but differences in expectations
and ideological goals among progressives would pose a considerable challenge too, and
would gradually serve to weaken the new regime's social support. To a degree, these
differences – significantly present  also within the socialist  movement itself – would
manifest  themselves  from the very beginning,  as  illustrated  by the  reception of  the
Republic's proclamation in Santander, where the workers' club (the  Casa del Pueblo)
raised the Republican banner and the post office the red flag flag of socialism.32 Yet the
primary division here – that between reformist and revolutionary politics – would also
be deepened by the minimal efficacy of Republican reform. At first, the reaction of the
libertarian  Sindicato Único de la  Metalurgia in  Valencia,  which welcomed any new
opportunities resulting from the regime change but did not see the Republic in itself as
enough,  could  be  said  to  be  representative  of  the  attitude  among  more  radical
31 Thus Republican campaigners arriving at a village shortly before the proclaimation of the Second 
Republic were greeted by the call 'Long live the men who bring us the rule of law!'. Quoted in 
Montero, E. 'Reform idealised: The Intellectual and Ideological Origins of the Second Republic', in 
Graham, H. and Labanyi, J. (Eds.) Spanish Cultural Studies (Oxford: OUP, 1995), 129.
32 Martínez, F. A., Laguna, A., Ruis, I., Selva, E., and Bordería, E. 'La cultura popular durante la 
Segunda República: Una política de la cultura' in Uría, J. (Ed) La cultura popular en la España 
contemporánea: doce estudios (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2003), 162f.
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progressives.33 But as economic limitations,34 strategic miscalculations,35 parliamentary
intransigence,  and  local  failures  to  implement  legislation  all  meant  that  the  first
reformist government would not fully deliver on the promises expected of the Republic,
the most disadvantaged sectors began to adopt other means to achieve their goals.36
Social tensions were also exacerbated by Republican unwillingness to reform the forces
of public order, which often responded to workers' protests with extreme brutality. This
was  particularly  galling  when  they  were  seen  to  be  defending  employers  blatantly
disregarding  progressive  legal  measures,  as  was  frequently  the  case  in  the  agrarian
south.37 As a result, social conflicts intensified dramatically throughout the tenure of the
first Republican government, and violent  opposition to the reform project would not
only come from the conservative establishment – whose first attempt to recover control
of  the  state  came  with  the  failed  military  coup  of  August  1932  –  but  also  from
revolutionary workers whose patience was tested by the impotence of parliamentary
politics to effect sufficiently rapid change.
Renau joins the Valencian PCE
Around the time when the Republic was proclaimed, the twenty-four-year-old Renau
joined the Valencian youth section of the Spanish Communist Party (Partido Comunista
de España, PCE). In so doing he was hardly following a general trend, for even at a time
of increased political activity, the PCE remained a very small party, nationally as well as
locally. Formed in 1921, it was still something of a 'newcomer' in Spanish politics, and
had struggled to find a place in a radical field of politics already occupied by well-
established anarchist, anarcho-syndicalist,  and socialist  organisations.38 Like the CNT
(but  not  the  Socialist  Party  or  its  trade  union,  the  UGT),  the  PCE had  also  been
outlawed during the Primo de Rivera dictatorship, making it yet harder to develop an
organisational  base.39 Its  legality would be restored  with the Republic,  but  years  of
33 Ibid., 162.
34 To some extent caused by the fact that the Republic came into being at the height of the Great 
Depression. 
35 Most prominent among these were, arguably, relatively radical proposals to secularise education (see 
chapter 3 below for more detail), which alienated large sectors of socially conservative Catholics, and 
the failure to demilitarise public order.
36 This included local strikes, violence, occupation and cultivation of unused land, etc. For a good 
account how social conflict escalated during the first Republican years, see Preston, P. The Spanish 
Holocaust: Inquisition and Extermination in Twentieth Century Spain (London: Harper, 2013), 3-33.
37 Ibid. See esp. 30.
38 Cruz, R. 'Como Cristo sobre las aguas. La cultura política bolchevique en España' in Morales Moya, 
A. (Coord.) Las claves de la España del siglo XX: Ideologías y movimientos políticos (Madrid: 
Sociedad Estatal España Nuevo Milenio, 2001), 187.
39 For an overview of the organisational activities of the PCE during its first decade, see Cruz, R. El 
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clandestinity had left their mark. An indication of  the operative method and very small
size of the Valencian PCE can be seen in the circumstances of Renau's admission, which
was allegedly formalised with a brief night-time meeting in a dark street behind the train
station. He was made political secretary of the local committee within weeks.40 
If  Renau's  endorsement  of  Marxism  was  prompted  in  part  by  his  negative
experience of anarchist activism and a desire to participate in a movement he thought
better placed to achieve tangible change, it must be asked why he did not join the much
more powerful Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español, PSOE), one of the
driving forces behind the establishment of the Republic and later a key part of its first
coalition  government.  Renau  did  not  address  the  question  directly  in  his
autobiographical account, but a number of reasons may be suggested. First, as direct
consequence of its small size, the PCE actually offered – in contrast to the PSOE and its
associated trade union, UGT, which operated with a rigid and bureaucratic structure
where promotion was slow – better opportunities for members to have a meaningful
impact on the party and local political life. Second, as indicated briefly in the previous
chapter,  the  socialist  trade  union  UGT had  collaborated  with  the  Primo  de  Rivera
dictatorship. Spanish socialism was consequently seen, to some extent, as an integral
part of the discredited establishment that Renau had decided to rebel against. Third, if
the PCE was weak in numbers, it gained, at least in its members' own eyes, more than
compensatory strength from its political convictions. This strength was not only rooted
in a belief in the practical power of Marxist doctrine but also in an awareness of the
importance of the communist  movement internationally.  Indeed, the feeling of being
part  of  a  greater  political  community,  which  through  the  Bolshevik  revolution  had
already realised part of its aspiration to be a force for global change, was no doubt an
intrinsic part of the uncompromising self-belief that underpinned the party's attraction
more generally.41 Its radicalism clearly appealed to restless souls like Renau who amidst
political  and  economic  crises  rejected  slow  parliamentary  engagement  and  instead
propagated revolutionary change.
Partido Comunista de España en la II República (Madrid: Alianza, 1987), especially chapters 7 and 8.
Hernández Sánchez, F. Guerra o Revolución: El Partido Comunista en la guerra civil (Barcelona, 
Crítica, 2010), 43-55.
40 Its Valencian branch was described by Rafael Pérez Contel as consisting of 'four cats' who celebrated 
every new recruit by throwing a party. Cited in Agramunt Lacruz, F. La vanguardia artística, 290.
41 Take, for example, the case of the university student Alejandra Soler, who joined the still relatively 
small PCE in 1934 after Spanish social conflicts had escalated to a stage where her engagement with 
the national student union, Federación Universitaria Escolar, seemed insufficient and needed to be 
supplemented by engagement with a bigger and more powerful organisation. Interview with the 
author, 22 June 2012. See also Cruz, R. El Partido Comunista, chapter 6.
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The PCE was one of the few organisations to mount vociferous opposition to the
Republic right from the start. According to the official party line, guided by the dogma
of  the  Comintern's  'Third  Period'  which  prohibited all  collaboration  with  reformist
forces, only the dictatorship of the proletariat was an option and anything else had to be
condemned as  reactionary.  Indeed,  a  small  group,  including  members  of  the  PCE's
national leadership, had gone into central Madrid to protest against the new 'bourgeois'
regime on the very day of  its  fêted proclamation,  provoking  hostile  reactions  from
jubilant crowds.42 The fact  that few shared the party's  dismissive opinion during the
optimistic spring days of April did not necessarily trouble the PCE faithful, however.
Remarking on their 'total isolation' at this time, the then General Secretary José Bullejos
wrote in his memoirs: 'we did not change our position, nor did we modify the tone of
the propaganda. We were proud to go against the stream.'43 Again, such attitudes would
have been underwritten by the fact that many, if not most, communists were convinced
that their Marxist-Leninist teachings represented a fundamental truth, and that this truth
would  not  be altered  by 'the  masses'  enthusiasm for  superficial  change.44 For  some
sympathetic  observers,  like  Renau's  youngest  brother,  Juan,  later  to  join  the  party
himself, this characteristic lent communists an air of 'exalted martyrs,' 'rushing to throw
themselves  to  the  ultimate  sacrifice.'45 Not  uncharacteristically,  their  set-backs  were
incorporated into a greater narrative of selfless 'heroes'  pledging loyalty to an ideal,
confident that they would ultimately be vindicated by history. 
Despite energetic efforts to step up recruitment, the Valencian party membership
remained small in the pre-civil war years. After a year of campaigning, of devoting
more time to politics than to work, families, or anything else, the number of members
was still around thirty, according to Renau.46 Few would pay them sustained attention
apart from the police, who in an indirect confirmation of the intensity of their labours
allegedly refused to believe that the short membership list obtained from a raid on their
42 Hernández Sánchez, F. Guerra o Revolución, 58.
43 Bullejos, J. La Comintern en España. Recuerdos de mi vida (Mexico: Impresiones Modernas, 1972), 
123f.
44 Cf. Juan Renau stating that communists must 'never give in to the abortive enthusiasms of street 
festivities' (entregarse jamás a los entusiasmos abortados de charanga). In Pasos y Sombras, 289.
45 Ibid. See also Cruz, R. 'Como Cristo sobre las aguas', 189f. For a study of how similar attitudes were 
present in the German communist movement, see Weitz, E. Creating German Communism, 1890–
1990 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 278.
46 Renau, J. 'Notas al margen', 468. According to Fernando Hernández Sánchez, PCE had a total of 4,950
members nationwide at the time of the Republic's proclamation, mostly spread out in very small 
groups. The relatively low membership numbers given for specific groups in the north (Santander, 
Vizcaya, and Guipúzcoa), where the PCE was much stronger than in Valencia, make Renau's figure 
seem plausible. See Guerra o Revolución, 54f. 
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offices  was the true  one.47 One  reason for  their  failure  to  grow resided  in  practical
strategy,  which  soon  revealed  a  relatively  sterile  pattern:  apart  from  copying  and
distributing material sent from the central committee in Madrid, which seems to have
been  the  main  form  of  operational  interaction  with  the  party's  Central  Committee,
Renau and his comrades would organise marches, usually every other Sunday. These
invariably  ended  in  the  central  square,  where  Assault  Guards  faithfully  waited to
disperse them with their batons. Sometimes popular support was greater than others, but
on the whole little was achieved.48 Another problem, discernable in their response to the
proclamation of  the Republic,  stemmed from the fact  that  standardised international
slogans often failed to reflect local concerns.  This was at times apparent even to the
party activists themselves, as shown in Juan Renau's reflection on his first experience of
activism – a demonstration against imperialist war and unemployment. 'For an instant',
he  later  wrote,  having described  his  wait  on the  central  square  where  people  were
happily going about their business or heading for the beach on a hot Sunday morning,
'I'm struck by the absurdity of it all. I imagine no one speaks about war, and there are
hardly any unemployed workers in Valencia. But discipline is discipline.'49 
That  said,  even  party  discipline  had  its  limits.  It  may  have  been  the  same
demonstration against unemployment – which even the socialist  Casa del Pueblo had
suggested  was virtually non-existent  in Valencia – which ended in such humiliating
failure that  Josep  Renau felt compelled to protest about it, in his capacity as Political
Secretary,  to  the  PCE’s  Central  Committee  in  Madrid.50 In  his  own account, their
response was threatening,  and it appears  the Valencian section only escaped serious
sanction  as  a  result  of  a  complete  change  in  the  national  party  leadership  shortly
afterwards.51 Even  if  communists,  as  disciplined  and  self-sacrificing  defenders  of  a
cause, were 'proud to go against the stream,' there were moments when blind obedience
to party hierarchy could not override members' awareness of their persistent failure to
advance towards their goal.
One  important  characteristic  of  the  PCE  group  including  Renau  was  the
47 Ibid., 469.
48 Ibid., 471f. The square referred to was called Plaza Emilio Castelar at the time, today Plaza del 
Ayuntamiento.
49 Renau, J. Pasos y Sombras, 312f.
50 Renau, J. 'Notas al margen', 472. Cf. Bellón, F. Josep Renau, 156. What exactly the letter said does not
emerge from the sources but Renau was apparently unhappy about the narrow and sectarian approach 
of the Party at this time.
51 Ibid. The leadership change took place at the IV PCE Congress in Seville, March 1932.
52
members' relatively young age.52 Politicised youth, and especially students linked to the
progressive  university  association,  the  Federación  Universitaria  Escolar  (FUE),  had
played  a  significant  part  in  the  protests  against  the  monarchy.53 Josep's  six-years-
younger brother Juan had been, and remained, active within the Valencian FUE, as was
Alejandra Soler, a history student who would join Josep Renau's PCE cell,  'Ruzafa',54
towards the end of 1934, when she was 21 years old. Greater political involvement of
the  young  would  frequently  lead  to  a  radicalisation  of  debates,  but  also  to  the
introduction of new issues to the political  agenda.  Critical  among these was gender
equality,  which  would  come  to  occupy  an  important  part  of  the  activities  of  the
Valencian group. While the Republic somewhat improved the status of women in Spain
and crucially passed the law of 1 October enfranchising all citizens over 23 years of age,
grass-roots activists like Alejandra Soler campaigned, through both the Valencian FUE
and the PCE, for further de facto recognition of women's rights.55 Manuela Ballester too,
a young talented artist,  Renau’s partner,  and  likewise  a member of  the Ruzafa cell,
contributed to such debates through articles  published  in various radical magazines.56
While men were evidently less active in these campaigns, and often found it difficult to
translate gendered aspects of egalitarian doctrine into practice,57 the increasing presence
52 This is based on the members of the 'Ruzafa' cell as indicated by Emilio Gómez Nadal. These 
included, apart from Josep Renau, Manuela Ballester, the writer Angel Gaos, the student and later 
teacher Alejandra Soler, and Arnaldo Azzati, a writer whose father (Félix Azzati) edited the Valencian 
daily (founded by Vicente Blasco Ibáñez) El Pueblo. See  Gómez Andrés, A. & Pérez i Moragón, F. 
(Eds.) Emili Gómez Nadal: Diaris i records (Valencia 2008), 386. To this group we should add 
Manuela's younger brother Antonio Ballester, who  discussed his participation l in a 1980 interview 
available at CDHM (Salamanca), Fuentes_Orales-Mexico, no 9. Their young age is of course not the 
least surprising if this  had been a cell of PCE's youth section, the Juventud Comunista (JC). Yet 
Alejandra Soler claims that she was never part of the JC, but joined the main party straight away, 
which suggests that the cell composition referred by Gómez was of the main party, if later in the 
Republican period, as Gómez joined at the time of Popular Front elections in 1936. For a brief 
overview of Gómez's professional and political career, see Pérez i Móragón, F. 'Emili Gómez Nadal, 
un intel· lectual en la cruilla del segle XX' Laberintos: revista de estudios sobre los exilios culturales 
españoles No 10-11 (2008-2009), 286-288.
53 Besides protesting against the dictatorship, the FUE campaigned above all for equal access to 
education. For a recent account of FUE in Valencia, see Perales Birlanga, G. Católicos y Liberales: El
movimiento estudiantil en la Universidad de Valencia (1875-1939) (Valencia: PUV, 2009). For a 
broader overview of the role of youth organisations in Spanish politics at this time, see Souto Kustrín, 
S. Paso a la juventud. Movilización democrática, estalinismo y revolución en la República Española 
(Valencia: PUV, 2013).
54 Named after a residential area in central Valencia.
55 Interview with the author 22 June 2012. She was particularly concerned to raise women's sense of 
self-worth – especially in rural areas. See also Alejandra Soler's memoir La vida es un río cuadaloso 
con peligrosos rápidos. Al final de todo...sigo comunista (2nd Ed) (Valencia: PUV, 2009). Regarding 
changing positions of women in politics, it should also be mentioned that the Second Republic also 
included, for the first time, female  members of parliament. Viktoria Kent (Partido Radical Socialista),
Clara Campoamor (Partido Republicano Radical), and Margarita Nelken (PSOE).
56 See 'Una madre en defensa de sus hijos' in Orto, 8 (October 1932) and 'Mujeres intellectuales' in 
Nueva Cultura, 5 (June-July 1935). During the civil war she edited the magazine Pasionaria.
57 Aguado, A. & Ramos, M. A. La modernización de España, 182. See also 261-276 for an analysis of 
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of such questions in political discourse signalled a new perspective, consubstantial with
the emergence of young people to direct emancipatory politics towards new concerns.
Another noteworthy characteristic of the Valencian PCE was that it contained
hardly any workers.  Renau  recalled  a  committee,  allegedly  indicative  of  the  social
composition of the local membership overall, consisting of three painters, one singer,
three of four students, and an artisan.58 Similarly, Emili Gómez Nadal, a journalist and
writer, later claimed that the Ruzafa cell, of which he too was a member, was essentially
one of 'intellectuals.' Although it has been suggested that the national PCE membership
included  a  relatively  low percentage  of  industrial  workers  in  general  (unsurprising
considering the country's uneven industrialisation),59 he stated that the Valencian section
was,  even  so,  'a  rather  odd  [particular] organisation  within  the  PC,  very  quaint
[pintoresca].'60 Whether the last remark was meant to suggest a certain disconnectedness
from the grit of 'real' revolutionary activism or simply the presence of strong idealism is
not  clear.  Either  way,  an  element  of  idealism would  help  to  explain  why the  PCE
recruits, who came mainly from middle- and lower middle-class backgrounds, decided
to dedicate  themselves  to  a  credo of  worker-centred  politics  in  the first  place.  This
seems particularly relevant  in  relation to  artists  and writers  who combined political
commitment  with  avant-garde experimentation.  Such  activists,  of  whom Renau is  a
perfect example, had already rebelled against the norms of dominant bourgeois society
in their creative work and no doubt hoped that the working masses, when the revolution
eventually came, would dismantle not only an oppressive economic structure but also
the  sclerotic  cultural  hierarchies  that  in  their  view  held  everyone  imprisoned  in  a
spiritual  sense.  Indeed,  progressive  writers  like  José  Díaz  Fernández  insisted  (and
whether or not Renau read him, he would have agreed) that cultural revival could only
spread with the rising working classes, because the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie were
both exhausted as historically progressive cultural forces.61 What was at stake here was
not only material  improvements for the working classes but the creation of a social
order that would benefit all productive members of society by bringing greater freedoms
and new possibilities of self-expression. That this was central to the Ruzafa group is
these tension which became particularly evident during the civil war.  
58 Renau, J. 'Notas al margen', 468. See also Tonico Ballester interview in CDHM (Salamanca), 
Fuentes_Orales-Mexico, no 9, 35.
59 See Cruz, R. El Partido Comunista, chapter 3. See also Hernández Sánchez, F.Guerra o Revolución, 
279.
60 Gómez Andrés, A. & Pérez i Moragón, F. (Eds.) Emili Gómez Nadal, 386.
61 See 'Acerca del arte nuevo' Postguerra (27 September 1927). Reproduced in Cobb, C. La Cultura y el
Pueblo. España, 1930-1939 (Barcelona: Laia, 1981), 163-168. 
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suggested by Emili Gómez Nadal's comment above, as well as by his admission that his
own militancy had mainly developed on a cultural and intellectual level. To some extent
this would gradually become true of Renau too, at least from 1934, when he resigned
from his post as Political Secretary.62 
Politics in the cultural sphere
Considering the fact of the PCE's relative weakness, as well as the influence of Renau’s
vocational  interests,  it  is  not  surprising  that  he  also  came  to  engage  in  other
organisational initiatives, often ones with a broader base than the PCE, and focusing to a
greater extent  on cultural questions. The first project  was the  Unión de Escritores y
Artistas Proletarios (UEAP), founded by himself and his colleagues in 1932-33.63 The
name is misleading, as nor did this organisation contain many 'proletarians'. That said,
the wording was not entirely of the founders' choosing. The original name contained the
term  'Revolutionary'  instead  of  'Proletarian',  but  when  they  applied  to  have  the
organisation  registered,  the  governor  of  Valencia,  Luis  Doporto,  a  Geography  and
History  professor  with  old  republican  credentials,  objected  to  the  inclusion  of
'Revolutionary' on the basis that it was 'very aggressive' and implied 'a radical cultural
change', something which was 'unacceptable.'64 Hence the organisation had to indicate
its political orientation by naming the social sector it sympathised with, rather than an
epithet they could apply to a majority of its members. 
The motivation for forming the UEAP – an organisation  undoubtedly working
for 'radical cultural change' – was spelled out in dramatic terms in a call to its inaugural
meeting, published in the Valencian daily El Pueblo on 7 May 1933. The text, attributed
to Renau,65 began by describing the state of the global economy,  at the time suffering
the full consequences of the Great Depression, in close to apocalyptic terms:   
A tragic wind blows across the universal landscape. The tall buildings
62 Bellón, F. Josep Renau,199. The reasons for his resignation, as well as its exact date, are not clear. It 
may be that frustration with party strategy led him to focus more on cultural propaganda work. It may 
also be that the increased political repression that followed the change of government in November 
1933 meant that formal leadership of the local PCE section came at too high a prince, especially when
Renau's career was going from strength to strength and he and Manuela had just had their first child 
(Ruy, born on 5 May 1934).
63 Founders were Josep and Juan Renau, Pascual Pla y Beltrán, Ángel Gaos, Francisco Badía, Rafael 
Pérez Contel, Manuela and Antonio Ballester, Emilio Gómez Nadal, Francisco Carreño, and José 
Bueno Ortuño. See Rose Martínez Montón's introduction to the 2011 edition of Renau, J. Pasos y 
Sombras, 19f.
64 Agramunt Lacruz, F. La vanguardia artística, 274.  This information originally comes from Pérez 
Contel, and is  given in summary form  in his Artistas en Valencia, 653. Also mentioned in Renau, J. 
'Notas al margen', 473.
65 Reprinted in Cobb, C. La cultura y el pueblo, 235-238.
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of capitalism crack and fall crashing to the ground in the five corners
[sic] of the world. The administrators of this chaos speak in technical
jargon of an economic crisis and formulate scientifically satisfactory
yet useless recipes.66 
Capitalist society, the text continued, was 'absurd and parasitic', and had arrived 'at the
end  of  its  destiny.'  Its  forms  of  community  obstructed  the  course  of  history,  and
threatened 'to hinder the development of life.' The cold facts – overproduction, forced
unemployment, the slaughter of 'imperialist' wars – all but spoke for themselves. Only
one  country had  been  saved  from 'misery  and  ruin':  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist
Republics (USSR).67  
The  world  was  consequently  being  divided  into  two  camps:  one  led  by  a
bourgeoisie which was turning to fascism and another led by the working classes – the
'exploited'  and  'oppressed'  called  to  organise  their  self-defence.  As  stated  by Clarté
fourteen years earlier, artists and writers could not remain impassive before this 'epic
struggle.' A retreat into solitude to produce art that is 'pure and dehumanised' at a time
when 'all human problems acquire dramatic urgency' would be a 'cowardly desertion'
and a 'crime.' In their awareness of this, members of the UEAP did not intend to turn
their backs on the world. On the contrary, they aimed to immerse themselves in the
'torrent of life',  and with 'intellectual arms and epic spirit' open a 'breach' in history,
preparing the path for 'a new world and a new civilisation, more just and humane.'68 
Organisationally, the UEAP was not tied to any political party, and the positions
espoused by its membership stretched, according to Pérez Contel, across the spectrum
of progressive politics.69 Yet collectively UEAP was part of a new network, extending
across Spain and Europe, and composed of cultural producers who sought new ways to
organise in support of revolutionary sectors of the workers' movement. The first steps
had been taken in France with the foundation, on 17 March 1932, of the Association des
Ècrivains  et  Artistes  Révolutionaires (AEAR).70 Renau  and  his  colleagues  saw  the
Valencian UEAP as its Spanish equivalent, but another section, using a direct translation
66 Ibid., 235.
67 Ibid., 235f.
68 Ibid., 238 .
69 Pérez Contel, R. Artistas en Valencia, 650-652.
70 Founded by Paul Vaillant-Couturier, together with Romain Rolland and Henri Barbusse, as the French 
section of the International Union of Revolutionary Writers, which had been established in Moscow in
1927. Stanton, M. 'French intellectual groups and the Popular Front' in Alexander, M. & Graham, H. 
The French and Spanish Popular Fronts. Comparative perspectives (Cambridge: CUP, 1989), 254-
269.
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of the French name, was also set up around the same time in Madrid, on the initiative of
the writers Rafael Alberti and Maria Teresa León,71 and yet another section appeared in
Catalonia.72 If any of them could be said to have represented Spain abroad, it was the
Madrid group led by Alberti and León, not least because Alberti had the most influential
international connections and would speak on behalf of the Spanish organisation at the
Congress of Soviet Writers in August 1934.73 Surprisingly, within Spain, there appears
to have been no formal organisational structure to co-ordinate activities  between the
three sections,  even if  ad hoc collaboration did occur.74 Specific  initiatives involved
organising exhibitions, as seen in the Primera Exposición de Arte Revolucionario, held
in the capital between 1-12 December 1933, with accompanying exhibitions organised
in  Valencia,75 as  well  as  the  publication  of  the  Madrid-based  magazine  Octubre:
Escritores y Artistas Revolucionarios (1933-1934).76 Beyond these examples there are
few traces of AEAR/UEAP's impact. Indeed, Gómez later remarked that the Valencian
section, which Renau claimed had about seventy members,77 was 'very superficial.'78 Yet
even so its existence must be considered significant, at least insofar as it offered a broad
organisational alternative helping artists and writers to participate in the struggle for a
new society  in their vocational capacity – that is, as artists and writers, rather than party
activists. Renau's engagement in UEAP was from this perspective an indication that,
after  a  time  of  intense  devotion  to  the  party,  his  primary  political  interests  would
approximate those outlined in  the  preceding manifestos  of  Barbusse,  where art  was
conceived as a function of politics and politics as a function of art. 
71 Fuentes, V. La marcha al pueblo en las letras españolas, 60.
72 Octubre (October-November 1933), 1 
73 Fuentes, V. La marcha al pueblo en las letras españolas, 62. Indeed, the couple's contacts in Moscow 
naturally made them natural candidates, from an international perspective, to lead the organisation's 
Spanish section. See Elorza, A. and Bizcarrondo, M. Queridos Camaradas: La International 
Comunista y España, 1919-1939 (Barcelona: Planeta, 1999), 195-198.
74 Cf. Agramunt Lacruz, F. La vanguardia artística, 276. The poet Pascual Pla y Beltrán looked after 
administrative matters because he was jobless. The group met in the studios of Renau, Francisco 
Carreño, and José Sabina.
75 See Octubre (April 1934), 16.
76 Alberti claimed at the 'First Congress of Soviet Writers' of August 1934 that Octubre succeeded in 
reaching the working masses. According to literary historian Victor Fuentes, however, it only reached 
small nuclei in 'capitals' and some parts of 'la campiña' of Córdoba, Jaén, and Málaga – who read and 
commented on the content and contributed with transcriptions of protest songs rooted in folklore. See 
Fuentes, V. La marcha al pueblo, 62.
77 In his autobiographical notes, Renau admitted that the contemporary claim to have 125 members, as 
stated in the in the October-November issue of Octubre, was almost certainly exaggerated. Renau, J. 
'Notas al margen', 473 (fn 4).  
78 Gómez Andrés, A. & Pérez i Moragón, F. (Eds.) Emili Gómez Nadal, 391.
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3. ETHICS THROUGH AESTHETICS:                         
THE POLITICS OF CULTURAL REFORM 
(1931-1933)
Renau's most influential contribution to the political life of the pre-war Republic did not
materialise through either the PCE or the UEAP, despite his evident dedication to both,
but rather through his collaboration with a number of political magazines.1 Working
with magazines and other print media, not only as an artist but also as a writer and
editor, had the obvious advantage of allowing him to communicate his ideas to a mass
audience.  Such  work  followed  naturally  from his  belief  that  art  must  come to  the
people, rather than the other way around,2 and fulfilled an essential function in the task
of mobilising 'the masses' in support of his political goals. That said, the magazines with
which he collaborated did not represent a uniform party political viewpoint, even if they
did share an advocacy of proletarian revolution. While magazines like Octubre (1933-
1934)  and Nuestro Cinema  (1932-1935) were broadly Marxist in orientation,  others,
most notably those that witnessed Renau's beginnings as a political artist, were inspired
by some form of anarchism – the primary examples being Orto (1932-1934), Estudios
(1928-1937), and La Revista Blanca (1923-1936). Nueva Cultura (1935-1937) was not
tied to any specific ideology but sought to operate as a forum for collaboration across
the progressive left. Still, with the possible exception of the somewhat mystical work
made for Estudios between 1935 and 1936, the overall message of his political work in
this period is remarkably coherent. It constitutes an integral testament to his ideas and a
vivid indication of the particular cultural environment in which they were embedded.
Taken together, this work gives us a much fuller sense of his ideological outlook than
does his party membership alone.
The forging of a new Republican nation
Before looking more closely at specific magazines and artworks, however, more must
be said in order to situate this body of work within the broader context of Republican
cultural politics. As suggested above, the arrival of the Republic meant that progressive
1 When asked about the importance of Renau within the Valencia party organisation, Alejandra Soler, 
who as mentioned joined at the very end of 1934, when Renau had just stepped down from leading 
roles within the local PCE, said that his contributions to party activities amounted to very little. 
Interview with the author, 22 June 2012.
2 See inteview with Manuel García García in García, M. et al. Josep Renau, 278-280.
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politicians and intellectuals could finally begin a modernisation project that had found
steadily growing support among reformist workers and cosmopolitan middling classes.
The ideological  character of this particular  project  was to a large degree tied to the
multiform yet identifiable philosophical-political outlook of the aforementioned group
of academics and writers who since the turn of the century, and with greater intensity
after the First World War, had engaged with social debates and in several cases had
become  leading  figures  of  the  Republican  movement.3 Many  had  links  with  the
Institución  Libre  de  Enseñanza  (ILE),  an  independent  educational  institute  founded
1876 in protest against state interference in the academic sphere, but later seeking to
participate in government-driven change.4 In the first decades of the twentieth century,
the ILE had come to act, in the words of historian Enrique Montero, as 'contemporary
Spain's first think-tank in matters of politics, educational reform, and the promotion of
science,'5 and had moreover sought to cement its influence by educating a new national
leadership. Conceived as an 'natural aristocracy' of 'lofty intellectual and moral culture,'6
this  leadership  would  maintain  healthy  traditions  while  also  helping  the  Spain  to
develop  and  modernise.  To  many  institucionistas,  then,  the  arrival  of  the  Republic
represented first of all an opportunity to replace an obsolete oligarchy with a new elite,
capable of regenerating the country socially, economically, and culturally.7 
Yet  to  reform  a  country  comprehensively,  replacing  the  political  leadership
would not be enough.  institucionistas had long recognised the need for an expansion
and  improvement  of  the  national  education  system,  both  to  facilitate  progress  and,
crucially, to defuse the threat of revolution.8 This task was tackled determinedly by the
first Republican government, which devised an ambitious cultural programme aiming to
instil in the Spanish population a new set of cultural values that would serve as a base in
3 Their influence and prominence in the first democratic parliament has led many to call the new regime
'the intellectual's Republic', following in an article by José Martínez Ruiz (better know as 'Azorin'). 
See Aguado, A. & Ramos, M. A. La modernización de España, 153; For a discussion focusing 
particularly on the role of intellectuals in Spanish politics at this time, see also Bécarud, J. and López 
Campillo, E. Los intelectuales españoles durante la II República (Madrid: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 
1978) and Arbeloa, V. M. and de Santiago, M. Intelectuales ante la segunda república española 
(Salamanca: Ediciones Almar, 1981).
4 The ILE was inspired from its foundation by the post-Kantian thought of German philosopher Karl 
Krause (1781-1832).
5 Montero, E. 'Reform idealised: The Intellectual and Ideological Origins of the Second Republic', in 
Graham, H. and Labanyi, J. (Eds.) Spanish Cultural Studies, 125.
6 Culture here meaning something aking to German 'bildung' – i.e. the broad education by which one 
becomes 'cultured'.
7 In the view of Tuñon de Lara, the ILE effectively tried to facilitate the ascendancy of the middling 
classes to positions of power from which they had been excluded by the Restoration system. Medio 
Siglo de Cultura Española, 44.
8 See editors introduction to Spanish Cultural Studies, 2.
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the formation of a new Republican nation. At the heart of these efforts stood a plan to
reform and  expand  primary  education.  The  challenge  of  educating  a  population  of
whom 44,37%  were  registered  as  illiterate was  recognised  by  the  first  Republican
Minister of Public Instruction and Fine Arts, Marcelino Domingo, who stated that the
Republic aimed 'to bring about a fundamental transformation of Spanish reality so that
Spain may become an authentic democracy.'9 The creation of about 2,000 schools per
year in the first  biennium (even if many of these were just a single classroom) and
13,580  teaching posts  between  April  1931 and  November  1933,  at  which  point  the
incoming  conservative  government  halted  the  programme,  indicated  a  genuine
determination to make that fundamental transformation happen.10 So too did the much
disputed and ultimately unsuccessful attempt to impose a teaching ban on the religious
orders, who had previously had a virtual monopoly on primary education.11 Considering
that the Republic represented a secularising project, seeking to detach the population
from its connection to traditional – and above all religious – authority, the reduction of
church influence in education was, as prominent republican and later president Manuel
Azaña said, essentially a matter of self-defence.12 But such measures also corresponded
to an idea of the moral responsibility of the state, which in the Republican view, again
expressed  by  Azaña,  had  an  obligation  to  take  control  of  education  and  further
'civilisation' throughout its territory.13 
In  addition  to  traditional  schooling,  a  number  of  influential  reformist
Republicans also saw art as an important pedagogical tool.  As an indication, perhaps, of
the Kantian roots of their intellectual training, they believed art had the capacity to alter
and  refine  audiences'  sensibilities,  and  accordingly  granted  it  a  pivotal  role  in  the
dissemination of new republican values. The prominent  institucionalista Fernando de
los Ríos, Marcelino Domingo's successor at the Ministry of Public Instruction and Fine
9 Domingo is  quoted in Cobb, C. 'The Republican State and Mass Educational-Cultural Initiatives 
1931-1936' in Graham, H. and Labanyi, J. (Eds.) Spanish Cultural Studies, 133. Literacy figures based
on the census of 1930, taken from Cobb, C. Los Milicianos de la Cultura. (Bilbao: Universidad del 
País Vasco, 1995), 26. On the same page Cobb also quotes another, significantly lower estimate 
(33,73%) but the first has been used since it is also closer to the estimate of 42.2% given in Aguado, 
A. & Ramos, M. A. La modernización de España, 16.
10 Ibid. The first government spent 7% of national budget on 'política educativo-cultural'. It wanted to 
raise the figure to 10%, but never managed to go that far, according to Eduardo Huertas Vázquez. See 
La Política Cultural De La Segunda República Española (Madrid: Ministerio de Cultura, 1988), 28.
11 This only became law in May 1933, five months before a conservative government came to power 
that was determined to oppose secularisation measures.
12 Cobb, C. 'The Republican State and Mass Educational-Cultural Initiatives 1931-1936' in Graham, H. 
and Labanyi, J. (Eds.) Spanish Cultural Studies, 135.
13 Aguado, A. & Ramos, M. A. La modernización de España, 154. Cf. Article 48 in Republican 
constitution of 1931.
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Arts, stated the case clearly in an interview of July 1932. After describing the work
undertaken at the ministry, de los Ríos justified their efforts by mentioning his personal
conviction  that  'Spaniards'  could  easily  assimilate  'ethics  through  aesthetics.'14
Elsewhere he would also add that it was critical for the future of Spanish culture that
these two factors be effectively co-ordinated.15 Thus echoing the logic whereby a 'moral
accord'  could  be  achieved  through  art,  de  los  Rios  too  suggested  that  aesthetics
represented way of life and must be harmonised with collective aspirations.16 The zeal
with which the government and other  organisations pursued this goal would arguably
add credence to the writer  Ernesto Giménez Caballero's (critical) remark, referring to
educational  policy as  a  whole,  that  the Republic  had  come to  Spain  'to  replace  the
Catholic religion with the religion of culture.'17 
The Misiones Pedagógicas
The most emblematic expression of reformist Republican educational philosophy, and
the primary means by which the dictum 'ethics through aesthetics' was to be converted
into practice, was the Misiones Pedagógicas. Founded on 29 May 1931, the Misiones
consisted of teams of teachers and university students, as well as cultural workers of
various kinds, who travelled the Spanish countryside to visit remote villages to present
educational  programmes  aiming,  in  the  official  formulation,  'to  disseminate  general
culture, modern forms of teaching, and education concerning citizenship.'18 In  practice,
this  work  would  take  the  form of  lectures,  poetry  readings,  theatrical  and  musical
performances  (involving  choirs,  and,  if  feasible,  small  orchestras) as  well  as  art
exhibitions  utilising  reproductions  from  the  Prado  Museum  and  occasional  cinema
screenings. Although the cultural dimension of this work has received by far the most
attention,  both  from contemporary commentators  and  later  historians,  the  Misiones’
lectures  would  also  deal  with  practical  subjects  like  agricultural  production,19
medicine,20 and the  characteristics of the new democratic regime.21 There would also be
14 El Sol 24 July 1932, 12. 
15 A statement of his to this effect ('...en un país como el nuestro la coordinación de la ética con la 
estética es esencial para el porvenir de la cultura.') is cited in  Huertas Vázquez, E La Política 
Cultural, 56f.
16 Cf. the precedents discussed on pages 30-32 and 40f.
17 Huertas Vázquez, E. La Política Cultural, 20. Orginally from an essay on Azaña, Giménez Caballero, 
E. Manuel Azaña (Profecías españolas) (Madrid, 1975 [1932]), 173.
18 Gaceta de Madrid 30 May 1931, 1034.
19 Highlighted in Caudet, F. Las cenizas del fénix. La cultura española en los años 30 (Madrid: 
Ediciones de la Torre, 1993), 83-106.
20 Mentioned by Fernando de los Ríos in El Sol interview, 24 July 1932, 12. 
21 Gaceta de Madrid 30 May 1931, 1034. See also Cobb, C. 'The Republican State and Mass 
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sessions  introducing  local  teachers  to  new  teaching  techniques.22 Before  leaving  a
location,  the  'missionaries'  would  moreover  provide  some  means  of  local  people
engaging in further cultural activities; typically a small library, but it could also be a
gramophone with selected records, or even a cinema projector.23 Between January 1931
and December 1933, they had visited 300 villages and created 3000 rural libraries. The
theatre  and  the  choir  had  gone  to  115  villages,  while  the  travelling  museum  had
exhibited two collections of reproductions in 60 places. In total, almost 4000 villages –
to  some extent  covering most  of  the  country but  mostly located  in  and  around the
central regions of Old Castile24 – had had some sort of contact with the organisation.25
According to  Manuel  Bartolomé Cossío,  the  last  director  of  the  ILE  and  an
admired  political  advisor  among Republicans,  the primary function of  the  Misiones
Pedagógicas, of which he was the founder and 'mentor', was to 'counter isolation'.26 This
ambition had at least two components. First, as seen in efforts to familiarise villagers
with other areas of Spain as well as with the Republic's political constitution, it was a
means to reduce the distance between different parts of the country, between city and
countryside, and a means, above all, to link 'isolated' rural areas with the capital.27 The
Misiones were, in other words, born out of an effort to create an integrated national
identity,  based  on  a  new  imaginary  tied  to  national  geography  and  modern  state
institutions. Given time, this could have played a crucial role in consolidating the new
regime, as it served to alter social frames of reference and displace traditional structures
of power. Politically, the Misiones was a way simultaneously to announce and secure
the  establishment  of  the  Republic,  while  also  signalling  its  adherence  to  a  more
inclusive notion of citizenship.
Second, the Misiones was a means of counteracting spiritual isolation. This is
indicated in the founding decree's stipulation that missionaries pay 'particular attention'
to the rural population's 'spiritual interests',28 but also, and more revealingly, in Cossío's
Educational-Cultural Initiatives 1931-1936' in Graham, H. and Labanyi, J. (Eds.) Spanish Cultural 
Studies, 135.
22 Ibid.
23 Fernando de los Ríos in El Sol 24 July 1932, 12.
24 See maps in Holguín, S. E. Creating Spaniards: culture and national identity in Republican Spain 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2002), 55-78.
25 See the organisations own report: Patronato de Misiónes Pedagógicas. Septiembre de 1931 – 
Deciembre 1933 (Madrid 1934), xxi. Figures frequently reproduced in scholarly literature. See, for 
example, Tuñon de Lara, M. Medio Siglo de Cultura Española, 262ff.
26 Statement taken from Patronato de Misiones Pedagógicas, x. For a succinct biography, see Huertas 
Vázquez, E. La Política Cultural, 61-63.
27 Holguín, S. E. Creating Spaniards, 55-78.
28 Gaceta de Madrid 30 May 1931, 1034.
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statement for the organisational report of 1934:  
If  isolation provides  the starting point  for  the Misiones,  and social
justice its foundation, it is clear that the essence of these [Misiones]
stems  from  the  opposite  of  isolation,  which  is  communication  to
enrich souls and encourage in them the emergence of a small world of
ideas and interests, of relations human and divine that previously did
not exist.29
If there appears to be a tension here between grandeur and modesty (working for social
justice and opposing isolation amounts, in the end, to creating 'a small world of ideas
and interests'), we should once again recall the political value that had historically been
ascribed to the aesthetic experience.30 Cossío was first of all referring to the importance
of opening up internal horizons, imagining new realities, which would in turn help the
politically and culturally disenfranchised to formulate new identities – identities that
would  no  longer  correspond  to  the  limited  space  that  a  rigid  social  structure  had
assigned them. Underpinning his vision was a recognition of potential, which could be
readily translated into a principle of equality. The poet Antonio Machado, also active in
the  Misiones,31 stated  the  case  bluntly  while  speaking  about  the  democratisation  of
culture more generally: 
What is at the heart  of the movement of the working masses is an
aspiration to perfection through culture...  But, people say,  'How are
these brutes ever going to be cultured?' What these brutes want is not
being brutes. Everything that is defined as a privilege is a dead value.32
The categorical shift referred to by Machado was (and remains) a pre-condition of any
conceptualisation of emancipation. As such, it explains the fierce opposition voiced by
conservatives who claimed that initiatives like the Misiones Pedagógicas propagated an
'unrealistic' view of people or even violated a 'natural' and divinely ordained order.33 It
moreover  shows  why  such  a  shift  was  indeed  commonly  sought  by  progressive
organisations  of  the  left,  and  why it  constituted  a  central  ambition  of  the  political
29 Patronato de Misiones Pedagógicas, x.
30 Cf. dicussion on the Idealist origins of modern art on pages 29-32 above. Tuñon de Lara has 
highlighted that Cossío, like de los Ríos, was particularly interested in the social importance of 
aesthetics. See Medio Siglo de Cultura Española, 52.
31 Machado was a member of the board of the Misiones. See first page of Patronato de Misiones 
Pedagógicas.
32 From a 1934 interview cited in Caudet, F. Las cenizas del fénix, 35f.
33 For a selection of hostile reactions, see Holguín, S. E. Creating Spaniards, 55-78. The conservative 
government voted into power in November 1933 slashed the budget of the Misiones Pedagógicas by 
half. See Huertas Vázquez, E La Política Cultural, 26f.
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magazines  to  which Renau was contributing by 1932.34 Yet  it  must  be stressed that
neither Machado nor Cossío conceived of the Misiones as preparing the ground for a
workers'  revolution.35 On  the  contrary,  if  the  intellectual  elevation  of  the  rural
population had to entail a radical transformation of self-perceptions, it was because only
this  would  allow  an  approximation  of  the  sensibilities  of  the  educated  classes  –
epitomised by the ILE establishment itself – that now constituted the cultural model of
the new Republican nation. Combating isolation through a recognition of equality was,
in the  insitucionalista view, above all a strategy to guarantee progress in an orderly
fashion. 
The initiative to extend education to parts of the population previously partially
or wholly excluded from it did not stop with government initiatives like the Misiones
Pedagógicas. The travelling theatre company La Barraca, founded in 1932 and led by
the poet Federico Garcia Lorca, operated as an independent group performing in towns
and  villages,36 while  the  student  theatre  El  Búho,  directed  by the  writer  Max Aub,
similarly  represented  an  non-governmental  initiative  taking  performances  to  the
countryside around Valencia.37 Although not directly linked to the Ministry of Public
Instruction and Fine Arts or the ILE, these projects largely shared their assumptions, and
moreover stand as eloquent testaments to the public spirit and optimism that inspired
many progressives  in  the initial  Republican  period.38 Alejandra  Soler,  the university
student  active  in  Renau's  PCE  cell  from  1934,  insisted  in  a  2012  interview  that
'everyone' in those days wanted to be 'useful'. Towards the end of his life, Renau too
suggested  that  this  sentiment  underpinned  his  work  at  the  time.39 Student  unions
moreover organised urban and worker-centred schemes, most notably the Universidad
Popular, likewise intended to facilitate access to education.40 Such initiatives stemmed
34 For a broad introduction, see De Luis, F. Cincuenta años de cultura obrera en España, 1890-1940 
(Madrid: Pablo Iglesias, 1994).
35 Although Machado would come to be broadly supportive of an increasingly radical workers' 
movement in the run-up to and during the civil war.
36 Part of the 'outreach' department (Departamento de Extensión Universitaria) of the umbrella 
organisation of provincial sections of the FUE, the Unión Federal de Estudiantes Hispanos (UFEH). 
The UFEH was, however, supported financially by the Ministry of Public Instruction and Fine Arts. 
Tuñon de Lara, M. Medio Siglo de Cultura Española, 265.
37 Part of the Valencian FUE. See Perales Birlanga, G. Católicos y Liberales, 320.
38 Cf. Tuñon de Lara, M. Medio Siglo de Cultura Española, 267f.
39 Alejandra Soler, interview with the author, 22 July 2012. For Renau's comments, see interview with 
José Manuel Fajardo in Mundo Obrero, 28 May 1980, 21.
40 This mainly consisted of students giving evening classes for workers, using the facilities of the 
University, though there were also more far-reaching experiments with students living together with 
workers. Tuñon de Lara, M. Medio Siglo de Cultura Española, 265. For comments on the varied 
results obtained in Valencia, see Perales Birlanga, G. Católicos y Liberales, 318f.
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from older attempts within the socialist and anarchist movements to provide working-
class constituencies with improved educational opportunities, but while the Universidad
Popular  operated  primarily  as  a  means  to  extend  the  benefits  of  state  university
education, older worker-oriented initiatives –  especially those sponsored by anarchist
groups – were primarily concerned to offer general and and political instruction based
on alternative ideological perspectives. 41
The reception of the Misiones Pedagógicas 
Before returning to Renau, it must be asked how these initiatives were received by the
rural population. Obviously there are very few – not to say no – direct sources, as the
rural audience, a great part of which was illiterate, tended not to leave any independent
written records describing their experiences. The nearest thing we have are testimonies
from those who participated in the various 'missions.' Their reactions cover a range of
views  and  emotions,  from  triumphant  confirmation  to  scepticism  and  disillusion.
Alejandra Soler, active in El Búho, has described the impact of their performances in
terms that vindicate the aspiration of Cossío: 
Many of them were illiterate. They had never read a verse, or seen a
theatre representation in verse.  And still to this day I have not seen
people with eyes shining brighter […] than these illiterate peasants,
who  came  to  see  […]  'Fuenteovejuna,'42 and  who  rose  from  their
chairs, delighted to understand what we were teaching them. It was
wonderful. It was, I don't know, human wisdom entering brains as if to
impregnate them and make them open their eyes.'43 
Whether  members  of  those  audiences  really  did  understand  cannot,  of  course,  be
ascertained.  That  said,  although  reception  would  no  doubt  have  depended  on  local
socio-economic conditions, the plot of Fuenteovejuna, describing how the murder of a
tyrannical  rural  commandant  goes  unpunished  because  the  entire  village  assumes
collective responsibility for the deed, may clearly have resonated with ordinary villagers
for whom daily life was a struggle, just as much as it fitted the agenda of a Republic
representing  the  democratic  overthrow  of  a  dictatorial  regime.  And  insofar  as  the
performances  primarily  aimed  to  spark  audiences'  interest  in  the  national  cultural
heritage, evident enthusiasm was perhaps sufficient feed-back to prove the their worth
41 De Luis, F. Cincuenta años de cultura obrera en España.
42 A play by Félix Arturo Lope de Vega y Carpio (1562-1635) first published in 1619.
43 Interview with the author, 22 July 2012.
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as a starting point for change. 
Other  testimonies  too  suggested  that  classical  theatre  was  particularly  well
received  by  the  rural  population.  At  times  this  was  explained  by  reference  to  a
correspondence between the cultural environment of the plays' origins and the nature of
their audience in the 1930s: one report from the Misiones Pedagógicas stated that if
their theatre feeds off the same repertoire as its more 'primitive' predecessors, 'it is only
because  it  is  directed  to  an  audience  that  is  analogous  in  its  tastes,  sensibilities,
emotional response and language...'44 Again, it is hardly surprising if traditional plays,
describing scenes which rural audiences would have recognised to some degree, proved
more successful than works associated with urban modernity.45 Yet it is interesting to
note  that  this  comment  also  takes  art  to  be  yet  another  measure  of  rural  people's
backwardness. Their tastes both confirmed and reinforced their cultural location in a
national  past.  The  cultural  strategy  adopted  to  promote  national  unity  and  inter-
connectedness served equally, in other words, to emphasise difference and distance.
There were also other moments when missionaries remarked on the inadequacy
of providing spiritual enrichment without adding material help too. 'They needed bread
and  medicine  […] and  we had  only songs  and  poems in  our  bags',  the  playwright
Alejandro  Casona  lamented  after  visiting  the  village  of  San  Martín  de  Castañeda
(Zamora) in 1934.46 Also Lorca, as he was coming to an end of his touring with La
Barraca  in  spring  1936,  remarked  that  hunger  precludes  any  ability  to  appreciate
beauty.47 The  fact  that  the  Misiones  focused  on  peasants'  perceived  spiritual  rather
material  poverty  has  furthermore  generated  historical  critique.  To  Tuñon  de  Lara,
writing  in  the  1960s,  their  approach  was  akin  to  'planting  trees  upside  down.'48
Considering the delay in enacting social and agricultural legislation, even where this
was not entirely the government's  fault,  a cynical  view would even suggest that the
Misiones provided a cultural substitute for more tangible socio-economic reform. 
44 Tuñon de Lara, M. Medio Siglo de Cultura Española, 264.
45 Alejandra Soler, who performed both new and classical works with El Búho, claimed modern works 
were less effective as they seemed harder for the audience to follow. Interview, 22 July 2012. 
According to the painter Ramón Gaya, who was one of the 'missionaries' responsible for the travelling
museum, villagers also responded sceptically to most kinds of painting. See Basilio, M. M. Visual 
Propaganda, Exhibitions, and the Spanish Civil War (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013), 73, 108.
46 Cited in Cobb, C. 'The Republican State and Mass Educational-Cultural Initiatives 1931-1936' in 
Graham, H. and Labanyi, J. (Eds.) Spanish Cultural Studies, 136.
47 Tuñon de Lara, M. Medio Siglo de Cultura Española, 244.
48 Ibid., 264. See also Cruz, R. En el nombre del pueblo: República, rebelión y guerra en la España de 
1936 (Madrid: Siglo XXI, 2006), where the author argues that the actual results of the cultural and 
educational drive of the first years were far from impressive. See esp. 48f.
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Renau's criticisms of the Misiones
Renau and his colleagues too were critical of the Misiones Pedagógicas, which despite
good intentions  and 'generous attitudes'  had in  their  view to be regarded as  wholly
insufficient. Their greatest problem – easily tied to a materialist critique – was a lack of
interest in feedback. In effect, as Renau later suggested, the rural population was treated
like an 'empty sack' to be filled with 'leftist' versions of Golden Age art.49 Audiences
were presumed to be entirely passive,  and culture was distributed from above, as if
through charity.50 Regardless of progressive intent, this was a paternalistic, not to say
elitist, approach to the task of regenerating and democratising Spain. 
But in addition to the lack of reciprocity, there was another problem, rooted in
the very heritage that organisations like the Misiones Pedagógicas sought to popularise.
While the group gathered around Renau had, like most progressive artists and writers,
profound  respect  for  the  'humanist  traditions'  of  their  national  past,  they were  also
critical of certain characteristics typically present in the works of the Spanish Golden
Age. According to Renau, they objected, above all, to its 'individualist', 'aestheticist',
and 'fatalist' nature, tendencies which moreover appeared to find new forms in much
contemporary work, produced by progressive Republicans as well as others.51 Even if
the  former  drew  on  tradition  with  the  objective  of  modernising  it,  this  tendency
amounted, in Renau's view, to an essentialist form of cultural conservatism which in fact
hindered the realisation of the Republic's progressive goals. It offered, in short, neither
ethics nor aesthetics that corresponded to the people's contemporary needs. What was
required here were entirely new cultural co-ordinates, inspiring the creation of a truly
modern Spain.52 Exactly how this vision might be elaborated would become the central
question of his most far reaching cultural project, Nueva Cultura, but was a fundamental
concern from the beginning of his days as a politicised artist. 
The  difference  between  the  values  which  reformist  institucionistas hoped  to
instil in the population and those propagated by more radical figures like Renau can be
clarified further by analysing the way their diverging aesthetic ideals were perceived to
49 Renau, J. 'Notas al margen', 477.
50 The idea of culture being distributed like charity is recurrent in the scholarly literature. See, for 
example, Cobb, C. 'The Republican State and Mass Educational-Cultural Initiatives 1931-1936' in 
Graham, H. and Labanyi, J. (Eds.) Spanish Cultural Studies, 136.
51 The primary representative of progressive Republicans adopting this approach would be García Lorca 
and his Gypsy Ballads (Romancero Gitano), published in 1928. This is particularly clear in a 1976 
interview with Renau by Inmaculada Julián González. See Julián González, I. El Cartel Republicano 
en la Guerra Civil Española (Madrid: Ministerio de Cultura, 1993), 185f. 
52 Renau, J. 'Notas al margen', 474f.
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correspond to political virtue. In connection with his statement regarding the capacity of
Spaniards to assimilate 'ethics through aesthetics', Fernando de los Ríos had added that
the goal of such education was to produce 'morally refined men' (hombres moralmente
exquisitos).53 In contrast to this ambition, aptly described by Machado as 'the gradual
aristocratisation  of  the  masses,'54 the  ambition  of  Renau  and  his  colleagues  was  to
transform 'the masses' into an agent of proletarian revolution, driving the revolt against
all traditional – and above all aristocratic – modes of being. 'The refined' (lo exquisito)
was precisely what Marxist writer César Arconada had, in a literary survey of June
1930,  praised  the  avant-garde  for  having  attacked  (and  in  his  opinion  destroyed).55
Although his choice of this word would not have been a conscious reference to de los
Ríos's  statement,  Arconada’s celebration of aggression marked a principal  difference
between reformist and revolutionary politics. Indeed, on the basis of this distinction, the
correspondence between avant-garde attitudes and the way radical artists and writers
imagined  revolutionary  subjectivity  can  be  taken  further:  if  refinement  could  be
associated with contemplation and a certain degree of passivity,  revolutionary ideals
revolved  around  activity,  violence,  conquest.  Conquest  –  part  of  Ortega's  defining
description of the avant-garde56 – was a particularly pervasive trope whenever cultural
and political discourses overlapped (on both the Left  and the Right).57 It  recurred in
1935  in  the  celebrated  statement  by  French  writer  André  Malraux,  which  sharply
contrasted with Spanish reformers' approach to the dissemination of cultural history and
identity: 'Heritage', Malraux claimed, 'is not transmitted; it is conquered,'58 Rather than a
passive recipient  of 'aristocratic'  education, then,  'the masses',  in  the minds of  most
revolutionary writers and artists, had to be an active and creative agent, occupying the
field of culture as producers as well as consumers, appropriating history on their own
terms.
53 Cited in Huertas Vázquez, E. La Política Cultural, 56.
54 Cited in Cobb, C. La Cultura y el Pueblo, 7.
55 La Gaceta Literaria 15 June 1930, 3f. 
56 See page 32f above.
57 Arconada also discussed conquering the spheres of arts and politics. See La Gaceta Literaria 15 June 
1930, 3f. For an example of this language on the right, see, for example, the national syndicalist 
publication edited by Ramiro Ledesma Ramos, The Conquest of the State (La Conquista del Estado).
58 The statement was made at the First International Congress of Writers for the Defence of Culture, held
in Paris in June 1935. Anzar Soler, M. I congreso internacional de escritores para la defensa de la 
cultura (Paris, 1935) Vol. 1 (Valencia: Generalitat Valenciana, 1987), 64.
68
4. ART TO GUIDE THE MASSES: 
ORTO AND ESTUDIOS (1932-1934)
To help achieve his radical artistic and political goals, Renau would, as suggested, work
with magazines propagating a revolutionary egalitarian politics.  What they proposed
was not only another regime change, but  an entirely new society based on different
values,  an  alternative  vision  of  a  future  nation.  In  Spain,  calls  for  a  radical  break
gathered  momentum  as  the  practical  failures  of  the  reforming  Republic  became
increasingly evident. The mood changed again as a concentrated conservative counter-
offensive, led by a new government after the November 1933 elections, threatened to
turn back to the clocks on the few gains made during the first biennium.1 At the same
time, the international climate, marked by economic crisis and increasingly authoritarian
responses to social unrest, most ominously represented by Hitler's ascent to power in
January 1933, unmistakably indicated sharpening social conflicts ahead, as well as a
further  deterioration  of  the  liberal  system.  To  achieve  the  goals  of  popular
enfranchisement in such an environment, a radical approach was needed, and with this a
new  kind  of  education.  In  spite  of  these  increasing  stakes,  and  well-intentioned
egalitarian sentiments, the practical effort to mobilise 'the masses' around a new set of
ideals remained, however, largely prescriptive and didactic.
The two magazines which more than any other launched Renau's career as a
political artist, Orto and Estudios, were both eminently didactic in their outlook, and the
idea that the proletariat had to achieve a certain level of political consciousness before
fulfilling its  revolutionary task was clearly reflected,  albeit  in  significantly different
ways, in its editorial ambitions. Orto, where Renau formed part of the editorial team as
the graphic director,2 stated in its inaugural issue of March 1932 (dedicated to 'the study
of the crisis of the global economy') its intention to aid 'all those who want to see clearly
and deeply in the intricate labyrinth of social problems.' It wished to teach its readers
about  'the  period  of  transition  and  construction  of  the  New  Era',  and  offered  the
following proclamation as a summary of its aims: 
1 This involved a reversal of land reform and labour agreements, as well as a halt to cultural expansion, 
etc. For an account of the effects this had on social relations, see, for example, Preston, P. The Spanish
Holocaust, 52-89.
2 The main editor was Marín Civera, who was politically committed to the anarcho-syndicalist 
movement. See Paniagua, J. 'Estudio preliminar: Marín Civera y la cultura popular, Orto (1932-1934)' 
in the facsimile version of Orto (Valencia: Centro Francisco Tomás y Valiente UNED Alzira-Valencia 
& Fundación Instituto de Historia Social, 2001).
69
Let  the  masses  understand.  Let  them enrich  their  sensibilities.  Let
them think with rectitude. Let them proceed accurately. 
This is what we aim to achieve.3 
If 'the masses' were clearly the main protagonists in Orto's conception of politics, their
impact, the editors seemed to suggest, would only have positive effect once they had
been given correct instruction. 
This particular attempt to guide progress failed to convince, however, as  Orto
eventually ran foul of its  readers.  Its  last  issue was published in January 1934, and
appears to have been preceded by a sudden drop in sales – prompting the editors to
insinuate,  somewhat  obliquely,  that  they  were  victims  of  a  co-ordinated  hostile
campaign.4 The problem seems to have been ideological differences, as the last editorial
insisted on defending, as if against an accusation, the magazine's advocacy of discipline,
control, and collectivity – terms which anarchists often responded to with ambivalence,
if not outright hostility.5 Perhaps its Marxist element was largely to blame for its failure
to  survive  among  Valencia's  militant  grass-roots,  still  predominantly  influenced  by
anarchism.6 It  is  also  possible  that  Orto's  particularly  strong  focus  on  international
subjects  made  its  content  somewhat  remote  from  the  immediate  concerns  of  the
Valencian readership.
By  contrast,  Estudios,  launched  in  1928  and  described  by  the  editors  as  a
monthly magazine of 'anarcho-sexo-nudist' orientation, was hugely popular, both locally
and nationally (indeed, its competition might have been a further contributory factor to
Orto's  demise).7 A direct  successor  to  a  publication  called  Generacion  Consciente
(1923-1928), Estudios was firmly established and enjoyed great prestige among Spanish
libertarians, not least because of the quality of its articles and the attractiveness of both
presentation and themes.8 In addition to political commentary and general educational
pieces, each issue contained practical advice on matters like diet and sex, for example. It
achieved an impressive circulation, both geographically (covering not only Spain, but
3 Orto (March 1932), 1.
4 No specific reasons explaining such a campaign were given. The drop in sales was highlighted already
in the editorial of the April issue 1933, where the editors appealed to their readers to suggest changes 
if they were not happy with the magazine's current direction.
5 Workers need to realise that 'discipline is not slavery, nor control authoritarianism', they stated, and 
reminded its readers that 'the world of the future does not belong to individuals, but to collectives, to 
the great masses'. See editorial of Orto (January 1934). 
6 Uniquely in Spain, Orto sought to marry the idea of Marxism with the ideas of Anarchism. Paniagua, 
J. 'Estudio preliminar', xv.
7 For a comprehensive study of Estudios, see Navarro Navarro, F. J. El paraíso de la razón: la revista 
"Estudios" (1928-1937) y el mundo cultural anarquista (Valencia, 1997).
8 Ibid.. See especially 70-76. 
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also France,  Belgium, and Argentina)  and also quantitatively.9 According to Spanish
cultural historian Javier Navarro Navarro, an estimate included in a 1933 CNT report by
Russian anarcho-syndicalist Alexander Schapiro may be seen as a reliable indication of
Estudios' regular print-run at this time: about 25,000 copies per month.10 In Navarro's
view, this figure may be compared with monthly print-runs of 6,000-8,000 copies for
another  flagship  anarchist  magazine  (for  which  Renau  also  did  a  few  covers),  the
Barcelona-based  but  also  nationally  distributed  La  Revista  Blanca (1923-1936).11
Whether or not the real figures consistently corresponded to these estimates, it is clear
that  Estudios  offered  Renau an opportunity to present his work in a highly respected
forum that reached a large working-class audience.
In terms of its content,  Estudios carried articles on politics, art, science, sexual
education and health. In accordance with typical anarchist pedagogy, its approach was
less prescriptive than that of  Orto and placed a greater emphasis on self-improvement
and independent learning. To introduce an element of dialogue between the magazine
and  its  readership,  Estudios  also  included,  as  did  Orto,12 a  section  where  a
knowledgeable  collaborator,  frequently a  Dr.  Roberto Remartínez,  answered  readers'
questions.13 A glance  at  this  correspondence  indicates  that  readers  too  placed  great
weight on their self-education, and later interviews with magazine subscribers saw them
reiterating that a 'whole generation' benefited from its positive formative influence. As
one interviewee stated:
In  terms of  education,  the magazine did a  great  job among people
[…]. Reading its pages, we discovered the value of culture in helping
the individual to develop within society.  […] They sparked in us a
feeling of solidarity and self-overcoming (superación);  a feeling of
being something more in this world than just  a number among the
millions of beings who form part of it.14  
Playing a part in this achievement, Renau's images were praised by readers for their
'eye-catching' qualities,15 which made them an important means by which the magazine
9 Ibid., 70f.
10 Ibid., 67.
11 Ibid. Renau's covers appear on the issues of 15 February 1934, 30 November 1934, and 4 January 
1935.
12 From December 1932, Orto included a 'consultorio sociológico' allowing readers to seek published 
answers to any question related to the magazine's field of interest.  
13 This section was predominantly geared towards questions relating to personal (often sexual) health, 
but would occassionally include broader cultural issues.   
14 Navarro Navarro, F. J. El paraíso, 74.
15 This praise was also extended to the other artist working regularly for Estudios, Manuel Monleón. 
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communicated its political and cultural content.16
The role of Renau as an artist contributing to the educational projects of  Orto
and  Estudios was necessarily different to that  of those who contributed with written
articles (though he occasionally did too). To understand why this was so, it must first of
all be remembered that images cannot communicate conceptual knowledge.17 They can
only imitate written discourse through symbolic correspondences, and to the degree that
these relations are less precise than linguistic relations (stabilised to some extent by the
authority  of  dictionaries  and  logical  connectors),  they  are  also  more  open  to
interpretation. Any political reading of Renau's work would thus have been a result of a
dynamic and less predictable exchange between its particular symbolic composition and
audiences'  understanding of  the symbols  themselves,  as well  as  their  possible inter-
relations. It may thus be presumed that Renau neither simply taught his audiences new
discursive knowledge,  nor  simply provided a symbolic  mirror  image of  pre-existing
conceptions. Rather, his influence would consist in guiding pre-existing conceptions, so
as to bind them to certain associational patterns that gave each component a specific
meaning.18 
The politics of realism
Renau’s determination to influence his readers, and thus make his images as effective as
possible, was part of the reason why Renau's work for  Orto and Estudios entailed not
only a change in content, compared with his earlier and ongoing advertising work, but
also a change in form. Instead of experimenting with Cubist and Surrealist influences,
his political work operated decisively within the realm of realism. That realism should
be his aesthetic choice in this context did not only relate to its perceived effectiveness in
Ibid., 210.
16 Ibid., 78, 209-217 (esp. 210).  More prosaically, images also constituted a significant factor in 
boosting sales, and it is noteworthy that Estudios would not miss any opportunity to advertise 
'sensational graphic material' on its cover. See Aug-Oct 1933, and ad for Renau's upcoming 'Ten 
Commandment' series in Jan 1934. 
17 Here I agree with Susan Sontag's view in On Photography (London: Penguin, 1979) (see especially 
page 24).
18 Like all propaganda, Renau's images needed to draw on pre-existing conceptions to be effective. 'The 
propagandist', Aldous Huxley observed in 1936, 'is a man who canalises an already existing stream. In
a land where there is no water, he digs in vain.' The metaphor is particularly apt in relation to images. 
If the impact of propaganda is generally greatest when preaching, as David Welch puts it, to the 
'already partially converted', the propagandistic image needs an audience already initiated in the 
relevant discourse to be correctly understood at all. See David Welch 'Nazi Propaganda and the 
Volksgemeinschaft: Constructing a People's Community' Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 39, 
No. 2, Understanding Nazi Germany (April 2004), 213-238 (see especially 214 for Huxley quote and 
the idea of preaching to the 'partially converted').
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conveying specific messages, but also to the fact that it was seen as expressive of a set
of  values  matching  his  political  orientation.  Before  considering  specific  images
highlighting the visual-pedagogical strategies of Orto and Estudios, then, it is necessary
to  clarify  the  aesthetic  logic  as  well  the  political  stakes  generally  implied  in  this
conception. In the case of Renau, this means returning, first of all, to the book that he
believed was one of the most influential in defining his path as an artist devoted to
politics: G.V. Plekhanov's Art and Social Life. 
The main contention of Plekhanov's book, originally a lecture delivered in Liége
and Paris in 1912, was that art, in order to maintain its vitality, needed to incorporate the
emancipatory ideas of its time. At the beginning of the twentieth century, abstracted
styles  like  Cubism  were,  in  Plekhanov's  opinion,  incapable  of  doing  this.  The
fundamental problem lay in their apparent appeal to a radical idealism, which stated that
objective  reality  was  unknowable  and  that  truth  was  an  isolated  product  of  each
individual. To Plekhanov, this idea was absurd, and made artists impervious to criticism,
regardless  of  the  quality  of  their  work.  It  effectively  meant  that  the  painting
corresponded  only  to  an  internal  reality  to  which  no  external  audience  could  have
access.19 At  a  time  when  human  emancipation  was  inextricably  linked  to  mass-
movements and collective action, such ideas disconnected art from the historical forces
of progress, and pushed it into a spiral of decay.20
These points were later stressed by the Spanish writer Ramón Sender, who in his
review of Plekhanov's book agreed (in terms that brings us back to Renau's first solo
exhibition of 1928) that Cubism, 'in itself accepted as a facile humoristic game', had
'descended to an inferior life; that of decorative art.' While 'aesthetically revolutionary',
it  had ultimately served a 'conservative social use'.  Hence, Sender concluded, avant-
garde  artists  experimenting  with  abstraction  thought  they  were  rebelling  against
tradition when in fact they were only disregarding precisely that which was 'new and
vital' in their era.21
To  engage  with  the  progressive  forces  of  the  era,  Plekhanov  and  Sender
maintained, artists had to adopt some form of realist aesthetic. Theoretically, there were
three major considerations – corresponding,  respectively,  to concerns for objectivity,
accessibility,  and  collective  action  –  that  made  adherence  to  realism  within  the
19 Cf. Ortega's description of avant-garde art. See pages 32f above.
20 Plekhanov, G. V. Art and Social Life (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1953). See especially 61f. Note 
too that Plekhanov accepts that artistic isolation (rejection of social life) can be a valid protest, but 
under entirely different social conditions (see, for example, 67).
21 Sender, R. 'Plejánov y el arte' El Sol 10 July 1929, 2. Also in Cobb, C. La cultura, 188-191.
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progressive  arts  politically significant  in  Spain  and  elsewhere.  These  considerations
were all  implicitly if  not  explicitly addressed in Plekhanov's  reasoning, but  must be
further explored for their full ramifications to become apparent. 
First and foremost, as is clear from Plekhanov's argument, realism meant that art
corresponded to an external and in theory universally accessible referent. This had an
evident  political  value  insofar  as  the  referent  could  be  a  point  of  convergence  for
collective opinion – a referent enabling the emergence of what the Clarté manifesto of
1919 called a 'moral accord.'22 Yet on a deeper level, this attribute is also essential if any
aesthetic co-ordination of sensibilities is to produce an agreement on the conditions of
collective  action.  Politically  motivated  endorsement  of  realism would  thus  logically
revolve around a readiness to collapse the subjective mediation of Schiller's aesthetic
epistemology (premised on a cancellation of opposites and a suspension of domination)
in order to formulate objective truths and capture in art a fragment of the real. 
This  logic  further  underpinned an  artistic  interest,  emerging at  this  time and
shared  by  Renau,  in  documents  and  the  documentary  as  a  particular  mode  of
representation. Documentary practices in art were from the beginning tied to collective
concerns.  These  practices  took  shape  across  Europe  around  1930  as  a  part  of  a
burgeoning workers’ movement, and responded to a need to give visibility to the new
mass-subject of democratic politics.23 To represent this subject adequately, artists sought
to  implement  the  philosophical  precepts  of  realism in  increasingly radical  ways.  In
effect this reduced the distance between art and social knowledge, between fiction and
non-fiction,  art  and  non-art.  Manifestations  of  this  ambition  can  be  seen  in  Soviet
attempts to create a literature based on fact,24 but also in suggestions, voiced by Renau
among others, that art could be profitably informed by sociology.25 It could further be
detected in an article published in the inaugural issue of Orto, where Renau argued that
art was unable to generate the great syntheses of the past and instead had to 'descend' to
contemplate the realm of 'economy.'26 The last example no doubt represented an attempt
by the artist to align his practice with the materialist principles of Marxism, but it may
22 See pages 40f above. Note the fact that Clarté demanded that artist should try to represent the truth as 
well as beauty in their works. 
23 See Jorge Ribalta's preface in Ribalta, J. (Ed.) The Worker Photography Movement (1926-1939): 
Essays and Documents (Madrid: Museo Reina Sofia, 2011), no page number.
24 See, for example, Wolf, E.'The Author as Photographer: Tret'iakov's, Erenburg's, and Il'f's Images of 
the West' Configurations, Volume 18, Number 3, (Fall 2010), 383-403.
25 See Renau, J. 'Cinema: El camino de la vida (Film ruso de Nicolaiekk)' in Orto, 5 (July 1932). See 
also, for example, Zambrana, A. 'Consideraciones literarias de un tipógrafo' in La Gaceta Literaria 15 
Sept 1928, 4.
26 Renau, J. 'Fundamentaciones de la crisis actual del Arte' Orto, 1 (March 1932). 41-44.
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also serve as a reminder that the epistemological link between documentary practices
and mass-politics typically contained an ideological  dimension committing both to a
programme of change. In this sense, as Molly Nesbit has observed in her study of avant-
garde photographers, artists used 'the most common of formal materials, the document
[…] because they need to keep up with its modernity, to criticize it and to surpass it.'27
Orto,  similarly,  presented itself as a magazine not of political opinion, but of 'social
documentation,' guiding its readers towards a new era. Reports on an increased interest
in  non-fictional  social  literature  as  the  political  situation  of  the  Republic  grew
increasingly volatile  may further  suggest  that  a faith in the transformative power of
social knowledge was shared by members of the reading public too.28 In conjunction
with  progressive  politics,  then,  the  promotion  of  the  document  may be  seen  as  an
attempt to take the aspirations of realism to a new level, an attempt that gave concrete
expression to what French philosopher Alain Badiou has called the twentieth century's
'passion for the real' – that is, a desire not only to know the real, but also to convert
previous centuries' utopian dreams into reality.29 
Intrinsically linked to this collectivist vision was the notion of realist aesthetics'
immediate accessibility. In this respect, realism was founded on the logic of mimesis. In
the standard translation of the Aristotelian term, mimesis refers to imitations of actions
taking  place  within  a  universally  graspable  plot.30 Even  if  realism  here  substituted
objective  reality  for  the  plot,  the  relation  between  representation  and  referent  is
essentially  the  same.  As  described  by  Jacques  Rancière,  mimesis  presumed  a
concordance  between the signs  exhibited by the artwork,  on the one hand,  and  the
emotion and perception by which these signs were understood, on the other. There was a
correspondence, in other words,  between the two fundamental  processes involved in
communication through art – poeisis (relating to production and display) and aisthesis
(relating to reception). Classical theatre thus operated in a space where the stage, the
audience and the world were 'comprised in the same continuum.'31 What was conveyed
from the stage was equally accessible to – that is, equally available to the senses of – all
members of the audience. 
27 Cited Mendelson, J. Documenting Spain, xxii.
28 Fuentes, V. La marcha al pueblo, 37-51 (especially 47). See also report form Madrid's annual book 
fair in El Sol 9 May 1934, 7. 
29 Badiou, A. The Century (Cambridge: Polity, 2007).
30 For a succinct explanation of the Aristotelian concept of plot, see Malcom Heath's introduction to 
Aristotle's Poetics (London: Penguin, 1996).
31 Rancière, J. The Emancipated Spectator (London: Verso, 2009), 60f.
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Along similar lines, one of Renau's closest collaborators, the painter Francisco
Carreño, would publish an article in Nueva Cultura describing realism as an inherently
popular form which could give audiences direct access to meaning.32 Accessibility was
here taken to involve understanding as well  as availability;  a perception which was
particularly pronounced in relation to photography – the realist image  par excellence.
'No kind of representation,'  asserted the Russian artist El Lissitzky in a claim which
would  later  be  echoed  in  Spain,  is  as  completely  comprehensible  to  all  people  as
photography.33 Politically,  this  carried  obvious  democratic  overtones,  and  contrasted
sharply with  the  abstracted  aesthetics  described  by Ortega  y  Gasset  as  intrinsically
incomprehensible  to  all  but  a  select  group.34 Indeed,  from  this  perspective  the
establishment of a democratic Republic clearly serves as an important contextual factor,
in conjunction with intellectual developments within the international left,35 to explain
why the arts in Spain saw a more general resurgence of realism in the 1930s.36 
The third reason why a return to realism was politically significant was that, in
comparison with abstracted forms of avant-garde expression, it was taken to encourage
strong emotive responses. Again, to understand why these associations were made quite
categorically in 1930s Spain, we need to return to Ortega y Gasset's 'dehumanized' art.
One of the fundamental characteristics of this art was emotional distance, maintained by
the  artist  (and  thus  imposed  on  the  audience)  in  order  to  arrive  at  pure  aesthetic
contemplation. Ortega y Gasset's illustrative example of what this entailed involved a
man who is lying on his death bed and is surrounded by his wife, his doctor, a journalist,
and a painter. Emotional engagement in the event is, in this example, strongest in the
wife and gets progressively weaker with each character mentioned above. The painter
takes virtually no interest at all in the distress before him, but rather contemplates the
room's aesthetic qualities: the light, its shapes and colours, and so on.37 For politically
committed artists  like Renau,  this  form of  detachment  was anathema,  and Ortega  y
32 See Carreño, F. 'Arte de Tendencia y la Caricatura' in Nueva Cultura, 11 (March-April 1936), 14f (part
I), and Nueva Cultura, 12 (May-June 1936), 14f (part II).
33 Ades, D. Photomontage (2nd ed.) (London: Thames & Hudson, 1986), 63. Cf. the proclamation in civil
war magazine Alianza, 30 (11 May 1937), stating that photography was a language 'that the whole 
worlds understands.' Cited in Mendelson, J. Revistas y Guerra, 354.
34 That is, people equipped with particular aesthetic sensibilities. Ortega y Gasset, J. La 
deshumanización, 70ff.
35 Including the official adoption of socialist realism in the USSR at the 1934 Congress of Soviet 
Writers. For background and connections with Spain, see Aznar Soler, M. Literatura española y 
antifascismo, 36-47. For further comment, see also pages 118-120 below.
36 Ernesto Gímenez Caballero was one of many who very clearly perceived realism's rising prestige in 
1930s. Ibid., 19f.
37 Ortega y Gasset, J. La deshumanización, 81ff.
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Gasset's particular terminology frequently led advocates of realist art to emphasise, as
did  Ramón  Sender  in  his  favourable  review  of  Plekhanov's  book,  its  'human  and
humanitarian'  –  as  opposed  to  'dehumanized'  –  nature.38 Such  normative  twists  to
Ortega's essentially descriptive term were perhaps always likely to surface in left-wing
criticism,  not  least  because  identification  and  empathy  were  cornerstones  of  the
solidarity which progressive mass-movements needed to grow and act. 
Photography as a political weapon
Concerns  regarding  objectivity,  accessibility,  and  emotional  identification  were  all
central to Renau's use of photography, which constituted his primary means of exploring
the  possibilities  of  realism.  As  suggested  by  the  simultaneous  emergence  of
documentary arts, photography (together with film) was seen by Renau and countless
contemporaries within the cultural circles of the socialist and communist left to offer an
ideal base on which to develop an a cultural formula adhering to Marxist principles. As
a form it denoted a primary interest in material reality; it was inherently made for mass-
production,  which  undercut  earlier  models  of  privileged  access  to  art;  it  effected  a
perfect  instance  of  mimesis,  which  made  it  both  universally  understandable  and
conducive to the formation of new collectivities;  and finally,  it  drew on developing
representational  technologies,  which  pointed  to  a  symbolically  important  link  with
scientific progress and modernity.  Photography offered, in short, a democratic mass-
expression supremely equipped to capture the reality of contemporary society. Of course
this, together with its association with objective truth, also made it a powerful political
and educational tool. Such considerations no doubt provided the immediate motivation
for Renau's adoption of the form. Before returning to the cultural battles of Republican
Spain,  then,  it  is  necessary  to  analyse  the  particular  propagandistic  potential  of
photography and consider the ways in which it reinforced the ideological message of his
visual artworks.
Photography was incorporated into Renau's work to create a number of different
effects, but most commonly it was presented as incriminating evidence, a fact to expose
establishment  lies.39 This  is  evident  in  series  like  'Dark  Pages  of  War:  what  they
concealed from the people' (Paginas Negras de la Guerra: lo que se ocultó al pueblo),
38 Sender, R. 'Plejánov y el arte'. See also Aznar Soler, M. Literatura española y antifascismo, 19f.
39 Cf. the comments of a contemporary German worker photographer: 'All sorts of things could be 
denied, but a photograph was evidence you could not twist around so easily.' Stumberger, R. 'AIZ and 
the German Worker Photographers' in Ribalta, J. (Ed.) The Worker Photography Movement, 86.
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published in Estudios between August and November 1933. Here censored photographs
originally obtained by the French magazine  VU  were presented as revealing the true
brutality of the First World War. Similarly, a photograph of colonial abuse, depicting a
white man beating a black man who is tied to a tree, was published in Orto in August
1932 and reused by Renau for Nueva Cultura in March 1935, with a caption explaining
that its distribution had been prohibited by a British court.40 Less violent, but published
with similar motives, was a photo feature on modern spying gadgets, which appeared,
possibly as a result of Renau's connection with both magazines, first in Octubre (July-
August 1933) and then, in expanded version, in Estudios (December 1933).41 In short,
the aim here was to prove the deceitful nature of the ruling classes (and, by implication,
the inadequacy if not wilful obfuscations of mainstream media). In the latter example,
the penetrating work of photography acquired an additional  dimension as the actual
machinery of duplicity was laid bare before readers' eyes. Yet in all cases photography
was taken to reveal, as indisputable fact, what the ruling classes tried to conceal.
However, the objectivity of the photograph, while certainly real in relation to its
indexicality, was often invoked in ways which extended its truth claim in problematic
ways. One illustrative if relatively crude example of this appeared in a short illustrated
column in the May 1933 issue of Estudios [Fig. 2]. This column was not necessarily put
together by Renau, but the logic at work applied also to many of his later compositions,
most  notably  the  Nueva  Cultura series 'Dark  Testimonies  of  Our  Times'  (Testigos
Negros de Nuestros Tiempos, 1935-1936, 1937).42 In the Estudios example, cryptically
entitled 'The Humane Sense of Women' (El Sentido Humano de la Mujer), we see two
photographs of  different  women:  one evidently a  member of  the urban bourgeoisie,
seated in a living room; the other a peasant, portrayed by the outside wall of a simple
stone house. The text to the right suggests that these images offer 'eloquent examples' of
how  the  'bourgeois'  woman  and  the  'village'  woman  display  diametrically  opposed
characteristics, which are in turn indicative of the moral composition of their class. The
first is apparently 'artificial' and 'individualist', devoid of all maternal instinct, while the
latter  displays  'affection'  and  is  ultimately  suggestive  of  'all  that  a  woman  can  be:
mother and sister, friend and lover.' The inclusion of a plastic doll next the former, and a
40 Nueva Cultura, 3 (March 1935), 8. All images in Orto appeared in a separate picture section in the 
middle of the magazine, consisting of two sheets of thicker and better quality compared to the rest. 
The pages in this section were not numbered. 
41 Octubre, 2 (July-August 1933), 13. Estudios had the same arrangement as Orto with regards to visual 
material (see previous note). Hence it is not possible to provide references with page numbers.
42 See chapter 5 below.
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small lamb in the lap of the latter, suggesting an analogy between the peasant and the
Virgin  Mary,  further  reinforces  the  distinction  in  maternal  capacity.43 Besides  the
essentialist description whereby both women are reduced either to their child-bearing
role or their relation to men (in itself indicative of the actual limitations imposed on
female emancipation in most Spanish progressive movements at the time44) and the way
anarchist propaganda made extensive use of Christian symbolism despite its fiercely
anti-clerical  stance,45 the  rhetorical  strategy  of  the  feature  is  noteworthy because  it
appeals to the objectivity of the photograph to validate a blatantly subjective reading of
its  content.  In  other  words,  photography serves  as  a  device  by  which  discursively
derived meaning could appear to be anchored in objective reality and correspond to an
undeniable truth. Such rhetorical techniques demonstrate clearly photography's potential
as  a  political  tool,  which  permitted  actors  to  'objectify'  subjective  conceptions  and
incorporate these into pre-determined cognitive patterns.
In a larger context, this conflation of objectivity and discourse was a powerful
way  to  disrupt  hegemonic  perceptions  in  the  public  sphere,  and  place  new  social
perspectives 'on firm ground.' This was arguably the fundamental aim of the progressive
documentary photography movement of the 1930s. Typically less romanticizing of rural
life than the  Estudios example considered above, it set out to depict life in Europe's
industrial centres as seen from a proletarian perspective, a perspective that was, as a
rule,  absent  from  mainstream  media.46 The  movement  spread  to  most  European
countries, but was particularly strong in Germany and Russia, where it had originated as
a result of two almost simultaneous initiatives in 1926, hoping to encourage workers to
supply worker magazines with photographs taken by themselves.47 Although ultimately
hampered by material limitations and at times contradictory attitudes from sympathetic
professionals,  'worker  photography'  became in  this  sense  one  of  the  most  effective
43 Jesus is at times referred to as 'The lamb of God' in Christian teachings (from the Gospel of John).
44 See Aguado, A. & Ramos, M. A. La modernización de España, 120f. For a more extensive analysis of 
gender relations in working class communities, see Nash, M. Mujer y movimiento obrero en España, 
1931-1939 (Barcelona: Fontamara, 1981).
45 For a succinct analysis of the overlaps between libertarian and Christian discourse, Álvarez Junco, J. 
'La subcultura anarquista en España: racionalismo y populismo' in Fonquerne, Y-R. & Esteban, A. 
(Coords.) Culturas Populares: Diferencias, Divergencias, Conflictos (Madrid: Universidad 
Complutense, 1986), 197-209.
46 Ribalta, J. The Worker Photography Movement, 84.
47 Ibid. In March 1926, the German illustrated worker magazine AIZ called on amateur photographers to 
send in images of their everyday life. The following month saw the publication of the first issue of 
Sovetskoe foto, a magazine dedicated to the task of enhancing the profile of photography in the 
building of socialism. Through these two initiatives a Europe-wide movement gradually emerged, 
aiming to use photography to strengthen the political and cultural mobilisation campaigns of the 
international left.  
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attempts  to  create  a  new proletarian  art  form.48 On  the  whole,  however,  its  lasting
achievement was to provide the worker movement with a concrete visual language –
that is, a means visibly to anchor progressive politics in the lived reality of everyday
life. As such, it was not, as art historian Manuel J. Borja-Villel has pointed out, merely
an artistic sub-genre, but 'an expression of a genuine Weltanschauung: a way of seeing
and experiencing the world.'49
The worker photography movement did not, in the view of critic and curator
Jorge Ribalta, have any real base in Spain, but magazines like Orto, as well as Alberti
and  Leon's  Octubre,  may well  be  seen  as  representatives  of  its  politically  charged
aesthetics.50 Nueva  Cultura,  whose  visual  elements  took  inspiration  from illustrated
workers'  magazines  like the  German  Arbeiter-Illustrierte-Zeitung  (A-I-Z,  1924-1938)
and  the  multi-lingual  Soviet  publication  SSSR  na  Stroike (English  title:  USSR  in
Construction, 1930-1941,1949), would also show affinities with this movement. These
magazines, like their international counterparts, reported on the plight of the poor in
images as well as words, and photo features were instrumental in their efforts to put
readers into contact with their class brethren elsewhere. As the world was going through
the worst  of the Great  Depression, and aggressive right-wing regimes across Europe
grew in strength,  such features inevitably focused on the suffering and violence that
frequently marred working class life. Widespread poverty and hunger was particularly
shocking considering the unprecedented fact of overproduction, and one of the most
powerful photo-spreads compiled by Renau as graphic editor for Orto juxtaposed three
images of food being deliberately destroyed with a fourth showing children lynched by
their  own mother,  allegedly unable  to  bear  the  thought  of  them slowly starving  to
death.51 The 'evidence' of wilful waste next to the lifeless children makes the perversity
of their fate painfully glaring, and as a whole the spread provides a more persuasive
example  of  how  an  ethical  argument  could  be  strengthened  by  photography's
documentary aesthetics. 
48 Leading figures in the worker photography movement stressed the importance of grass-roots 
participation, yet when it came to evaluating and publishing the results, professional opinion and work
was typically given precedence. See Wolf, E. 'The Soviet Union: From Worker to Proletarian 
Photography' in Ribalta, J. The Worker Photography Movement, 32-50.
49 Borja-Villel, M. J. 'Presentation' in Ribalta, J. The Worker Photography Movement.
50 That is, these magazines did not send out their own photographers, nor did they explicitly attempt to 
popularise photography as such  among their readers, yet photography was the main form of 
illustration, which moreover had a similar style to that seen in European counterparts.
51 Orto, 17 (November 1933).
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The transformative power of photomontage
The  technique  of  deploying  contrasting  juxtapositions  to  reinforce  a  particular
interpretation of the photograph was also central to the art form that would be most
intimately  associated  with  Renau  –  photomontage.  As  an  artistic  technique,
photomontage had first appeared in Germany and Russia around the time of First World
War.52 In Germany it was above all linked to the Berlin Dada movement, which sought
to  criticize  the  social  order  underwriting  the  conflict  through  a  disjointed  form  of
collage based on newspaper cuttings.53 John Heartfield (born Helmut Herzfeld54), whose
work would later constitute the single most important influence on the political art of
Renau, was one of the principal figures in this group, and the pioneer of a subsequent
form  where  the  Dadaist  collage  was  given  a  more  didactic  orientation.  In  Russia
montage had similarly been used to oppose a traditional order and was, at least until the
gradual  imposition  of  socialist  realism  from  1928,  closely  associated  –  especially
through Constructivists like Alexander Rodchenko and El Lissitzky – with the aesthetics
of the Bolshevik Revolution. Although art historian Dawn Ades has suggested that there
is  little  evidence  of  mutual  creative  influence  between  these  groups  in  their  early
stages,55 Heartfield's entry into the Communist Party in 1918 and growing prominence
as a political agitator would eventually bring him into direct contact with the Bolshevik
avant-garde  and  place  his  work  at  the  heart  of  revolutionary  art  debates  in  both
countries.56 What  had  united  German  and  Russian  artists  from  the  beginning  was,
according to Ades, the rise of social concerns on the artistic agenda, and a concomitant
desire  'to  move away from the limitations of  abstraction without  slipping back into
antiquated illustrational  or  figurative modes.'57 In  this  ambition,  just  as  photography
became a way to insert reality into the artwork, collage or montage permitted a range of
expressive possibilities not available to adherents of traditional realism.58 Photomontage
was,  in  other  words,  an  attempt  to  harness  the  power  of  the  photograph  –  its
accessibility  and  indexical  realism  –  in  order  to  manipulate  and  metaphorically
52 Various forms of humoristic and popular manipulation of photographs can be seen to have their roots 
in the 19th century, however. See Naranjo, J. 'Josep Renau. Photomontage, Between Political Agitation
and Artistic Production' in García, M. et al. Josep Renau: Fotomontador, 257.
53 See Ades, D. Photomontage.
54 Heartfield changed his name as a protest against the anti-British campaign seen in Germany during 
WWI. See Drew, J. (ed.) John Heartfield 1891-1968: Photomontages (London: Arts Council, 1969),  
11.
55 Ades, D. Photomontage, 27.
56 Evans, D. Photomontage: A Political Weapon (London: Gordon Fraser, 1986), 15-21.
57 Ades, D. Photomontage, 64-66, 66.
58 Cf. Various artists. Fotomontaje de entreguerras.
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transform the reality it represented. 
The propagandistic potential of this technique could be explained in a number of
ways.  The  possibility  to  disrupt  perspectives,  present  unexpected  or  even  shocking
juxtapositions, allowed artists to produce forceful and compelling images that would
more readily command audiences' attention.59 By merging disparate objects, montage
could jolt viewers out of cognitive habits or force them to see connections not normally
visible to the naked eye. Yet even where the symbolic relations or metaphors were not
entirely new to viewers –  as would most often have been the case in the examples
considered here – montage, as suggested above, could be influential in clarifying and
perhaps dramatising these by sharpening contrasts which had previously not been so
clear-cut.60  The effect in such cases would be more subtle, but nonetheless powerful –
indeed,  probably more powerful  than attempts to shock,  as  viewers  might  not  have
realised  that  they  were  being  influenced.  Finally,  it  must  be  remembered  that
appropriate exemplification often makes abstract propositions both accessible and easy
to remember, which in itself has an obviously political value. In an interview towards
the end of his life, Renau said that the 'secret' of art was 'to say things that everybody
understands  and  nobody  forgets.'61 Photomontage,  with  its  combined  realism  and
flexibility, was an ideal medium to realise such an ambition and to put it to political use.
Renau's  development  as  a  montage  artist  went  through several  stages.  Apart
from an early Surrealist-inspired composition appearing in  the short-lived Valencian
magazine Murta (1931-1932),62 his first montages drew primarily on the ideas of Soviet
film  maker  Vsevolod  I.  Pudovkin.63 The  latter  allegedly  came  to  Renau  via  Juan
Piqueras, the editor of a progressive film magazine with which he collaborated, Nuestro
Cinema  (1932-1935).  'Piqueras  imprinted  Pudovkin's  theory  on  my mind',  he  later
commented, 'that a pointless image, according to what it  has at its side,  changes its
meaning and acquires another...'64 The influence of this thought and its application to
film may be glimpsed in compositions like the one appearing in the first issue of Orto
(March 1932)[Fig.  3].  Here a  nurse,  situated in  the middle of  the pictorial  field,  is
shown pumping breast milk into a glass bottle. Four additional scenes are incorporated
59 Cf. Estudios readers describing Renau's work as 'eye-catching'. See page 71 above.
60 Intelligibility was of overriding importance to both Heartfield and Renau, which meant that they 
avoided visual metaphors which risked being misunderstood or simply puzzling.
61 García, M. et al. Josep Renau, 279.
62 Called 'El hombre árctico' in Murta, 2 (December 1931).
63 By first montages I mean those made in a period stretching, roughly, from March to November 1932.
64 Cited in Forment, A. Josep Renau, 119.
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in the corners: we see infant beds in a maternity ward, a baby being bottle fed, naked
children  walking  in  a  row,  and  five,  slightly  older  children,  standing  together  and
laughing. Accompanying an article on the economic crisis and eugenics, the image was
presumably intended to defend the benefits  of state investment  in child care.65 Thus
Renau invited the viewer first to contemplate the central image, suggesting a form of
rationalisation  of  infant  care,  and  then  to  proceed  to  read  the  peripheral  scenes
sequentially, like a story culminating in a happy ending (after which, appropriately, the
gaze is  diverted back to  the start  and the circular process starts  anew).  Rather than
various photographic fragments merged into one image, this was collection of images
arranged to be read one by one in a certain order, much like a film.
Another example, slightly different but also indicative of the formal approach of
Renau's first montage work, appeared in the September 1932 issue of Estudios and was
entitled 'Panorama of bourgeois society' (Panorama de la sociedad burguesa)[Fig. 4].
This composition shows an urban landscape revealing stark class hierarchies. The top
part is made up of skyscrapers, suited attendees at a high-society dinner, a luxury car,
and a smiling woman with a horse, while the bottom part contains scenes from poor
workers' homes. A dark horizontal field cuts the image in half, which leaves the two
sections sharply divided. The only interaction between the two sections is represented
by a man begging. Here again different pictorial elements are juxtaposed without really
forming a unitary whole. In this case, however, the disconnection clearly forms part of
the message conveyed,  as  the composition can be said to  reinforce  the  notion of  a
fundamental  binary opposition in society (the bourgeoisie versus the proletariat)  and
reminds us of the distinctly Manichean world-view associated with Bolshevism.66 
Even if  it  could thus be applied with some success, this formal strategy was
modified  from late  1932,  when  Renau  discovered  the  work  of  John  Heartfield.  In
contrast to the sequential and segmented examples above, Heartfield had developed a
technique  where  different  photographic  fragments  were  combined  in  one  single
compositional unit. Renau later suggested that this is the difference between collage, as
seen  in  Dada  experiments,  and  the  political  photomontage  which  Heartfield
subsequently pioneered: while collage offered a fragmented image which could only
65 The article, entitled 'La Eugénica ante la crisis económica mundial de hoy y sus previsiones para el 
futuro', criticised, for example, the rise in infant mortality rates and cuts to services in maternity 
wards.
66 As highlighted by the historian Peter Holquist. See 'Violent Russia, Deadly Marxism? Russia in the 
Epoch of Violence, 1905-21' Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History, Vol. 4, No. 3 
(Summer 2003), 652.
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question the limitations of representation, montage did not diminish the formal realism
of the picture, but rather aimed to create what he called 'a strictly photographic space.'67
The  interaction  between  the  different  elements  would  thus  be  more  immediate  and
persuasive, enhancing the effect of visual metaphors and creative alterations of reality.
By imitating the 'straight' press photograph, Heartfield's montage can also be read as a
more  unsettling  (if  perhaps  self-defeating)  critique  of  photography's  truth  claim  as
such.68 Either way, an illustrative example, reproduced by Renau in the April 1933 issue
of Orto, is Heartfield's 1932 image of a hyena prowling a muddy battlefield littered with
dead bodies.[Fig. 5]69 It wears a top hat and a military medal where the inscription has
been changed from 'Pour le Mérite' to 'Pour le Profit.' Together with the caption, 'War
and  Corpses  –  The  Last  Hope  of  the  Rich',  Heartfield  communicated  through  one
simple, effective image an uncompromising critique of the ruling classes, perceived by
left-wing  radicals  both  to  have  profited  from the  World  War  and  be  ready to  start
another in defence of their privileges.
The experience of seeing his first Heartfield montage on the November 1932
cover  of  A-I-Z was  described  by  Renau  as  'enlightenment.'70 Contemplating  the
composition showing a white dove impaled on a bayonet [Fig. 6] – a comment on the
violent suppression of an anti-fascist demonstration in Geneva that year – he saw, at a
stroke, how his political convictions could be expressed in 'concrete images' and how he
could  best  contribute  to  the  revolutionary  cause.  By  maintaining  a  semblance  of
photographic  realism,  Heartfield's  formula  contained,  in  Renau's  view,  a  particular
propagandistic  potential  that  other  montage  artists  had  yet  to  explore. A desire  to
harness this potential for political purposes was, unsurprisingly, a fundamental driving
force for Heartfield too, who in 1931 had told a Moscow audience:
If I collect documents, combine them and do that in a clever way, then
the agitational-propagandistic effect on the masses will be immense.
And that is the most important thing for us. That is the foundation of
our work. Therefore it is our task to influence the masses, as well, as
strongly, as intensely as possible.71
67 Renau, J. ‘Homenaje a John Heartfield’ First published in Photovision, no. 1, July-August, 1981. 
Reproduced in Brihuega, J. (Ed.) Josep Renau, 453-458. Quote on 456.
68 See Kriebel, S. 'Manufacturing Discontent: John Heartfield’s Mass Medium' New German Critique 
107, Vol. 36, No. 2, (Summer 2009), 53-88.
69 Published in A-I-Z, 18 (April 1932).
70 Evans, D. Photomontage, 22.
71 Ibid. p 19.
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Although  the  political  value  of  photomontage  was  far  from  uncontested  in
contemporary  Marxist  debates,72 Heartfield  and  Renau  were  not  the  only  ones
convinced  of  the  technique's  efficaciousness.  The  cultural  critic  Walter  Benjamin
commented  in  1934  that  the  German  pioneer,  who  also  produced  images  for  a
publishing  house  called  Malik,  had  turned  the  simple  book  cover  into  a  political
weapon, while the surrealist poet Louis Aragon likened Heartfield's work to a 'knife that
cuts  into  every heart.'73 Before  the  revolutionary  force  of  his  twisted  realism  –  its
'revolutionary beauty,' in the words of Aragon – audiences would be compelled to see
the violent truths that underpinned contemporary society.74 
Apart from its power to shock, montage artists and their Marxist champions of
the 1930s maintained that photomontage also carried a crucial epistemological claim.
The problem with straight photography, argued Benjamin, was that it generally failed to
represent social relations. A picture of a factory building, to use his own example, tells
us  nothing  about  the  exploitation  that  goes  on  inside.75 The  potential  strength  of
photomontage was to incorporate into the image the discursive meaning that may make
that exploitation visible.76 This point was later emphasised by Renau, who in a 1981
essay on Heartfield claimed that political photomontage was in fact 'the only' artistic
form that could represent, 'verisimilarly,' 'the absurd and paradoxical character' of the
society in which we live. Photomontage captured its  'contradictory essence,'77 which
could be neither visualised nor photographed in a real space.  That such a procedure
should moreover be distinguished from other forms of photographic manipulation had
been pointed out in 1931 by the Hungarian art critic Alfréd Kemény, who offered the
following  clarification  in  the  German  worker  photography  magazine  Der  Arbeiter-
Fotograf:
72 For a good empirical and theoretical analysis of Heartfield's reception in the USSR, see Gough, M. 
'John Heartfield's biography of Soviet petroleum' in Mendelson, J. (Ed.) Magazines, Modernity, and 
War (Madrid: Ministerio de Cultura, 2008), 75-90. These debates should also be placed in the context 
of wider contemporary discussions concerning different understandings of realism. In his famous 
exchange with Bertolt Brecht, Georg Lukács claimed that photomotage could, at most, have the effect 
of a 'good joke,' while Brecht defended new representational techniques as necessary to capture the 
reality of twentieth century society. See Various authors Aesthetics and Politics (London: Verso, 
2007), 28-86 (esp. 43, 83).
73 For Benjamin's comment, see 'The Author as Producer' in Benjamin, W. Reflections (New York: 
Schocken Books, 1986), 229. For Aragon's comment, see text originally published in Commune, 20 
(April 1935) but also reproduced in Various authors, Fotomontaje de entreguerras, 119-121 (quote on 
120).
74 Various authors, Fotomontaje de entreguerras, 119-121.
75 See 'The Author as Producer', esp. 229f.
76 Cf. Various authors, Fotomontaje de entreguerras, 121.
77 Renau, J. 'Homenaje a John Heartfield', 455.
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While bourgeois photomontage uses photographed parts of reality to
falsify social reality as a whole […], revolutionary photomontage by
an  “artist”  (technician)  of  Marxist  orientation  brings  photographic
details (parts of reality) into a dialectical relationship, both formally
and  thematically:  therefore  it  contains  the  actual  relationship  and
contradictions of social reality.78
Thus, as long as it  was correctly informed, an arrangement of several  photographic
images could simultaneously represent and aesthetically re-enact contemporary social
relations.  It  did  not  trick  the  audience,  but  rather  offered  it  an  opportunity  to  see
through,  in  art  critic  John  Berger's  term,  the  deceitful  surface  reality  of  bourgeois
ideology  and  to  contemplate  a  deeper  truth  regarding  capitalism's  inner  logic.79
'Revolutionary photomontage'  – as opposed 'bourgeois photomontage'  – captured the
complexity of contemporary society in a way which a single reality fragment (i.e. a
straight photograph) could not do.
Photomontage in Orto and Estudios (1932-1934)
For all his praise for Heartfield, Renau did not simply copy his magisterial example.
First of all, Renau rarely produced compositions where elements were truly arranged in
one photographic space80 – an effect that was easier for Heartfield to achieve since he,
unlike Renau, used bespoke photos taken in his own studio.81 The nearest Renau came
was  an  integration of  different  elements  into one  image.  An early example of  this,
providing a complement to 'Panorama of bourgeois society', appeared in the December
1932 issue of Estudios with the title 'Bourgeois sensibility' (Sensibilidad burguesa)[Fig.
7].  Here  we  see  a  smiling  woman,  evidently  of  the  affluent  classes,  enjoying  the
company of her two cats, and, on the other side of a drawn brick wall, two children –
unhappy, poor, apparently abandoned. The contrast between the situation of the children
and the comfort enjoyed by the cats suggests that the woman utterly lacks compassion
and that the indifference of the rich before the plight of the poor has taken on monstrous
proportions.  If  viewers  appear  to  be  implicated  by the  boy's  accusatory stare,  it  is
78 Cited in Simmons, S. ‘Picture as a Weapon in the German Mass Media, 1914-1930’ in Marquardt, V. 
H. (Ed.) Art and Journals, 175.
79 Renau himself saw montage as a the most 'adequate form' to express Marxist-Leninist dialectics 
visually. See Renau, J. La Batalla por una nova cultura (Valencia: Eliseu Climent, 1978), 150.
80 Cf. Heartfield images like 'Hurrah, die Butter is alle' in A-I-Z (December 1935) and 'Mimikry' in A-I-Z
(April 1934).
81 See Kriebel, S. 'Manufacturing discontent', 65, for comments on Heartfield's studio practice.
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because only they can be expected to change the reality of the children's cruel exclusion.
As in 'Panorama', 'Bourgeois sensibility' offers an image where social division is
portrayed as spatial division. Yet at the heart of the message is a question of common
humanity, a status effectively denied to some of the most deprived social sectors of pre-
and inter-war Spain. Many owners of the large estates across the south especially, did
little to alleviate the brutal living and working conditions endured by the day-labourers
in their employ, who during harvest times typically had to toil from sun rise to sun set
for starvation wages and make do with virtually nothing during the remainder of the
year. Conservative parts of the urban establishment similarly tended to view industrial
workers, often living in cramped and unhygienic quarters, as simply troublesome rabble
to which no concessions should be made.82 The first Republican government tried to
mitigate some of the suffering caused directly or indirectly by such attitudes, but  to
radical groups on the left change was, as indicated, too slow and insufficient. In fact,
Renau's title implicitly discredits, as communists and anarchists explicitly did, the very
validity of the reformist model as such: if disregard for the rights of the poor is to some
extent inherent in the 'bourgeoisie', no 'bourgeois' regime – as the liberal Republic was
labelled – could be expected to ensure genuine social justice.83 
The coming of social justice had been the theme of Renau's montage for the
previous  issue  of  Estudios (November  1932).  Entitled  'The  dawn  of  social  justice'
(Amanecer de la justicia social)[Fig.  8], it  shows a couple in evening dress dancing
under a crystal chandelier, while two rural women and two hands – one reaching out as
if to grasp something, the other a clenched fist – form a quarter-circle beneath them.
One  of  the  rural  women  has  non-European  features;  a  reminder  of  the  fact  that
colonialism occupied a central place in Renau's and his colleagues' global understanding
of social injustice.84 But as this was not necessarily a big issue for the political left in
Spain,  we  can  assume  that  their  knowledge  of  colonialism  was  largely  shaped  by
features in foreign magazines like A-I-Z, which did address such questions.85 It is also
notable that all but the couple appear to have emerged out of a dark haze, and that the
82 Cruz, R. En el nombre del pueblo, 30.
83 Cf. Juan Renau's references to the Republic as a 'Republiquita' (little Republic) that would make no 
substantial difference. Pasos y Sombras, 290.
84 Rosa Ballester, Manuela Ballester's younger sister, said in a 1979 interview that Renau would make 
references to colonial abuses from the early stages of his political activism. See CDMH (Salamanca) 
Fuentes_Orales-Mexico, no 10, 10. Both Orto and Estudios included articles of colonial abuse with 
relative regularity.
85 Manuel Monleón, the other main artist working for Estudios, even copied a Heartfield image for A-I-Z
showing a black and a white clenched fist next to each other (Ob schwarz, ob weiß, 1931) for his 
cover for Estudios, 126 (February 1934).
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women,  observing  the  dancers  with  angry  expressions,  have  an  almost  ghost-like
quality. It  is as if the politically and historically oppressed – appearing as a form of
repressed  social  subconscious  –  have  returned  to  demand  their  due  from  those
benefiting from their labour.  The montage was in all  likelihood made before Renau
penned  his  call  to  the  inaugural  meeting  of  the  Unión  de  Escritores  y  Artistas
Proletarios,  but  it  is  tempting  to  see  in  this  composition  a  visualisation  of  a
revolutionary 'breach in history,' providing the excluded with an entry point to a social
space where equality in all its forms may be recognised and enacted.86 
The oneiric quality apparent here is in fact a recurring and distinct feature of
Renau's  photomontages,  through  which  the  inclusion  of  photographic  reality  is
accompanied or even countered by an aesthetic suggestion of dreams and nightmares.
While this aesthetic is occasionally attached to a desirable possibility, it more frequently
indicates  an  ideological  veil  that  accompanies  and  obscures  material  exploitation,
facilitating viewers'  task  of  'seeing through'  by making visible  the  components  and
quality of  its fabric.  This can be seen in an untitled  Estudios  montage published in
August  1933 where rural  workers  – mostly women – are toiling in a  field,  situated
beneath a pulpit from which a smiling priest tells them 'Resignation, brethren. Christ
suffered more for us.'[Fig. 9]87 Behind the pulpit,  at the centre of the pictorial field,
stands a gigantic crucifix, behind which a corpulent and visibly content man in suit –
carrying a small yet plainly visible swastika on his lapel – hands the priest a bundle of
notes.88 The dark palette and sombre atmosphere of the composition recalls the religious
painting of the Spanish Golden Age,89 yet instead of celebrating piety and sacrifice it
denounces religious discourse as a tool to conceal hypocrisy and legitimise suffering. 
Again, such a view would not have been unfamiliar to the readers of Estudios, or
any  other  radical  left-wing  magazine.  Throughout  the  period  of  the  Restoration
monarchy  (1875-1931),  and  continuing  into  the  Republican  era,  the  Church  was
perceived by substantial sectors of Spaniards as a legitimising tool for a constellation of
ruling conservative powers, underpinned by a landowning elite, determined to maintain
a social  system based on rigid hierarchies  and multiple forms of  exclusion.  Indeed,
during the monarchy, with its repressive approach to any assertion of workers' rights,
86 See page 56 above.
87 Org. 'Resignación hermanos. Más padeció Cristo por nosotros.'
88 Again there is a similarity with a Heartfield montage ('Der sinn des Hitlergrusses', cover of A-I-Z  
[October 1932]) which shows how a saluting Hitler receives a bundle of notes from a huge suited man
standing behind him. Both images linked the wealthy capitalist to fascism.
89 Especially, perhaps, José de Ribera (1591-1652) and Francisco de Zurbarán (1598-1664).
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the  clergy's  often  pervasive  and  direct  influence,  particularly  in  cities,  in  spheres
affecting both political  and  everyday life  made it  a  key symbol  of  social  control.90
Church collaboration with state institutions blurred the boundary between religious and
political authority, and for the urban poor, especially, the external imposition of a rigid
though  arbitrarily  applied  moral  code  added  to  material  hardship  a  dimension  of
psychological abuse. Popular anticlerical views also held priests to be lazy, immoral and
acting  primarily  out  of  their  own  material  self-interest.  'What  was  the  Church?',  a
Barcelona  worker  asked  in  1936,  'Only a  chain store dealing in  funerals,  baptisms,
marriages, hospitals, education, money-lending, banks, cafés'.91 While the poorest were
denied their most basic needs, the Church was seen to use its position to amass fortunes
for itself. 
While  such  hypocrisy naturally  embittered  those  most  disadvantaged  by  the
system of which religion was an integral part, it also generated much resentment among
progressive sectors of the middling classes – the background from which Renau and
many of his colleagues came. Their disdain for the clergy, like that of poorer sectors,
was exacerbated by the subsequent opposition of the Church to Republican reform92 –
although their anticlericalism long pre-dated the Republic. The influence of writers like
Vicente  Blasco  Ibáñez  (1867-1928),  a  novelist  and  militant  republican  who  caused
controversy  through  his  newspaper  El  Pueblo,  contributed  to  the  dissemination  of
anticlerical sentiments and had a particularly strong impact on the political atmosphere
of his native Valencia. It is said that Renau’s own father, José Renau Montoro, was an
admirer of Blasco Ibáñez, and his youngest son Juan would later characterise him as an
anti-clerical catholic. It seems Blasco Ibáñez was not the only factor here, however. The
alleged failures of local priests to pay Renau Montoro for his artistic contributions to
church processions, payments which the young Josep was typically sent to collect, may
well have been enough to stir anticlerical feelings in the struggling father of five.93 It
may also have created a psychological foundation for the anticlerical sentiments of his
eldest son.94  
90 For a thoroughgoing analysis of the social roots of anti-clericalism on the Spanish left, see Thomas, 
M. The Faith and the Fury: Popular Anticlerical Violence and Iconoclasm in Spain, 1931-1936 
(Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2013).
91 Cited in Graham, H. The War and its Shadow, 39. 
92 As a result of secularising legislation, not to mention the recurrence after 1931 of popular anti-clerical 
protests leading to church burnings, the Church tended to identify the Republic as a whole with anti-
clericalism. See, for example, Preston, P. The Spanish Holocaust, 16f.
93 Cf. page 21 above. 
94 Renau, J. Pasos y Sombras, 19.
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To return  to  Renau's  dark  1933  portrayal  of  clerical  complicity  in  systemic
oppression, then, it is evident that the catholic tropes serve to broaden the link between
the  culture  of  the  church  and  the  hypocrisy depicted,  as  well  as  to  emphasise  the
benightedness and tragedy of the lives endured by the rural poor. The scene is infused
with a sense of grotesque surreality, reinforced by the facial expression of the priest and
the disproportionally huge cross with the man behind it. The only thing that seems truly
real  is  the pained expression on the face  of one woman who looks up towards  the
viewer.
The  grotesque  and  surreal  element  of  this  image was  greatly  enhanced  in  a
coloured montage series called 'The Ten Commandments' (Los Diez Mandamientos),
published in Estudios between February and November 1934.95 Satirizing the failure of
the  conservative  establishment  to  live  up  to  its  own  ethical  doctrine,  'The  Ten
Commandments' combined caricatures of the rich with graphic images of brutality and
bloodshed.96 The first two installments, arguably the most accomplished from an artistic
point of view, may in this sense be taken as representative of the tone of the series as a
whole. The first, 'You shall have no other gods before me' (Amar a Dios sobre todas las
cosas97)[Fig. 10], which is the only one to contain a touch of humour, portrays a wealthy
man, a representative of the bourgeoisie, who has himself taken the position of god.
With a smug smile on his face he is surrounded by money and lightly dressed women
(presumably  representing  prostitutes).  His  halo  is  made  of  bayonets.  Here  the
supposedly virtuous ruling classes are, in other words, characterised by narcissism and
megalomaniac  ambitions,  driven  by  materialistic  desires  that  perverted  love  and
glorified war. 
The second commandment, 'You shall not take the name of the Lord thy God in
vain' (No tomarás, en vano, a Dios por testigo)[Fig. 11], is more severe in its imagery. It
shows the body of a prisoner, killed by decapitation, lying before a crucifix and a Nazi
flag. The bloody scene appears to be located in a domestic saloon, with its dark-red silk
drape drawn back to reveal the symbols that sanction murder. A hand enters the pictorial
field from the right, suggesting an impotent gesture to stop what has occurred. Being a
militant atheist, Renau no doubt felt that any calls for God's help in times of real crisis
95 The idea as such came from Adja Junker's series of drawings of the same title, published in Orto, 9 
(November 1932).
96 It was described by the magazine as an 'implacable critique of the international bourgeoisie'. See the 
ad for the upcoming series in the picture section of Estudios, 125 (January 1934).
97 Rather than a direct translation of the Spanish phrase, I have opted to use one of the standard 
translations of same commandment in English.
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were bound to be 'in vain' – especially considering his 'true' face represented in the
previous  installment  and  his  allies  as  represented  here.  To  some  degree,  then,  his
recycling of the Christian message in this context may contain implicit criticism against
workers still holding on to religious beliefs.98 Even so, little can detract from the main
charge of the montage, which is directed against a God that is portrayed as pitiless and
cruel when his repressive law is offended. 
Indeed,  as  the  series  continues  the  scenes  become  not  only  more  formally
complex, but also more violent, gruesome, and shocking. The fifth commandment, 'You
shall not kill' (No matarás)[Fig. 12], is illustrated with a central figure pasted together
from gunships, the façade of a symbolic 'Parliament of Peace', and a skull wearing the
royal crown – all surrounded by red smoke and blood-drenched bodies. In the lower
right corner we see a face which has been cut in half just below the nose, the raw flesh
confronting the viewer like a  grisly scream. Similarly the illustration for  the eighth
commandment, 'You shall not bear false witness against thy neighbour' (No mentirás)
[Fig. 13], is built around four corpses whose blood stains most of the pictorial field,
while a sign in the lower right corner tells an audience that total calm reigns the country.
In these images it is as if Renau sought to shock his audiences into action by the sheer
force of visual horror. Here the real takes on a predominantly psychological dimension;
it manifests itself in suffering, severed limbs, the materiality of our bodily existence and
death.99 Photography is used relatively sparingly, only just enough to anchor in reality a
a  truly nightmare-ish vision of  contemporary Spanish society.  The hypocrisy of  the
Church and the catholic establishment were here tied to acts of extreme brutality, and
politics appeared inseparable from violence. 
Like  all  Renau's  Esudios montages,  the  images  constituting  'The  Ten
Commandments' series were printed on a separate page, as if to allow the possibility of
them being cut out and used as a small poster for the home or the workplace. The idea
in itself blurs the boundaries between the ephemerality of printed mass-media and the
lasting value ascribed to more traditional artworks, and reinforces the fact that Estudios
considered its task to be that of fostering an entire alternative culture, encompassing
98 Cf. the Orto photo feature, presumably put together by Renau, entitled 'Freedom to pray and freedom 
to sleep.' Here Renau mocks working-class women in Depression-hit America for praying for more 
jobs. Orto, 8 (Octobre 1932).
99 This is also a central aspect of 'the real', as conceptualised by Badiou and, before him, Jacques Lacan 
(among others). For an brief comparative discussion, see Buch, R. The Pathos of the Real: On the 
Aesthetics of Violence in the Twentieth Century (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 
2010), 8-15.
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new arts  as well  as new morals  and education.  That 'The Ten Commandments'  was
appreciated by readers (and, despite or perhaps because of its grim content, actually
used  as  wall  decoration)  is  suggested  by  an  anecdote,  supplied  by Renau  himself,
describing events during the first phase of the civil war, when all social relations were
indeed saturated with violence. Shortly after being appointed General Director of Fine
Arts  on  9  September  1936,  Renau  had  to  visit  anarchist-held  Toledo,  in  order  to
safeguard the artistic treasures of the city's cathedral. Entry into the city proved difficult,
as  the  anarchist  militia  in  command  would  not  recognise  any  central  government
authority.  Negotiations between Renau and the local leadership only took a turn for the
better once the artist noticed that his  Estudios series hung on the wall in the militia
leader's  office  and  could strategically  indicate  that  he  was  the  creator  of  the  much
admired works.100 
In terms of form, 'The Ten Commandments' offers one of the clearest examples
of the fact  that  Renau's practice also blurred the boundaries between photomontage,
drawing, and painting. To a much greater extent than Heartfield, Renau included in his
montages elements that were visibly drawn by hand.101 He also made heavier use of air-
brush – a tool which he claimed to have introduced to Spain before anyone else and
which had quickly become central to his commercial poster work.102 In purely technical
terms, this is how he produced the oneiric atmosphere of montages like 'Dawn of social
justice' and, to a lesser extent, the second installment of 'The Ten Commandments'. Yet
it must be added that a less strictly realist aesthetic also formed part of the particular
graphic style of  Estudios, and in a sense reflected the magazine's holistic and spiritual
outlook. Probably for the same reason, Estudios was the only political magazine which
Renau supplied with designs that were based entirely on air-brush and devoid of overt
social criticism.103 
Nonetheless, the general point remains: montage, regardless of all contemporary
claims about its quasi-scientific epistemological potential, was for Renau a technique
that  could not  be  categorically separated  from other  forms of  visual  representation.
100 Cited in Bellón, F. Josep Renau, 205.
101 Again, this is partly a consequence of him trying to achieve Heartfield's effect without copying all 
aspects of his practice.
102 For his claim to have been the first to use air-brush in Spain, see interview with Facundo Tomás Ferré,
held during Renau's last visit to Valencia. Tomás Ferré, F. Los Carteles Valencianos en la guerra civil 
(Valencia: Ayuntamiento de Valencia, 1986), 107.
103 See, for example, his series on the seasons, Las cuarto estaciones, in the January issue, 1935. Other 
examples include the series entitle Hombres grandes y hombres funestos de la historia (Februrary-
November 1935), El amor humano (January 1936), and La lucha por la vida (February-September 
1936). 
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Apart from the evidence of his own practice, this was suggested by a distinction he
made in a 1933 article 'Cinema and Future Art' (El Cinema y el Arte Futuro), where
science  was  described  as  the  'analytical'  and  art  the  'synthesising'  branch  of  human
knowledge.104 Considering  its  fundamental  nature  as  assemblage,  photomontage
undeniably  corresponded  to  his  'synthesising'  category  (while  straight  photography,
according to this scheme, can be considered an 'analytical' fragment that can provide
scientific information and direct  links  between art  and material  reality105).  A clearer
indication of  Renau’s view of photomontage as intrinsically tied to other forms of art
would come in the 1981 essay where  he described Heartfield as an artist who worked in
the Realist tradition of Goya and Daumier and who should be seen as a painter using
modern means.106  
In terms of content, 'The Ten Commandments' reflected and coincided with an
intensification of the social conflicts  accompanying Spain's uneven twentieth-century
development,  which had  reached a  new pitch with the arrival  of  the  Republic.  The
reversal of the 1931-33 republican-socialist coalition government's reform programme
after the right's victory in the November 1933 elections – just as Depression-induced
unemployment  in  Spain  was  reaching  its  peak  –  exacerbated  tensions  in  city  and
countryside, and left huge numbers of people without the means to support themselves
or their families.107 In the agrarian south and south-west of Spain, minimal measures to
protect  unionised  workers,  to  guarantee  a  fair  distribution  of  work,  and  enforce
agreements on minimum wages were either undermined or ignored, and union activity
everywhere  was  met  with  increasingly  harsh  repression.108 Strikes  were  called
throughout the spring of 1934, all of which ended in stalemate or union defeat, and on 7
March the Minister of the Interior, Rafael Alonso Salazar, closed down the headquarters
of the Socialist  Youth,  the Communist  Party and the CNT after declaring a state  of
emergency.109 In the cultural sector, most projects to expand education were halted and
the budget for the Misiones Pegagógicas was cut by half.110 This attack on progressive
104 Reproduced in Pérez Merinero, C. & Pérez Merinero, D. Del cinema como arma de clase: antología 
de Nuestro Cinema 1932-1935 (Valencia: Fernando Torres, 1975), 46.
105 Forment has plausibly claimed that Renau was never interested in photography as a potential art form 
in itself (though he did, as we have seen, take great interest in it as document). See Forment, A. 'El 
artista en sus libros. La biblioteca Josep Renau' Kalías, no 9 (1993), 141.
106 Renau, J. ‘Homenaje a John Heartfield’, 454f.
107 Preston, P. The Spanish Holocaust, 52.
108 Ibid., chapter 3.
109 Ibid., 61, 78. 222 of 315 days of Radical government passed with a state of emergency declared, 
which meant that constitutional guarantees were suspended.
110 Huertas Vázquez, E. La Política Cultural De La Segunda República Española, 25-27.
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politics was paralleled by a new assertiveness among the conservative and extreme right
sectors. The violent activities of fascist groups like the Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional
Sindicalista (JONS) and Falange Española, the latter funded by wealthy monarchists as
an  instrument  of  political  destabilisation,  went  largely  unpunished,  while  the  mass
Catholic party, the Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas (CEDA), gaining
increasing influence in parliament, adopted a style and rhetoric making it practically
indistinguishable, at least to Spain’s contemporary left, from Italian Fascism or  early
Nazism.111 The  mixture  of  Catholic conservatism and  fascist  trappings  found in  the
CEDA served  for  many as  sufficient  proof  that  the  old  conservative  establishment,
primarily comprised of ecclesiastical authorities, wealthy industrialists, and landowners,
was turning to fascism in a desperate attempt to defend their respective interests. Hence
the  frequent  juxtaposition  of  swastikas  with  bourgeois  and  religious  symbolism  in
Renau's  representation  of  the  alliance  oppressing  Spain's  poor.  If  the  Republic  had
momentarily brought hope to the socially and economically disenfranchised, the centre-
right government elected in 1933 (which would last for two years) and depended on the
CEDA for its parliamentary majority appeared determined to extinguish that hope, if
necessary with the boot of authoritarianism.
The growing unrest of 1934 culminated in a socialist-led revolutionary revolt in
October – the subject of Renau's blood-soaked illustration of the eighth commandment.
After nine months of continuous defeats, the left was in no position seriously to attempt
a revolutionary conquest of the state, but when the President, Niceto Alcalá Zamora,
invited the CEDA to form part of a new government, important sectors of the socialist
movement  felt  they had  no  choice  but  to  act  against  the  erosion  of  the  Republic’s
democratic potential. Lack of preparation and a wavering attitude among the socialist
leadership  nationally  meant  that  the  rising  was  swiftly  defeated  in  Madrid  and
Barcelona and of minimal consequence in most other parts of the country.  The only
place  where  the  insurrection  was  temporarily  successful  was  the  northern  mining
districts  of  Asturias,  where  the  terrain  and  the  miners'  particular  skills,  as  well  as
effective  collaboration  between  socialist,  communist,  and  anarchist  organisations
allowed the rank-and-file to hold out for two weeks. The governmental response was
ferocious,  and  involved  the  deployment  of  Moroccan  mercenaries  who  used  brutal
colonial tactics to terrorise the civilian population. Once the rising was defeated, the
task of maintaining 'public order' went to Civil Guard Major Lisardo Doval Bravo, who,
111 Preston, P. The Spanish Holocaust, 56.
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equipped with special judicial powers, used savage methods to punish workers further
for their insubordination.112
The events  of  October,  despite  causing little  disturbance  outside of  Asturias,
presented the government with an excuse to unleash a series of repressive measures
across  the country.  Workers'  clubs  were  closed,  the socialist  press  was banned,  and
leaders  of  workers'  organisations  were  arrested  in  cities,  towns,  and  villages.  In
Valencia, Renau and Manuela Ballester, with whom he now had a six-months-old baby,
Ruy, were among those detained.113 Exactly how long they were kept in arrest is not
clear,  but  since  none  of  the  available  sources  give  any  details  on  the  matter,  the
detention was presumably relatively short.114 Many were much less fortunate of course
and  thus  the  demand  for  a  far-reaching  amnesty  for  the  thousands  of  people  who
remained in prison as a result of the events of October 1934 would become foundational
to the reconstruction of a new broad left alliance, just as it was later also probably the
most important rallying cry of the early 1936 Popular Front election campaign, as well
as featuring in election posters by Renau and Manuela.115 Overall the October rising and
its aftermath would have a pervasive impact on all areas of politics; it raised the stakes
of the social conflicts besetting the Republic, and accelerated the polarisation that would
make social relations in 1936 even more explosive.
Considering its repercussions, the October insurrection could not but have an
impact on the Spanish cultural environment too.  Among those already committed to
social struggle, reports of the atrocities served to strengthen their resolve, while many
who had previously remained detached now felt compelled to add a social dimension to
their work.116 In the prologue to Emilio Prados' poetry collection, Llanto en la Sangre
(1937), the poet and publisher Manuel Altolaguirre stated that it was 'necessary for the
year of the bloody repression of Asturias to arrive for all of us, all poets, to feel an
urgent duty  [imperioso  deber]  to  adapt  our  work,  our  lives, to  the  emancipatory
112 Reports of Doval's abuse provoked horror in the international press and eventually forced his 
relocation on 8 December. Ibid., 88. See also Cruz, R. En el nombre del pueblo, 64-67.
113 Ruy Renau was born on 5 May 1934. Regarding the arrest, see 1980 interview  with Antonio Ballester
in CDMH (Salamanca) Fuentes_Orales-Mexico, no 9, 42f. Fernando Bellón also claims, without 
explaining why, that Renau was already hiding from the police  in August 1934. See Josep Renau, 
182. For further, if inconclusive thoughts on this see also, Forment, A. Josep Renau, 107.
114 In his 1976 interview with Inmaculada Julián, Renau claimed that the police were often fairly lenient 
with him since he was well-known and highly respected professionally. See Julián González, I. El 
Cartel Republicano, 186.
115 See in interview with Renau in García, M. et al. Josep Renau: Fotomontador, 278-280. On references 
to Asturias in February election campaign, see also Cruz, R. En el nombre del pueblo, 69-82.
116 See Aznar Soler, M. Literatura española y antifascismo, 62-65.
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movement in Spain.'117 In addition to the overall human cost of the rebellion, writers
were also moved by specific cases like the extra-judicial assassination while in state
custody of Luis de Sirval, a journalist who had travelled to Asturias to report for the
Valencian daily El Mercantil Valenciano.118 Further protests related to the imprisonment
and torture of the journalist Javier Bueno, and the month-and-a-half-long imprisonment
of writer Antonio Espina for writing an article against Hitler.119 Such events, together
with the knowledge of book burnings and even harsher repression against dissent in
coercive states like Nazi Germany,120 served as a wake-up call for progressive cultural
producers in Spain, reminding them that their activities were by no means separate from
broader  social  and  political  developments.  Thus,  when Álvarez  del  Vayo  addressed
delegates  in  Paris  at  the  First  International  Congress  of  Writers  for  the Defence  of
Culture  in  June  1935,  organised  by  the  Association  des  Ècrivains  et  Artistes
Révolutionaires, he could justifiably claim that he spoke 'in the name of a country that
[had] experienced eight months of tense fighting for culture', and that 'for Spaniards' (as
indeed progressives of many other nationalities), the question of defending culture went
'beyond the limits of the purely literary.'121 
117 Cited in Fuentes, V. La marcha al pueblo, 62.
118 As well as the farcical trial held in Oviedo in Aug 1935, which made the most respected names of the 
intellectual elite (Miguel de Unamuno, Antonio Machado, 'Azorín', Juan Ramón Jiménez, Julian 
Besteiro, José Bergamín, Corpus Barga, José F Montesinos) to sign a letter protesting against the 
sentence. See El Sol (11 August 1935).
119 Fuentes, V. La marcha al pueblo, 62. The editors of Nueva Cultura (including Renau) also published a
note declaring their support for Espina. See 'Carta a Antonio Espina' Nueva Cultura, 10 (January 
1936), 2.
120 The importance of this knowledge to artists' increasing commitment was emphasised in the memoirs 
of Rafael Pérez Contel. See Artistas en Valencia, 39.
121 Fuentes, V. La marcha al pueblo, 63.
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5. CREATING A CULTURAL POPULAR FRONT: 
NUEVA CULTURA (1935-1936)
It would be in this very highly charged social and political environment in Spain that the
most ambitious of Renau's cultural projects,  Nueva Cultura, was launched. Although
first  appearing  in  January 1935,1 the  magazine  had  been  discussed  among Renau's
closest  collaborators  in  the UEAP since the end  of  1933,  when they had agreed to
develop a publication based on a principle of active anti-fascism. It would be open to
collaborators  of  various  ideological  backgrounds  as  long  as  they accepted  its  basic
raison d’etre.  It  would also be independent  not only of the UEAP2 but  of all  other
political organisations too, the PCE included.3 That said, Renau did seek advice from
the  PCE during the  preparations,  especially after  initial  hopes  to  engage prominent
cultural  figures  in  Madrid  came  to  nought.  But  Renau  was  told  by  PCE  General
Secretary José Díaz and Politburo member Antonio Mije that the Party had neither the
means nor the expertise to aid their project anyway. Insofar as the PCE leadership had
any opinions, they added, Renau and his colleagues would hear them after publication.4
But judging from the account which we have from Juan Renau, the only misgivings
ever  expressed within PCE circles  came from members  of  the  Valencian Provincial
Committee itself, who nonetheless later retracted their complaints after a meeting in
which Josep Renau forcefully defended the magazine. (On this occasion, as so many
others, wrote the admiring Juan, his brother's implacable arguments simply crushed all
objections like a 'bulldozer.'5) Despite the limitations imposed on what would thus start
as a self-financed and regional publication (whose first print was only 1000 copies6),
rather than the national magazine envisaged, Nueva Cultura quickly grew in stature and
1 In his autobiographical notes Renau claimed that most of the material for the first issue was put 
together by himself, while Rafael Pérez Contel, also a member of the editorial team, insisted that the 
issue was the result of a group effort. See Renau, J. 'Notas al margen', 469, and Pérez Contel, R. 
Artistas en Valencia, 656ff. 
2 Most, if not all, of the founding members were however part of this organisation, and the two 
initiatives would often operate in tandem. See Renau, J. 'Notas al margen', 479, and Pérez Contel, R. 
Artistas en Valencia, 653.
3 Ibid., 473f. Pérez Contel has also stressed that the the magazine was not tied to the PCE Artistas en 
Valencia, 651. A slight modification in its organisational structure occured in the civil war, when 
Nueva Cultura became the official magazine of the Valencian 'Aliança d'Intel· ltuals per á Defensa de 
la Cultura,' itself closely related to the Popular Front government. See chapter 6 below.
4 J. 'Notas al margen', 470f.
5 Renau, J. Pasos y Sombras, 347.
6 Pérez Contel, R. Artistas en Valencia, 658.
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reach.7 By  summer  1936,  contributions  came  from  a  wide  range  of  collaborators,
including some who had first rejected the idea.8 Support groups, formed of volunteers
who  facilitated  the  magazine's  distribution,  were  established  in  Alicante,  Sevilla,
Santiago,  and  Bilbao,  and  editorial  committee  members  were  located  all  over  the
country, as well as in Paris.9 
Apart from Renau, who has been described as 'the life and soul' of the magazine,
foundational figures in the formation of Nueva Cultura were Ángel Gaos, Rafael Pérez
Contel, Francisco Badía, Francisco Carreño, Juan Serrano, Armado Bazán, Pascual Pla
y  Beltrán,  Juan  Renau,  and  Antonio  and  Manuela  Ballester.10 Ángel  Gaos,  also  a
member of UEAP and the PCE, was a powerful orator and one of the most erudite in the
group.11 He was  moreover  recognised  as  its  best  writer,  as  a  result  of  which  most
editorials were penned by him.12 Gaos also stood out ideologically,  as he combined
Marxist convictions with a deep religious sentiment.13 Pérez Contel was a sculptor who
would work with  Nueva Cultura throughout its  existence,  and take  command of  its
graphic design during the war years. Badía and Carreño were part of Renau's closest
circle of friends since school days,  while Serrano,  a medic and writer,  and Armado
Bazán,  appear  to  have  been  newer  acquaintances.  Bazán,  a  Peruvian  essayist  and
7 Josep Renau tended to suggest that the magazine was funded by him only, while Pérez Contel insisted 
that all the editors contributed to the extent that they could. Either way, Renau was by far the highest 
earner (apart from his successful career in advertising, he had also taken up a part-time teaching 
position at the San Carlos School of Fine Arts in 1933), which no doubt meant the greater part of the 
cost was carried by him. See Julián González, I. El Cartel Republicano, 186, and Pérez Contel, R. 
Artistas en Valencia, 654, 658.
8 According to Renau he talked to Miguel Prieto and Arturo Serrano Plaja, who in turn had discussed 
the idea with the Octubre group in Madrid. See J. 'Notas al margen', 470.
9 There are no exact figures on later print runts, nor geographical spread, apart from the support groups 
mentioned in the magazine itself (see no 13 [July 1936], 23.) According to both Josep and Juan  
Renau  it also had some presence in Latin America. See Ibid., 459, and Renau, J. Pasos y Sombras, 
346f. For a list of editorial committee members, see Nueva Cultura, 6 (August-September 1935), 16.
10 The exact membership of the editorial board is not clear and may have changed over time. Juan Renau
claimed the original group consisted of Josep Renau, Pérez Contel, Carreño, Francisco Badía, Serrano,
Pla y Beltrán, Alonso, an administrator and himself (Pasos y Sombras, 345). Francisco Agramunt by 
contrast claims it also included Ángel Gaos, Antonio Deltoro, José Bueno, and Armado Bazán, but not
Pla y Beltrán, Badía, and Alonso. (La vanguardia artística, 300-303). The list above represents the 
names  present on both lists (Josep and Juan Renau, Pérez Contel, Serrano, Carreño), plus names that 
were elsewhere mentioned by either Renau (Manuela, Ángel Gaos) or Pérez Contel (Bazán, Antonio 
Ballester) as having played a significant part from the start, as well as names whose close personal or 
organisational ties to Renau mean they can be assumed to have been have played a part in the 
magazine's inception (Pla y Beltrán, Badía).  
11 Gaos was inthe PCE from early 1936 at least. Nadal mentions him as part of the his PCE cell, though 
Nadal himself only joined the PCE around the time of the general elections in February 1936. Gómez 
Andrés, A. & Pérez i Moragón, F. (Eds.) Emili Gómez Nadal, 386. Juan Renau called him an 'orador 
de escandalo' Pasos y Sombras, 297.
12 J. 'Notas al margen', 481f.
13 Ibid. Renau claimed that he occasionally left editorial meetings because he was irritated by the 
materialist emphasis of his colleagues' social, political, and cultural analysis. See also Agramunt 
Lacruz, F. La vanguardia artística, 276, 299.
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literary critic resident in Valencia, spoke a number of languages and would be the first
to contribute with translations of foreign articles and documents.14 Pla y Beltrán, the
UEAP administrator and nominally 'President' of the Valencian PCE, was a self-taught
poet. He was one of the few (if not the only one) in the group from a poor background,
for which reason he had been obliged to turn to factory work from a young age. After
discovering poetry, he had become a prolific and uncompromising writer – the enfant
terrible of  Valencian  letters  according  to  Juan  Renau15 –  and  would  later  impress
observers with his ability to connect through his work with the most exploited sectors in
Spanish society.16 Juan Renau was also, as we've seen, active in both the UEAP and the
PCE, and held positions of responsibility in the Valencian branch of the students’ union,
FUE, for which he was briefly the General Secretary (Comisario General).17 He too
wanted to go to art school, but as José Renau Montoro decided that two artists was
enough for  one family,  he had to settle for law studies instead. The subject  did not
interest him and eventually he became a historian and writer. Antonio Ballester was a
sculptor who was fully involved with local avant-garde circles and moreover had close
family ties to Renau, who had married his elder sister, Manuela.  
An  extended  mention  needs  to  be  made  regarding  Manuela  Ballester,  who
played a pivotal role not only as a co-editor and contributor to Nueva Cultura but also
as crucial support in Renau's political and artistic career generally. Manuela was herself
an excellent painter, predicted in the late 1920s to achieve great success,18 but would
ultimately sacrifice a significant part of her own artistic ambitions for the career of her
husband.19 Indeed,  as  Fernando Bellón has  suggested,  it  is  difficult  to imagine how
Renau's phenomenal artistic output in the Republican years – encompassing, as it did,
multiple forms of advertising commissions, magazine illustrations, and book covers, as
well as regular and frequent contributions to political magazines like Orto and Estudios
14 Pérez Contel, R. Artistas en Valencia, 657. Pérez Contel did not specify which languages, but says that
Bázan provided translations for the first issue, which means his language skills could have included 
French, German, Russian and Italian.
15 Renau, J. Pasos y Sombras, 350f.
16 Fuentes, V. La marcha al pueblo en las letras españolas, 223. See also Agramunt Lacruz, F. La 
vanguardia artística, 277.
17 Agramunt Lacruz, F. La vanguardia artística, 279. Juan Renau also ran the visual arts section of its 
magazine, FUE.
18 Ibid. 204-262. See also two articles in Laberintos: revista de estudios sobre los exilios culturales 
españoles No 10-11 (2008-2009): Bellón, F. 'Manuela Ballester, hija, hermana y esposa de artista' (pp. 
148-164) and Escrivá Moscardó, C. 'Recordando a Manuela Ballester' (pp. 165-177). There also an 
exhibition catalogue, García García, M. (Ed.) Homenaje a Manuela Ballester (Valencia: Institut 
Valencià de la Dona, Generalitat Valenciana, 1995).
19 See Bellón, F. 'Manuela Ballester, hija, hermana y esposa de artista', 159.
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– could have been maintained without the assistance of his wife.20 Even while providing
help, Manuela had to restrain her husband's otherwise unbounded eagerness to take on
new projects.21 It  also seems that the couple depended hugely on Manuela's  mother,
Rosa Vilaseca, to take care of all household duties while they worked.22 Nonetheless,
Manuela's  own  work  would  achieve  some  visibility  through  collaborations  with
publishers like Cenit,23 as well as with magazines like Orto and Nueva Cultura.24 During
the war years she would take the lead in editing another publication, Pasionaria, as part
of  her  work  for  the  Committee  of  Anti-Fascist  women  (Comité  de  Mujeres
Antifascistas).25
If these were Renau's key collaborators from the beginning, various prestigious
names would be added to the list as  Nueva Cultura's stature grew. Among those who
repeatedly contributed with articles and art work during its pre-war phase (during the
civil war the list would expand even further, as it became the official publication of the
main  cultural  organisation  in  Valencia.  See  chapter  7)  we  find  the  novelist  and
playwright Max Aub, the poet Juan Gil-Albert, and the writer César Arconada. Taking
this array in conjunction with the political positions of the editors, the magazine thus
represented a broad and varied ideological outlook which spanned  the spectrum of the
progressive left.26 
In  its  efforts  to  co-ordinate  the  different  political  voices  present  in
common  opposition  to  fascism,  Nueva  Cultura offered  a  cultural  parallel  to  the
contemporary  political  developments  which  would  culminate  in  the  Popular  Front
coalition that fought the February 1936 elections. Materialising (and triumphing) largely
as a result of the extraordinary campaigning of Manuel Azaña, the electoral coalition
would include reformist republicans, socialists and communists, who sought to regain
the political initiative and resume the reformist programme that had first defined the
Republic in 1931-33.27 Even the previously sectarian PCE had, as a result of grass roots
pressure, begun to engage in cross-party collaboration in connection with the Asturian
20 Ibid., 150.
21 Bellón, F.  Josep Renau, 227.
22 See Bellón, F. 'Manuela Ballester, hija, hermana y esposa de artista', 151.
23 Escrivá Moscardó, C. 'Recordando a Manuela Ballester', 167.
24 Apart from articles mentioned in footnote 56 on page 53 above, see photomontages in Orto, 15 
(September 1933) and Nueva Cultura, 9 (Decembre 1935), 10f.
25 Agramunt Lacruz, F. La vanguardia artística, 204-262.
26 Arconada was a communist, Aub a socialist, and Gil-Albert not affiliated to any political party.
27 For an account of Azaña’s role in the creation of the ‘Popular Front’ coalition of 1936, see Preston, P. 
‘The Creation of the Popular Front in Spain’ in Preston, P. and Graham, H. (Eds.) The Popular Front 
in Europe (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1987), 84-106.
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rebellion. It then, fortuitously, found its marginal participation in the electoral coalition
officially  sanctioned  when,  in  July-August  1935,  the  Popular  Front  strategy  was
endorsed by the Comintern.28 
Before considering how these political developments influenced Nueva Cultura,
it should be mentioned that the Spanish Popular Front was not itself free of internal
tensions. These can, in most cases, be traced to the fact that the coalition from the outset
meant  different  things  to  its  different  component  political  parts.  For  reformist
republicans  and  many  parliamentary  socialists,  the  ultimate  goal  was  to  recover
parliamentary strength and thus defend Republican constitutionality and (especially for
the  socialists)  the  legislative  power  of  parliament  to  enact  social  reform.  For
revolutionary socialists and communists, however, the Popular Front was primarily a
pragmatic and temporary concession forced by the defeat of October 1934, a defeat that
reminded the  radical  left  once  again  of  its  limitations (as  similar  failed  risings  had
across Europe since the Bolshevik revolution): the repressive apparatus of the modern
state  would always  triumph in  an open battle  with revolutionary forces.  It  was  this
insight,  plus  the  Soviet  fear  of  expansionist  Nazism,  that  finally  prompted  the
Comintern  to  admit,  at  its  Seventh  Congress  of  25  July-20  August  1935,  that  the
sectarian  tactic  characterising  its  'Third  Period'  needed  to  be  abandoned  for  one
emphasising collaboration with all progressive parties, at least until historical conditions
were more favourable to radical change. Finally it must also be noted that many of the
grass-roots constituencies that supported the Popular Front primarily saw it as a vehicle
to resume the journey towards comprehensive social and political reform, however this
was achieved. That this part of the Popular Front contained an element that was more
radical  than  the  coalition's  electoral  programme  suggested  became  clear  when  the
narrow electoral win of February 1936 gave rural and urban workers across Spain the
confidence  to  stage  a  series  of  land  occupations  and  other  challenges  to  industrial
management.29 As in the first years of the Republic, then, there were different views
within the progressive camp concerning the pace and scope of the change pursued. The
difference was that  after  five years  of  escalating social  conflict,  such disagreements
were potentially more  explosive than  ever  before.  Failure  to  co-operate would now
28 Graham, H. The Spanish Republic at War, 59-62. See also Haywood, P. ‘The development of Marxist 
theory in Spain and the Frente Popular’ in Alexander, M. and Graham, H. (Eds.) The French and 
Spanish Popular Fronts (Cambridge: CUP, 1989) 
29 For an overview of the political dynamics of the Popular Front in Europe see editors introduction in  
The Popular Front in Europe, 1-20. For the cases of Spain and France, see also Alexander, M. and 
Graham, H. (Eds.) The French and Spanish Popular Fronts, 1-8.
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come at a price that progressive Republicans could hardly afford to pay.
What kept the coalition together, despite internal tensions, was, as indicated, an
overriding commitment to anti-fascism. The unifying effect  of this commitment was
particularly strong and even broader in cultural spheres, where confrontations between
reformists and revolutionaries had never been as sharp as in politics proper. With a few
reservations we can thus concur with cultural historian Manuel Aznar's comment that
Nueva Cultura be first and foremost considered an attempt to form a 'cultural popular
front.'30 The term is useful as long as we see Nueva Cultura as the intellectual branch of
a developing social movement rather than merely as a cultural project which found a
symbolic counterpart in an electoral coalition. Moreover, it is important to note that it
did  not  attract  collaborators  on the basis  of  any pre-determined agenda.  Though its
founding idea was to fortify anti-fascism in and through the arts, it basically operated as
an  open  forum  where  the  significance  of  anti-fascist  commitment  was  constantly
redefined through dialogue and interaction.
If Nueva Cultura was, as its subheading declared, primarily committed to
the creation of a new 'intellectual current' (orientación intelectual), it also stressed to its
readers the need to translate intellectual activity into concrete action. The first editorial
stated that the magazine's aim was to overcome 'anxious' contemplation and that only
action  could  generate  'authentic  creation  and  reality.'31 Similarly,  in  the  October-
November  issue  of  1935,  commemorating  both  the  Bolshevik  Revolution  and  the
Asturian  rebellion,  the  editors  asserted,  with  Marx,  that  the  task  was  no  longer 'to
contemplate the world,  but to transform it.'  Aware that their efforts as 'revolutionary
intellectuals'  would add but 'a  grain of  sand'  to 'the dynamism of these terrible and
decisive times,' their labour would be 'in vain' if they could not make readers 'play an
active role'  in  the process  of  contemporary history.  Only by convincing  a  broader
population  to  turn  to  action  would  progressives  amass  the  force  to  overthrow
'imperialism' and create 'new forms of human co-existence.'32 
The responsibility of the artist in this 'drama' was discussed in an open letter to
the sculptor Alberto Sanchez, written by Renau and Carreño and published in  Nueva
Cultura's  second issue (February 1935).  Entitled 'Situation and Horizons of  Spanish
Visual  Arts:  Letter  from  “Nueva  Cultura”  to  the  Sculptor  Alberto'  (Situación  y
30 Soler, M. A. ‘La revista Nueva Cultura y la construcción del Frente Popular cultural de la revolución 
española (1935-1937)’ (Faximil Edicions Digitals, 2006).
31 Nueva Cultura, 1 (January 1935), 2.
32 Nueva Cultura, 7-8 (October-November 1935), 2.
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Horizontes de la Plástica Española: Carta de ”Nueva Cultura” al Escultor Alberto), the
text  starts  with  four  'objective  facts'  which,  according  to  the  authors,  justify  their
intervention: first, the fact that an increasing number of artists supported the anti-fascist
cause, which they understood to be about combating an 'anticulture' resulting from 'the
decomposition of capitalism'; second, that they grasped that the current system needed
to be changed for one that was 'more just and rational' as well as conducive to the peace
needed  to  create  art;  third,  that  they  understood  that  only  'the  true  people  –  that
composed of workers and peasants – may create this society'; and fourth, that despite
these  insights  many  artists  had  not  understood  the  'formidable  role  of  culture'  in
maintaining the present system. After offering an extended analysis of the development
of Spanish arts from the early twentieth century to their present day, the authors then
criticized Alberto Sanchez, who, in spite of his commendable attempt to give tangible
expression to life in the countryside, had failed to represent the reality of rural social
relations.  Even  though  his  work  sought  to  connect  with  the  spirit  of  the  Castilian
landscape, it seemed oblivious, Renau and Carreño maintained, to the present revolt of
its people. This was a consequence, in their view, of the fact that Sanchez had allowed
himself to be influenced by the 'idealist' and abstract conceptions which unavailingly
limited the social impact of contemporary art. These conceptions, rooted in the notion of
'art for art's  sake,'  diminished the content of the work and tied it  to an individualist
paradigm, which ultimately deprived it of the most important capacity granted art: its
ability 'to establish spiritual contact between peoples.' The solipsistic decadence which
took its place undermined, in other words, the possibility of art contributing to social
mobilisation – a 'fact' which could only aid, in Renau and Carreño's view, the advance
of fascism.33 
In  his short  reply to  Nueva Cultura,  Alberto Sanchez declared himself  to be
prepared to join the revolutionary struggle, but suggested that to debate whether abstract
art  was  'bourgeois'  or  not  was  a  waste  of  time.  Certainly,  Renau's  art-theoretical
argumentation may – not least from a present-day perspective – appear unproductively
rigid,34 but it should be reiterated that terms like abstraction and realism should not be
understood  too  literally.  The  opposition  was  not  one  between  non-figurative  and
figurative  representation.  Rather,  as  in  the  distinction  between  collage  and
photomontage, the former is concerned with the theoretical and practical limitations of
33 Nueva Cultura, 2 (February 1935), 3-6.
34 Renau himself later admitted that the argument presented in the letter may appear 'a bit naive and 
schematic' (un poco ingenua y esquématica). Pérez Contel, R. Artistas en Valencia, 137.
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representation,  whereas  the  latter  refers  to  some  kind  of  engagement  with  social
reality.35 What Renau and Carreño criticized was,  in essence,  an idea of art as  self-
referential experimentation or as a self-justifying pursuit of some timeless Beauty. Even
if  such art  is  not  necessarily socially inconsequential  in the long term,36 Renau and
Carreño's critique must again be understood in the context of contemporary political and
cultural demands for immediate collective action. Realism, thus understood, was (and
is) the only way to speak directly to 'peoples' – to use their own description of their
audience – rather than 'individuals'.37  
The 'Dark Testimonies of our Times' series
Renau's  own  answer  to  the  challenge  of  formulating  an  innovative  and  politically
effective  response  to  his  times  had  been  found,  as  we've  seen,  in  photomontage,  a
technique which he developed further in  Nueva Cultura,  and especially in the series
'Dark  Testimonies  of  our  Times'  (Testigos  Negros  de  Nuestros  Tiempos).38 'Dark
Testimonies' did not start out as a series of montages based on photography, but its core
idea was from the beginning to use documents that would unmask the reality of fascism.
The first couple of installments consisted of quotes from speeches, books, and other
material,  arranged  as  a  textual  unit  and  accompanied  by  commentary  to  make  the
significance of the excerpts plain to all.39 The fourth issue of Nueva Cultura (May 1935)
was conceived in its entirety as an installment of 'Dark Testimonies', highlighting the
dangers  of  fascism  through  detailed  analysis  of  statistics,  tables,  political
documentation, as well as photographs taken from Germany and Italy.40 Also anxious to
point out the real danger of fascism rising to power in Spain, the introductory editorial
offered a historical analysis of the emergence of European fascisms which highlighted
similarities between the context of continental  events and the contemporary Spanish
situation (pointing broadly to a political and economic crisis that leads Capital to side to
with anti-liberal  forces, forming an alliance aiming primarily to defeat  Marxism and
35 See pages 83f above.
36 See pages 32f above.
37 Renau later claimed that the letter had significant impact among cultural circles locally and even 
nationally. Pérez Contel, R. Artistas en Valencia, 137.
38 For an analysis covering every installment of this series, Revert Roldán, J.M. Disseny gràfic en 
revistes valencianes: Gràfica i retòrica en Nueva Cultura (1935-1937), unpublished PhD thesis, 
University of Valencia, 211-238.
39 See number 1 (January 1935), 6f; number 2 (Febrauary 1935), 8f. The installment appearing in 
number 3, 8f, is the first to include photography.
40 Including some pictures previously used for the photo-series 'Dark Pages of War: what they concealed 
from the people' in Estudios, August to November 1933.
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defend an order conducive to their material interests). It ended with a passage which
later, against the reality of Francoist repression, would appear darkly prophetic to Renau
and the other Nueva Cultura editors:41
Just  as  in  Italy,  in  Germany,  and in  Austria  – just  as  in all  fascist
countries,  incapable  of  saving  their  national  bourgeoisie  from  the
mortal decadence of capitalism – they will mount here, on top of the
Spanish  people,  on  top  of  its  hunger,  its  misery  and  its  toil,  an
absolutist state of military men, clergy, and adventurers at the service
of capitalists and landowners. They will lock away Spanish culture in
dark seminaries, and through this tragic Spanish night will burn yet
again stakes of the Inquisition.42
Against this threat, Nueva Cultura reiterated its commitment to fight on the side of 'the
people', to join the workers' militias to oppose those 'who carry in their hands the yoke
of servitude and the arrows of martyrdom.'43
In the more image-rich instalment of 'Dark Testimonies' that followed, the focus
would increasingly turn to Spain, and Renau would add to his ominous rhetoric a dose
of  bitter  sarcasm.  This  was  particularly  evident  in  the  sixth  instalment  of  August-
September 1935. Entitled 'Spain through the glasses of Don Salvador de Madariaga'
(España a través de las gafas de Don Salvador de Madariaga), the montage combines
excerpts from two books by Madariaga, then the Spanish representative in the League of
Nations,  with images from key events from the Republican period. The first  pairing
consists of a quote which states that the Spaniard is 'not a citizen of an egalitarian state
like the French, nor is he a member of a national society like the English, nor a subject
of an empire like the Italian or the German of today. He is a man.'44 Below this quote we
see an image of dead bodies scattered on the ground and a group of onlooking police
officers, priests, and soldiers. In reference to the bloody repression of an anarchist rising
in Casas Viejas (Cádiz) in January 1933, Renau's caption simply reads: 'The Human
Condition: Casas Viejas.'45 The conflict between intransigent conservatism and popular
41 Cf. Pérez Contel, R. Artistas en Valencia, 656.
42 Nueva Cultura, 4 (May 1935), 5.
43 Ibid.
44 Nueva Cultura, 6 (August-September 1935), 8.
45 The nation-wide anarchist rising of 8 January 1933 was easily suppressed in most of Spain. Many 
government supporters as well as the right-wing press applauded the response of public order forces, 
but as the extreme brutality used to suppress the rising in Casas Viejas became known, the 
government – and especially the socialists, who formed part of the coalition – clearly felt events to be 
politically damaging.  There are many accounts, including Ramón Sender’s contemporary eyewitness 
reportage. For a concise and vivid historical account, see Preston, P. The Spanish Holocaust..., 27f.
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revolutionary compulsion is similarly put in sharp relief throughout the composition.
Another  quote  remarking  on  Spanish  passivity  before  the  vicissitudes  of  life  is
juxtaposed with an image from the Asturian rebellion,  and Salvador de Madariaga's
suggestion that Spanish society needed political institutions to have a religious base is
placed next to an image of a burning church. Referring to a spate of church burnings
that took place shortly after the proclamation of the Republic,  the caption underneath
states 'New catholicism: 11 May 1931'. Apart from the fact that Renau thus ridiculed the
statesman's  denial  of  Spanish workers'  readiness  to  rebel,  it  is  noteworthy that  this
montage  also  suggests  a  modification  of  his  rhetorical  strategy.  In  addition  to the
recurring  reliance  on  photography being  read  as  proof,  Renau  signals  here  a  clear
presumption that his audience shares his understanding of the meaning of the events
portrayed. If not, his sarcasm would risk being misunderstood. In itself, this implies that
didactism  has  here  been  replaced  by  an  expression  suggestive  of  a  discursive
community, a community where the artist addresses his audience less as a teacher than a
fellow activist propagandising for a common cause.
A more elaborate example of this can be found in the October-November issue
of 1935, where a four-page instalment of 'Dark Testimonies' appeared under the title
'Let's talk now about the good life in Spain' (Hablemos ahora del buen vivir en España)
[Fig. 14]. The montage, which is made up of a long series of captioned images reading
like  a  photographic  comic  strip,  starts  with  a  reference  to  a  fortune-teller  advert
emphasising  the  importance  of  knowing  the  future.  A narrator,  whose  commentary
accompanies the images, takes this as a starting point for a presentation of Spain's key
cultural institutions, which allegedly offer a sound base for future national development.
The tone is  again one of biting sarcasm, as a few extracts will  show. The reader is
advised  not  to  'fear'  popular  enfranchisement,  as  the 'distinguished  clairvoyant'  José
Ortega y Gasset can be trusted to 'prophesize the failure of the masses in their attempt to
direct the destinies of the world.' Should the reader be a sworn atheist, the narrator
presents a child from the Basque village of Ezkioga who 'with the same naivety with
which he would pick a number in the national lottery' will offer 'a true and disinterested
testimony [...] of having seen God himself in a living image.'46 Catholicism does not
only represent the sole true creed, continues the narrator, but has also had a positive
influence on modern culture and the mass media in Spain. A review of magazines then
shows covers with anticommunist titles and pictures of workers behind bars, and behind
46 The village of Ezkioga was famous as a site of Marian apparitions that began in June 1931. 
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the header of  Revista de Occidente,  praised for its  'elegant'  propagation of the 'new
conceptions'  of  'western  idealism',  we see  two-thirds  of  a  swastika.  The rest  of  the
'culture' on show is dominated by naked female models, cabarets, as well as images of
heavy drinking, said to illustrate the interests of the 'gentlemen' of the fascist Falange
Española. At the end of the narrative sequence, under an image of soldiers in Morocco,
the narrator mentions how the Spanish state, as the 'moral tutor' of its population, sends
its young to the colonies for a 'cultural exchange'. The next picture, taken in Asturias
during the 1934 rising, shows a Moroccan mercenary taking aim with his rifle: the other
side of that generous exchange.47 Finally, the narrator asks, as the reader is faced with an
image of a  working-class woman sitting on the curbside is  holding her head in her
hands, 'is having been born Spanish not enough to bring a tear to one's eye?'48
As in 'Spain through the glasses of Don Salvador de Madariaga,' the images here
are supposed to belie the captions, and thereby make apparent Renau's satire. Yet in this
montage,  the  relation  between  image  and  text  is  less  self-evident  and  can  only be
unambiguous if subjected to a predetermined reading (again suggesting Renau's trust in
a  like-minded  reader).  Indeed,  should  the  relation  be  studied  without  any  fixed
predisposition, meaning seems to come apart, as its essential indeterminability produces
a cognitive clash between different possible interpretations. Looking at the third and the
fourth image [Fig. 15], for example, depicting seers from Ezkioga, it is impossible, on
the sole basis of what is shown, to be certain whether the images confirm or undermine
the claims  made by the narrator.  The  'reality'  of  the  photograph is,  in  other  words,
caught  in  a  tension,  suspended  between  divergent  truths,  mutually  exclusive  and
irreconcilable.  One  might  even  suggest  the  images  do  not  so  much  stage  a  clash
between interpretations as conjure manifestations of two possible worlds. Either way,
this  tension  inevitably  problematises  the  inherent  discursive  meaning  elsewhere
ascribed to the photograph. Yet considering that most of these pictures were presumably
taken from mainstream media, this too may be understood as part of Renau's objective.49
What is undermined, on such a reading, is first and foremost the truth of the photograph
as it appears in the 'bourgeois' or 'reactionary' press. Needless to say, the distinction is
47 This picture was a reproduction of the cover of Crónica 28 Octubre 1934.
48 Nueva Cultura, 7-8 (October-November 1935), 12-15.
49 Renau said in a 1978 interview that the 'Dark Testimonies of Our Times' series aimed to turn 
'reproductive media' into 'productive media' – a statement which seems to have referred to a process 
whereby images that already in the public sphere are given new meaning by an artist who inserts them
into a new context. See Tomás Ferré, F. 'Los carteles valencianos en la Guerra Civil Española' in 
Aguilera Cerni, V. (Ed.)  Arte Valenciano, 189f. 
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purely ideological.
The quest for a cultural alternative
Nueva Cultura had from the outset sought to occupy a 'critical, polemical, and creative'
position vis-a-vis Spanish mainstream media. An editorial column entitled 'Index of the
Spanish  press'  (Índice  de  la  prensa  española),  appearing  in  the  inaugural  issue,
maintained that the lamentable 'material and political' situation (referring, in effect, to
ownership  structures)  of  national  magazines  had  turned  them  into  instruments  of
'spiritual  oppression.'  This  was doubly significant  since  the press,  together  with  the
cinema,  constituted  the  'primary  indicator'  of  contemporary  cultural  life  and  a
predominant 'pedagogical  influence'  on 'the masses.'50 In  order  to clarify the pivotal
justification and ambition of their own endeavour, then, Nueva Cultura’s editors offered
an overview of its relationship to its main ‘competitors’.
After a quick review of the dominant conservative,  catholic, monarchist, and
fascist  magazines  that  constituted  Nueva  Cultura's  main  adversaries,  as  well  as
'pornographic' general interest magazines dismissed as true expressions of a 'decaying
bourgeoisie,' the editors turned to publications which lay closer to its own ambition.51
They commended the socialist  paper  Leviatán,  while  suggesting that  its  exclusively
political content was too narrow to address their own interests, and also expressed a
recognition  of  certain  'healthy'  and  'authentic'  elements  in  anarchist  magazines  like
Estudios and  La  Revista  Blanca,  which  otherwise  suffered  from  a  degree  of
'disorientation' and 'anachronism.' 
The  two  most  important  titles  in  Nueva  Cultura’s  overview  were  the  well-
established  Revista  de  Occidente  (1923-1936,  1963-present),  founded  by  Ortega  y
Gasset,  and  the  liberal  catholic  Cruz  y  Raya  (afirmación  y  negación)  (1933-1936),
founded by the writer José Bergamín. These were deemed to constitute the only two
Spanish  publications  representing  a  truly  modern  culture.  Revista  de  Occidente –
incidentally the first magazine that Renau had regularly read in his youth – was praised
for the high standard of its literary and philosophical content, but was considered too
liberal  and  germanophile  in  its  political  orientation.  Cruz  y  Raya,   described  as  a
'national  response'  to  the 'cold occidentalism' of  Ortega's  magazine,  was praised for
having followed a broad and liberal path, despite the growing influence of fascism in
50 Nueva Cultura, 1 (January 1935), 1f. The column was written by Ángel Gaos. Renau, J. 'Notas al 
margen', 469.
51 The criticism was in one sense remarkable, since Renau was himself the creator of some of these 
'pornographic' images. Bellón, F. Josep Renau, 189. Cf. photomontage entitled 'La Rosa', published in 
Crónica in April 1936. Cut out available in Archivo Josep Renau, 84/2.2. 
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conservative circles. The editors of Nueva Cultura shared its desire to take as their point
of departure Spain’s own realities and to create a 'national culture', but crucially did not
want to suggest  (as they implied  Cruz y Raya  did) that certain religious or political
forms could be seen as consubstantial with what it meant to be Spanish.52 
These comments,  read in  conjunction with Renau's  retrospective ones on the
magazine's  birth,  highlight  not  only  Nueva  Cultura's  critical  role  but  also  give  an
indication of how it conceived of its positive cultural contribution. Fundamentally, the
aim of  the magazine was  to  formulate a  new cultural  narrative,  departing from the
'moral conservatism' and 'spiritual autarky' discernable, as Renau had pointed out, in
Republican  reincarnations  of  Golden  Age  art  as  well  as  in  fascist  manifestations
appearing at the extreme end of the essentialist spectrum. It wanted to lay the basis of
lasting change, influenced by international progressive ideas as well as healthy national
traditions.  Thus  Nueva  Cultura  hoped  to  dismantle  the  rigid  and  discredited  value
hierarchies on which fascism too ultimately relied. Indeed, to its editors, anti-fascism
did not only signify a combative stance against violent reaction, but a commitment to a
different cultural order that would make the future resurgence of fascism a practical
impossibility. Similar feelings among progressives elsewhere help to explain a Europe-
wide concern with cultural renewal (seen not least in the work of the Frankfurt school
and the writings of  Antonio Gramsci) – a concern that took many forms in the interwar
years. To  achieve  such  radical  renewal  cultural  producers  needed  to  embark  on  an
exploration  of  the  unknown,  to  unfix  the  boundaries  of  collective  and  individual
existence.  New  cultural  possibilities  had  to  be  articulated  for  alternative  cultural
identities to be imagined. To such ends, Nueva Cultura advocated the creation of a new
Spanish 'myth,'53 incorporating what was useful from the past in a radically reformulated
cultural  self-perception.  Constituting,  in  effect,  a  new 'social  imaginary,'54 this  myth
would serve as an ethical foundation for the 'just and rational' system posed to replace
52 Nueva Cultura, 1 (January 1935), 1f.
53 The use of the term 'myth' suggests the influence of the French syndicalist thinker George Sorel, who 
stressed the importance of myth in people's lives. However, there is no mention of Sorel anywhere in 
Nueva Cultura, and I know of no other indication that Renau might have read him.
54 This term does not appear in Nueva Cultura but is useful as a clarification of what the editors sought 
to change. First elaborated by Lacan in the 1920s, the concept of the 'social imaginary' was taken up 
by theorists like Cornelius Castoriadis and Charles Taylor who described it as the way in which people
imagine the society which they inhabit and sustain. By this none of them mean a visualising of an 
abstract representation of institutions and practices, but rather of significations (Castoriadis) which 
come to hold together shared meanings in society, or an underlying moral order (Taylor) which 
consciously or unconsciously informs behaviour and thought. Both Castoriadis and Taylor can be said 
to place the individual as a (trans)formative and/or reproductive agent of social institutions at the 
centre of their theoretical concerns.
109
the capitalist order in Spain, as well as a source of inspiration for future artistic creation.
The last installment of 'Dark Testimonies' to be published before the start of the
civil war, an installment entitled 'Anathema', gave expression to a clearly millenarian
dimension of this aspiration55 [Fig.16]. Here an old myth is  invoked to speak of the
coming of a new one, as the prophet Isaiah emerges from the Old Testament to witness
the  cruelties  and  injustices  of  the  modern  day.  The  images  consist  of  small
photomontages depicting contemporary scenes of social misery while the captions are
taken from the biblical  original  where the prophet speaks of a  coming judgement –
depicted as a popular revolution – against Judah. In the first instance, the montage thus
provides another example of how Renau criticized a traditionally Christian society by
using elements from its own cultural canon. Yet the historical overlap produced by the
juxtaposition of Isaiah with contemporary events is  arguably the composition's  most
salient feature, and emphasises how social injustice and violence have deep historical
roots which can only be overcome – as the Clarté and UEAP manifestos also stated –
through a complete break with history. According to this vision, true change will only
come with  what  Juan  Renau  called  the  'quotidian Final  Judgement,' vindicating  the
powerless and signalling the dawn of a new world.56  
Turning principles into practice
The values projected onto this new world are not only to be detected in Nueva Cultura's
textual  and  visual  content,  but  also  in  its  editorial  practice.  Relations  between
collaborators were,  first  of all,  based on a clear principle of  egalitarianism. Though
Renau was a key figure in the founding of the magazine, there was no single voice
standing above the rest at editorial meetings. All decisions were taken collectively.57 As
a result, these meetings, typically held in the old and run-down Ateneo Musical, which
had the advantage of being visited by neither the police nor its own members, would
often involve epic discussions and heated arguments.58 All contributions were welcome,
but nothing went into print without first being scrutinised by the group, and editorials
were only written once divergent views had been synthesised into one. According to
Juan Renau, the intensity of the effort  often left  the participants exhausted.  'We left
those glorious and torrid meetings like convalescents after a devastating typhus: rickety,
55 Nueva Cultura, 12 (May-June 1936), 12-14.
56 Renau, J. Pasos y Sombras, 351.
57 Ibid., 346. Cf. Pérez Contel, R. Artistas en Valencia, 654f.
58 Agramunt Lacruz, F. La vanguardia artística, 299.
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out of breath, beaten to a pulp,' he later wrote in his autobiography59 
Around  the  time of  the  fourth  issue  (May 1935),  editorial  discussions  were
moved to a workers' café in the port.60 Here all those present in the café were invited to
contribute  with  questions  and  comments.61 Nueva  Cultura  thus  opened  its  editorial
process to direct feedback from its intended readers, and allowed them to participate as
cultural  producers  as  well  as  consumers.  While  the  latter  may  be  said  of  other
magazines too, especially where linked to efforts to create an alternative, 'proletarian'
culture, such an immediate, and potentially risky, connection with the readership was
unusual, if not unique.62 It bespoke the editors' aspiration to a 'profound immersion in
the community' and to create a 'popular' (though not 'populist') publication that would
open up cultural debate to all. To what extent the magazine actually managed to appeal
to  working class constituencies nationwide may be indicated by the fact that the stated
professions of its various support group members generally suggested a higher socio-
economic position.63 Considering that any real engagement with the magazine's content
demanded a certain level of education, and that cultural concerns in general tend to be
less  pressing for  the poorest,  this should not  be surprising.  Nonetheless,  in  view of
Nueva  Cultura's  commitment  to  a  multilateral  process  theoretically  tied  to  the
proletarian revolution, workers' contributions, where they could be secured, remained
vital nourishment for their project.
Nearer to the time of the February 1936 elections, Nueva Cultura expanded on
this idea and began to engage in an alternative version of the Misiones Pedagógicas, by
visiting  villages  in  the  Valencian  countryside.64 There  the  editors  read  out  and
encouraged discussion around the magazine’s editorials and illustrations – above all, it
seems, the 'Dark Testimonies' series. In the immediate term, these sessions would have
focused on building electoral support for the Popular Front. Like many progressives, the
group behind  Nueva Cultura was convinced that another victory for the conservative
block  risked  irreparable  damage  to  constitutional  freedoms  and  worsening  social
59 Renau, J. Pasos y Sombras, 346.
60 J. 'Notas al margen', 478f. The café was called El Polp and was then Calle de la Reina.
61 Pérez Contel confirmed that Nueva Cultura also travelled around the countryside in order to engage 
villagers in their work (see below), so it would not be out of character if they adopted a similar modus
operandi in the café. See Artistas en Valencia, 653.
62 Other Renau-related magazines that operated with some kind of feedback mechanism (mostly in the 
form of a section for readers' letters) were Orto, Estudios, Octubre, and Nuestro Cinema.
63 See Nueva Cultura, 10 (January 1936), 15, and Nueva Cultura, 11 (February 1936), 21. Members of 
these support groups were mainly doctors, skilled workers, journalists, teachers, students, writers and 
artists.
64 J. 'Notas al margen', 479. Pérez Contel, R. Artistas en Valencia, 653.
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inequality, and in January 1936 the magazine even published a supplement containing
photomontages,  a  poster,  and  an  'electoral  manifesto'  outlining  in  detail  what  it
considered to be at stake in the upcoming elections.65 At the same time, Nueva Cultura's
rural excursions also underscored the magazine's long-term goal. By actively interacting
with their  rural  audiences,  they addressed  an immediate  political  challenge  in  ways
which simultaneously sought to widen the dynamics of grass-roots democracy and to
formulate a new cultural consensus. 
Less  interactive,  but  nonetheless worthy of  mention in  the context of  Nueva
Cultura's extra-editorial activities, was the setting up in December 1935 of a 'popular
cinema study club' (Cine-Estudio Popular). Renau and his colleagues saw the cinema as
a powerful educational tool, and with this organisational initiative, which was part of an
expanding and diversifying trend during the Republican years,66 they aimed to support
the dissemination of progressive films while also helping members to see the underlying
ideological and economic reasons for what was in their view the regrettable content of
mainstream, and above all  Spanish,  cinema.67 They had already organised an earlier
session on 17 February 1935 (then without the 'popular'  in the club name),  but  this
seems to have been a one-off event, and the initiative did not really develop a regular
momentum until the end of the year.68 However, beyond the two first two screenings,
consisting of Rene Clair's The Last Billionaire  (1934)69 on 22 December and Mervin
Leroy's American gangster story Little  Caesar (1931)70 on 5 January 1936 – the latter
accompanied by a talk entitled 'On some fascist myths'71 – no details are given in the
magazine about  further activities.72 The last mention of the cinema club, emphasising
65 The manifesto was divided into five sections: 'traditional culture', 'the university', 'primary education', 
'the problem of artistic creation' and 'the national minorities'. In relation to each of these, the magazine
argued for a politics that would guarantee equal access to education, a progressive approach to culture 
and science, and complete recognition of national minorities within Spain, preferably within a federal 
state structure or even through full independence.
66 Pérez Merinero, C. & Pérez Merinero, D. Del cinema como arma de clase: antología de Nuestro 
Cinema 1932-1935 Valencia: Fernando Torres, 1975, 25.
67 Renau’s/Nueva Cultura’s view was essentially that big capital's ownership of the film industry 
allowed it to use the medium to propagate its own values, or simply to sedate workers with mind-
numbing entertainment. For a representative text here, see 'Manifesto de Amigos de Nuestro Cinema' 
in Pérez Merinero, C. & Pérez Merinero, D. Del cinema como arma de clase, 221-225.
68 Judging from the lack of notices in Nueva Cultura between February 1935 and January 1936, as well 
as a note in the January issue (page 13) saying that the project had been long in the making.
69 Original title: Le dernier milliardaire. Spanish title: El último millonario
70 Spanish title: Hampa dorada
71 One section of this talk was reproduced in Nueva Cultura, 10 (January 1936), 13f. Here Max Aub 
presented a few impressionistic thoughts highlighting how fascism  opposed  the natural plurality of 
’Life’.
72 The fact that no Soviet film is mentioned, despite Renau's stated admiration for Soviet film-making, 
may partly be due to Republican censorship. For a contemporary discussion around this, see, for 
example, Nuestro Cinema, 11 (April-May 1933), 146f. See also Pingree, G. B. 'Modern Anxiety and 
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only its general importance in the anti-fascist struggle and encouraging the creation of
similar clubs where these did not already exist, appeared five months later (May-June,
1935).
Nueva Cultura and the USSR
The positive example and practical  inspiration in  Nueva Cultura's  pursuit  of  radical
cultural change was, above all, the Soviet Union. Admiration for the socialist state was
by no  means  restricted  to  communist  circles  in  the  interwar  period,  but  would  for
various reasons be expressed by observers across the progressive spectrum – something
true in Spain as well as in Europe more broadly.73 The USSR was first of all an ally in
the  struggle  against  fascism,  but  many would  also  be  impressed  with  the  apparent
success of the Five Year Plans in both rapidly industrialising an agrarian country and
keeping it immune to the corrosive effects of the Great Depression. In this sense, then,
the USSR also appeared to represent a  superior model of  economic development,  a
model  which  looked  particularly  powerful  when  contrasted  to  the  malfunctioning
economies  of  the  US  and  much  of  Europe.  While  workers  in  advanced  capitalist
countries were left  without the means to support  their families,  the Soviet economy
maintained full employment. The optimism, dynamism, and vitality that in sympathetic
accounts accompanied the construction of  socialism added yet  another dimension to
such foreboding comparisons with a 'declining' west.74
Equally important,  however,  especially for  Nueva Cultura and other  cultural
endeavours  of  its  kind,  was  the  perception  that  the  USSR represented  a  revival  of
humanist values and a new model of social equality.75 Such aspects of the Soviet project
offered an interesting counterpoint for Spanish progressives who had seen their hopes
for equality sparked by the Republic, just as they also underscored why the USSR was
perceived as the antithesis of fascism.76 A central  expression of these values can be
Documentary Cinema in Republican Spain' in Larson, S. and Woods, E. (Eds.) Visualizing Spanish 
Modernity (Oxford and New York: Berg, 2005), 301-328.
73 Most obviously, this led to the coinage of the term 'fellow-traveller', meaning (in this context) 
someone who sympathised with the goals of the Bolshevik Revolution but was not a card-carrying 
member of the Communist Party. 
74 An interesting empirical study of this can be found in Erika Wolf's article on the reception of the 
glossy Soviet propaganda magazine USSR in Construction. See Wolf, E. 'When photographs speak, to 
whom do they talk? The origins and audience of SSSR na Stroike (USSR in Construction)' Left 
History, Vol. 6, No. 2 (2000), 53-82.
75 See Nueva Cultura special issue on the Bolshevik revolution (October-November 1935). See also, for 
example, Cruz, R. 'Como Cristo sobre las aguas', 189. To compare another national context, see Weitz,
E. Creating German Communism, chapter 7.
76 Hence the Red Army could be referred to as the 'Army of Peace'. See Nueva Cultura, 7-8 (October-
November 1935), 20f.
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found  in  the  idea  that  the  socialist  state  had  not  only  liberated  workers  from  the
dynamics of capitalism, but had granted them (as the Republican ultimately hoped to
do) unprecedented opportunities to fulfil their individual potential. 
A photo-series  reproduced  in  the  October-November  1935  issue  of  Nueva
Cultura, originally taken from the multilingual propaganda magazine  SSSR na stroike
(USSR in Construction),77 offered but one illustration of how such ambitions were put
into practice. It followed the journey of illiterate peasant Viktor Kalmykov, who takes
up work at the newly constructed Magnitogorsk steel plant. There he finds not only a
secure income and comradeship, but also access to basic educational resources to help
him develop his intellectual abilities.  In  the end he is elected member of the plant's
'industrial-revolutionary council' and nominated, in recognition of his achievements, for
the 'Order of the Red Banner of Labour.' According to the accompanying text, the story
of Kalmykov is representative of 'thousands' of rural and urban workers who have all
been transformed in the process of socialist construction. His was a typical example of
the 'the new man' emerging under communism, granted for the first time the profound
rewards  of  civic association and individual growth.78 Needless to say,  the illustrated
story  does  not  give  any  indication  of  the  extreme  hardship  and  violence  that  the
realisation of the Five Year Plans also entailed.
From a theoretical perspective, the question of the fate of the individual in a
collectivist society was central to the editors of Nueva Cultura, who sought to counter
all forms of individualism – revolutionary as well as reactionary – with a collectivist
ethos respectful  of pluralism. As indicated by the narrative of Kalmykov, the USSR
offered potential guidance here, and on an ideological level the country seemed to have
resolved the tension between collective obligation and individual freedom by means of
the concept of 'socialist emulation.' This was presented to Nueva Cultura readers via an
article by Maxim Gorky, published in the July issue of 1936.79 The highest form of
socialist emulation, said Gorky, drawing on a speech made by Stalin on the subject,
could be found in the Stakhanovite movement. Named after the record-breaking miner
who was officially celebrated as a communist role model, this movement represented
77 The series was originally entitled 'The Giant and the Builder' and appeared in USSR in Construction, 
1, 1932.
78 Nueva Cultura, 7-8 (October-November 1935), 22-25. The path-breaking reportage first delivering 
individual life stories from the Soviet Union appeared in A-I-Z (September 1931) under title '24 Hours
in the Life of a Moscow Worker Family'. See Wolf, E. '”As at the Filippovs”: The Foreign Origins of 
the Soviet Narrative Photographic Essay' in Ribalta, J. (Ed.) The Worker Photography Movement, 124-
131.
79
'Sobre el Hombre Nuevo' Nueva Cultura, 13 (July 1936), 11.
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'an  explosion'  of  energy,  a  celebration  of  work,  and,  crucially,  a  voluntary unity of
purpose.80 These  characteristics  brought  new  impetus  to  socialist  construction  and
would eventually make Soviet citizens, already 'socially equal,' equal as 'men' – that is,
equal 'in force and value.' Yet, Gorky hastened to add, this development must not entail
repression of the development of the individual. 'The more diverse the talents and gifts
of men', he stated, 'the more abundant will be their work,' and the faster the world would
be collectively reorganised along communist lines.81
Similar comments were made at the First International Congress of Writers for
the Defence of Culture in 1935, an event which  Nueva Cultura followed with great
interest.82 One of the principal speakers was French writer André Gide, who began his
talk by stating that  it  was possible to support  communism actively while remaining
profoundly individualist. This assertion was based on his conviction – comparable to
Gorky's – that 'being as distinct [particular] as possible is  how each individual best
serves  the  community.'  Gide,  like  most  delegates,  expressed  his  admiration  for  the
USSR, whose progress offered an 'unprecedented spectacle' of 'exemplary' importance.
This admiration led him to add a collorary thesis to the first,  namely that 'it  is in a
communist society that every individual, the distinctiveness [particularidad] of every
individual, may develop most fully.'83 Gide would later become disillusioned with the
USSR,  but  considering  Nueva  Cultura's  determination  to  seek  collective  action  in
defence  of  pluralism,  it  is  not  difficult  to  see why these sentiments  of  Gide’s were
quoted in its June-July issue of 1935 as both inspiration and prestigious support.84
Formulations like those of Gorky and Gide would not only have been read as
attempts to safeguard individual expression in a collectivist society, but would also have
appealed  to  Renau  and  other  Nueva  Cultura editors  because  of  their  potential
applicability to the problem of regional nationalism.85 In his notes on the history and
rationale behind the Valencian magazine (written at a time when Valencian regionalism
80 From a less biased and historical perspective, questions regarding voluntary self-sacrifice under 
Stalinism are, of course, very complex. For a sophisticated social and cultural history, see Kotkin, S. 
Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995). 
81
'Sobre el Hombre Nuevo' Nueva Cultura, 13 (July 1936), 11.
82 For a comments on the wider impact of the congress in Spain, see Anzar Soler, M. I congreso 
internacional, 77ff.
83 Cited in Nueva Cultura, 5 (July-July 1935), 2.
84 The centrality of Gide's intervention to the philosophical outlook of Nueva Cultura has also been 
emphasised by Manuel Aznar Soler. See ‘La revista Nueva Cultura y la construcción del Frente 
Popular cultural.'
85 The other regular contributor who had a strong interest in nationalism and its place within Marxist 
thinking was Emili Gómez Nadal. 
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was enjoying a resurgence86), Renau stressed that its battle against essentialisms was
shaped by the fact that 'Spanishness' tended to be exclusively located within the  geo-
cultural co-ordinates  of  Castile  and  Andalusia.  There  was  thus  a  certain  sense  of
exclusion  conditioning  cultural  relations  with  the  capital,  a  sense  which  initially
expressed itself as a 'provincial complex' but must later have been a significant factor
informing  the  magazine's  opposition  to  homogenising  notions  of  cultural  identity
emerging from any centre.87 Instead of enforced uniformity within the present Spanish
state, Nueva Cultura's approach to regional nationalism was consequently based on self-
determination and coexistence via multinational fraternity.88 Here Gide's comment at the
Paris  congress  provided  direct  encouragement,  as  he  prefaced  his  theses  with  the
insistence that it was possible to be profoundly French and profoundly internationalist at
the same.89 Yet once again it was the USSR that offered the practical example to follow,
as  it  had  adopted  a  nationalities  policy encouraging  –  at  least  on paper  –  the  free
expression  of  national  difference  within  a  multicultural  union.90 This  policy  was
discussed  on  several  occasions  in  Nueva  Cultura,  typically  in  articles  published  in
Valencian,91 but had interested Renau from an earlier date, as evinced by a photo feature
in Orto entitled 'The liberation of oppressed nationalities in the USSR' (La liberación de
las nacionales oprimidas en la URSS), published in August 1932.
The changes in the USSR were seen to affect not only work and politics but all
spheres of life, however. According to Nueva Cultura's October-November 1935 issue,
dedicating eighteen pages to the achievements of the socialist state, the USSR had also
made  huge  progress  with  regards  to  women's  emancipation,  child  care,  and  the
promotion of healthy sexual and marital relations.92 Yet revolutionary aspirations went
86 This is particularly notable in the recollections appearing in Doro Balaguer's 1994 book on Renau. 
That Renau's autobiographical texts should engage with such debates is of course not surprising, as 
they were written in the early stages of the transition to democracy (1977).
87 Renau even talks about a concentration camp logic in reverse. See Renau, J. 'Notas al margen', 477f. It
should also be mentioned that the PCE had demanded greater recognition of cultural differences and 
even self-determination for minority nations since the early days of the Republic. Nueva Cultura's 
approach in this regard can thus be seen as a more broadly accepted position on the radical left. Cruz, 
R. El Partido Comunista de España, 130.
88 The clearest editorial statement on this question is found in the election manifesto of February 1936. 
According to this, Nueva Cultura sees 20th century Spain as a product of an imperialist project and 
advocates full self-determination for all its constituent peoples. See 'Manifiesto electoral de Nueva 
Cultura' in Nueva Cultura, 10 bis. (February 1936), 8.
89 Cited in Nueva Cultura, 5 (July-July 1935), 2.
90 In reality, however, the nationalities policy of the Soviet Union was complex and in many cases 
extremely violent. See Martin, T. 'The Origins of Soviet Ethnic Cleansing' The Journal of Modern 
History, Vol. 70, No. 4 (December 1998), 813-861.
91 The author or translator of these were in all likelihood Emili Gómez Nadal.
92 See the articles entitled 'El amor al hombre: la comuna del Bolshevo' (26f), 'Dignificación de la mujer'
(page 27), and 'Hombre+Mujer' (page 29).
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further still. In the article quoted above, Gorky insisted that socialist 'emulation' must
also  come  to  mean  mutual  aid,  helping  one's  neighbours  in  everyday  life.  Soviet
workers had to create new socialist manners, new customs and morals, making words
like  'comrade'  signify  more  than  an  'empty  gesture.'93 This,  at  heart,  would  lend
substance to its democratic promise of equality, just as passionate dedication to work
would  ultimately  realise  its  economic  promise  of  prosperity.  Taken  together,  such
political visions combined with tangible technological and industrial advances to make
the USSR more than a momentarily impressive example of economic administration.
For many, especially in progressive intellectual circles, it represented a supreme model
of modernity, and an attempt to realise the highest aspirations of humankind. 
The influence of the USSR on Renau particularly was last but not least related to
the arts. As most progressive artists would have expected, the gradual emergence of a
new life in the USSR was accompanied by new artistic developments. Different formal
trends had fought for influence since the Bolshevik Revolution, but generally, among
different art forms, photography and, above all, cinema came to be considered the most
characteristic media of Soviet culture.94 Renau, as mentioned, was from an early stage
inspired by the cinematographic theories of Pudovkin, and wrote on several occasions
about the superiority of Soviet cinematography, especially compared to its American
counterpart.95 In the April 1932 issue of Orto, for example, he had argued that regardless
of ideological  injections,  Hollywood productions made manifest  the cold realities of
American  life  –  mechanisation  and  standardisation,  subjugation  of  all  'pure'  human
values  to  the  single-minded  goal  of  material  accumulation  –  and  that  it  was  up  to
European and Russian film makers to achieve a much needed 'humanisation' of film.96
In a review of the Russian film El Camino de la Vida  (1931),97 directed by Nikolai Ekk,
93
'Sobre el Hombre Nuevo' Nueva Cultura, 13 (July 1936), 11.
94 Lenin famously claimed that of all the arts, film was the most important to the Bolshevik regime. For 
a general analysis of why photography and film were presented as particularly relevant to Bolshevik 
Russia, see Hauser, A. The Social History of Art (Vol. 4): Naturalism, Impressionism, The Film Age 
(3rd Ed.) (London: Routledge, 1999) pp. 214-247. For a more detailed analysis of the debates within 
the Russian avant-garde, see, for example, Buchloh, B. H. D. 'From Faktura to Factography' October, 
Vol. 30 (Autumn 1984), 82-119. For an insight into the more prosaic reality of Soviet cinema, see 
Taylor, R. 'A “Cinema for the Millions”: Soviet Socialist Realism and the Problem of Film Comedy' 
Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 18, No. 3, Historians and Movies: The State of the Art: Part 1 
(July 1983), 439-461.
95 Again it may be noted that Renau's advertising work produced some contradictions in his creative life,
as he was, between 1934 and 1936, the main designer of posters for the Valencian film production 
company CIFESA. In this capacity, he arguably served the very film industry he so severely criticised 
in his articles.
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'Cinema. América y Europa' Orto, 2 (April 1932), 31-35.
97 Original title: Putyovka v zhizn. English title: Road to Life.
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Renau further claimed that the superior quality of Russian cinema was ultimately a sign
of  the  political  and  cultural  superiority  of  the  proletarian  Soviet  state.98 Its  unique
conditions allowed for the production of a unique kind of film where form and content
were perfectly fused.
Comparable ideas were expressed beyond the circles linked to  Nueva Cultura.
The  April-May 1933  issue  of  Nuestro  Cinema published  an  article  taken  from the
American  magazine  Experimental  Cinema  (1930-1934),  where  the  critic  Somerset
Logan  argued  that  Russian  film  did  not  include  any  romanticised  features  or
'arrangements' of the facts of daily existence. Indeed, she claimed, Russia was 'the only
country  where  film  is  made  from  the  substance  of  life  itself.'99 Apart  from  the
considerable romanticisation that such sentiments in themselves reveal, what is striking
is the similarity between such understandings of the place and role of artistic creation in
the USSR and the foundational artistic vision expressed in the nineteenth century by
Schiller with regard to arts in ancient Greece. Here, too, art had become inseparable
from life and politics and offered but an immediate expression of life's self-formation.
Such  celebrations  of  perceived  fusions between  art,  life  and  politics  hid,
however, a fundamental tension that affected progressive artists working in the USSR
and elsewhere. If art only reflects the actually existing substance of life – being, in this
sense, an exemplary form of realism – it deprives itself of any ability to influence the
process by which life may change.  Its  transformational capacity is, in effect, ceded to
politics.100 This dynamic manifested itself with particular clarity in the USSR, where
Stalin famously referred to writers as 'engineers of the human soul.' Literature, in this
phrase, was thus just another tool of socialist construction, critical in the design of a
new mode of  being and living,  but  tied,  like all  other  activities,  to  an  overarching
centralised plan.  The  direction  of human development lay, in other words, solely and
firmly with the Party. Yet such a scheme jarred, as we have seen, with the fundamental
role ascribed to art in many progressive – and especially avant-garde – circles. André
Malraux, as  a participant  at  the Soviet  Writers'  Congress of August  of  1934,  where
Stalin's phrase was extensively discussed, diplomatically  remarked that 'if writers are
the engineers of the human soul, then they should not forget that the highest function of
98
'Cinema: El camino de la vida (Film ruso de Nicolaiekk)' Orto, 5 (July 1932).
99 Nuestro Cinema, 11 (April-May 1933), 152f. Cf. Comments made by Juan Piqueras: 'If at the present 
there is any cinema that can be said to be strong, it is Russian cinema. But that is because its images 
exist in perfect communion with the life it represents!' Nuestro Cinema, 4 (September 1932), 110f. 
100 Cf. Jacques Rancière's distinction between the artistic and political avant-garde on page 17 above.
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the  engineer  is  to  invent.'101 To  renounce  artistic  autonomy completely  and  instead
simply translate political instructions into artistic form was, in this view, to deprive art
of its fundamental mission. It signified an abandonment of its commitment to indicate
new modes of life, and replaced innovation with a formula conducive to mechanical
conformity, especially where artistic as well as other practices were tied to a singular
revolutionary 'blueprint'.  
Innovative realism
While Renau's artistic practice suggests he was mostly inspired by Soviet arts before the
imposition  of  socialist  realism,  the  tension  between  collective  co-ordination  and
autonomous  creation  would  apply  to  all  socially  committed  artists  and  was  clearly
formative also in his own artistic development.102  Nueva Cultura's declaration that the
role of art was to serve as a 'mediator and interpreter', 'clarifying' the social problems of
the day, appeared to lie closer to a perspective emphasising the need for collective co-
ordination.103 His general adherence to realism and use of the photographic document
were  likewise  rooted  in  a  determination  to  address  collective  experiences.  Indeed,
documents,  written  as  well  as  visual,  constituted  the  critical  device  by  which  he
anchored his art in the 'facts' of social life, and imparted to it a significance tied to co-
existence and contemporaneity.104 Renau too worked, to some extent, with 'unadorned'
reality, if only to expose its contrast to hegemonic religious and political myths.105 
Yet in content as well as form, his was an innovative rather than a conformist
realism.  Indeed,  in  the  absence  of  a  victorious  –  or  even  a  particularly  strong  –
revolutionary party to drive change and provide inspiration, it could hardly have been
otherwise. Art had to lead the way in the quest to open up minds, prompt new attitudes,
and  formulate  social  alternatives.  From this  perspective,  realism in its  documentary
mode may even have granted art enhanced transformational capacities: art made from
the materials of life may well have been better equipped to shape life in its own image. 
It should also be reiterated that, despite the use value of the USSR as a  practical
101 Anzar Soler, M. I congreso internacional de escritores, 63.
102 Albert Forment and Facundo Tomás have also suggested that there was a tension in Renau’s work 
between the theory, which tended towards socialist realist dogma, and the practice, which was 
formally experimental. See Forment, A. Josep Renau, 102, and Tomás Ferré, F. Los Carteles 
Valencianos, 90. See also the analysis of Renau's theory of the poster on pages 185-195 below.
103 Nueva Cultura, 10 bis. (February 1936), 7.
104 Cf. reply to Alberto Sanchez, where Renau and Carreño maintain that 'El arte tiene que ser un 
concepto de actualidad.' Nueva Cultura, 5 (June-July 1935), 14. 
105 Renau also expressed frustration with artists (e.g. certain 19th century realist painters, and, at times, 
Sorolla) who tried to cast a poetic gloss on poverty. See Bellón, F. Josep Renau, 139.
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model, for Renau and the editors of  Nueva Cultura, there was no ready revolutionary
blueprint  available  for  Spain.  The  aesthetic  formula  accompanying  if  not  driving
cultural renewal was yet to be discovered, and while stylistic choices may indicate what
Renau himself saw as sound aesthetic principles at the time, the final answer would only
be provided in democratic collaboration with those whom a new culture was meant to
represent.  That  said,  if  utopian  promises  were  to  materialise,  it  is  clear  Renau
envisioned some sort of 'rational' consensus – 'the peace needed to create art'106 – to
replace  the  plethora  of  voices.  Here  the  influence  of  the  USSR was  significant.  It
suggested to contemporary progressives in Europe the realistic feasibility of a model
where  the  multiple  crises  of  the  interwar  years  could find  a  radical  solution in  the
implementation  of  a  total  life  programme,  by forging  a  collective  unity  that  would
ultimately render the conflicts of politics obsolete. 
In Spain, by contrast, political conflicts were visibly intensifying, and the winter
of 1935 and spring of 1936 were marked by frenetic political activity across the country.
Renau first  dedicated his  energies  to campaign,  through the PCE as  well  as  Nueva
Cultura,  for  a  Popular  Front  victory in  the  February elections,  and,  when this  was
narrowly achieved, extended his efforts to further cultural change through a revitalised
progressive agenda.107 The tumultuous months that followed the elections were marked
by  a  continued  obstruction  of  progressive  measures  by  the  conservative  elite  and
increasingly  desperate  responses  from  the  people  affected.  Social  relations  became
increasingly conflictive and violent in the countryside, where land occupations, always
brutally  suppressed  by  the  Civil  Guard,  were  ultimately the  only  means  for  many
destitute peasants to attempt to feed their families. One such event, which occurred in
the Castilian town of Yeste on 28 May, leading to 18 deaths (including one civil guard)
as well as scores of wounded and arrested, was held up by the editors of Nueva Cultura
(July  1936)  as  paradigmatic  of  agrarian  conflict  across  Spain  and  an  occasion  to
reiterate their unwavering solidarity with the rural proletariat.108 But violence was also
seen to escalate in urban areas, where extreme right groups, most notably the Falange,
were engaged in deliberate political destabilisation via deadly street battles with left-
wing  activists.109 Fatefully,  the  all-republican  government,  formed  after  the  Popular
Front coalition had delivered the desired result at the polls, responded to the mounting
106 Nueva Cultura, 2 (February 1935), 3.
107 J. 'Notas al margen', 479. Cf. extract from the interview reproduced in Bellón, F. Josep Renau, 193f.
108 Nueva Cultura, 2 (February 1935), 3. For a good account of the events at Yeste, see Preston, P. The 
Spanish Holocaust, 119f.
109 Preston, P. The Spanish Holocaust, 110-127. See also Cruz, R. En el nombre del pueblo.
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crisis with tense passivity. It felt itself to be trapped between two undesirable extremes:
between on the one hand military reaction, widely rumoured to be imminent and in fact
prepared  in  detail  over  the  spring  of  1936,  on  on  the  other  some  kind  of  popular
revolution. For many among the middling classes and indeed for the majority of the
Spanish population as a whole, the military option was by no means clearly perceived as
the greater danger.110 
Yet for radical progressives like Renau and his colleagues, it was evident that the
task  of  formulating  a  new  cultural  matrix  for  the  country had  to  be  discussed  in
conjunction with increasingly urgent calls to action.  Soon  this urgency would reach a
new pitch, as the descent into civil war, following from a failed military coup on 17-18
July 1936, meant that all progressive organisations, cultural and political, were forced to
adopt new forms of self-defence.
110 Graham, H. 'The Spanish Popular Front and the Civil War' in Graham, H and Preston, P. The Popular 
Front in Europe, 113.
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6. MOBILISING FOR SURVIVAL:        
RENAU'S EARLY WAR POSTERS (1936)
The  military  rebellion  proclaimed  on  17  July  1936  in  Spanish  Morocco,  across
mainland Spain the following day, was intended as a swift coup d'etat to halt a revived
Republican  reform  programme.  Support  for  military  intervention  had  grown  in
conservative  sectors  –  civilian  as  well  as  military  –  since  the  February  elections,
spurred, not only by to the threat of reform, but also by a worsening spiral of political
violence, to which its preferred political forces had, at the very least, contributed.1 On
its  own terms,  however,  the rising failed.  Working-class  militia,  together  with loyal
public order forces and incensed crowds, rapidly organised to subdue rebelling garrisons
in key cities, especially Madrid and Barcelona. The situation in Valencia, where Renau
joined those laying siege to the barracks in the neighbourhood of Font de Sant Lluís,
took longer to settle, but was secured for the Republic at the end of July.2 In the initial
weeks, the rebels had managed to take about a third of the country – one area in the
north-north-west and another in the south-west – and would have faced almost certain
defeat had it not been for the intervention of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. Answering
a  petition  for  military  aid,  Hitler  and  Mussolini  sent  enough  planes  for  General
Francisco Franco – soon to  emerge  as  the undisputed  leader  of  the rebel  side –  to
transport  the  Army of  Africa  swiftly  from Morocco  to  Seville.  With  Spain's  most
ruthless and efficient fighting force thus poised to expand rebel territory in the south,
the failed take-over escalated into full-scale civil war.
Not only could the central  Republican government not neutralise the military
threat posed by the rebels, but it was also facing, in some parts of the country, a serious
challenge from the worker organisations that had rushed to oppose the rebels. As the
rebellion disrupted official communication channels and deprived the government of
any  control  over  public  order  forces  (which  in  some  places  melted  away),  armed
workers took over control of local administration and policing. Across the Republican
zone, above all in major urban centres like Barcelona and Valencia, but also in smaller
towns, the centrifugal force unleashed by the military revolt placed trade unions and
workers organisations in an unprecedented position of power – a fact which led some,
1 For violence as provocation, see Preston, P. The Spanish Holocaust, 110-127 (esp. 110).
2 Forment, A. Josep Renau, 144. See below for a more detailed account of Renau's participation. For a 
detailed account of events in Valencia, see Girona, A. Guerra i Revolució al País Valencià Valencia: 
Eliseu Climent, 1986.
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especially  but  not  exclusively  in  the  CNT,  to  announce  the  start  of  a  proletarian
revolution.3 There  were  widespread  expropriations  or  collectivisation  of  industries,
printing presses and agricultural land, especially where owners had fled the Republican
zone. Confiscations of cultural buildings associated with the aristocratic establishment
or bourgeois elite were widespread too.4 (Renau himself served as main editor for a new
newspaper,  Verdad,  which  deployed the  confiscated printing presses  of  the regional
right-wing daily Diario de Valencia.5) So even though the Republican government had
survived the rebellion, the virtual paralysis of state functions meant that it had lost the
means to enforce its authority on the remaining Republican territory. As new worker-led
entities consequently took the tools of change into their own hands, the political class
previously  charged  with  driving  reform  became  only  one  of  a  number  of  actors
exercising decisive influence on the organisation of Republican life.
Throughout  Republican  Spain,  a  reversal  of  hierarchies  and redistribution of
public and private space indicated that a new social order was in the making. The twin
events of war and revolution had set new parameters for social and cultural change, and
direct  popular  participation  in  politics  had  suddenly  become  a  fact.  The  precise
organisational character of this participation differed with each locality, but typically
involved committees or other local micro-authorities subject to a substantial degree of
grass-roots  influence.6 Such  local  self-governance  was  particularly  crucial  to  the
revolution  as  conceived  by  anarchist  and  other  libertarian  organisations.  While
ideologically  predisposed  to  view  any  state  with  hostility  regardless  of  the
circumstances, the fact that the reactionary alliance responsible for the coup had been
allowed to form within Republican state institutions only strengthened the libertarian
belief that any meaningful revolution had to be based on an alternative model of social
organisation.7 When an unprecedented opportunity to dismantle state power presented
3 For a vivid eyewitness account of the revolution in Barcelona, Valencia, and Madrid, see Borkenau, F. 
The Spanish Cockpit: An eyewitness account of the Spanish Civil War (London: Pheonix Press, 2000). 
See also Fraser, R. Blood of Spain: an oral history of the Spanish Civil War (New York: Pantheon, 
1979). Bosch Sánchez, A. Ugetistas y Libertarios: Guerra Civil y Revolución en el País Valenciano, 
1936-1939 (Valencia: Alfonso el Magnánimo, 1983).
4 In Barcelona, for example, the revolutionary artists union Sindicat de Dibuixants Professionals 
installed itself in the 18th century palace of the Marquis of Barberá and Manresana (on Av de la Puerta 
del Ángel). See Termes, Josep, Miravitlles, Jaume, Fontseré, Carles. Carteles de la República y de la 
Guerra Civil (Barcelona: La Gaya Ciencia, 1978), 354. In Valencia the conservative Círculo de Bellas 
Artes became the new home of the progressive Popular Front organisation Cultura Popular. Pérez 
Contel, R. Artistas en Valencia, 482. Cf. Abella, R. La vida quotidiana, 16f.
5 Forment, A. Josep Renau, 144.
6 Graham, H. The Spanish Republic at War, 96.
7 Graham, H. '”Against the state”: a genealogy of the Barcelona May Days (1937)' European History 
Quarterly, 29, 4 (1999), 485-542. 
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itself in the wake of the military rising, libertarian organisations took it, unsurprisingly,
with tremendous zeal. Indeed, an almost carnival-like atmosphere – as jubilant for those
who welcomed change as it was deadly for those who were deemed opposed to it –
reigned in libertarian strongholds like Barcelona and, to a lesser extent, Valencia, where
the safe distance from any active military fronts effectively meant that the revolution
was  initially  the  only tangible  consequence  of  the  coup.8 Unlike  in  Madrid,  where
worker  militias  rapidly  had  to  concentrate  their  energies  into  fighting  rebel  troops
advancing across  the Guadarrama mountains just  north  of the city,  in cities  such as
Barcelona  and Valencia,  deep  inside Republican  territory,  the  fighting of  July 1936
immediately  gave  way  to  the  construction  of  a  new  society;  decentralised  and
collectivist, and in which the watchword was ‘egalitarian’.
Crucially, however, libertarians were not alone in believing that the defeat of the
coup  must  be  followed  by radical  social  change.  Many on  the  left  of  the  socialist
movement also participated in the re-ordering of social and political hierarchies, as did
many  relatively  moderate  progressives,  who  felt  that  the  rising  had  effectively
invalidated more cautious approaches to reform.9 Additionally each locality would see a
variety of non-politically-affiliated participants who felt that events could be shaped to
their personal advantage.10 What resulted was not simply the replacement of a liberal
order with a libertarian one, then, but rather a hybrid political situation shaped by a
multitude of actors. As was the case with the Popular Front coalition – which nominally
remained in existence,  at  least  as a term denoting a collection of progressive social
groups – there was no overarching single motive driving this process, and much less a
universally shared conception of a goal.  Yet  what was clear was that  the rising had
irrevocably altered the political landscape of Spain. For if similar attempts to abolish the
democratic process were to be prevented in the future, real adjustments had to be made
to the national distribution of political power. At the very least, such adjustments had
properly to equip the constituencies legally granted beneficial reform with the capacity
8 For an overarching account of the revolutionary atmosphere in cities like Barcelona and Valencia, see,
for example, Abella, R. La vida quotidiana, 24, 93ff. See also Girona Albuixech, A & Navarro 
Navarro, J. Sufrir la guerra: La vida cotidiana (Valencia: Prensa Valenciana, 2007), 33-39. Juan 
Renau included in his memoirs an evocative description of the fear that also haunted the inhabitants of
Valencia at the time. See Pasos y Sombras, 372ff. For an account of revolutionary violence in the 
Republican zone, and especially Madrid, see Preston, P. The Spanish Holocaust, 221-303. 
9 A clear example can be found in the political composition of the revolutionary government in 
Valencia, the Popular Executive Committee (Comité Ejecutivo Popular). Virtually all progressive local
parties and political organisations, from left-of-centre republicans to the anarcho-syndicalist CNT, 
were represented in some capacity. See Girona, A. Guerra i Revolució, 54f.
10 Preston, P. The Spanish Holocaust, 221.
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to defend their rights against intractable reaction. 
Yet to defeat the rising, it was first of all necessary to meet the military rebels on
the  battlefield.  What  had  started  as  an  irregular  struggle  between  opposing  groups
composed  of  worker  militias,  public  order  forces,  and  some  soldiers,  as  well  as
heterogeneous constellations of paramilitary and civilian groups on both sides, was as a
result of Axis aid to the rebel Generals rapidly turning into a total war. With this in
mind, the fact that the coup seemed to have blown the political horizon wide open,
making  previously  abstract  proposals  for  greater  democracy  suddenly  appear  like
concrete possibilities, would yet be of uncertain consequence. For as defenders of the
beleaguered  central  government  quickly  saw,  the  equally  undeniable  fact  that  the
Republic would be embroiled in a brutal  war of  survival  would inescapably impose
practical  limitations  on any emancipatory goals  pursued.  Before  any lasting change
could be achieved, then, all advocates of progressive politics had first to channel their
energies towards the primary goal of overcoming the threat posed by the rebels and their
international backers. 
The left-wing organisation that saw this most clearly was the the PCE. Rather
than  supporting  revolutionary  celebrations  of  local  self-governance,  which  had
debilitated the Republican state from the outset  of the conflict,  the PCE established
itself as a party of discipline and order defending central government authority.11 The
Republican war effort, in its view, had to be prioritised everywhere and be centrally co-
ordinated so that all national resources could be used efficiently. In concrete terms, this
meant that all industries had to be placed on a war footing, that the independently led
worker militias had to be incorporated into a reconstructed Republican army operating
under central command, and that all efforts be made to secure international support and
war materiel  to match the arsenal  of the much better equipped enemy.12 Britain and
France  avoided  involvement,  for  a  variety  of  motives  including  the  fear  of  being
dragged into a larger European conflict, and to this end sought to maintain a continent-
wide Non-Intervention Agreement that only damaged the Republic further (as it greatly
complicated Republican acquisitions and transport of arms, while doing nothing to stop
German and Italian supplies from reaching the rebels). Eventually, in the nick of time in
October 1936, a reluctant Soviet Union broke the Republic’s isolation to send military
aid, for fear that, otherwise, its looming defeat would free up German fire-power for
11 For first hand account communist attitudes to the revolution in Valencia, see  Borkenau, F. The 
Spanish Cockpit, 117f.
12 See the poster-sized Manifesto published in the party newspaper, Mundo Obrero, 18 August 1936.
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aggression against vulnerable Soviet frontiers. This Soviet intervention vastly increased
the  prestige  of  the Spanish  Communist  Party,  which  also  for  a  variety of  domestic
reasons we will consider later, was now rapidly being transformed into one of the most
potent political forces in Republican Spain. As such, it would become one of the main
drivers of Republican war mobilisation, and its sudden centrality to Republican politics
made  the  party  one  of  the  most  decisive  defenders  of  a  reconstructed  (and  indeed
expanded) Republican state. 
The PCE’s war strategy immediately put it  at odds with libertarian and other
revolutionary groups, who were determined to defend their local conquests of political
and  economic  power.  In  response  to  communist  attempts  to  restore  central  state
authority, libertarians declared the PCE to be hostile to the revolution. The PCE, in turn,
insisted  that  communists  too  were  committed  to  the  revolutionary  cause,  but  that,
according to the logic of the Popular Front strategy, this had to be furthered by the
elected government. Hence the communist deputy Dolores Ibárruri stated,  only days
after  the  July rising,  that  'the Communist  Party,  true to  its  revolutionary principles,
respectful of the will of the people, places itself at the side of the government that is the
expression of this will […].'13 According to this position, the question was not whether
or not to support the revolution but rather what form the revolution should take. Either
way,  libertarians  would  continue  to  see  any  defence  of  existing  state  structures  as
anathema, and suspected the PCE in particular of plotting a Stalinist take-over while
paradoxically  protecting  Spanish  middle-class  and  property-owning  interests  in  the
process.14 In  fact,  the  PCE's  Popular  Front  commitment  to  a  liberal  public  order  –
seeking above all to stop collectivisation, material destruction and uncontrolled violence
– did earn it important backing from middling as well as working-class sectors.15 It may
furthermore  be  that  progressive  members  of  the  middle  classes  felt  that  the  statist
policies of the PCE offered not only a superior strategy to mount a viable war effort but
also a preferable means to implement the social change that the coup had seemed to
precipitate. To the extent that such considerations constituted another factor contributing
to the PCE's vertiginous war-time growth, they were no doubt particularly significant in
securing support for the party among Republican cultural producers.
The initial engagement of cultural groups
13 From a speech delivered on 29 July 1936. Text in AHPCE (Madrid) Carpeta 17, julio 1936. 
14 Cf. Fraser, R. Blood of Spain, 323-334.
15 Graham, H. The Spanish Republic at War, 182-184.
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Seeing  the  rebellion  as  an  attempt  to  install  a  repressive  reactionary  regime,  most
writers and artists declared their support for the Republic shortly after the July days. At
the end of the month, a Madrid-based group, representing the Alliance of Anti-Fascist
Intellectuals  (Alianza  de  Intelectules  Antifascistas,  hereafter  AIA),  published  a  note
strongly condemning the 'criminal rising.'16 The Spanish AIA was initially a product of
the international networks forming around to the Paris Congress of 1935, but would
become a significant cultural actor only after the military rebellion, when it was rapidly
transformed  into  the  most  important  association  of  artists  and  writers  within  the
Republic.17 The AIA statement of 31 July was indicative of its outlook: it highlighted
that the rising clearly showed, through its 'militarism, clericalism, and aristocratic cast
attitudes,' how old forms of conservatism had gained a new impetus by joining forces
with  'fascism'.  Below  the  statement,  over  fifty  signatories  of  various  political
persuasions  declared  their  'full  and  active  identification  with  the  people,'  who  was
'gloriously fighting side by side with the Popular Front government.'18   
Composed of a politically varied and broad progressive membership, the AIA
was a hybrid cultural organisation defending the agenda of the Popular Front. The fact
that several prominent members were linked to the Communist Party, among them the
poet Rafael Alberti and the writer Maria Teresa León in Madrid, not to mention Renau
in Valencia,  did not compromise its broad Popular Front commitment – especially not
when the Comintern had adopted a collaborative parliamentary strategy anyway. There
seems to have been no direct involvement of the PCE leadership in the AIA’s emergence
or in its initial  activities.19 Yet,  as we shall  see,  the AIA would come to collaborate
closely with the party from September 1936, when, as a result of a change in the central
government, the PCE was offered the culture and education portfolio and thus emerged
rapidly at the forefront of a propaganda campaign to restore government authority. The
involvement of the AIA in this campaign suggested that it too opposed a decentralising
revolution.  Like  the  PCE,  the  AIA supported  calls  for  substantial  social  change  –
indeed,  it  would  soon  become  a  leading  force  in  an  expanded  cultural  reform
programme – but defended structures allowing change to be implemented with a degree
16 El Sol 31 July 1936, 6.
17 Aznar Soler, M. Literatura española y antifascismo, 109f.
18 El Sol 31 July 1936, 6.  Among the well-know names were Luis Buñuel, Rafael Dieste, Rosa Chacel, 
Arturo Serrano Plaja, Luis Cernuda, Maria Zambrano, Manuel Altolaguirre. Rafael Alberti and Maria 
Teresa León would soon be prominent members of the organisation but were stuck in Ibiza at the 
beginning of the war.
19 That is, as far as I am aware, no one has presented any evidence of this.
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of centralised control.  Beyond such generalities,  however,  the AIA did not formally
attach itself to any specific political faction.20 In this regard, the July declaration was
doubly characteristic, both in its celebration of popular resistance against the coup and
its silence on the complexity that consequently marked Republican political relations. 
But if the AIA thus appeared disengaged from political debates, it did not wish to
maintain a distance from social and military developments.  This was highlighted by
AIA’s  Valencian  branch,  which  published  as  the  Association of  Intellectuals  for  the
Defence of Culture (Asociación de Intelectuales para la Defensa de la Cultura, hereafter
AIDC). It made a similar proclamation of loyalty in the new publication co-edited by
Renau, Verdad, emphasising that the support offered by cultural groups in the aftermath
of the coup should not only be moral, but practical too.21 An early example of such
engagement had already been provided by Renau during the first days of the rising.
According the artist's own account, he had been daydreaming in his studio on 17 July
when a call from a party comrade informed him of the rising in Morocco. After an
emergency  meeting  with  other  party  members,  he  had  led  a  group  of  militants  to
observe and if possible attack the barracks of Font de Sant Lluis. Their weapons arsenal
had amounted to a total of five automatic pistols and eleven hunting rifles – next to
nothing considering the fire power of their adversary. While access to nearby buildings
had allowed Renau to station the few militants that were armed in strategic places, the
situation had remained extremely precarious until a call for support attracted hundreds
of locals – virtually all women – to come and block off the barrack gates. To make this
'siege' more effective, and make the officers within aware of the feeling in the street,
Renau had further instructed the crowd to make as much noise as possible – to sing,
scream, and shout. The impressive ruckus that followed had finally convinced him he
could safely leave the site to report back to party headquarters. By then night had fallen.
The next morning,  having received reinforcements  and inside information from two
soldiers who had escaped the barracks, the crowd had decided to storm the building.22
Although the Valencian writers' association no doubt exaggerated when claiming that
20 The AIA never published statements outlining a clear political vision. Indeed, considering its 
ideologically heterogeneous membership it is difficult to see how it could.  
21 Verdad 31 July 1936, 4. Given the coinciding dates there must have been some co-ordination with 
Madrid section in the publication of these statements. Manuel Aznar has pointed out that the Valencian
AIDC was founded a few months before the war, on 24 April 1936. But like the Madrid section, it did 
not really come alive until after the rebellion. See Aznar Soler, M. (Ed.) Valencia, capital cultural de 
la República. (Vol 1-2) (Valencia: Generalitat Valenciana, 2007), 21ff.
22 From Renau, J. 'Les dones donen valor' Trellat, no. 1 (1980). Cited at length in Bellón, F. Josep 
Renau, 193-196.
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most of its members had experienced the rebellion in the streets or 'sites of danger,' and
though that support was anyway only a very small part of why Valencia was held for the
Republic, Renau's direct engagement and that of other cultural workers in the city does
nonetheless indicate intellectuals'  desire  to  participate directly and practically in the
Republic's defence.
Artists' and writers' involvement with the fighting took more lasting forms too.
Some,  including  the  poet  Miguel  Hernández  and  the  artist  Helios  Gómez,  both
committed to the PCE during the war,23 went to fight at the front.24 Others organised
cultural  events in order to raise funds for militias.25 More unusually,  Nueva Cultura,
which temporarily suspended its  normal publication, put  together a military manual,
carrying the title 'Nueva Cultura makes its best offer to the combatants' (Nueva Cultura
hace su ofrenda mejor a los combatientes). The manual provided 72 pages of detailed
and clearly illustrated information on everything from trench construction to weapon
maintenance – information which would have been of incalculable value as many militia
members heading for the front had not handled a weapon before, much less engaged in
regular military combat. According to Renau, the idea for the manual came from himself
and was accepted by the Nueva Cultura group after some discussion. To assemble the
content,  they approached  a  high  ranking  officer  who  enthusiastically  supported  the
project by providing technical information and the instructional text.26 The drawings
were done by Pérez Contel. It is unclear precisely how the manual was funded, yet it
was a project of considerable scale, as the finished product eventually appeared in two
editions, each with a print run between 20,000 and 40,000 copies.27 On the front page of
the first edition, published in October, the editorial team inserted a reproduction of John
23 Miguel Hernández joined the party in 1936, Gómez in 1931. 
24 Hernández was a political commissar in the battalion of 'El Campesino' and stationed in Teruel,  and 
various places on the southern fronts. Helios Gómez fought in Aragón, Madrid, Andalucía, and 
formed part of the Culture Militias in the Durruti División. 
25 See, for examples, notes in Verdad on 11 August (p. 4), 16 August (p. 4), 10 September (p. 2), all 
announcing AIDC exhibitions and fundraising events.
26 See Pérez Contel, R. Artistas en Valencia, 634, and Renau, J. ‘Notas al margen', 480. In his 
autobiographical account, Renau maintained there were two officers, while Pérez Contel claims there 
was only one. There is, however, an interview where Renau too suggests there was only one (page 
186), which means that this is probably the truth. See Julián González, I. El Cartel Republicano, 186.
27 In a 1980 interview Antonio Ballester claimed that the Nueva Cultura group expropriated a print shop 
only hours after the news of the rising, and it may be that the manual was printed with whatever 
resources available there. CDMH (Salamanca) Fuentes_Orales-Mexico, no 9, 45. If not, it is likely 
that other collectivised print shops, ultimately run by the same unions that sent militias to the front, 
would have shared if not entirely carried the financial burden. With regards to print runs, the lower 
fugure belongs to Pérez Contel (Artistas en Valencia, 634), the higher to Renau (‘Notas al margen', 
480).
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Heartfield's  'Liberty  Herself  Fights  in  Their  Ranks.'28 Made  up  of  a  photograph  of
Republican  militiamen  superimposed  on  Delacroix's  iconic  painting  of  the  1830
revolution in France ('Liberty Leading the People'),  the composition of  the image –
foregrounding a scene of contemporary fighting – could be said to mirror the editors'
conviction that the practical struggle against reaction now had to take precedence over
detached cultural theorising. This was a time when every progressive artist had to make
a concrete contribution to the task of defeating a common enemy.
Within the first month of the rebellion, Renau and his colleagues also launched
another special Nueva Cultura publication, entitled 'Nueva Cultura for those who fight
at  the  front'  (Nueva  Cultura  para  los  que  luchan  en  el  frente).29 This  was  more
recognisably a cultural endeavour, combining visual art and poetry with descriptions of
historical  parallels  to  the  conflict,  as  well  as  informative  articles  on  the  war  work
undertaken  behind  the  lines.  But  if  the  front-line  edition  thus  represented  some
continuity  with  the  pre-war  magazine,  it  was  nonetheless  clear  that  practical
considerations  figured  among  the  primary  motivations  for  this  publication  too.  By
highlighting  the  value  of  various  contributions  to  the  war  effort  and  insisting  that
civilian tasks be carried out in the same 'combative spirit' as the fighting at the front, the
magazine sought to create psychological links between the various fronts that had to be
integrated to secure the Republic's survival in this new kind of war (another edition, of
which more will be said below, was made for agricultural workers). In this sense, Nueva
Cultura sought  to  instil  in  its  readers  a  notion of  totality which  would inform and
motivate individual action in the war. 
Renau and the Nueva Cultura team thus produced a variety of publications to aid
Republican war mobilisation. Among these, another brief mention needs to be made of
the daily newspaper Verdad, which unlike the cultural initiatives mentioned above was
tied to the Valencian PCE (and, to begin with, the PSOE) and became a regular outlet
for many  Nueva Cultura  contributors  in the first  months of  the conflict.30 Until  his
nomination as General  Director  of Fine Arts on 9 September 1936,  Renau formally
28 The second edition had a cover designed by Rafael Pérez Contel. See Pérez Contel, R. Artistas en 
Valencia, 633.
29 The first issue, distributed as a supplement to Verdad, appeared on 21 August 1936. Four issues were 
produced, each printed in 4 000 copies, according to a report published in Nueva Cultura, no. 1 
(second phase), March 1937. Only two issues seem to have survived to this day and are incorporated 
into the facsimile version of the magazine (both printed and digital). In terms of size, they consist of 
only one large sheet (about A2 size) printed on both sides. 
30 Nueva Cultura would not resume independent regular publication until March 1937.
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shared the editorial position with socialist writer Max Aub.31 This arrangement no doubt
reflected the newspaper's initial aspiration, also part of PCE policy between 1934 and
1937, to propagandise for unification of the socialist and communist parties.32 
Yet the most widely acknowledged means through which Renau engaged with
the mobilisation politics of the early war period was, without a doubt, posters. Indeed,
having established himself as a prominent commercial poster designer, Renau would
during the war become one of the Republic's most prominent creators of political poster
propaganda. His work, nearly always made for the PCE, at least in the first half of the
war, would in some cases be distributed across Republican territory and count among
the most widely seen of the entire conflict.33 His forceful images of popular resistance to
the military coup, as well as dramatic exhortations to greater discipline, remain to this
day Renau’s most famous contribution to the Republic’s battle for wartime victory.
The politics of poster production
Poster  production  was,  in  general  terms,  the  most  widespread  form  of  artistic
engagement  with  war  and  revolution  in  Spain  after  1936.34 Largely  a  Republican
phenomenon,  as  most  printing  presses  were  located  in  loyalist  territory,  posters
appeared  in  the  streets  of  major  urban  centres  almost  immediately  after  popular
resistance  to  the  July rebellion  had  formed.35 The  fact  that  many print  shops  were
collectivised and run by unions facilitated the proliferation of these posters.36 So too did
artists' rapid response to the rising. As for the  modus operandi for producing posters,
31 According to Albert Forment, however, Aub was rarely present at the magazine. Josep Renau, 144.
32 For a concise analysis of war-time debates around unification, see Hernández Sanchez, F. Guerra o 
Revolución, 183-191. Verdad later referred to itself as a publication of the PCE only.
33 Jordi Carulla  suggests that Renau was one of the very few to have his worked published Republic-
wide. Carulla, J. & Carulla, A. La Guerra Civil en 2000 carteles (2 vols.) (Barcelona: Postermil, 
1996), 41. 
34 There are now several studies and exhibition catalogues that include analytical articles on the posters. 
Grimau, C. El cartel republicano en la guerra civil (Madrid: Cátedra, 1979) is one of the earlier 
accounts of Republican posters but is still worth reading. For an extensive and at times more in-depth 
analysis of poster semiotics and communication strategies, see Julián González, I. El Cartel 
Republicano. The most extensive collection of reproductions is found in Carulla, J. & Carulla, A. La 
Guerra Civil en 2000 carteles, though Guerra, A. (Ed.) Carteles de la guerra, 1936-1939: Colección 
Fundación Pablo Iglesias (Barcelona: Fundación Pablo Iglesias, 2004) is also good. For a in-depth 
analysis of posters produced in Valencia, see Tomás Ferré, F. Los Carteles Valencianos. For an 
analysis of posters in their socio-political context, see also Basilio, M. M. Visual Propaganda.
35 The Spanish printing industry was largely located in Barcelona, Valencia and Madrid. On the reaction 
of artists to the coup, see, for example, Termes, J., Miravitlles, J., & Fontseré, C. Carteles de la 
República, 354f.
36 This included Gráficas Valencia, which published most of Renau's work throughout the conflict. 
Indeed, virtually all of the Valencian print industry was first run by the Popular Executive Committee, 
which also commissioned artists to produce recruitment posters for the militias. See Girona, A. 
Guerra i Revolució, 88, and Pérez Contel, R. Artistas en Valencia, 407f.
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there was significant variation, however. Ideologically driven practitioners like Renau
and his colleagues typically made posters on their own initiative – Antonio Ballester, a
member of Renau's circle from the start,  later claimed that they expropriated a print
shop and were working on posters 'within hours' of hearing the news of the rising37 –
while others took commissions from the parties and unions that were now the main
clients  for  publicity  work.  Large  artists  unions,  like  the  Sindicat  de  Dibuixants
Professionals in Barcelona or the Sindicato de Profesionales de Bellas Artes in Madrid,
both with a membership running into the hundreds,38 operated almost like commercial
enterprises,  albeit  without  any strict  procedures  for  invoicing.39 Although  first-hand
accounts are vague on this matter, such irregularities seem to be explained primarily by
the fact that war needs still overrode strictly financial concerns, and that members were
largely content with the daily union wage of ten pesetas – the same that was paid to
militia men – that they were guaranteed regardless.40 Another noteworthy feature of the
commissioning processes, concerning artistic questions, was that it tended to decouple
political and aesthetic aspects of poster design. Artists were, as a rule, free to complete
commissions in whatever style they liked, which typically meant that they continued to
paint just as they had done before the war. The majority were uninterested or not even
fully aware of how politics could relate to specific visual traditions.41 The same may
perhaps  be  said  of  publishing  organisations  too:  the  Sindicat  de  Dibuixants
Professionals even made pre-prepared poster designs to which the organisational name
was simply added once a 'buyer'  had been found.42 Consequently Republican poster
production as a whole showed no overarching patterns linking particular aesthetics with
37 CDMH (Salamanca) Fuentes_Orales-Mexico, no 9, 45.
38 Miguel Gamonal Torres has suggested that the Sindicat de Dibuixants Professionals had as many as 
1,800 members. Arte y Política, 29. This would have included a significant level of war-time inflation,
as previously unaffiliated people of all backgrounds sought union membership for protection and 
material benefits. Jordi Carulla doubts that the number of active members exceeded 1,000. Carulla, J. 
& Carulla, A. La Guerra Civil en 2000 carteles, 53.
39 Madrigal Pascual, A. A. Arte y Compromiso, 279f. Cf. Julián González, I. El Cartel Republicano, 
102f, 195f .
40 The wage, in addition to the protection afforded by union membership at a time when accusations of 
being a counter-revolutionary could have deadly consequences, also explains such organisations' 
rapidly rising membership figures in the first stages of the war. Julián González, I. El Cartel 
Republicano, 100-103, 195. 
41 See, for example, Termes, J., Miravitlles, J., & Fontseré, C. Carteles de la República, 357. Lorenzo 
Goñi, a member of the Sindicat in Barcelona, claimed in a 1974 letter to Inmaculada Julián that 
Russian posters were not well known to them at the time. See El Cartel Republicano, 195. A similar 
statement was made by Fontseré in a 1978 interview, who furthermore insisted that artists in war-time 
Barcelona mainly copied each other. Renau, who participated in the same interview, interjected that 
this was not true of his case, as he was more conscious of international trends. See Ruipérez, M. 
'Renau-Fontseré: Los carteles de la guerra civil' Tiempos de Historia, Vol. 5, No. 49 (Decembre, 
1978), 19-21.
42 Julián González, I. El Cartel Republicano, 102f.
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particular  political  groups,  and  individual  posters'  formal  qualities  would  only
exceptionally serve as a guide to publishers' ideological orientation.43 Yet by virtue of
their content, posters would nonetheless offer a powerful, if impressionistic, sense of
how the recent events had been internalised and meanings ascribed to them. Described
by the Catalan poster artist Carles Fontseré as a 'multicoloured flood of revolutionary
imagery,' they urged people to recognise the gravity of the moment, to join the workers'
militias, and to embrace the ideals for which the militias were fighting.44
Posters  were,  from the  very beginning,  a  constitutive  part  of  the  radicalised
atmosphere and gave widespread representation to the iconographic myths that fuelled
the revolutionary imagination.45 'Every union', Fontseré wrote, 'every little committee,
published their own poster; every profession and trade – hairdressers, taxi drivers, tram
operators – wanted to see themselves in a poster, breaking the chains that oppressed
them.'46 This desire to be seen to participate indicates the importance of the symbolic in
revolutionary processes  of  transformation, and with  regard the  analysis  that  follows
here, it is crucial to remember that such symbolic occupancy of public space was in
itself a demonstration of power.47 This demonstration could, of course, also enhance real
power.  Political  posters  speak  a  language  of  authority.  In  this  way  they  foster  a
collective awareness of authority, and ultimately serve as a psychological instrument to
enforce authority as it operates on various social and political levels. At the very least,
then, the politicised alterations of the visual environment in Republican Spain would
have alerted urban inhabitants to the fact that the established order was being forcefully
challenged. Indeed, in Barcelona, claimed Fontseré, posters served as a revolutionary
'certificate', signalling to the local bourgeoisie that social changes were not simply part
of some 'passing brawl', but the first steps towards the creation of a new society.48 
But  if  this  change was  irreversible,  posters  also indicated  that  there  was,  as
suggested  above,  no  unified  vision  guiding  revolutionary  action.  They  formed  no
singular 'certificate', but rather a wildly heterogeneous mass of certificates, issued by a
range of different self-proclaimed authorities wishing to shape a historical moment. The
43 An assessment which is shared by Jordi Carulla. See  La Guerra Civil en 2000 carteles, 71.
44 Termes, J., Miravitlles, J., & Fontseré, C. Carteles de la República, 356. 
45 Cf. Ruipérez, M. 'Renau-Fontseré: Los carteles de la guerra civil', 12. Cf. Also  Grimau, C. El cartel 
republicano, 9, and Gamonal Torres, M. Arte y Política, 34.
46 Termes, J., Miravitlles, J., & Fontseré, C. Carteles de la República, 361.
47 Cf. Susan Sontag's claim that a poster appearing in the context of other posters is always competitive 
and visually aggressive. Sontag, S. 'Posters: Advertisement, Art, Political Artefact, Commodity' in 
Beirut, M. Looking Closer 3 (New York: Allworth Press, 1999), 196-218 (see esp. 196-198).
48 Termes, J., Miravitlles, J., & Fontseré, C. Carteles de la República, 356.
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sheer profusion of signs competing for space on crammed city façades clearly signalled
that  the revolution was not one but multiple.  Indeed, torn,  overlapping,  haphazardly
arranged posters may well have given contemporary passers-by an overall impression of
fragmentation and competition rather than unity and strength.49 As an expression of a
new symbolic  order,  then,  posters  did  not  only highlight  the  sudden  dominance  of
revolutionary forces but also the problem of political disorganisation caused by this very
change.
Communicating PCE strategy
As  part  of  its  campaign  to  centralise  the  Republican  war  effort,  to  overcome  this
disorganisation and to mobilise the Republican population around a unified war vision,
the PCE made good use of various means of propaganda, among which posters were
prominent. Organisations like Altavoz del Frente (Loudspeaker of the Front), operating
under the auspices of the party's national newspaper,  Mundo Obrero, orchestrated an
impressive  array  of  propaganda  activities,  including  film  screenings,  theatre
performances, and the playing of music from trucks moving along the front, to mention
but a few.50 Most notably, they organised prolific and multifaceted graphic propaganda
campaigns,  'saturating'  city  streets  with  slogans  and  images  in  ways  that  would
dramatically alter the face of urban environments – evident not least in Madrid, as both
the  capital  and  military  front-line,  in  autumn  1936.51 The  aim  was  to  create  an
atmosphere in which indifference to the war would be practically impossible and where
a restricted number of slogans would be allowed to dominate. In pursuing this aim, the
PCE propaganda teams displayed,  as  several  historians  have  suggested,  a  particular
dynamism and skill.52 This has to be explained, first of all, with reference to the fact that
the PCE understood, like no other Popular Front party, the crucial role of propaganda to
49 This is particularly clear in images of urban environments in the photographic archive of the Junta de 
Defensa de Madrid. The archive can be consulted digitally as well as physically through the AGA 
(Madrid). See, for example, 33,F,04049,54121,001; 33,F,04049,54123,001; and 
33,F,04049,54125,001.
50 Alvarez Lopera, J. La politica de bienies culturales del gobierno republicano durante la guerra civil 
española. Vo1. (Ministerio de Cultura; Madrid, 1982), 118f. Fernández Soria, J. M. Educación y 
cultura en la guerra civil (España 1936-1939) (Valencia: Nau Llibres, 1984), 83-85. Hernández 
Sanchez, F. Guerra o Revolución, 298-300.
51 The term 'saturate' is taken from the founder of the Altavoz, César Falcón. See Cobb, C. Los 
Milicianos de la Cultura, 40. For the organisation’s own report on its activities, see the second and 
third issue of the magazine Altavoz del Frente. Relevant articles are reproduced in Gamonal Torres, M.
Arte y Política, 100-104. Altavoz was particularly active in Madrid, where propaganda efforts were 
constantly  intensified as Franco's troops approach the capital in late autumn of 1936. . 
52 Ibid. See also Hernández Sanchez, F. Guerra o Revolución, 300, and Alvarez Lopera, J. La politica de
bienies culturales, 119.
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a successful mobilisation campaign. But the efficacy of PCE propagandists would also
have been due, as Jesús Hernández, communist Minister of Public Instruction between
September 1936 and April 1938, indicated, to the party's general stress on discipline and
organisation (about which more will be said later). It is also likely, that the party and
affiliated  organisations  managed  to  recruit  –  partly  because  of  the  importance  they
granted visual propaganda production – a disproportionate number of the most talented
artists.53 Among these artists was, of course, Josep Renau.
In order to analyse further how the PCE sought to instil into the population a
heightened level of war consciousness and attract the broadest possible support for the
party, the remainder of this chapter will focus more closely on the early war posters
made by Renau. If the efficiency of PCE propaganda is often commented on, little has
been said, beyond the merely descriptive, about its symbolic content.54 A close reading
of Renau's  work may thus complement the existing literature by offering a detailed
study  of  the  visual  rhetoric  employed  by  the  PCE  both  to  unite  the  Republican
population  and  to  strengthen  its  own  position  in  the  crystallising  war  effort.  As
indicated,  Renau was by no means the only prominent poster  artist  working for the
PCE, but in  terms of  content  his  work was representative of  PCE propaganda as  a
whole, especially since he often addressed key points in the party's war programme.
In this task, Renau had to negotiate a number of war-related constraints which
had a distinct impact on his artistic output and which must inform how we analyse his
war  posters.  To  begin  with,  war-time  poster  production  was  always,  as  he  later
remarked, a 'race against time', often forcing artists to settle for less than perfection. On
one occasion Renau even had to run into a print shop and draw straight onto the printing
blocks while a car was waiting with the engine running.55 In Renau's particular case, it is
also  clear  that  additional  time  limitations  obtained  once  he  was  appointed  General
Director of Fine Arts in September 1936. From this point onwards, he did most of his
graphic  work  outside  his  official  timetable  of  duties  –  usually  in  evenings  or  at
53 Other examples would include José Bardasano, another nationally known artist who made posters for 
the unified socialist-communist youth movement JSU, and Parrilla, who also made posters for the 
JSU. The fact that communist organisations attracted the best poster artists is surely from the fact that 
they were typically the biggest 'clients' for such work. This is suggested both by the photo archive of 
the Junta de Defensa de Madrid, and Fontseré's account of poster production in Barcelona. With 
regard to the latter, see Termes, J., Miravitlles, J., & Fontseré, C. Carteles de la República, 374. 
54 Some analysis of this kind is found in Grimau, C. El cartel republicano. Close readings of some of 
Renau's work can also be found in Tomás Ferré, F. Los Carteles Valencianos, though the insights thus 
produced are only briefly related, if at all, to the socio-political context in which his posters appeared. 
55 Forment, A. Josep Renau, 167.
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weekends, when he went back to Valencia from Madrid to spend time with his family.56
Perhaps it was partly for these time-related reasons that Renau later claimed to dislike
most of his artistic output from the war.  Another problem making poster production
particularly challenging in this period – a problem which became more decisive as the
conflict dragged on – was material scarcity. Colour ranges were limited and the hues of
final prints unpredictable throughout, and paper scarcity became a pressing issue less
than a year after the war had begun.57 
Most importantly,  the war years  meant that  the relative artistic  independence
hitherto maintained by Renau was now sacrificed in favour of a stricter observance of
party policy, at least in all matters relating to short-term political and military strategy.
After September 1936, this change can no doubt be attributed to his elevation to a post
where he represented both party and government at a national level, as well as to the
greater  discipline  required  in  times  of  war.  For  Renau  himself,  however,  a  stricter
adherence to the party line would not have created any dilemma. He always wished to
conform to the content of party teachings, even if he insisted on his freedom to express
that content through innovative forms. This he managed to achieve without any real
fight. Indeed, aside from some disagreements with certain comrades in the Valencian
party,  Nueva  Cultura’s  editorial  independence was,  as  we  have  seen,  as  much
guaranteed  by  the  Central  Committee's  unwillingness  and  inability  to  engage  with
cultural matters as by any assertion of autonomy on Renau’s part.58 But if his (and the
general) tendency to follow the party leadership became increasingly marked during the
war,  it  was  no  doubt  also  because  of  the  sheer  scale  of  events  now  unfolding.
Experiences of unseen levels of military aggression and violence must have engendered
a greater sense of vulnerability, which would have enhanced the need for guidance and a
sense of greater safety in collective responses. As Renau and his colleagues came to
understand the war as a decisive world historical moment, the party, together with the
Soviet  backing  associated  with  it,  must  have  appeared  the  only  force  of  sufficient
magnitude to actually have an impact on its outcome.59 Individual ideas, no matter how
56 This is highlighted by Renau in interview reproduced in Julián González, I. El Cartel Republicano, 
190. However, as mentioned on page 159 below, Renau's personal secretary at the General Directorate
of Fine Arts, Antonio Deltoro, later stated that Renau would periodically disappear from his office in 
order to focus on some poster commission. See Forment, A. Josep Renau, 164. 
57 See, for example, an article entitled 'Litografía de la guerra y la revolución', published in Adelante (16 
february 1937). Reproduced in Gamonal Torres, M. Arte y Política,180f.
58 See pages 97 above. 
59 Hence, no doubt, his insistence that artists must recognise the 'objective' facts of the conflict. These 
facts were often defined, of course, by the communist leadership. 
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grand, logically lost significance in such circumstances.
Either  way, with regard to my forthcoming analysis, the particular conditions
obtaining during the war meant that Renau's graphic propaganda was at once more one-
dimensional in its politics and more variable in its aesthetic qualities, compared to his
work of earlier periods. To address questions of artistic intent, then, as expressed in war
posters, it is necessary to modify the analytical angle adopted in previous chapters and
focus on symbolic content rather than form. The latter, as indicated, was often simply a
result of practical restrictions, and could thus no longer serve as a signifier of Renau's
long-term cultural project, which in any case was put on hold throughout autumn of
1936.60 This analytical modification is also required by the fact that it is precisely the
content  of Renau's poster propaganda that offers the most significant clues to how the
PCE positioned itself in the internal battles to shape Republican politics after the coup.
As we shall  see,  in  order  to  assist  PCE efforts  to  attract  mass  support  across  class
boundaries,  Renau  was  careful  to  adopt  a  symbolic  lexicon  that  could  speak  to
progressive members of the middling classes as well as to revolutionary workers. The
efficacy of  his  posters  revolved,  to  a  large  degree,  around the very ambiguity  thus
produced. Another ambiguity, similarly introduced to raise PCE's profile, resulted from
Renau's tendency to blur the distinction between party and state policy. In combination
they suggest an implicit strategy in Renau's early war poster production – a strategy
whereby the revolution could be equated with the Republican war campaign and the
PCE conflated with the war-time government.
Posters to mobilise the home front
The first poster Renau produced – and according to him one of the earliest produced
during the conflict61 – is noteworthy because it can be viewed as a prophetic illustration
of what would be the changing organisational characteristics of the PCE during the war.
It  called on 'workers,  peasants,  soldiers,  intellectuals'  to 'strengthen the ranks of the
Communist  Party'  and  depicted  four  men,  each  a  representative  of  these  groups,
contemplating  the  situation  before  them with  determined  expression  [Fig.  17].  The
realistically painted style, underscoring PCE's exaltation of strict discipline, is typical of
60 Such an assertion would seem reasonable in light of the fact that Nueva Cultura temporarily stopped 
its regular publication and that all efforts were momentarily geared towards the immediate goal of 
mobilising the Republican defence. A return to long-term as well as short-term concerns can be seen 
in Renau’s lecture on the social function of the poster in December 1936, as discussed later, and was 
also an intrinsic part of his work as General Director of Fine Arts, at least after the battle for Madrid. 
61 Julián González, I. El Cartel Republicano, 199.
137
Renau's  war-poster  aesthetic,  which  tended  to  rely  heavily  on  air  brush  –  largely
because it was a faster technique than montage. In the background a large red flag is
tied to the bayonet of a rifle; its hammer and sickle is dominating the left half of the
picture, urging the men onwards. 
With  remarkable  prescience,  Renau's  poster  captures  a  number  of  important
aspects of the war-time PCE. First of these is the fact, already mentioned, that the party
managed  to  recruit  people  of  different  ages  and  socio-economic  backgrounds  to  its
ranks. The reasons for this are complex and related, as we have seen, to its disciplined
response to the revolutionary events taking place in the Republic in the aftermath of the
coup. But the party would also owe much of its success to its exceptional organisational
abilities. Within its own structures, the PCE would pioneer different forms of integrated
organisations  which  the  Republic  would  need  to  develop  across  home  as  well  as
military  fronts  in  order  to  survive  the  challenge  posed  by  total  war.62 If  the  PCE
experienced vertiginous growth after July 1936, it  was to a large extent because the
party simply seemed, in the eyes of many, to be the organisation best placed to lead the
war effort.
Yet such assertions cannot be made without reference to the Soviet Union, which
in October 1936 became, as mentioned, the first and only state to supply the Republic
with significant amounts of  war materiel.  As a result,  large parts of the Republican
population  primarily  came  to  associate  the  flag  on  Renau's  poster  with  the  Soviet
Union’s solidarity with the Republic, rather than communism per se. For this reason it,
it could be used to garner support from people of a wide range of political persuasions.63
A striking indication of this may be found in another poster, made for the moderate left
republican  party,  Izquierda  Republicana,  in  1937.64 Here  a  foregrounded  statue
representing the Republic is placed next to a giant profile of Stalin, under whose steady
gaze Republican soldiers storm forward. Produced by an organisation that cannot in any
sense  be  called  Stalinist,  the  poster  is  a  powerful  testimony to  the  broad  prestige
enjoyed by the Soviet Union in the war-time Republic – at least until victory began to
seem impossible. But if Soviet-related symbols could thus simply be associated with the
Popular Front as a whole, the party that would derive the greatest benefit from their
62 These incorporated also youth and women's sections, where the same membership hybridity could be 
observed. See Graham, H. The Spanish Republic at War, 180f.
63 Ibid., 174, 181. For a contemporary reflection on the popularity of the Soviet Union in Republican 
Spain during the autumn of 1936, see, for example, Araceli, G. 'La Hora Rusa de Madrid' Mundo 
Gráfico 18 November 1936, 8-9.
64 Made by Josep Espert.
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proliferation in the Republican public sphere was undoubtedly the PCE.  
A more  complex  use  of  ideologically  charged  yet  semantically  open-ended
symbols can be observed in a Renau poster highlighting the importance of domestic war
industries.  For  financial,  geographical,  and  political  reasons,  Soviet  aid  could  not
compensate entirely for the asymmetries caused by Non-Intervention, which meant that
it was essential for the Republic to be able to produce military materiel internally too.
To highlight this need, Renau's poster, made at some point in autumn 1936, bore the
slogan  'War  Industry.  Giving  us  a  handle  on  victory'  (Industria  de  guerra.  Potente
palanca de victoria)[Fig. 18]. Composed mainly of montage, it shows a large industrial
wheel  being turned by a powerful  arm.  Between the wheel and the arm appear  the
outlines of four bayonets. Just below the wheel is a red star, in the top left corner the
text 'Partido Comunista'. The link between the visual elements, tying together industrial
output with political as well as military goals, is evident, and so is the promise of peace
implicit  in  the  tranquil  blue  sky making up  the  background.  In  terms  of  its  visual
symbolism, the design celebrated both worker strength and a peaceful yet politically
undecided  Republican  future.65 The  latter  aspect  was  particularly  important  and
stemmed from the fact that the visual language of the poster, regardless of its stated
connection with the PCE, was, as we shall see, open to several political readings.
A key  characteristic  of  Renau's  war  industry poster  was,  first  of  all,  that  it
contained symbolic references to autonomous worker power as well as statist politics,
and as such effectively served to link libertarian revolutionary imagery to the PCE's (in
one sense anti-revolutionary) war programme. The most immediate symbol potentially
giving rise to revolutionary associations is found in the arm, which by clutching the
shaft is also greeting the viewer with a clenched fist salute. Although in Spain the salute
came to represent adherence to the anti-fascist cause broadly understood, it was well-
known to have its origins in revolutionary left-wing politics.66 Further references in this
regard  could be  derived  from the celebration  of  industry –  implicit  in  the elevated
position of the wheel – which can be seen as linked to the emancipatory project of the
worker  movement  as  a  whole.  Yet  if  many  Spanish  workers  were  now  pursuing
emancipatory goals in opposition to the state, the visual language of Renau's poster also
represented an endorsement of a state-led model of revolution. This is especially clear in
65 Unfortunately it has not been possible to establish a date for when this poster might have been made.
66 The clenched fist salute was first adopted in 1926 as the official salute of the German Communist 
Party's paramilitary organisation, the Red front Fighters League (Roter Frontkämpferbund) and from 
there spread to communist parties around the world. See Weitz, E. Creating German Communism, 3.
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its  visual  references  to  the  USSR. From an  aesthetic  point  of  view,  Renau's  poster
exhibits unmistakable commonalities with the work of Soviet artists like Gustav Klucis,
for example, a Constructivist who used photomontage to create some of the most of
iconic  images  of  the  Bolshevik  Revolution  and  Stalinism.  Indeed,  the  inclusion  of
photography  against  a  simple  background,  the  monumental  portrayal  of  worker
strength, all directly connect Renau's design with the visual culture of the Soviet avant-
garde. The implications of this were not merely stylistic. By 'quoting' (to borrow a term
from  Susan  Sontag)  Soviet  precedents,  Renau  presented  them as  originators  of  an
authoritative model that Spain should follow in her own construction of cultural as well
as  industrial  modernity.67 Such articulations  of  war strategy,  above all  when tied  to
definitions  of  the  revolution,  would  clearly  carry  a  political  significance  reaching
beyond the war into a post-war future.
Even where purely aesthetic references were not readily appreciated by a general
public largely unfamiliar with Soviet avant-garde art,68 there was a sense in which the
purely  visual  language  of  Renau's  poster  may  have  prompted  associations  to  the
Bolshevik revolution  before  any other.  For  the  Soviet  Union  was,  especially in  the
1930s (that is, at the time of the first Five Year Plans), typically and probably more
consistently  than  any  other  country  represented  by images  of  heavy  industry.69 Yet
again, the propagandistic power of the poster lies in the fact that such associations could
not be made unambiguously. Industry had long acted as a trope of progress in socialist
iconography, and could furthermore be seen in anarchist war posters depicting a 'new
Spain'.70 The desire to further the process of industrialisation would have been shared by
many reformist republicans too, who saw economic development as an integral part of
the overall modernisation of the country. In this sense, then, industry provided a symbol
of  material  wealth  and  universal  well-being  that  spoke  equally  to  all  progressive
ideologies. It allowed Renau to create a poster that stayed true to his ideological identity
67 Cf. Sontag, S. 'Posters: Advertisement, Art, Political Artefact, Commodity'.
68 If professional commercial artists had little knowledge of Soviet aesthetics (as suggested by Carles 
Fontseré and Lorenzo Goñi), it is safe to assume the general public did not have much knowledge of it
either.
69 As seen in international propaganda magazines like USSR in Construction, this is clearly how 
Moscow wanted the country to be presented. More empirical work needs to be done on how images of
the USSR were distributed in Spain, but one source used by the mainstream press was a picture 
agency run by one of the founders of the Spanish Association of Friends of the Soviet Union 
(Asociación de Amigos de la Unión Soviética, AUS), Mario Rawicz. This would presumably trade 
only in images approved by Moscow. See Horacio Fernández's introduction to Rawicz, M. 
Confesionario de papel: memorias de un inconformista (Valencia: Comares/IVAM, 1997), 25. 
Moreover, virtually all posters produced by the AUS during the war, including one by Renau, would 
include some representation of heavy industry. 
70 De Luis, F. Cincuenta años, 51. 
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without necessarily alienating other groups on the left.  Most importantly,  it  struck a
balance  between celebrating the dreams of revolutionary workers and acknowledging
the realities of modern war.
Another  attempt  to  strike  a  balance  between  revolutionary  politics  and
centralised war mobilisation,  this time with more immediate impact, was made with
regard to collectivisation in the countryside. Much of the agrarian south, which had the
greatest  proportion  of  landless  peasants,  quickly  fell  to  the  rebels  as  they  were
advancing  from  Seville  to  Madrid.  Where  collectivisation  had  occurred  in  zones
successfully held by the Republic, it was often a contentious issue that divided different
sectors of the middling peasantry. In this context the PCE attracted broad support as a
result of its robust defence of 'law and order' and small-scale private property,  especially
among small landowning farmers in Catalonia and Valencia, where a strong libertarian
influence meant that  forced collectivisation and confiscations,  mostly carried out by
anarchist groups, were more widespread than in the central zone.71 Yet this was more
than just an issue of local pragmatics or political opportunism, for the PCE’s position on
collectivisation  was  ambivalent  to  the  core.  At  a  time  when  the  Soviet  Union  was
realising a vast collectivisation programme, loyal communists could hardly oppose the
concept as such. Yet the need to regain central control over food supplies and avoid any
disruptions to Republican food production, critical when most grain producing areas lay
in  rebel-held  territory,  meant  that  the  party  had  to  reject  any  ideas  of  blanket
collectivisation as unsuitable for wartime conditions in Spain.72 This ambivalence was
also present in the celebrated agricultural decree of 7 October, signed by communist
Minister  of Agriculture,  Vicente Uribe.  The decree stipulated that  land belonging to
active supporters of the rebellion could be confiscated for collective use.73 This was,
however, the only legally expropriable land, and as a whole the decree followed earlier
governmental  efforts  to  limit the impact  of collectivisation.74 Even so,  the PCE was
quick  to  make  political  capital  from  the  reform  among  radicalised  sectors  of  the
peasantry,  who  were  told  that  the  decree  represented  a  'new  era'  in  the  Spanish
71 Graham, H. The Spanish Republic at War,182. In Valencia, the circle gathered around Renau and 
Nueva Cultura saw almost immediately after the July rebellion how the sole threat of forced 
collectivisation could disrupt food production by discouraging peasants from working their lands, and 
promptly resolved to distribute posters defending the right toproperty among Valencian villages. From
interview with Antonio Ballester, CDMH (Salamanca) Fuentes_Orales-Mexico, no 9, 46.
72 For a concise summary of the PCE position, see Fraser, R. Blood of Spain, 291. See also Hernández, 
F. Guerra o Revolución, 160f. 
73 Published in Gaceta de Madrid 8 October 1936, 236f.
74 Point emphasised by Helen Graham in The Spanish Republic at War, 230.
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countryside.  Thus  highlighting  the  progressive  content  of  a  measure  essentially
designed to maintain the status quo, the party could also reinforce its standing among
small and middling landowners who were protective of their private property while also
courting  support  among  rural  workers  who  saw  collectivisation  as  a  progressive
redistributive measure that should be officially sanctioned in the wake of the coup.
An official poster communicating the basic content of the decree was made by
Renau at some point in October [Fig. 19].75 The composition is made up of a peasant
standing  in  a  field,  holding  a  rifle  in  his  raised  right  arm,  around  which  falls  the
wringing body of snake, stabbed by the rifle's bayonet. On the shoulder end of the rifle
is written the word 'Decree'  (Decreto),  and on the body of the snake; 'Rebel owner'
(Propietario faccioso). To the lower right corner we see the other hand of the peasant,
holding a sickle. Above this are excerpts from the official text, and a heading which
states: 'Peasant,  defend  with arms the  government  that  gave  you  land'  (Campesino,
defiende con las armas al gobierno que te dió la tierra). 
Renau later claimed that this poster was both the most widely distributed and the
most poorly executed design he ever put his name to.76 The whole process was done in
in less than twelve hours, and the excerpts had to be added afterwards.77 It appears the
complaints of the artist referred mainly to the lack of integration between image and
text. But there is also a sense in which the purely visual elements also fail to speak for
themselves. Had it not been for the qualifications added to rifle and snake, the intended
significance of these would have remained elusive. As it stands, the composition has to
be read in a rather literal manner; the information becomes dictated, as opposed to felt,
and  the  impact  of  the  message  reaches  the  spectator  through  an  indirect  and
'rationalised' route. The reliance on text – indeed the poster is one the most 'text-heavy'
Renau  ever  did  –  would  represent  a  double  weakness  since  the  intended  audience
included  members  of  the  poorest  sections  of  the  peasantry,  many  of  whom  were
illiterate.
The information campaign surrounding the October decree did not stop with the
poster,  however.  Renau  also  co-authored,  together  with  graphic  designer  Mauricio
Amster,  an  official  leaflet  entitled '7 October.  A new era  in  the  countryside'  (7  de
Octubre. Una nueva era en el campo).78 Like the poster, this leaflet focused exclusively
75 Again, we do not know the exact date, but according to the artist himself this was made immediately 
after the decree was passed in October.
76 Julíán González, I. El Cartel Republicano, 199.
77 Ibid., 199.
78 Published on 1 November 1936, according to the back page.
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on the redistributive aspect of the measure, but it is noteworthy that Renau also added a
series of references to the Communist Party which highlight its role in the formulation
of the decree in such a way that party and ministry become virtually synonymous.79 It
was  a  mode  of  presenting  government  initiatives  which  would  later  be  reproduced
within the Ministry of Public Instruction and Fine Arts and clearly showed how the
party used its governmental positions to gain new members.80 Yet if the leaflet provided
an opportunity for proselytism among day labouring peasants, another special  Nueva
Cultura edition,  'Nueva Cultura for the countryside' (Nueva Cultura para el campo  ),
would address the implications of the October decree from the opposite point of view.81
Here the intended audience was almost certainly landholding peasants, or at any rate an
audience of some level of education, as each issue contained detailed articles describing
how to maximise production, as well as what foodstuffs, based on nutritional value,
should  be  prioritised  in  times  of  war.82 The  feature  discussing  the  October  decree
emphasised more clearly Uribe's stated conviction that forced collectivisation would be
counterproductive  in  Spain  –  a  conviction  which,  despite  the  magazine's  recurring
features  on  the  Soviet  precedent,  was  allegedly  shared  by  members  of  the  Nueva
Cultura group.83 In  short, then, through different outlets Renau and his collaborators
found ways simultaneously to highlight both sides of the symbolically loaded initiative
and  to  outline  suggested  benefits  to  audiences  of  different  political  orientation  and
socio-economic status. Thus the government appeared to represent the interests of both
middle  and  working  class  constituents,  while  the  PCE  presented  itself  –  with
questionable justification but notable success, as a result of their propaganda skills – as
the driving force behind progressive change.
79 For example: 'We are realising the slogans of the Communist Party: to expropriate the land from the 
idlers, the caciques [bosses of clientelist networks][...], to give it to the living soul of the Nation.'
'Communists, together with their socialist brothers, republicans, and all democratic men, have no
other concerns in government than that of working for the happiness of our people.' 
Ministerio de Agricultura 7 de Octubre: Una nueva era en el campo (Madrid, 1936), 6.
80 The clearest examples, discussed by Álvarez Lopera, could be seen in the evacuation of the Prado 
museum and the opening of a free public museum in Valencia which made use of the private art 
collection of the Duke of Alba. See Álvarez Lopera, José. La política de bienes culturales, 37, 70, 
103. See page 175 below.
81 This was visually and textually a much more elaborate publication than its Nueva Cultura counterpart 
for the front. Up to twelve pages long and printed in two colours, it looks more like the normal 
magazine, though filled with more practical content. According to the Nueva Cultura report in March 
1937 three issues had been published and printed in 5000 copies each. 
82 It seems safe to assume that this was mainly distributed to small-holders in the Valencia region, while 
the ministry leaflet was presumably distributed throughout Republican territory as a whole.
83 See Antonio Ballester interview, CDMH (Salamanca) Fuentes_Orales-Mexico, no 9, 46.
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Propaganda to boost the army
In addition to these efforts to galvanise and unite the home front the PCE also used
propaganda resources to capitalise on its prescience and efficiency in military matters.
Here the initiative and innovative power of the party was in many ways real as well as
projected, not least in relation to the task of reconstructing the Republican army.  The
Republican  government  soon  recognised  the  need  for  a  regular  fighting  force  –  a
continuing series of militia defeats in the south in the summer and early autumn 1936
made the case for such a move unanswerable – and the PCE placed itself at the forefront
of developments.84 Immediately after the July rebellion taken place,  it  had created a
prototype and training ground for a future army in its  Fifth  Regiment,  based on an
already  existing  party  militia.85 Apart  from  military  training,  the  Fifth  Regiment
pioneered various integrating organisational models linking military units to auxiliary
training facilities and civilian services (e.g. nurses' training, family support, etc.).86 That
this holistic approach to war mobilisation, crucial in the effort to maximise the utility of
limited Republican resources, was furthermore a part of the image that the PCE tried to
project to potential recruits can been seen in party posters highlighting how enlisted
soldiers would be entitled to child care.87 Another central feature boosting the credibility
of the PCE as a war party was its constant stress, in propaganda as well as all practical
activities preparing recruits for war, on the importance of hierarchy and discipline.88 The
association  with  discipline  became  a  great  source  of  pride,  not  only  for  the  PCE
leadership, but for communist rank-and-file too. As memoirs and contemporary letters
show, it served as a cornerstone of communist group identity, and reinforced a sense of
representing the vanguard, the most efficient and skilled, among Republican troops.89 
In the wake of what had been a treasonous military coup, the task of legitimising
84 Graham, H. The Spanish Republic at War, 138-148.
85 Ibid., 84. The Milicias Antifascistas Obreras y Campesinas was formed in 1933 to protect meetings 
and party premises. See also Alpert, M. The Republican Army in the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2013), 15, 44-49.
86 Ibid. 147f, 180. 
87 AGA (Madrid), 33,F,04061,55211,001. Poster designed by Parilla.
88 See, for example, the speech delivered by the General Secretary José Díaz in the Monumental Cinema
in Madrid on 20 October 1936. Reproduced in Díaz, J. Tres años de lucha (Brenes: Muñoz Moya, 
2005),  178-183.
89 Cf. Letters responding to the question 'Why have you joined the PCE?' held in the civil war archive in 
Salamanca (CDMH (Salamanca) PS-Madrid, 474, 20. These appear to be part of an internal survey 
and would no doubt conform to general party orthodoxy no matter what, but it is still instructive to see
the number that in one way or another single out discipline and organisation as keys to the strength of 
the party. The emphasis on discipline isalso recurrent in later accounts on the conflict. See, for 
example, the interview with José Duque, a PCE militant stationed in Aragon during most  of the war 
(CDMH (Salamanca) Fuentes_Orales-Mexico, no 38), and testaments by party members held in the 
PCE archive in Madrid (AHPCE 'Tesis, memorias, manuscritos' 38/3, 44/3, 44/8, 40/3).
144
to the broad Republican population an army currently under reconstruction was one of
the  most  serious  challenges  facing  the  Republican  authorities.90 To  address  this
challenge the  PCE took inspiration from the  Red Army and introduced,  once  again
through  the  Fifth  Regiment,  the  figure  of  the  political  commissar.  The  role  of  the
commissar was diverse, involving all tasks concerning soldiers' welfare, but in the midst
of fighting the commissar's responsibility was above all to explain and legitimise the
rationale of orders and to maintain morale among the troops – many of whom would
have been new to the searing experience of modern warfare.91 They served as a link in
the chain of command, representing soldiers' interests while at the same time enforcing
discipline. This double function was crucial not least because a Republican Army had to
incorporate both the professional officers who remained loyal after the July rising and
the workers'  militias that  had  fought  it.  While  elements  of  the  former tended  to be
disdainful  of  militia  strategy,  the  latter,  understandably,  remained  suspicious  of  the
career  officers'  credibility  and  claim  to  loyalty.92 Against  this  background  the
government of Largo Caballero  created, in mid-October 1936,  an officially instituted
General  Commissariat,  which  was  to  facilitate  political  and  military  co-ordination
between the disparate forces making up the Republican Army under construction.93 
Even within this new government-created commissariat, the political commissar
remained closely associated with the Communist Party. The party keenly promoted its
function within the armed forces, above all because it saw the crucial importance that
commissars  would  have  as  the  Republic  sought  to  convert  inexperienced  and
inadequately  trained  men  into  a  robust  and  disciplined  army.94 The  PCE  had  no
executive influence over the formation of the new General Commissariat in October, but
some officers, who at any rate disliked what they regarded as political interference in
their  sphere,  would  suspect  the  Commissariat  of  being  mainly  an  instrument  of
90 Anti-militarism had formed part of the political consciousness of many segments of the population in 
Spain before July 1936, but the coup had invariably made it stronger among all Republican groups.
91 Alpert, M. The Republican Army, 174-201. See also Matthews, J. Reluctant Warriors: Republican 
Popular Army and Nationalist Army Conscripts in the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939 (Oxford: OUP, 
2012), 63-101. For an extensive autobiographical account attempting to evaluate the role of 
commissars in the civil war, see Álvarez, Santiago. Los comisarios políticos en el Ejército Popular de 
la República. Aportaciones a la historia de la Guerra Civil Española (La Coruña: Ediciós do Castro, 
1989). 
92 Ibid. The importance of commissars in ensuring loyalty also among the officer corps was emphasised 
by Federico Bonet, a commissar himself, interview held at CDMH (Salamanca) Fuentes_Orales-
Mexico, no 15, 64f.
93 Published in Gaceta de Madrid 16 October 1936, 355.
94 Graham, H. The Spanish Republic at War, 147. Cf. article in Mundo Obrero 1 October 1936, entitled 
'La dimensión de los comisarios políticos', which stated that 'the political commissar must know how 
to make is his men understand the necessity of a conscientious discipline of iron.'
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communist aggrandisement.95 Such impressions would have been strengthened by the
presence of a high number of communist commissars in Republican army ranks. But
rather than conspiracy, this was, again, due to the fact that the PCE understood their
military importance and was the first to nominate qualified and experienced personnel
to such posts.96 
In connection with these developments, Renau was to create one of his most
celebrated posters, bearing the slogan 'The Commissar, nerve of our popular army' (el
Comisario,  nervio  del  nuestro  ejército  popular)[Fig.20].97 The  design  shows a  large
number of bayonets emerging from the right-hand side of the poster, and an arm in long
sleeve uniform occupying a central  place among them. The arm does not carry any
weapon; it launches into battle solely with its clenched fist. In the background we see
dark stormy skies; a red and yellow horizon under large black clouds. The background
is made up of coloured and retouched photographs. So is the arm, presumably belonging
to  the  commissar.  The  clenched  fist  represents  the  only  human  element  in  the
composition; it is the soul, the nerve, of the resistance, the guide offering directions. Its
tensed features signal determination and strength. Together with the sharpened steel and
threatening sky, the overall impression of the image is violent, aggressive, even if the
blades appear to fixed in their position. They form an impenetrable defence – a defence
virtually piercing the gaze as it reads the image from left to right – beyond which, as the
slogan in Madrid later prophesied, the enemy 'shall not pass'.98 
This is how the poster most commonly appears in present day reproductions.99
Here  there  is  no  explicit  reference  to  the  Communist  Party,  or  any  other  political
organisation.  This  is  consistent  with  claims made by Renau towards  the  end of  his
career, stating that the poster was commissioned by the General Commissariat when it
was created in October.100 As the task would have been to represent the Republican
Army,  there  could  be  no  room  for  explicit  proselytism.  However,  such  claims  are
complicated by the fact that there is another version [Fig. 21], coloured differently (in
the particular example seen here, but colour scheme could vary due to several factors)
and exhibiting certain variations in terms of composition: the bayonet above the arm not
95 Ibid., 147.
96 Ibid., 147.
97 Undated, but in all likelihood made in October 1936.
98 See below. '¡No pasarán!' ('They shall not pass!') became the defining slogan during the battle for 
Madrid.  
99 In all likelihood because this is the version held by the Josep Renau archive. 
100 Julíán González, I. El Cartel Republicano, 199. Cf. Forment, A. Josep Renau, 165.
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reaching across the picture frame, the fist  having a slightly different  shape, the sky
being visible  across  the  entire  background,  the  writing of  the  definite  article  in  'El
Comisario' appearing in capitals, and so on.101 But above all this version includes, in
letters appearing above the arm of the commissar,  the additional  inscription 'Partido
Comunista'.  The letters  are of  the same colour as  the uniform,  leaving the political
identity of the commissar beyond any doubt. 
It may have been that Renau created the latter poster first, evidently published
by the PCE, and then simply adapted its content once he received the commission from
the government's General Commissariat.102 Even so, the fact that there would thus have
been two versions promoting the same initiative, one linked to the Communist Party and
the  other  to  the  Republican  Army,  meant  that  the  Commissar  poster  may stand  as
another example where Renau's work served to blur the boundaries between party and
state policy. Provided the two versions could be seen in the same space and the initiative
was received favourably, it is clear which political organisation would reap the rewards
in terms of enhanced reputation and membership.
The association between commissars and the PCE would be further reinforced
by an increasing popular awareness of the historical model provided by the Bolsheviks
during the Russian Civil  War.103 This link was reinforced through all  forms of PCE
propaganda, as indeed were more general claims, often appearing in posters as well as
speeches,  regarding  'instructive'  similarities  between  the  Russian  and  Spanish
conflicts.104 (This  provided  a  more  recent  alternative  to  the  other  historical  parallel
mentioned at the same time in non-communist Republican media: namely, the French
101 This can be found in the poster collection of the University of Valencia, for example.
102 It could also be that the version published by the PCE was the only one existing during the war, as the 
first version mentioned is – at least in the form available today – in all likelihood a reproduction from 
1949. In a letter to art historian Inmaculada Julián, dated 13 November 1974, Renau explained that he 
had reproduced a number of his civil war posters in 1949. These reproductions can be identified by the
signature 'renau 36' (whereas all other work was simply signed 'renau') and the fact that there is no text
in the margin stating where the poster has been printed (which was the case with other civil war 
posters by Renau). Both these characteristics can be observed in the first version referred to above. 
What remains unclear, however, is why Renau should have made this reproduction significantly 
different from the original, when comparisons show that all the other 1949 reproductions mentioned in
the letter to Julián are nearly identical to their originals. (Renau worked from black and white 
photographs of the originals when making the reproductions.) In the absence of any reasonable 
hypothesis explaining this alteration, it must be considered possible that there was an original version 
also without the 'Partido Comunista' inscription, even if I have not come across a surviving copy of 
this in any archive or poster catalogue.
103 There were also precedents set during the French Revolution, which did not, however, receive much 
attention in Spain. See Álvarez, Santiago. Los comisarios políticos, 98.
104 See speech delivered by José Díaz on 20 October 1936 in Madrid. Tres años de lucha, 178-183. See 
also plain-text posters by the Association of Friends of the Soviet Union in Madrid, highlighting the 
relevance of the Russian experience for the upcoming battle for Madrid. AGA (Madrid), 
33,F,04062,55378,001).
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invasion of Spain in 1808.105) Particularly important in terms of reinforcing the linkage
between the Russian and Spanish civil wars were widespread screenings of Soviet films
like 'Chapaev' (1934) and 'We are from Kronstadt' (1936),106 where the heroism of the
Bolshevik commissar  was on full  display.107 Both productions claimed to  retell  real
events – the first following World War I hero Chapaev and his commissar Fourmanov,
as they led a group of peasants in the Russian Civil War, the second relating how a
commissar  inspired  a  group  of  undisciplined  sailors  to  perform heroic  deeds  in  the
defence of Petrograd in 1919. Both films underscored the importance of inspirational
individuals while emphasising that victory in battle ultimately lay with the collective.
According to Santiago Álvarez, a communist commissar who would rise to a prominent
position  in  Enrique  Lister's  11th Division,  there  could  be  no  doubt  that  Spanish
commissars were greatly influenced by prototypes like Fourmanov, who, in his view,
turned  the  'uncut  diamond'  that  was  Chapaev  into  an  exemplary  military  and
revolutionary leader.108 
The fearless advance of this leader, and his calls on the rest of the men to follow,
are also captured in the poster Renau made for the film in spring 1936 [Fig. 22].109 As in
the  Commissar poster, the main protagonist is the only human element represented in
the composition, and appears lightly armed in contrast to the rifles and machine guns
around him. His chief weapon is his bravery, rooted in a willingness to self-sacrifice –
characteristics powerfully described in the final  scene of  the film, where he single-
handedly holds off an ambush and perishes just before reinforcements come to win the
day. In contrast to  the 'Commissar', this poster offers a portrayal of attack. There is a
strong forward movement; Chapaev himself at the helm, flanked by bayonets, guns, and
the red flag of socialism. 
While 'Chapaev' had been screened before the military rising in July, and had
immediately become a reference point for some militia men going to the front,110 'We
are from Kronstadt' would not premier in Madrid until 18 October, when it was shown
105 The parallels with the French invasion in 1808 would figure much more prominently in communist 
propaganda in 1937, but these references were repeatedly used in the Republican papers like ABC 
(Madrid), already in the run-up to the defence of Madrid. See, for example, front pages on 6 and 7 
November 1936.
106 Original titles of the films are: Chapaev (Spanish title: Chapáiev) and My iz Kronshtadta (Spanish 
title: Los Marinos de Cronstadt).    
107 Álvarez, Santiago. Los comisarios políticos, 96.
108 Ibid., 94.
109 The poster is reproduced next to review of the film published in Nueva Cultura, 11 (March-April), 16.
110 See the description of a truck carrying milicianos with the text 'los chapaiefs' written on the side in 
AHPCE (Madrid) 'Tesis, memorias, manuscritos' 38/3.
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with the sole intention of boosting military morale ahead of the imminent attack on the
capital city.  Screenings were organised by the propaganda section of the Ministry of
Public Instruction and Fine Arts, which had acquired the film from the Soviet embassy,
and Renau was part of the team that would turn its promotion into a massive advertising
campaign.111 The correspondent  for  the British daily  News Chronicle,  Geoffrey Cox,
later remembered how the huge number of placards produced for the film had turned the
lamp posts in the central boulevards of Gran Vía and Alcalá into 'one winding column
of red.'112 The sheer fact that the film  was a Soviet production would soon prove its
strongest attraction, however, as the first appearance of Soviet tanks on the central front
six days later marked the beginning of general enthusiasm for all things Soviet among
the Republican population.113 As for Renau's main contribution, it unsurprisingly took
the form of another poster – one which he would later consider the best he ever made
[Fig. 23].114 
The fundamental elements making up this composition consist of several naval
cannons, pointing at varying angles to the right, and a powerful arm – naked this time,
coloured red – hitting out alongside these with a clenched fist. In the background of the
upper part we see a red star, over which is written the title of the film. In the lower right
corner is a text which states that this is a Soviet production, while an emblem in the top
right corner makes clear that it is supplied by the Ministry of Public Instruction and Fine
Arts.  In  terms  of  the  symbolic  message,  we  are  again  presented  with  a  'heroic'
composition, though in this case there is no individual fearlessly rushing into battle.
What is exalted,  in the view of art historian Facundo Tomás Ferré,  is  not a specific
romantic hero, but heroism as a concept. The aim is, in other words, not to facilitate
identification  with a  specific  person,  but  'to  provoke a  sensation  of  acceptance  and
amity  as  well  as  implied  participation,  immediate  awareness  of  the  possibility  that
oneself, any self, may realise the described action.'115 As the defence of Madrid would
demand an extraordinary degree of courage/heroism from all parts of the population,
such messages were in many ways a necessary response to the moment. 
The  film  appeared  to  have  a  powerful  impact  on  its  audience.  The  PCE
111 Renau, J. La batalla per una nova cultura, 142. See also the interview in García García, M et al. 
Josep Renau, 278-280. 
112 Cox, G. Defence of Madrid: An Eyewitness Account from the Spanish Civil War. (Wellington: Otago 
University Press, 2006 [1937]),  49.
113 Graham, H. The Spanish Republic at War, 164, 174.
114 García García, M et al. Josep Renau, 280. 
115 Tomás Ferré, Facundo. Los Carteles Valencianos, 30.
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newspaper Mundo Obrero spoke of the 'unanimous and enthusiastic' applause following
from the  première.116 Renau,  who declared  the  film a  'masterpiece  in  the  genre  of
agitation and propaganda', claimed people left the cinema 'electrified.'117 After attending
the opening night, the Russian correspondent for Pravda, Mikhail Koltsov, noted in his
diary  how  the  audience  –  mainly  consisting  of  militia  men  and  soldiers,  but  also
including  several  political  dignitaries  –  followed  the  drama  intensely,  looking  for
answers to their own situation on the screen.118 Suggestions that 'We are from Kronstadt'
made a forceful impression are moreover supported by testimonies where participants in
the fateful battles around Madrid claim to have particular memories of seeing it along
the front or in the city.119 In a tense and emotionally charged atmosphere, the film no
doubt hit a nerve among the Republic's young defenders. Still, the most palpable proof
of  its  impact  would be found in  the  various  imitative acts  it  inspired  – acts  where
inexperienced  soldiers  literally  copied  the  behaviour  of  the  film's  characters  once
military operations in the capital reached their decisive stage.
The efficacy of propaganda in the defence of Madrid
By 6 November 1936, Franco's Army of Africa had reached the outskirts of Madrid. A
relatively small force of 30,000 men, it  had advanced some 400 km from Seville in
three months and now looked ready to capture a city of over one million inhabitants.120
Despite incessant calls from certain organisations – above all the PCE – to prepare the
city  for  enemy  attack,  defence  measures  had  been  put  in  place  relatively  late.121
Barricades were built  and trenches dug as the enemy was already closing in on the
outskirts. It  took a great communal effort to fortify the city – a task which engaged
women and children as well  as working men and was driven by an indomitable (if
overdue)  sense  of  urgency  and  determination.122 Once  the  gravity  of  the  situation
became patent to all, all mobilisation efforts were stepped up. Around this time Renau
116
'En presencia de las autoridades de la República es proyectado ”Los marinos de Cronstadt” film 
soviético, que presenta el ministerio de Instrucción Pública' Mundo Obrero 19 October 1936.
117 García García, M et al. Josep Renau, 280.
118 Koltsov, M. Diario de la guerra de España (Barcelona: Backlist, 2009), 178-181 (esp. 180).
119 AHPCE (Madrid) 'Tesis, memorias, manuscritos' 44/8.
120 Fraser, R. Blood of Spain, 259. Fraser states that the Francoist forces at Madrid consisted of 20,000 
men but more recent figures has increased the number to 30,000. See Montoliú, P. Madrid en la 
Guerra Civil (Madrid: Silex, 1998) 191.
121 For an overview of the preparations and the leading role played by the PCE, see Montoliú, P. Madrid 
en la Guerra Civil, 181-188. See also Vázquez, M. & Valero, J. La Guerra Civil en Madrid (Madrid: 
Tebas, 1978), 185-216. For a highly narrativised account, see also Reverte, J. M. La Batalla de 
Madrid (Barcelona: Crítica 2004).
122 Contemporary newspaper reports and magazine features in, for example, ABC 4 November 1936 and 
Estampa 7 November 1936. 
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called his  Nueva Cultura colleague  Rafael  Pérez  Contel  to  demand he  immediately
travel from Valencia to Madrid with the originals of their military manual, so it could be
printed and distributed over the capital. In the end they could not find anyone to print it,
as all print shop staff had gone to the front.123 On his return to Valencia, Pérez Contel
was accompanied by Renau's wife, Manuela.124 Manuela would not be alone in leaving
Madrid; many evacuated the city, and in a dramatic decision, taken and put into effect
on  6  November,  the  entire  Republican  government  also  left  for  Valencia.  Despite
continuous repetition of slogans like '¡No pasarán!' (They shall not pass!) and 'Madrid
will be the tomb of fascism', the flight of the government appeared an open confession
that the city could not be defended.125 Yet after a period of uncertainty, news emerged of
a local defence committee being set up, led by General José Miaja. Through this, the
remaining military and political  leaders  –  among whom the  PCE would  exercise  a
prominent influence – took up the task of rapidly organising defence operations and
encouraging the population to participate in the resistance.126 
The Francoist offensive was launched at dawn of 8 November. Attacking from
south-south-west, the plan was to cross through the working class districts of Usera and
Carabanchel, as well as the Casa de Campo, the huge scrub land to the west of the
city.127 Republican troops put up fierce resistance,  and were  aided later  that  day by
crucial reinforcements in the form of the 11th International Brigade – volunteer units
organised and trained by the Comintern.128 First deployed in the Casa de Campo, their
significance was not derived so much from numbers  as  from the morale boost  and
practical example they provided. Many inexperienced Spanish soldiers were impressed
by their discipline when faced with danger at the front.129 For the civilian population,
too, the arrival of the International Brigades inspired a new sense of hope. As the troops
marched  down  the  Gran  Vía  in  corduroy  uniforms  and  steel  helmets,  singing  the
Internationale  in  various  languages,  many  believed  that  Russia  was  'finally
intervening.'130 Though the International Brigades were made up recruits from all over
123 Pérez Contel, R. Artistas en Valencia, 635.
124 Ibid. 
125 For a description of the sense of panic that spread once the news of the government's departure was 
known, see Koltsov, M. Diario de la guerra de España, 241.
126 Graham, H. The Spanish Republic at War, 167-181. For the popular spirit that characterised the 
defence of Madrid, see Fraser, R. Blood of Spain, 255-271.
127 Thomas, H. The Spanish Civil War, 459.
128 Ibid., 465f.
129 Fraser, R. Blood of Spain, 263. As always there were exceptions to the rule, as related by Federico 
Bonet, who claimed to have been more scared of the undisciplined Italian brigaders he fought next to 
than the enemy. CDMH (Salamanca) Fuentes_Orales-Mexico, no 15, 73.
130 Thomas, H. The Spanish Civil War, 465.
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Europe and beyond, and were not 'Russian' in any sense, significant Russian aid had, as
mentioned, arrived shortly before the attack on Madrid, not least in the form of tanks
and planes. Tanks were critical in combat against the rebels' Italian counterparts, while
air support offered some protection from the German and Italian bombers. Whenever
Russian  chatos managed to take down an enemy plane, the civilian population would
respond with loud cheers.131
Throughout  the  first  week  Republican  and  international  troops  succeeded  in
halting  Franco's  push  on  the  capital.  It was  an  achievement  which  demanded
considerable sacrifice and bravery – as Renau had had a chance to observe first-hand
near his lodgings on the Calle del Sacramento, a short walk from the Royal Palace – and
soon new war heroes emerged within Republican ranks.132 One of these was Antonio
Coll, a naval orderly and communist youth member from Mallorca, who had been seen
destroying two enemy tanks in the suburb of Usera by throwing himself to the ground
and waiting for the vehicles to nearly run him over before throwing his grenades. It had
been like a scene taken straight from 'We are from Kronstadt', where a Russian soldier
had performed exactly the same feat.133
While  Coll  died  shortly  afterwards,  his  example  was  celebrated  across
Republican media.134 Huge posters called on others to imitate the brave sailor.135 He had
proved that enemy tanks were not 'invincible juggernauts',136 and news spread of how
other soldiers did indeed follow in his footsteps. Renau later recalled a peasant from La
Mancha,  a  'real  brute'  called  Carrasco,  who allegedly single-handedly destroyed  six
tanks by a similar technique.137 But the method also continued to claim new Republican
victims. In another unit in Usera, party member Mariano Moya saw a young fighter lose
both hand and eye as he tried to repeat his compatriot's heroic deed.138 Such incidents
did not, of course, halt efforts to make propagandistic use of these courageous displays.
'Anti-tank  specialists'  were  invited  to  speak  at  public  rallies,  even  interviewed  by
131 Fraser, R. Blood of Spain, 262. Bonet also emphasised importance of Russian planes, at least to the 
morale of the population. CDMH (Salamanca) Fuentes_Orales-Mexico, no 15, 81.
132 For Renau's address in Madrid, see Gómez Andrés, A. & Pérez i Moragón, F. (Eds.) Emili Gómez 
Nadal, 397. For Renau's brief witness account of the fighting on the Cuesta de San Vicente, see Julián 
González, I. El Cartel Republicano, 89.
133 Ibid., 268.
134 See, for example, Mundo Obrero 10 November 1936, ABC 14 November 1936, and Mundo Gráfico 
18 November 1936.
135 See photo in AGA (Madrid) 33,F,04042,53543,001. 
136 Fraser, R. Blood of Spain, 262.
137 Renau, J. La batalla per una nova cultura, 144. See also interview with Facundo Tomas Ferré in Los 
Carteles Valencianos, 108.
138 AHPCE (Madrid) 'Tesis, memorias, manuscritos' 44/8.
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foreign journalists, and 'We are from Kronstadt' was shown with increasing frequency in
and around Madrid in November and December.139
Eventually, on 23 November, the attack on Madrid was called off, though crucial
battles in its vicinity continued as the rebels sought to cut off supply lines and complete
their siege of the capital.  Bloody hand-to-hand fighting had taken many lives in the
University City, where rebels had managed to break though on 15 November.140 From
that day the rebels had also intensified aerial bombardment, giving substance to Franco's
remark that he would rather destroy the capital than leave it to the 'Marxists.'141 But the
bombing  had  only reinforced  the  population's  resolve  to  resist,  and  the  front  lines
established towards the end of November would remain unchanged for the remaining 28
months of the war.142 
The  refusal  to  surrender  to Franco's  troops turned Madrid as  a  whole into a
symbol  of  Republican  heroism.  From  November  onwards,  artists  and  writers  paid
constant homage to the city and its inhabitants, hoping to inspire in the population of
other Republican cities the same fortitude that the defenders of Petrograd inspired in
Coll and his likes.143 General Miaja was lauded as the saviour of the capital, despite the
fact that his limitations as a military strategist and technician had by and large made him
a figurehead for the defence committee.144 But in this context, discrepancies between
myth  and  reality  mattered little.  In  a  sense  they echoed  the fact  that  'We are  from
Kronstadt,' a film which Mundo Obrero had insisted was historically accurate, included
scenes that the director, Efim Dzigan, later admitted were 'poetic inventions', introduced
to underscore metaphorically the spirit  that  characterised the defence of the Russian
city.145 One of these scenes was precisely that of a sailor allowing a tank to almost run
him over before destroying it with a hand-grenade.146 What mattered, in other words,
was  that  'poetic  invention'  could  be  –  and  had  been  –  converted  into  action.  It
demonstrated that propaganda could reach its audience and make a decisive difference.
Indeed, not only Coll and his followers but the whole of Madrid had amassed the very
139 Fraser, R. Blood of Spain, 267f. Graham, H. The Spanish Republic at War, 174.
140 Ibid., 267. 
141 Thomas, H. The Spanish Civil War, 471.
142 Fraser, R. Blood of Spain, 269, 271. 
143 Apart from posters and other graphic propaganda there was the cultural magazine Madrid, appearing 
in spring 1937 and produced in part by the Ministry of Public Instruction and Fine Arts, as well as an 
art album of the same name, appearing at the same time and financed by the same ministry.    
144 Graham, H. The Spanish Republic at War, 171.
145 Mundo Obrero 19 October 1936. Claim from film director in Renau, J. La batalla per una nova 
cultura, 143. 
146 Renau, J. La batalla per una nova cultura, 143.
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spirit of resistance which mobilisation campaigns had sought to inculcate. 
A number of contemporary observers wrote about propaganda as if its positive
impact on mobilisation efforts could be taken for granted. As Republican society was
gradually put on a war footing, numerous articles were published describing art studios
as  'trenches'  where  artists  worked  tirelessly  to  boost  Republican  morale  and  war
readiness.147 Some  poster  designers  felt  their  labours  constituted  a  direct  war
contribution. When Lorenzo Goñi, for example, had finished his classic poster showing
a dying soldier pointing an accusing finger straight at the viewer, asking 'What have you
done  for  victory?',  Carles  Fontseré,  who  shared  studio  with  Goñi,  heard  the  artist
proudly answer his own creation, 'Well, I've done this!'148  Comparable views on the
efficacy of posters were expressed in the political press, with El Socialista stating on 29
October  that  'the  psychological  value  of  [posters],  when  intelligently  executed,  is
considerable'. In effect, these combatants of 'paper and ink' shaped, the editors claimed,
those of 'flesh and bone.'149 The Valencian poet Carles Salvador similarly wrote of the
'silent battle of lithographic sheets /, which provides a mirror image for the young / and
turns them into brave soldiers.'150 What these statements all point to, in other words, is a
belief in the power of images to visualise certain values and communicate a heroic ideal
to young inexperienced men going to the front. In an affirmation of mimesis and the
instructive capability of  art,  they posited a link between the studio and the field of
battle, making the pen and brush tools of war, guiding the bayonet and rifle. 
Although this model of aesthetic efficacy seems simplistic, at least in the short
formulations above, we have seen from the mobilisation campaigns of autumn 1936 that
art can be used as a tool to direct action, especially when conditions demand action and
there are no precedents from lived experience to follow. It should come as no surprise
that the clearest example of this would relate to the most realistic of art forms; that is,
147 See, for example, Otero Seco, A. 'Madrid. El Sindicato de Profesionales de la Bellas Artes, trinchera 
antifascista' Mundo Gráfico 13 October 1937, and Valle, N. 'Los artistas españoles en la defensa de 
Madrid' Estampa 26 December 1936. Both reproduced in Gamonal Torres, M. Arte y Política, 104-
107, 111f. Cf. the fact that staff at the General Commissariat tended to refer to artists and writers who 
collaborated with this organisation as 'The Talent Battalion'. Álvarez, Santiago. Los comisarios 
políticos, 132f.
148 Termes, J., Miravitlles, J., Fontseré, C. Carteles de la República, 361. See also letter to Imnaculada 
Julián where Goñi emphasises how poster artists really felt they were making a valuable contribution 
to the war effort. Julián González, I. El Cartel Republicano, 195f. The idea behind the particular 
design referred to here has of course appeared in various versions in different countries throughout the
20th century. Before the Spanish Civil War, there was a British version and Russian version, for 
example. In the letter cited above, however, Goñi maintains that he did not know about these and 
believed he had thought of something original.
149
'El de papel y tinta hace al de carne y hueso' El Socialista 29 October 1936, 1.
150 Cited in Blasco, R. 'Vida quotidiana' in Aznar Soler, M. (Ed.) Valencia, capital cultural, 735.
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film. In a situation where individuals had little choice but to turn to external references
for  guidance,  film represented  a  particularly  powerful  means  to  simulate  a  missing
precedent  and  provide  viewers  with  a  comparative  framework  by which  their  own
situation could be interpreted and understood. The importance of such a framework is
underscored by the wider use in Republican war propaganda of historical parallels, be
they  the  popular  defeat  of  the  invading  French  in  1808  or  the  'heroic'  defence  of
Petrograd in the Russian civil war. Claims to veracity were no doubt important,  yet
images could clearly access and modify behavioural registers regardless of their status
as artefact or document, as long as audience members saw in their content an edifying
dimension.
Yet the impact of an image or film would also have been determined by the
viewer's pre-existing relation with the groups or symbols represented therein. In this
regard it is suggestive that the first to imitate the purported actions of Kronstadt sailors
were members of the PCE or its youth organisation, and in all cases linked to the Fifth
Regiment.151 Of course, political creed is not the only imaginable source of identification
– Coll might primarily have seen the film's characters as fellow members of the navy,
his followers might have primarily seen him as a fellow defender of Madrid, among any
number  of  psychological  possibilities  –  but  it  does  seem  the  most  plausible  link,
especially if we remember the tendency among PCE recruits to associate their political
identity with courage, disciple,  and self-sacrifice.  At any rate,  in the light of this, it
seems  reasonable  to  hypothesise  that  images  purporting  to  represent  an  instructive
precedent would only be effective if audience members could find something in these
images  that  indicated  the precedent's  specific  relevance to  them. For propaganda to
work, that is, there had to be a symbolic bond mediating the message, a bond allowing
the message truly to engage the audience, and thus create the fundamental conditions for
it to be assimilated and acted upon.
To conclude, then, we should return to the domain of posters and the rhetorical
strategies employed by Renau as he visualised the war programme of the PCE. With
regard  to  slogans  concerned  with  the  home front,  this  chapter  has  emphasised  the
ambiguity  or  openness  of  most  visual  symbols  used  by  Renau.  This  ambiguity  is
significant  as  it  allowed  him  to  merge  a  revolutionary  register  with  one  equally
compatible with moderate Popular Front politics. By so doing, Renau effectively and
151 See Archivo Histórico del Partido Comunista de España, Colección Digital Complutense (CDC), 
Guerra Civil – Propaganda, no 41 (available at http://www.ucm.es/BUCM/atencion/17952.php). (Last 
accessed 12 April 2014).
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faithfully illustrated the PCE ambition to control the threat posed by a decentralising
and collectivising revolution by fusing its symbolic significance with war victory – even
if  this  victory would  result  from a  state-led  campaign.  If  we also acknowledge  the
importance of the symbolic bond between image and audience,  the logic of Renau's
rhetorical strategy becomes even clearer. Considering the ambition to strengthen both
party and war effort through mass-recruitment, it was crucial that symbols were open to
different  readings,  as  this  would  allow  them  to  attract  different  groups  of  people.
Theoretically, that is to say, this ambiguity would have helped to secure for Renau's
posters a heterogeneous but still  attentive audience, which as a result of that attention
would be receptive to the message that his posters sought to propagate. Finally, as a
result of another set of rhetorical overlaps, that message blurred the boundaries between
party initiative and government policy, which served to present the PCE as the engine of
military mobilisation as well as progressive change. Still, it is, of course, impossible to
state  with  any  precision  exactly  how  the  posters  studied  here  may  actually  have
influenced public attitudes regarding the PCE and/or the war, nor can they be shown
definitely  to  have  contributed  to  increasing  membership  figures.  But  the  work
considered  in  this  chapter  does  provide  an  instructive  example  of  how  the  PCE
communicated its image as a revolutionary party supporting the Popular Front. At the
very least we have seen how Renau's visual imagination represented a clear expression
of the PCE's desire to appeal to a wide constituency and present an inclusive vision of
the war. As the following chapter will show, however, from September 1936, the PCE's
attempt  to  consolidate  its  war  vision  would  rely  not  only  on  its  own  artists  and
propaganda teams, but also on the party's ability to direct to this end the organisational
and financial resources of the Ministry of Public Instruction and Fine Arts. As General
Director of Fine Arts within this Ministry, Renau played an important role here too, not
only in the urgent tasks relating to the psychological and military conscription of the
Republican population at war, but also in the long-term modifications of the Republican
cultural programme.
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7. RADICAL NATION-BUILDING:    
'POPULAR CULTURE' IN WAR (1936-1938)
The PCE gained two ministerial  portfolios  as  a  result  of  the reconfiguration of  the
Republican  government  on 4 September 1936.  The Ministry of  Agriculture  went  to
Vicente Uribe, a metal worker from Bilbao and core party member since the 1920s,
while the Ministry of Public Instruction and Fine Arts would be led by Jesús Hernández,
a work shop painter who had also been active in the Bilbao section of the PCE since its
early days  and had  been  responsible  for  party propaganda and  Mundo Obrero.  The
inclusion of communists in the new cabinet, presided by veteran socialist union leader
Francisco Largo Caballero, was not a political given – indeed, Stalin had opposed such
a move for fear it would damage the Republic's chances of negotiating an end to Non-
Intervention – yet for his own political-tactical reasons Largo had made his acceptance
of the premiership conditional on it.1 Still, the communist presence in government was
consonant with the fundamental aim of the cabinet change, namely to restore working-
class confidence in the Republican leadership, which had been fatally discredited by the
weak governmental  reaction to the military rebellion and its  aftermath. Even though
Largo was essentially a cautious union bureaucrat, he had retained a workerist aura that
meant that many radicalised workers saw in him a guarantee of their interests in the new
revolutionary  situation.2 The  nomination  of  Jesús  Hernández  as  Minister  of  Public
Instruction and Fine Arts was similarly greeted as a political victory for revolutionary
workers. In December 1936, the Valencian journalist and writer Vicente Vidal Corella
described Hernández as a 'proletarian fighter' who would break 'the traditional barrier
that  hinders  the  development  of  culture  […].'3 As  this  description  suggests,  the
nomination of Hernández was seen to represent not simply an adjustment of political
strategy, but also, if not primarily, a qualitative shift in the Republican cultural agenda.
It was, in fact, in the fields of education and arts, more than any other, that the
Republic would respond positively to the revolutionary events triggered by the coup. On
the one hand such changes were, as suggested, necessary to mobilise and secure the
1 Graham, H. The Spanish Republic at War,132. See also Hernández Sánchez, F. Guerra o Revolución, 
107-112, for a detailed analysis of the negotiations taking place between Moscow and the PCE 
leadership over this issue. 
2 Ibid., 129, 132.
3
'La magnífica labor que realiza en Valencia la Alianza de Intelectuales para la Defensa de Cultura' 
Crónica 13 Dec 1936, 11f.
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loyalty of activist working-class constituencies. On the other, the changes reflected the
fact that cultural  relations in Republican Spain had already been irrevocably altered.
The  coup,  and  the  revolution  it  triggered,  had  shattered  certainties,  delegitimised
authorities,  and opened up hitherto  unimagined social  and cultural  possibilities.  The
social and cultural fabric had been violently torn and much had to be remade entirely. In
the wake of such disruption, operating on multiple levels, education and the arts would
immediately exercise  a  critical  influence.  Hernández,  advised  by his  team, saw this
clearly, and accordingly restructured virtually all operations under their command. The
cultural policy pursued as a result did not only respond to the specific challenges posed
by the war,  but  also accelerated,  as an intrinsic and crucial  part  of the mobilisation
effort, the process whereby a new Republican society would take shape.
The core ministerial team assembled by Hernández was young, dynamic, and
ambitious. All were members of the PCE. As his undersecretary, Hernández appointed
Wenceslao Roces,  a professor  of  Roman Law, translator of  Marx  and key figure in
various cultural initiatives throughout the party's history.4 Remarkably, Roces was the
only team member – not excepting Hernández himself – who was over thirty years old.5
The post  of  General  Director  of  Primary Education  was  taken  up  by César  García
Lombardía, an activist of lower middle-class background who had risen in the Spanish
Federation of Educational Workers (Federación Española de Trabajadores de Enseñaza,
hereafter  FETE)  and  become  known  for  advocating  a  greater  politicisation  of
education.6 Finally, the role of General Director of Fine Arts, normally reserved for an
art  historian,  was,  as we know, assumed by the twenty-nine-years-old Josep Renau.
Before outlining in greater detail the work done by Renau in this capacity, it should be
stressed that the three departmental heads had all criticised earlier Republican reforms
as insufficient. While faithful to the Communist Party's Popular Front commitment, they
nonetheless shared an desire to transform the ministry into an efficient instrument of
more extensive change. Spurred by this desire, all three worked with immense youthful
energy. Indeed, while Hernández was an effective propagandist, it was, in the view of
historian Christopher Cobb, the trinity under him that represented the real power of his
4 See Gómez, M. El largo viaje. 
5 Roces was 40, Hernandez 29, Renau 29, and García Lombardía 27. The fact that relatively young 
people were put in positions of great responsibility was not unheard of in the war-time Republic. The 
Communist Youth leader Santiago Carrillo was only twenty-one when he was appointed Councillor of
Public Order of the Madrid Defence Committee.
6 See Cobb, C. Los Milicianos, 35f.
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ministry.7
The official nomination of Renau as General Director of Fine Arts came five
days after the formation of the new government.8 According to his own account of the
event, he  received a call in the afternoon of 6 September, urging him to report to Party
headquarters as soon as possible the next day. He took the night train and was received
by a PCE commission led by Pedro Checa, administrative secretary of the Politburo,
first thing in the morning. After a short conversation, Renau was prompted to accept the
post there and then.9 The fact that he did so must primarily be seen as a sign of his
strong sense of loyalty to the party.  Renau later wrote that he felt  there were better
qualified candidates than him, and that the offer came as a complete surprise. The poet
Rafael Alberti, who was equally close to the party but arguably had a higher artistic
profile, would have been a less surprising choice. According to Renau, Alberti himself
later admitted he had expected the party to approach him first in this regard.10 But above
all it seems Renau was reluctant to accept a position involving extensive administrative
duties  when  the  war  provided  an  unprecedented  opportunity  to  develop  the
transformative potential of his art. His retrospective meditations suggested that for this
reason alone he would never have accepted an official post that required all his time.11
Whether there was an actual agreement to that effect is unclear, but Renau did manage
to combine his official duties with creative work, as is evident from the fact that his
artistic output –  although much less prolific than at any other point in his career – never
came  to  a  complete  halt  during the  war  period.  Antonio  Deltoro,  Renau's  personal
secretary at the General Directorate of Fine Arts, even claimed in a 1983 interview that
whenever Renau received a couple of poster commissions, he could be absent from the
office for days.12 While Renau would later be immensely proud of what he and his
colleagues achieved at  the General  Directorate,  his own artistic  project  remained, in
other words, his real passion. Renau's decision to compromise its development at a key
moment can only be explained with reference to his commitment to the party. 
Renau's main responsibilities as General  Director of Fine Arts would revolve
around the organisation of heritage conservation, a task immeasurably complicated both
7 Ibid., 34. See also 'The educational and cultural policy of the Popular Front government in Spain, 
1936-1939' in Alexander, M. and Graham, H. (Eds.) The French and Spanish Popular Fronts.
8 Gaceta de Madrid 10 September 1936, 1730.
9 Renau, J. Arte en Peligro, 12f.
10 Julián González, I. El Cartel Republicano, 189f.
11 Renau, J. Arte en Peligro, 12f.
12 Forment, A. Josep Renau, 164.
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by the widespread vandalisation of religious institutions and the material damage caused
by indiscriminate bombs and mortar shells.13 Renau had already participated with a local
Valencian committee for the protection of cultural treasures and was not unfamiliar with
the difficulties that such work involved.14 Yet there was another aspect to Renau's role,
one which corresponded more closely with his background as a pioneering vanguard
artist. Hernández knew that the first challenge of his ministerial incumbency would be
to instil a heightened level of war consciousness across many parts of the home front,
thereby  persuading  all  sectors  of  the  Republican  population  to  accept  a  broad  war
coalition. To do this he had to channel ministry resources to maximise the impact of
official  propaganda. In an interview published on 12 September 1936, the new culture
and education minister stressed the importance of the General Directorate of Fine Arts
in this task and expressed his ambition to turn it  into 'a centre marked by vitality and
creativity.'15 As an innovative propagandist with organisational skills and access to large
cultural networks, Renau was no doubt a perfect candidate to implement this vision.16
Under  his  direction,  the  General  Directorate  of  Fine  Arts,  having  previously  been
characterised  as  a  rather  insular  institution exuding an  'archaeological  air',17 quickly
began  to  engage  actively  with  contemporary  artists  and  underwrite  activities  that
responded to the radically altered realities of the war.
Organisational strategies
One  of  the  first  major  organisational  changes  made  by  Renau,  in  response  to
Hernández's desire to disseminate the slogans of the Popular Front, was to equip the
Misiones  Pedagógicas,  the  travelling educational  groups  created by the  Republic  in
1931 that were now part of his brief, with a 'Cultural Propaganda Section.' Created on 8
13 For a selected bibliography on this topic, see footnote 51 in the Introduction. For an in-depth analysis 
of the social and cultural motivations driving the vandalisation of Church property, see Thomas, M. 
The Faith and the Fury.
14 Renau, J. Arte en Peligro, 13. Here we should also add his childhood experiences working for his 
father's restoration business. See Forment, A. Josep Renau, Chapter 1.
15
'Entrevista con Jesús Hernández' Mundo Obrero 12 September 1936. Reproduced in Gamonal Torres, 
M. Arte y Política, 65-67. See also interview in ABC (Madrid) 13 September 1936, 9.
16 Renau's former colleagues at Verdad similarly understood his nomination as a harbinger of change. 
According to an editorial note published on 9 September 1936, Renau was not only the Spanish artist 
with the most complete set of intellectual abilities needed for the role, but also represented a 'solid 
guarantee' that Spanish cultural life would finally emerge from half a century of 'incompetence' and 
favouritism. The General Directorate would certainly change under Renau's stewardship, but it would 
still face, as we shall see, accusations of favouritism.
17 An expression used by the artist Gabriel García Maroto who shortly before the war published various 
articles in the Socialist newspaper Claridad criticising the General Directorate for perceived inactivity
(see especially 3 June 1936). Quoted in Cabañas Bravo, M. Josep Renau: Arte y Propaganda en 
Guerra, 40. 
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October  1936,  its  official  aim was  to  'organise,  direct,  and  control  all  cultural  and
artistic activities aimed to strengthen the combative spirit of the people.'18 Immediate
results could be seen in the form of large publicity boards in Madrid, and a spectacular
installation in Valencia that which functioned as a combined information point, theatre
stage, and outdoor cinema screen.19 The design, inspired by Russian constructivist artist
El Lissitzky's 1920-24 project for a tribune to Lenin, was made by the Valencian artists
Regino  Mas  and  Gori  Muñoz  [Fig.  24].20 These  initiatives  did  not  simply  aim  to
communicate vital war information but also, according to the official justification for
the measure, served to enhance 'the social consciousness that must inspire the Spanish
people  in  this  decisive  battle.'21 Like  all  cultural  institutions  inherited  from  the
Republican reform programme, Misiones Pedagógicas now had to dedicate part of its
resources to the vital task of psychologically mobilising the home front. 
Further  organisational  reform of  the  General  Directorate  of  Fine  Arts  would
similarly be justified with reference to war needs and efficiency. To improve efficiency
in  particular,  Renau  instituted  a  number  of  changes  through  1936  and  1937  that
amounted to a de facto process of centralisation. These reforms were partly intended to
repair the directorate's 'broken structures' – another consequence of the coup – but also
meant  to  give  Renau  and  his  closest  team greater  oversight  and  control,  especially
important with regards to the task of safeguarding the national artistic heritage.22 Thus a
Central  Council  of  Archives,  Libraries,  and  Artistic  Heritage  was  created  on  16
February 1937,23 while the summer months saw the establishment of a Central Council
of  Music  (24  June)24 and  a  Central  Council  of  Theatre  (22  August).25 But  if  such
initiatives  appeared  to  give  the  Renau,  as  the  President  of  all  these  bodies,
overwhelming power in most areas of cultural management, it must be remembered that
there were  real  limitations  to  the amount  of  control  that  could be exercised on the
ground.  New  macro-structures  represented  only  an  initial  step  in  the  process  of
organisational reconstruction, and war-related disruptions relating to military activities
18 Initiative signed 8 October 1936. Published in Gaceta de Madrid 11 October 1936, 295.
19 Madrid boards can be seen in Mundo Gráfico 18 November 1936, 8f. A description of the Valencian 
installation can be found in Cabañas Bravo, M. Josep Renau: Arte y Propaganda en Guerra, 137, 141 
(see also picture of Valencian installation on 133).
20 Gamonal Torres, M. Arte y Política, 36. 
21 Gaceta de Madrid 11 October 1936, 295.
22 The role of the Central Council of Archives, Libraries, and Artistic Heritage was explicitly to co-
ordinate and provide instructions with regard to all activities falling under these headings in the  
Republican zone as a whole. See Gaceta de Madrid 17 February 1937, 847f, and 19 April 1937, 282.
23 See note above.
24 Gaceta de Madrid 25 June 1937, 1365.
25 Gaceta de Madrid 24 August 1937, 769.
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or missing staff often undermined attempts to direct details from the top, at least in the
Republic-wide operation to protect artistic heritage.26 
Yet if the contingencies of war thus meant that Renau would not always achieve
the level of managerial control he desired in some areas, there were other areas where
he  willingly  let  initiatives  take  shape  without  much  top-down  direction.  This  was
particularly evident in creative and propagandistic work, which was often delegated, in
terms  of  elaboration  as  well  as  implementation,  to  external  organisations  like  the
Alliance  of  Anti-Fascist  Intellectuals  (AIA).27 On  several  occasions  ideas  for
propaganda events were first formulated by these organisations, who then turned to the
General Directorate of Fine Arts for financial and logistical support. One example of
this can be found in the concluding parade of what was known as the Children's Week
(Semana  del  Niño)  of  January  1937,  a  Christmas-related  festival  highlighting
Republican  efforts  to  protect  children.  The event  as  a  whole  was  organised  by the
Ministry of Public Instruction and Fine Arts together with the local AIA and Valencia's
CNT-affiliated  artists'  union,  the  Sindicato  de  Arte  Popular  de  Valencia,  while  the
concluding  parade  incorporated  ideas  originating  in  Valencia's  Ateneo  Popular.28
Another example, which left clearer traces of Renau's personal involvement, can found
in the planned celebrations of the Valencian  Fallas in 1937. An annual spring festival
where one of the highlights involves the burning of large effigies, the  Fallas of 1937
was set to include several rebel statues that would be consigned to the flames at the end
of  the  festivities.  Again  the  statues  were  constructed  by  members  of  the  AIA and
sponsored  by the  Hernández's  ministry.  In  the  end,  as  a  result  of  the  risk  of  rebel
bombardment, and amidst considerable public debate, the celebrations were cancelled
on the orders of the local civil governor, though the political caricatures were exhibited
in an indoor space in the city centre (the  lonja).29 The public could also observe the
works in a special edition of Nueva Cultura which included related essays, poems, and
photographs taken by Renau.30 Here, then, the influence of members of the AIA and
26 Alvarez Lopera, J. La politica de bienies culturales, 75-83.
27 José Alvarez Lopera states that the AIA was effectively a 'para-official' organisation.
28 Cabañas Bravo, M. Josep Renau: Arte y Propaganda en Guerra, 138-142. The ministry also produced
a propaganda leaflet entitled Luchamos por una infancia feliz (Barcelona: Sociedad General de 
Publicaciónes, [1937]).
29 For an extensive analysis of the debate and events surrounding the Fallas of 1937, see Hernández i 
Marti, G-M. 'Les falles antifeixistes del 1937' in Aznar Soler, M. (ed) Valencia, capital cultural de la 
República, 283-313. For a contemporary comment with images, see Lamata, F. 'Este año no ha habido
Fallas'  Mundo Gráfico 28 April 1937, 7. 
30 Renau also published an article in the regular Nueva Cultura calling on the population of Valencia to 
realise the progressive political potential inherent in the city's traditional festivities – a potential 
augmented by the fact that its form was a genuine product of popular expression. See 'Sentido popular
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similar organisations was crucial to both the form and reception of initiatives launched
with ministerial support. To the extent that Renau exercised any direct control over the
mounting of events, it was essentially as a prominent member of a creative partnership.
When  it  came  to  smaller  projects,  Renau  was  even  prepared  to  entrust  colleagues
outside of the ministry with all aspects of planning and execution. Rafael Pérez Contel
noted in his memoirs that Renau gave him full responsibility for an art album that would
be published in 1937 as an homage to General Miaja, proclaimed as the hero of the
defence of Madrid.  Pérez Contel’s brief was simply to take charge of the whole design
as well as the list of contributors and present the results to Renau when he was done.31 
Such instances are worth highlighting since they show that the PCE-led Ministry
of Public Instruction did not simply dictate the content of Republican cultural policy
from above.  Despite  a party preference for hierarchical  organisation, and despite its
recognition of the vital importance of a unified Republican war vision, most cultural
initiatives were actually the results of shared authorship. Total control of the cultural
environment may not have been a party priority anyway – such a suggestion would
explain the fact that no Comintern or Central Committee leaders, other than Hernández,
ever interfered (as far as I am aware) with the planning of cultural events.32 It must be
noted, too, that as a Popular Front organisation, the PCE had little to lose from making
broad progressive associations like the AIA part of a coalition shaping cultural policy. If
anything, it boosted the PCE's own Popular Front credentials, which in turn may have
aided party kudos and, indirectly, recruitment. 
But if Hernández and his team did not, in other words, adhere to pre-scripted
plans  that  were  narrow  and  exclusive  in  a  political  sense,  its  modus  operandi,  as
indicated in Renau's delegating of the homage to General Miaja, was undeniably based
on personal contacts and favouritism. Indeed, without reference to contacts established
prior to the war we cannot understand the extensive war-time collaboration between the
y Revolucionario de la Fiesta de las Fallas' Nueva Cultura, 1 (second phase) (March 1937), 14.
31 Pérez Contel, R. Artistas en Valencia, 573.
32 Of course, we have also seen from Renau's preparations for Nueva Cultura that the PCE leadership 
were neither very interested nor confident about their abilities when it came to cultural matters. As for 
the Comintern, it is also worth noting that there was a marked antipathy between Hernández and the 
highest representative of the Comintern in Spain, Palmiro Togliatti, who complained in a 25 
November 1937 report to Moscow that the education and culture minister did not maintain sufficiently
close work relations with other party colleagues. Hernández Sánchez, F. Comunistas sin partido. 
Jesús Hernández. Ministro en la Guerra Civil, Disidente en el Exilio (Madrid: Raíces, 2007), 56. 
None of the recent studies discussing the Comintern's influence in the Spanish Civil War has presented
clear evidence of direct Comintern involvement in cultural matters. See Elorza, A. and Bizcarrondo, 
M. Queridos Camaradas, Radosh, R., Habeck, M. R. and Sevastianov, S. Spain Betrayed: The Soviet 
Union in the Spanish Civil War (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2001), and 
Hernández Sánchez, F. Guerra o Revolución.
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AIA and  the  Ministry  of  Public  Instruction  and  Fine  Arts.  Most  prominent  AIA
members in both Madrid and Valencia had been part of Renau's artistic network since
1933-1934, and many had contributed to political magazines like  Octubre  and Nueva
Cultura. Moreover, during the time he spent as General Director of Fine Arts, Renau
remained  a  prominent  member  of  AIA's  Valencian  branch,  which  in  March  1937
adopted a relaunched Nueva Cultura as its official publication.33 
The problem here was that even if heavy reliance on personal connections was
not  in  any  way  unusual  in  Spain's  traditionally  clientelistic  public  sphere,  such
organisational  approaches  nonetheless  sparked  accusations  of  sectarianism,  both  by
contemporaries (above all among anarchists) and later by historians.34 In this regard,
however, distinctions must be made between the behaviour of different members of the
ministry's leading team. On the few occasions when exclusions were clearly politically
motivated, the initiative appears to have come from Jesús Hernández and/or Wenceslao
Roces.35 The  most  striking  examples  would  be  the  rejection  of  Rafael  Dieste's
contribution to a publication devoted to the 1937 Congress of Writers for the Defence of
Culture (more details on this congress follow below) and Roces's decision to annul the
jury's choice in the National Poetry Prize of 1938 (awarding the prize to Pedro Garfías,
who was a member of the Communist Party, unlike the originally designated winner,
Juan Gil-Albert).36 Renau, by contrast, let his favouritism be guided by professional and
artistic ties – not, as a rule, by politics. Indeed, Renau was on the very jury that had
awarded the National Poetry Prize to Juan Gil-Albert,  a long-standing contributor to
Nueva  Cultura. This  difference  matters  because  it  should  make  us  question  any
suggestion that Renau blindly obeyed Moscow-imposed communist dogma and used his
influence  to  make  Republican  artists  conform  to  the  dictates  of  socialist  realism.37
33 According to Renau, the Valencian 'Alliance of Anti-Fascist Intellectuals' incorporated about 70% of 
the local intelligentsia. See Renau, J. ‘Notas al margen de una nueva cultura por Josep Renau’ in 
Brihuega, J. (Ed.) Josep Renau, 481. In Madrid the organisation's official publication was El Mono 
Azul and in Barcelona Meridiá.
34 See Fernández Soria, J. M. Educación y cultura, 58. See also Alvarez Lopera, J. La politica de bienies
culturales, 29.
35 To some extent this will have been because both Hernández and Roces were part of the 'old guard' of 
the PCE and thus more marked by the PCE's sectarian history. It may also be said that Hernández had 
few other criteria to work with, as his cultural education, according to Alvarez Lopera, was a late and 
relatively superficial aquisition. La politica de bienies culturales, 29.
36 Dieste, R. Testimonios y homenajes (Barcelona: Laia, 1983), 76-79. For Roces’ intervention, see 
Zambrano, M. Los intelectuales en el drama de España (Madrid: Trotta, 1998), 51f.
37 Gamonal Torres and above all Trapiello come close to this position. However, any assessment of 
debates must first of clarify what is understood by socialist realism. While this thesis has primarily 
defined that term with reference to epistemology and the relation between the artistic and the political 
vanguard, it is more commonly understood in terms of the aesthetic qualities seen in painting under 
Stalin. There the intention was to underscore the ‘monumental’ and heroic characteristics of socialist 
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Although Renau was an advocate of realist art, broadly understood, such homogenising
impositions would first of all run counter to the collaborative approach he had adopted
for his cultural projects throughout the Republican period. Moreover, any claim that he
exclusively sponsored a single aesthetic also ignores the creative diversity on display in
magazines and posters published with ministerial subsidy.38 Art production addressing
war  themes  was  naturally  the  first  to  receive  state  backing,  but  how exactly  these
themes were to be interpreted was evidently a matter for each artist or group to decide.
But if  Republican cultural production under Hernández thus remained in many
ways pluralistic, selective ministerial support for certain cultural entities could not but
have an  impact  on the political  content  of  the Republican cultural  environment.  As
organisations like the Alliance of Anti-Fascist Intellectuals were granted much greater
visibility than groups lacking official support, it would be their particular war vision that
would  come  to  dominate  the  public  sphere.  This  was  clearly  part  of  Hernández's
propaganda strategy, as the slogans that consequently became ubiquitous were those that
had been approved – though not necessarily scripted – by the ministry. Although the
Ministry of Public Instruction was not the only official body to co-ordinate Republican
propaganda (this task was shared not least  with a propaganda ministry created on 4
November  1936,  and  led  by  progressive  republican  Carlos  Esplá39),  the  disjointed
campaigns seen in the immediate aftermath of  the coup were in this way gradually
replaced by a more coherent set of messages, stressing the legitimacy of the Popular
Front government and highlighting the mass participative nature of the Republican war
effort.
The expansion and radicalisation of the cultural programme
The idea that the Popular Front government represented an expression of the popular
will was not only significant as part of a governmental bid to legitimise central authority
and  the  new  government,  but  also  allowed  members  of  progressive  cultural
organisations to suggest that the government now occupied the role of the vanguard in a
subjects, and would typically contain, to take the view of Clement Greenberg, a significant element of 
kitsch. See 'Avant-Garde and Kitsch' Partisan Review, 6, 5 (1939), 34-49. For a paradigmatic study of 
the place of socialist realism in 20th century art history, see Golomstok, I. N. Totalitarian Art: In the 
Soviet Union, the Third Reich, Fascist Italy and the People's Republic of China (London: Overlook 
Duckworth, 2011).
38 This can be seen most clearly in the variety of posters published by the General Directorate of Fine 
Arts, and magazine produced by the Valencian Casa de la Cultura: Madrid. Cuadernos de la Casa de 
la Cultura.
39 On 27 May 1937, the Ministry of Propaganda was restructured and became a Subsecretariat of 
Propaganda belonging to the Ministry of the Interior.
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process  of  social  and  cultural  change.  Renau,  previously  so  critical  of  Republican
reform, made his own position in this regard clear in the first issue of Música (January
1938),  the magazine produced by the new Central  Council of Music. In a short text
justifying the creation of the Council, he highlighted that while the Spanish state had
previously constituted  an  dam-like  obstruction  to  all  that  was  alive  and 'healthy'  in
cultural production, the new popular Republic had opened a 'flood of possibilities for all
innovative currents' and 'all forms of creative will.'40 Similar opinions were expressed
elsewhere, indicating that even well into the war, after so much wartime destruction,
cultural  producers  (like  many  revolutionary  segments  of  the  population)  still
emphasised the critical importance of the constructive, transformative content of anti-
fascism.41 Indeed,  this  aspect  of  the  struggle  had,  if  anything,  only  gained  in
significance. For if one of the consequences of the coup had been radically to destabilise
existing cultural models, those pursuing progressive politics in its wake had no choice
but  to  rebuild  cultural  relations  anew.  In  this  sense,  Republican  intellectuals'  anti-
fascism,  as  it  evolved  after  the  rising,  may be  compared  to  the  most  far-reaching
European responses formulated after the Great War – responses including, for example,
the  foundational  manifesto  of  Clarté.  But,  as  in  the  case  of  Clarté,  radical  cultural
visions  in Republican Spain were not easily converted into practice,  even when the
instruments of the state were in progressive hands. As we shall see, the very wartime
circumstances in which Republican cultural initiatives were launched also sometimes
set acute limits on the possibilities for innovation, while, at the same time, reservations
among progressive  intellectuals –  evident  not  least  in  their  ambivalent  attitude to  a
perceived popular will – left important problems of cultural innovation unresolved.
Before  turning  to  a  more  extensive  analysis  of  specific  Republican  cultural
initiatives and debates domestically, we should also note how very important was the
international  dimension  of  culture  to  the  defenders  of  the  Republic.42 The  clearest
expression of this could be seen in the Second International Congress of Writers for the
Defence of Culture, which in a show of solidarity with the besieged Republic was held
40
'Misión del Consejo Central de la Música' Música, 1 (January 1938), 5.
41 See, for example, Vicente Vidal Corella's aforementioned comments in 'La magnífica labor que realiza
en Valencia la Alianza de Intelectuales para la Defensa de Cultura' Crónica 13 Dec 1936, 11f. See also
the collective statement delivered at the July 1937 Writers' Congress for the Defence of Culture (see 
following paragraph for more detail). Reproduced in Gamonal Torres, M. Arte y Política, 232-240. 
42 In this regard, in a addition to the conference mentioned here, see for example the  fund raising leaflet 
written by Nancy Bedford-Jon es for an American audience. Students under arms. Education in 
Republican Spain (New York: Youth division of Medical and North American Committee to aid 
Spanish democracy, 1938).
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in Valencia, Madrid, and Barcelona on 4-12 July (with closing sessions in Paris on 16-
17 July) 1937.43 The congress was organised by the Spanish and French branches of the
Alliance  of  Anti-Fascist  Intellectuals  and  received  support  from  several  ministries,
among them the Ministry of Public Instruction and Fine Arts.44 It attracted writers and
artists of a variety of political persuasions. Their common denominator was a conviction
that fascism represented a mortal threat to pluralism and humanist values – here taken to
stem from an overriding concern with human welfare and fulfilment  – and that  the
Spanish war had to  represent  the  first  step  towards  the  definitive defeat  of  fascism
everywhere. With this in mind, the 66 speakers from 22 countries repeatedly highlighted
the universal significance of the Republican cause, while the Spanish delegation (from
which  Renau  was  absent,  as  he  was  abroad  on  official  duties45)  proclaimed  in  a
collective  statement  their  absolute  loyalty  to  both  revolution  and  government  –  a
political entity which had by then, as they expressed it, become 'something much more
important than a government.'46 Such sentiments identified the Republic as a leading
force in a transcendental  project  for cultural  renewal,  a  project  that  would not only
redeem the  traumatic  sacrifices  made  in  Spain,  but  inspire  cultural  transformations
across the rest of the continent too.47 From this perspective, the telegram sent to the
congress by Albert  Einstein struck a (melo)dramatic but characteristic note:  hope in
'better times,' it stated, was for the moment kept alive only 'by the heroic fighting of the
Spanish people for freedom and human dignity.'48  
Crucial to the realisation of such lofty sentiments was the practical dimension of
43 The main works on the congress are by Luis Mario Schneider, Inteligencia y guerra civil española, 
and Manuel Aznar Soler Literatura española y antifascismo (1927-1939). These books constitute the 
first two of three volumes in a collective work entitled II congreso internacional de escritores para la 
defensa de la cultura (1937) (Valencia: Generalitat Valenciana, 1987). The third volume is a 
documentary compilation with speeches delivered during the conference.
44 See Schneider, L. M. Inteligencia y guerra civil española and Aznar Soler, M. Literatura española y 
antifascismo, chapter 5. For a contemporary comment on the somewhat chaotic organisation of the 
congress, see Koltsov, M. Diario de la guerra de España (Madrid: Ruedo Ibérico, 1963), 429. For the 
view of one of the organisers, see Gil-Albert, J. Memorabilia, 176-182.
45 At this time Renau was working on the Republican Pavilion at the International Paris Expo, which 
will be discussed later on in this chapter.
46 Reproduction in Gamonal Torres, M. Arte y Política, 232-240. According to the introduction by 
Gamonal (page 58) the statement was signed by Arturo Serrano Plaja (who also read it on behalf of 
the group), Antonio Sánchez Barbudo, Angel Gaos, Antonio Aparicio, Arturo Souto, Emilio Prados, 
Eduardo Vicente, Juan Gil-Albert, José Herrera Petere, Lorenzo Varela, Miguel Hernández, Miguel 
Prieto, and Ramón Gaya. 
47 Galician vanguard writer Rafael Dieste, close colleague of many of the signatories of the collective 
statement and collaborator on one of the most important Republican cultural magazines during the 
war, Hora de España, would later describe how the progressive Republican intellectuals of the 1930s 
had a strong sense of rediscovering a transcendental value of Spanish culture. Dieste, R. Testimonios y
homenajes, 18f.
48 Cited in Vicente Aguilera Cerni's introduction to Renau, J. Función Social del Cartel Publicitario 
(Valencia, Fernando Torres, 1976), 16.
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Republican cultural policy, and progressive artists and writers were certainly justified in
highlighting that as a primary indicator of the wartime Republic's serious progressive
intent. The cultural reform programme begun during the pre-war period of progressive
republican  government  (1931-33)  was  not  only  resumed  in  wartime  as  soon  as
administrative structures could be set up, but was actually expanded within the first year
of the conflict. This was made possible, firstly, by the record 1937 budget allocated to
the Ministry of Public Instruction and Fine Arts. Not only was it a bigger than ever
amount  but  it  also  constituted  a  significantly  larger  proportion  of  the  overall  state
budget compared to the previous year.49 That the Republic should significantly increase
its spending on education and culture as a proportion of its total budget, even when it
urgently  needed  to  direct  scarce  funds  to  its  military  defence,  is  itself  a  powerful
indicator of just how vital the Republican authorities considered the cultural dimension
of  the  mobilisation  effort,  both  in  the  immediate  and  the  long  term.  Measures
announcing progressive change were understood as  crucial  to boost  civilian morale,
while educational initiatives would further serve to promote a cohesive understanding of
the conflict. In addition to signalling a commitment to a more egalitarian Spain, in itself
important to shore up government legitimacy, the cultural programme offered a direct
means of expanding its loyal base among wider segments of the Republican population.
In order to produce tangible returns on the budget allocated,  culture minister
Hernández  and  his  team  channelled  the  funds  towards  constructive  and  practical
projects.50 They directed 40 million pesetas towards the building of 10,000 new schools.
Around 7 million was spent  on canteens and evacuation colonies.  This was another
investment of combined humanitarian and military value, as the parents of evacuated
children would thus be free to engage in war-related work. The minimum wage for
teachers  were  raised,  and  the  number  of  university  grants  increased  from  1  to  5
million.51 The  budget  also  made  possible  the  implementation  of  a  series  of  new
initiatives that showed with particular clarity how the immediate circumstances of the
war,  as  well  as  ideological  orientation of  the  ministerial  team,  would  influence  the
content of the cultural programme in the long term. The most prominent among these
49 The exact budget allocation was 496,6 million pesetas – 9.4% percent of the total – which can be 
compared with the previous year's allocation of 353,6 million pesetas (7.1%). The budget allocated to 
the Ministry of Public Instruction in 1938 was in fact even larger, both in terms of absolute figures and
its relative size within the total state budget (562,5 million, 10.4%). In 1939 the relative size dropped 
markedly (7.6%). See Sánchez Asiaín, J. A. La financiación de la guerra civil española. Una 
aproximación histórica (Barcelona: Crítica, 2012).
50 Less money was spent on perquisites for ministerial staff, for example. Cobb, C. Los Milicianos, 41.
51 Alvarez Lopera, J. La politica de bienies culturales, 31f. 
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were the Worker Institutes (Institutos Obreros) and the Cultural Militias (Milicias de la
Cultura).
The Worker Institutes were intended to facilitate access to further education for
young people of working class background while also equipping the army with more
recruits capable of receiving higher military training.52 Enrolment was first opened to
those aged 15-18 , then, from 28 June 1937, to those aged 15-35, entry being geared to a
two-year secondary education diploma. The institutes were free, with grants also made
available for those with dependants, especially if study entailed a loss of income. The
first and biggest institute opened its doors in Valencia on 31 January 1937, with other
schools  following  in  Sabadell,  Madrid,  and  Barcelona.53 At  the  end  of  the  war  an
estimated 873 students had been inducted to classes, some of which were delivered by
visiting political,  military,  and literary dignitaries,  as  well  as  teachers  of  recognised
professional distinction.54 Insofar as the Institutes were intended to secure the loyalty of
those who attended, the initiative achieved evident success.55 In later interviews, former
students of the Valencian worker institute remembered both their happy anticipation of a
new education and their disappointment, sadness and frustration at realising that the
defeat  of  the  Republic  also  meant  they would  not  have  the  time or  opportunity to
complete their studies.56
The Cultural Militias, established by decree on 30 January 1937, can be seen as
a  militarised  version  of  the  Misiones  Pedagógicas,  although  they  also  drew  on
educational initiatives developed in the Red Army.57 The militias offered literacy and
other classes  to soldiers stationed at the front. Its staff, mostly recruited from university
students but also including some qualified teachers and various other professionals, was
52 For a monograph drawing on interviews with former students as well as archival research, see Escrivá 
Moscardó, C. Los institutos para obreros: un hermoso sueño republicano (Valencia: L'Eixam, 2008). 
See also Fernández Soria, J. M. Educación y cultura.
53 Foundational decrees dated 10 March 1937 for Sabadell and 11 May 1937  for Madrid and Barcelona. 
For a more detailed chronology of the beginning and end of courses at the Worker Institutes, see 
Escrivá Moscardó, C. Los institutos para obreros, 15-23.
54 Among those visiting were the socialist minister Indalecio Prieto, the renowned poet Antonio 
Machado, and the military commander Valentín Gonzaléz ('El Campesino').
55 Azaña explicitly spoke of the Worker Institutes as a means of securing the loyalty of working class 
youth. Escrivá Moscardó, C. Los institutos para obreros, 26.
56 See former students' one-sentence descriptions of their experiences at the Valencian Worker Institiute, 
printed on the inside of Cristina Escrivá's Los institutos para obreros. Typical assessments and/or 
recollections included: 'Espíritu de superación que nos inculcaron me ayudo en mi vida,' and 
'Soñabamos con abrir nuestras fronteras a la cultura.' Cf. Bedford-Jones, N. Students under arms, 24.
57 The teachers' union, FETE, had already laid the ground work for the Cultural Militias before January  
1937.  They were established by ministerial decree which also underwrote their efforts with a 
generous budget. Even so, the real 'take-off' came  in May. See Cobb, C. Los Milicianos, especially 
chapter 4.
169
assigned to specific military units where they shared with the soldiers the privations and
routines of front-line life. This helped not only to establish a rapport between teachers
and students, but also meant that the Cultural Militias were  in situ and thus able to
maximise use of the soldiers' free time when they were not required for military tasks.
This in turn contributed a great deal, along with the enthusiasm of the teachers and the
high value placed on culture within the Republican army, to the initiative's  tangible
success. For the results were impressive – especially considering the organisational and
material  obstacles,  not  to  mention  the  constant  relocations  caused  by  military
deployments, which the teachers had to negotiate.58 Between May 1937 and October
1938 about 25,000 soldiers achieved some degree of literacy in the Army of the Centre
alone.59 In a similar period, the Cultural Militias had also organised, in the Republican
Army  as  a  whole,  hundreds  of  cinema  screenings,  radio  broadcasts,  and  trench
newspapers,  as  well  as  1,418  functioning  front-line  libraries  to  support  soldiers'
continued learning.60 Such figures include only part of their activities, yet in themselves
they suggest that the Cultural Militias achieved a greater reach than any other single
initiative in terms of expanding adult education. More than any other piece of reform,
this  initiative  justified  writer  Maria  Teresa  León's  later  claim  that  during  the  war,
Republican Spain was, in effect, turned into 'one immense school.'61
The  educational  opportunities  provided  by  the  Cultural  Militias  were,  by
numerous accounts, gratefully received by those who had previously been denied any
realistic  chance  to  study.  Teachers'  and  observers'  descriptions  of  front-line  classes,
while  obviously  biased  to  some  degree,  repeatedly  stressed  how  illiterate  soldiers
applied  themselves  diligently to  the  task  of  learning the alphabet,  and  how already
literate  soldiers  devoured  all  the  books  available  in  trench  'libraries.'62 As  with  the
students attending the Worker Institutes, many soldiers saw the classes provided by the
Culture Militias as proof of the Republic's progressive intentions, and many recognised
the  initiative's  empowering  potential.63 Isidro  Martínez,  a  42-years-old  agricultural
58 For a more extensive evaluation of the factors that helped or hindered the militias' work, see Cobb, C. 
Los Milicianos, 109f, 169f.
59 Cobb, C. Los Milicianos, 108f.  An impressive statistic, however one defines literacy, although this is 
of course a complicated question. For a discussion, see Cobb's discussion on page 94.
60 The period referred to here is May 1937-August 1938. Fernández Soria, J. M. Educación y cultura, 
57f. Figures also appear in Salaün, S. La poesía de la guerra de España (Madrid: Castalia, 1985), 274.
61 León, M. T. La Historia Tiene la Palabra (Noticias Sobre el Salvamiento del Tesoro Artístico)(2nd Ed.)
(Madrid: Hispamerica, 1977 [1944]), 30.
62 See for example Fraser, R. Blood of Spain, 292. See also the war diaries of composer and writer 
Vicente Salas Viu Diario de guerra de un soldado (Madrid: Hispamerica, 1977), 29f, 38f, 78. Cf. 
Bedford-Jones, N. Students under arms, 13-16. 
63 For particularly clear examples, see Salas Viu, V. Diario de guerra, 29f, 38f. See also articles 
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worker serving in the same unit as composer and writer Vicente Salas Viu, had told
Salas Viu, according the writer's diary entry for 25 November 1937, that he had always
known he could have aspired to more in life, but that he had hitherto been lacking the
means. Now, he said, as a result of the Republican Army's educational provision, he had
the means and only asked for more time.64
Primary  education  for  both  adults  and  children  would  not  only  change
quantitatively,  but  also  qualitatively.  First  of  all,  education,  especially  in  the  form
delivered  by  the  Cultural  Militias,  was  geared  towards  the  immediate  task  of
legitimising the war effort, which in turn led to increased politicisation. This tendency
was accentuated by the fact that the Militias operated under the direct authority of the
political commissar, whose task was, in part, to remind the troops of the rationale of the
war and thus maintain morale.65  The politicised nature of primary education, especially
in the army, was also evident in the teaching materials distributed by the Ministry of
Public Instruction and Fine Arts. Significant ministerial investment – 100,000 pesetas,
which  may be  compared  to  the  121,000  pesetas  spent  on  school  equipment  –  was
reserved in the ministerial budget for 'press and propaganda.'66 The most notable item
used in this regard, designed specifically for the Cultural Militias, was a Republican
'anti-fascist'  literacy  primer,  the  Cartilla  Escolar  Antifascista.  Written  by  Fernando
Sainz and  Mundo Obrero  editor Eusebio Cimorra,  and lavishly designed, with some
assistance from Renau, by Polish-born graphic designer Mauricio Amster, the primer
was  produced  in  two  slightly  different  editions  with  estimated  print  runs  ranging
between  70,000  and  150,000  copies.67 Using  the  primer,  soldiers  would  learn  the
construction of phrases by breaking down a given sentence into words, syllables and
letters, which could then be used to assemble other appropriate sentences on the same
published in the front-line press, reproduced in Fernández Soria, J. M. and Mayordomo, A. 
Educación, Guerra y Revolución. Valencia, 1936-1939  (Valencia: PUV, 2007), 165, 169.
64 Salas Viu, V. Diario de guerra, 78.
65 Still, the principal priorities of these two (i.e. commissar and teacher)  diverged, which sometimes 
caused noticeable tensions. See Cobb, C. Los Milicianos, 111-125.
66 Ibid., 56.
67
 The authors are indicated  in Cobb, C. 'The educational and cultural policy of the Popular Front 
government in Spain, 1936-1939' in Alexander, M. and Graham, H. (Eds.) The French and Spanish 
Popular Fronts, 251. The lower of the estimated print-run figures comes from Santiago Álvarez (Los 
comisarios políticos, 147), the higher from Rafael Pérez Contel (Artistas en Valencia, 594). In 
addition to minor visual alterations, the most important difference between the two editions was that 
the second edition substituted a montage centred on the founder of the Spanish Socialist Party, Pablo 
Iglesias, for the earlier one focusing on Largo Caballero, who at that point had been forced to step 
down as Prime Minister. Although I have not been able to find exact publishing dates, this change, and
the fact that the first edition contains images from the preparations of the 1937 Fallas, indicate that the
first edition must have been produced sometime between late March and early May, and the second 
sometime after the government change of 17 May 1937.
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theme. The sentences provided by the reader also communicated  important war-related
messages:  for  example,  'Obedience  to  the  legitimate  government',  'War  of  national
independence', and 'Produce more and better on the home front', are a few of the slogans
given as the instructional starter phrases. Others related to political leaders and included
a homage to the anarchist Buenaventura Durruti, (now transmuted and incarnated as a
Republican war hero) and another to the founding father of Spanish socialism, Pablo
Iglesias; yet another was for 'Lenin, our great teacher.'68 In this relatively ecumenical
way,  the  composers  of  the  primer  sought  to  consolidate  a  new  national  political
imaginary as the same time as strengthening army discipline. The primer also reminded
soldiers why wartime sacrifices were ultimately worthwhile: 'We are fighting for our
culture', stated one spread, while the final image was accompanied by the sentence 'A
happy and prosperous Spain.' As a publication serving both as a propaganda medium
and a learning and teaching aid,  the 'anti-fascist'  primer stands as  a  major  example
demonstrating how the imperatives of Republican war mobilisation shaped initiatives
that were also key components of  the Republic's vision for a post-war future.
As the final  image in the primer indicates,  war-time education was not only
about  maintaining  front-line  morale,  or  even  offering  a  means  of  individual
empowerment,  but  also about reviving a more ambitious Republican nation-building
project.  This  aspect  of  the  cultural  programme  was  seen  as  intrinsically  linked  to
literacy teaching,  especially where  political  ignorance  was  deemed part  of  the  very
definition of illiteracy itself. Hence the magazine Cultura Popular stated in June 1937: 
To raise the cultural level of the soldier is to strengthen his political
consciousness. It is obvious that our army has to be composed of men
conscious of an ideal, for which they are prepared to die. Down with
illiteracy!  Bear  in  mind  that  illiteracy  does  not  simply  mean  the
inability  to  read  or  write,  but  rather  a  lack  of  clear  concepts  and
indifference to the great moral and social conflicts facing us.69
In addition to the inclusion of political and military slogans in the 'anti-fascist' primer,
the importance that militia teachers and the education ministry accorded broad political
instruction was furthermore evident in the teaching of geography and history, which was
to include comparative historical studies of revolutionary societies like Mexico and the
68 These examples are taken from the second edition.
69 Cultura Popular, 2 (June 1937). The translation is taken from Cobb, C. 'The educational and cultural 
policy', 247. 
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USSR.70 The ambition to forge a new Republican nation, based on progressive values
and a commitment to social justice, became particularly clear in this connection. Yet
what  such  teaching  also  demonstrates  is  how,  under  the  leadership  of  Hernández’s
ministerial team, the curriculum as a whole adopted a distinctive tone – one that had
emerged from the new radical discourses shaping wartime Republican politics. But it
did so, crucially, in ways that ensured that the political content of the teaching remained
compatible  with  general  Popular  Front  policy.  The  inclusive  strategy  bespoke  once
again  the  central  role  occupied  by  the  cultural  programme  in  a  broad  Republican
mobilisation effort.71
The politics of cultural heritage
The cultural programme's shift in tone did not only affect educational material but also
articulations  of  the  relationship  between  the  'people'  and  Spain’s  cultural  heritage.
Instead of 'high' culture made available to the 'popular'  classes, all cultural treasures
were now to be regarded as part of an undivided popular legacy. This view was accepted
and often propagated by the progressive cultural establishment, which in many cases
had arrived at this way of thinking prior to the war anyway. The 'people' had long been
identified  as  a  source  of  authentic  cultural  value,  not  least  among  Romantics  and
prominent representatives of the Generation of '98 (especially Miguel de Unamuno).
Moreover, those known as the Generation of '27, and above all the influential poet and
playwright Federico García Lorca, had often appropriated popular art forms for their
own  creative  and  experimental  purposes.72 As  we  have  seen,  from 1931,  the  same
writers  wholeheartedly  supported   Republican  attempts  to  disseminate,  through
initiatives like the Misiones Pedagógicas, the resulting fruits among the 'people' that had
provided their inspiration. Left-wing critics like Renau similarly conceived of a future
Spanish culture as one with clear popular  – if not  necessarily traditional  folkloric –
roots.  'Culture'  was thus typically regarded within progressive intellectual  circles  as
inextricably tied to the 'people.' It was only logical, then, when the Republican cultural
programme had to respond to the political disruptions of the war period, that official
70 Cobb, C. Los Milicianos, 117. Cf. Fraser, R. Blood of Spain,  292. 
71 See also the assessment of Cobb, who states that there were few accusations of sectarianism in 
relation to the political content of teaching materials, since these drew on values and objectives that 
were common to all Popular Front parties. Cobb, C. Los Milicianos, 133.
72 For an analysis of the role of the 'people' in Spanish cultural production, see Sinclair, A. 'Elitism and 
the cult of the popular in Spain' in Timms, E. and Collier, P. Visions and Blueprints: Avant-garde 
culture and radical politics in early twentieth-century Europe (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1988), 221-235.
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proclamations  influenced  by  the  progressive  cultural  elite  should  go  beyond  the
ambition of making cultural  treasures accessible to the 'people' to declare that these
treasures  in  fact  belonged  to  the 'people'  as  an  inalienable right.73 Still,  in  order  to
convert cultural reforms into political capital, ministerial policy in this regard had to be
presented as a extraordinary transfer of cultural ownership, initiated and overseen by the
progressive Republican state.
Particularly important in bolstering, or indeed spinning, this interpretation was
Josep  Renau's  work,  part  of  his  brief  as  General  Director  of  Fine  Arts,  to  protect
national artistic treasures. Expropriations in the initial revolutionary period of the war
had already given the 'people'  de facto control over many valuable cultural artefacts.
This  included  scores  of  religious  objects,  some  of  which  were  threatened  with
destruction  as  a  result  of  accumulated  anti-clerical  hatred.  Other  art  works  risked
damage  from  ignorance  or  neglect,  or  loss  to  the  black  market.74 So  apart  from
protecting artistic heritage from actual war damage, the General Directorate of Fine Arts
(hereafter  GDFA) and  collaborating organisations  –  above all  the  Alliance  of  Anti-
Fascist Intellectuals, whose members had been the first to engage with the issue – had to
use a variety of strategies to prevent further deterioration at the hands of the popular
militias. To begin with, there was a publicity campaign in which the national heritage
was presented as a part of working-class history. 'Workers of today: respect the labour
of our companions of yesterday,' proclaimed a characteristic GDFA poster, showing an
image  of  ornamental  details  above  a  church  door.  Where  persuasion  failed,  a
combination  of  juridical  and  police/military force  (at  first  often  involving the  Fifth
Regiment) was deployed to enable the authorities to confiscate valuable objects at risk.
Still the conservation task was difficult, as for many in the militia the acquisition of
valuable objects did not only mean potential income, but also the symbolic conquest of
luxury (whether  objects  or  properties)  and as  such constituted tangible proof of  the
revolution's  success.75 Thus  the  government  had  to  persuade  the  militias  that
73 See the speech delivered by Jesús Hernández at the inaugural ceremony of the first Worker Institute, 
31 January 1937. Entitled 'La Cultura para el Pueblo', it is reproduced in the party publication El 
Partido Comunista por la libertad y la independencia de España (Llamamientos y discursos) 
(Valencia: Ediciones del P.C. de E., 1937), 131-152. For a comparable view, see Maria Teresa León's 
reflection that the hoarding of valuable art treasures in private collections may one day be considered 
a 'social crime'. León, M. T. La Historia Tiene la Palabra, 45. 
74 See Alvarez Lopera, J. La politica de bienies culturales, especially chapters 1.2 and 1.9. See also the 
literature listed in footnote 51 in this Introduction.
75 Ibid., chapters 1.2 and 1.9. See also description of the excitement with which artists of the Catalan 
Sindicat de Dibuixants Professionals rummaged through content of the aristocratic palace they had 
confiscated after the July 1936 coup. Termes, Josep, Miravitlles, Jaume, Fontseré, Carles.  Carteles de
la República, 355.
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relinquishing  part  of  their  material  conquests  did  not  signify  a  rolling  back  of
revolutionary power, but rather its consolidation by the new representative government.
The state had to be presented as the legitimate custodian of a heritage ultimately owned
by the polity it served. 
A practical expression of this idea can be found in the arts exhibition held in
Valencia, in a former Roman Catholic seminary, the Colegio del Patriarca, towards the
end  of  December  1936.  Made up of  works  taken  from the Duke of  Alba's  Madrid
residence, which, like the Prado Museum, had been emptied of its most valuable objects
to protect them from rebel bombs, the exhibition sought to demonstrate how the cultural
treasures  previously in  the  hands  of  the  privileged  few  were  now available  to  the
public.76 The proposal to turn the evacuated works into an exhibition was Renau’s own,
in his official capacity.77 But it also had earlier precedents in Madrid, where communist
militia occupying the Duke of Alba’s residence in the immediate aftermath of the coup
had spontaneously transformed this into a 'Museum of Capitalism' which they opened to
the  public.78 Co-opting  this  idea  officially,  Hernández  and  Renau  also  took  the
opportunity to turn the inaugural ceremony for the Valencia exhibition into a public
relations coup for the PCE, where the Republic’s achievements blended yet again with
self-praise  of  the  party  and  attempts  to  highlight,  as  especially  revolutionary,  the
credentials of the Ministry of Public Instruction and Fine Arts. In the presence of an
international delegation, speeches praised the Madrid militia men's respect for art and
the  Fifth  Regiment's  efforts  in  bringing  the  collection  to  a  relatively safe  home in
Valencia.79 At  the  centre  of  the  seminary's  inner  courtyard  were  positioned  four
blackboards,  placed  against  each  other  at  square  angles,  where  visitors  could  read
messages such as: 
The Communist  Party  gives  to the people,  through the  Ministry of
Public Instruction, the art treasure of the Duke of Alba, saved by our
brave militia men from the fire and shrapnel unleashed on the people
of Madrid by fascist barbarity (The Central Committee of the CP). 80 
This particular blurring of party and government activity may well have prompted a
76 This was also readily understood by journalists reporting on the exhibition. See, for example, Vicente 
Vidal Corella's review in Crónica 3 January 1937, 12f.
77 Cabañas Bravo, M. Josep Renau, 131-137.
78 Koltsov, M. Diario de la guerra de España, 187. For a good analysis of the politics of the exhibitions 
in both Madrid and Valencia, see Basilio, M. M. Visual Propaganda, chapter 2.
79 For a contemporary report on the proceedings, see Verdad 26 December 1936, 1f.
80 Photographs of the inner yard in Cabañas Bravo, M. Josep Renau, 131.
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cabinet order, signed nine days after the exhibition opening, which strictly prohibited
the making of party propaganda through governmental bodies.81 Beyond such conflicts,
however,  and  regardless  of  the  grandiloquent  statements  on  display,  the  real  public
benefits of the exhibition must have been limited, as it was only open for three days (26-
28  December).82 This  was,  furthermore,  one  of  the  few  examples  (if  not  the  only
example) where confiscated art works were exhibited to the general public. Again, what
it sought to demonstrate, over and above practice, was the principle that art would no
longer be exclusive. Embracing this principle, the culture ministry had effectively set as
its ultimate goal the redefining of all culture as popular culture.83
Encouraging popular cultural production
Realising the idea of a new and truly popular culture did not only involve facilitating
access to existing cultural resources (that is, democratising the consumption of culture)
but also encouraging popular cultural production itself. Indeed, herein lay the greatest
difference between war-time policy and the progressive yet largely top-directed cultural
initiatives of the pre-war years. As had been advocated by Nueva Cultura and various
cultural critics from the revolutionary left before the war, people were now granted the
means  to  participate  actively  in  cultural  activities  and  shape  the  outcome  of  these
according to their own needs and disposition. While obviously important as a political
principle, the recognition and cultivation of creative abilities where these had previously
been  neglected  could  also,  on  an  individual  level,  be  profoundly  psychologically
transformative  in  itself.  If  literacy programmes had  opened  up the  horizon to  some
extent,  reading  and  creative  writing,  regardless  of  proficiency,  allowed  students  to
explore further the intellectual possibilities this revealed and acquire new knowledge
according to their own lights and capacity. Creative work of all types also opened doors
to new interests and talents. In some cases, as witnessed by Vicente Salas Viu when
meeting an ordinary soldier who felt that the war had revealed a true vocation in him as
a poet, the discovery of new talent, of which this was but one example, could (and did)
even prompt a new sense of self.84 Far from being a matter of a superficial change of
81 Gaceta 6 January 1937, 91.
82 As  in an advert  on front page of Verdad 26 December 1936.
83 See also the short propaganda leaflet Protección del Tesoro Artístico Nacional (Valencia: Ministerio 
de Instrucción Pública y Bellas Artes, 1937) which stated that artistic works produced by past 
generations had often been reserved for the  (privileged) few but would now be 'of the people and for 
the people' (page 7).
84 Salas Viu, V. Diario de guerra, 78.
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subjective  identity,  such  shifts  in  self-perception arguably represented an immediate
form – in the strictest sense – of individual emancipation.
One  of  the  most  important  examples  of  popular  participation  in  cultural
production can be found in the war ballad. In purely quantitative terms, the explosion of
this form of amateur poetry dwarfed all other cultural phenomena during the war. The
cultural historian Serge Salaün has counted between 15-20,000 individual compositions,
of which roughly three quarters were written in the Republican zone. These belonged to
around 5,000 different authors, whose work was published in approximately 75% of the
military press and 50% of the magazines printed on the home front.85 Some established
literary magazines – the Alliance of Anti-Fascist Intellectuals'  El Mono Azul being the
most famous example – also published, if only for a time, amateur compositions next to
work by recognised poets.86 By so doing they clearly signalled the comparable if not
equal importance of established and amateur writers in the elaboration of a new Spanish
culture. Many progressive intellectuals saw the war ballad as a genuinely revolutionary
form.  Even  though  the  war-ballad  did  not,  as  a  rule,  show  any  signs  of  formal
experimentation – being essentially a re-invented medieval tradition – it could still be
seen as revolutionary as a result of its sheer popularity (in both senses of the word). So
even  though  this  popularity  was  related  to  its  deep  traditional  roots,  recognisable
structure, and often epic if not elegiac qualities, the form was deemed an instrument of
change precisely because of the socio-cultural impact that its vast proliferation would
consequently entail.87 In  order  to build on this potential,  the writing of  ballads  was
strongly encouraged by the teachers  of  the Culture Militias,  as  well  as  the political
commissars,  who recognised in  such initiatives  a  powerful  means of  boosting troop
morale. 
In terms of form and content, ballads thus offered perhaps the most accessible
medium through which soldiers could participate actively in a collective effort to invest
the war with meaning. It must be noted, however, that although poems were written by
85 Figures cited in Fernández Soria, J. M. Educación y cultura, 144f. The key work on war-time poetry is
Salaün, S. La poesía.
86 El Mono Azul seems  only to have lasted until May 1937, when there was a break in the magazine's 
already irregular publishing pattern. When it returned, itfilled simply a page in the Madrid daily La 
Voz, which meant that it had been downsized considerably. As a result the content became more 
orientated towards politics. See Monleón, J. “El Mono Azul” Teatro de urgencia y Romancero de la 
guerra civil (Madrid: Ayuso, 1979), 19.
87 See, for example, Maria Teresa León's 'La cultura, patrimonio del pueblo' in León, M. T. (Ed.) 
Crónica general de la guerra civil (Sevilla: Renacimiento, 2007 [1937]), 90. See also Verdad 8 
Septembre 1936, 1, where the student theatre company El Búho describes their work as 'classical' and 
'popular' and therefore 'eminently revolutionary'.
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men across the military hierarchy, the message they communicated did not necessarily
depart from official rhetoric.88 At one level, this is unsurprising. Dissidence in print was
prevented by censorship, and the frontline atmosphere would no doubt have generated a
degree of conformity regardless. Yet no one was forced write verses in aid of battle
morale, so neither is there any reason to think that the words did not reflect genuine
feelings. At any rate, the phenomenon of ballad writing would certainly have responded
to a genuine need, as soldiers tried to make sense of their motives for fighting and
psychologically survive the searing experience of industrialised warfare. This fact was
clear also to Republican intellectuals,  who generally supported attempts to stimulate
amateur production. Moved by the verses sent to the editorial board of El Mono Azul,
Maria Teresa León saw in them lyrical proof that 'the epic is reborn when heroes need
songs.'89
Still, regardless of motivation, soldiers' own cultural work became an important
factor reinforcing the dominant narrative of the war.90 This was particularly clear in
relation  to  another  major  form  of  popular  self-expression:  the  wall-newspaper.91
Building on precedents from the Soviet Union, but also from revolutionary Mexico, the
wall-newspaper typically consisted of a large paper sheet or board onto which printed or
handwritten contributions were attached and replaced on a revolving basis. It  was an
essentially hybrid form, where quotes by leadership figures and pictures by professional
artists  mingled  with  comments  and  thoughts  formulated  by  the  ordinary  soldiers
working to produce the newspaper.92 In its most developed form, the wall-newspaper
was promoted as a collective art work, and various aesthetic criteria were highlighted in
officially  sponsored  competitions  organised  to  encourage  greater  participation  and
experimentation with the war-newspaper form.93 Yet it was the integrating function of
88 War ballads often celebrated Republic's cultural reform programme, for example. See Salaün, S. La 
poesía, 269-282.
89 León, M. T. La Historia Tiene la Palabra, 29f.
90 That is, a narrative declaring, in various ways, the rising an attempt to perpetuate the oppressive quasi-
feudal rule of a corrupt aristocracy, who in return for military aid had sold Spain's independence to the
fascist powers of Europe.
91 According to the General Commissariat, there were over 4,000 wall-newspapers in Republican Spain 
during the war. Salaün, S. La poesía, 34.
92 For a good analysis of the wall-newspaper, see Mendelson, J. 'Propaganda Laboratories: Artists and 
Magazines during the Spanish Civil War' in Revistas y Guerra 1936-1939 (Madrid: Museo Nacional  
Centro de Arte Reina Sofia, 2007), 355-359 (English version).  Cf. Salas Viu, V. Diario de guerra, 
29f.
93 Ibid. Mendelson highlights a 1938 article by Renau's close colleague and Nueva Cultura collaborator 
Francisco Carreño, who unsurprisingly, considering the cultural ambitions of Nueva Cultura, was one 
of the commentators stressing that the wall-newspaper must be a popular and collective effort. Similar
sentiments were expressed in connection with a review of a wall-newspaper competition held in 
Madrid in summer 1938. See Mundo Gráfico 1 June 1938, 2. 
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the wall newspaper that provided the  key to its military and political importance. Hence
commissars  and  cultural  commentators  addressing  the  phenomenon  demanded  that
wall-newspapers  reflect  a  truly  communal  project,  strengthening  ties  between
contributors and readers while also linking individual units to a larger popular army
constituency.94 As with published ballads, the wall-newspapers' political content was no
doubt a product of local group dynamics as well as of different forms of censorship.
Indeed, if commissars as a rule placed great weight on wall-newspapers, then, it was
because they offered not  only a means of  maintaining morale,  but  also a means of
enforcing among soldiers a certain degree of self-regulation.95
Yet we must not overstate the restrictive implications of the political function
imposed on popular cultural production. In some ways, in addition to the overall re-
distribution of manpower that the war entailed, it was precisely the fact that text and
image  production  was  primarily  geared  towards  the  clearly  defined  goal  of  war-
mobilisation that opened the door for many who may have had the passion but perhaps
not the experience or outstanding talents that would allow them to work as artists and
writers in normal conditions. This is evidently true in relation to the production of wall-
newspapers,  but  also  applied  to  poster  design,  since  many studios  operated  during
wartime  with  a  team  of  amateurs  guided  by  one  or  two  professionals.96 Frontline
magazines  furthermore  offered  opportunities  for  soldiers  with  no  or  little  artistic
experience  to  have  their  drawings  as  well  as  articles  and  poetry  published,  and  a
selection of such work would even be compiled in a 1938 series of leaflets published by
the  General  Commissariat  of  the  Republican  Army,  with  the  likely  intention  of
distributing them nation-wide.97 And again, as with more traditional schooling (e.g. the
literacy classes of the Cultural Militias), the expectation of political conformity did not
necessarily prevent these initiatives containing the potential for genuine empowerment
too, especially considering the ways in which they encouraged the development of new
94 Ibid. Documents from the General Commissariat, held in the military archive of Ávila, show that 
political commissars were concerned to maximise the potential of wall-newspapers, especially in 
terms of raising morale and awareness of the political ramifications of the war. See, for example, 
Comisariado General, Caja 697, Carpeta 13 (especially docs 2 and 3). 
95 This conclusion draws more on the archival evidence mentioned in the previous footnote than on  
Mendelson's mostly art historical analysis, although there are passages in this too that would support 
such a reading (especially on 358f).
96 Mendelson, J. 'Propaganda laboratories', 353. The involvement of non-professionals was also 
highlighted by Renau in an interview with Facundo Tomás Ferré. Renau suggested that the 
'democratic' aspect of poster production to some extent compensated for the poor quality of many 
posters. See Tomás Ferré, F. Los Carteles Valencianos, 108f.
97 The three leaflets were entitled Poesía en las trincheras, Escritos de Soldados, and Los dibujantes 
soldados, All were edited by Gabriel García Maroto and published by the Subcomisariado de 
Agitación, Prensa y Propaganda del Comisariado General de Guerra in 1938.
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skills and abilities.
Another  significant  way  in  which  popular  cultural  production  was  both
encouraged and controlled can be found in competitions. These events were, as Serge
Salaün has pointed out, an intrinsic part of the organisational support necessary to make
soldiers' poetry a tangible aspect of wider cultural change.98 Practical arrangements were
made by a wide variety of military and civilian entities: in relation to wall-newspapers,
one of  the biggest  organisers  of  competitions  was Cultura Popular,  a  Popular  Front
organisation  that  worked  closely  with  GDFA during  Renau's  incumbency.99 Yet  if
competitions were conceived as a means of celebrating the democratisation of culture,
they also served as a reminder that hierarchical cultural divisions were still present in
the Republican zone. Although competition winners were at times decided by popular
vote,  it  was  common for  participating work to  be judged by panels  of  professional
writers and artists.100 Sometimes their critical authority was used to brutal effect. When
the GDFA organised a competition for war songs in 1937, for example, they proposed to
select  and publish,  as  Renau's  Nueva Cultura  colleague Pérez  Contel  later  recalled,
'those that had, in addition to a popular character, a certain literary and musical dignity.'
But  of the 117 entries recorded, only six  were included in the final  compendium.101
While competitions attested to an official desire to encourage popular participation in
cultural production, they also indicated how the cultural elite perceived there to be clear
limits to amateur producers' ability to evaluate their own work.
There was more at stake here than a simple divergence of taste. If, on the one
hand,  the  immediate  circumstances  meant  that  popular  participation  in  cultural
production had to strike a balance between individual autonomy and the unity needed
for war, it also revealed a tension between the actual results obtained in the process and
progressive intellectuals' hopes for a future revolutionary art. This constituted a problem
that was rarely made explicit and only troubled a certain group of artists (including
Renau),  but  is  nonetheless  key  to  the  cultural  debates  examined  here.  For  if  the
98 Salaün, S. La poesía, 78.
99 For wall-newspaper competition, see  Mendelson, J. 'Propaganda laboratories', 359. See also article in 
Mundo Gráfico 1 June 1938, 2. In general terms, Cultura Popular worked mostly with the supply of 
books and publications to hospitals and the front. For an overview, see Fernández Soria, J. M. 
Educación y cultura, 69-79. A report (dated 18 October 1937) highlighting the close relationship 
between Cultura Popular and the General Directorate of Fine Arts during the war can be found in 
AGA (Madrid), Legajo 13054, Caja 4656, 14.  
100 For more on competitions, see Salaün, S. La poesía, 73-78.
101 Pérez Contel, R. Artistas en Valencia, 580. The selected songs were 'U.H.P.', 'Canto de la flota 
republicana', 'Venguemos a los caídos', 'Himno', 'Canto nocturno en las trincheras' and 'Nueva 
humanidad.'
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'revolution'  of  the  immediate  post-coup  period  momentarily  seemed  to  vindicate
romanticised  beliefs  in  the 'people'  as  a  progressive force destined to  announce  the
beginning of a new era, the prosaic nature – not to mention the uneven quality – of
many of the amateur art works later produced as its corollary suggested that this new era
would be little different  in artistic terms unless the 'people' could be guided in their
efforts by an appropriate authority. As artists and writers began to take a longer view,
then,  it  became necessary to  debate,  in  greater  detail,  what  the 'revolution'  actually
meant for artistic production. And this, first of all, necessitated a more precise definition
of the relationship between the artist and the 'people'.
The artist and the people
General proclamations of loyalty to the 'people' and the 'revolution' became a staple of
Republican cultural life soon after the defeat of the military rising. We have already
seen  how  the  Madrid  and  Valencian  groups  linked  to  the  Alliance  of  Anti-Fascist
Intellectuals  published statements  of  support  for  the militias  before the end of  July.
Similar pronouncements would be made, in a seemingly endless stream, throughout the
conflict.102 Indeed, they appeared regardless of the fact that intensifying war pressures
and reinforced state authority made the 'revolution' – at least beyond its articulation in
cultural  spheres – little more than an aestheticised intellectual construction from the
summer of 1937 onwards. By then the libertarian and dissident communist organisations
defending  a  decentralised  and  collectivising  order  had  been  defeated  in  violent
confrontations with regional and central government forces in Barcelona (the May Days
of 1937).103 Then, in August 1937, the government issued a decree by which the last
bastion of libertarian union power – the Council of Aragon – was forcibly dissolved.
Such curtailment of local political autonomy was not solely motivated, as we have seen,
by a desire to dismantle  libertarian revolution, but responded to the need for centralised
co-ordination in the face of the ever worsening dislocations and pressures (economic,
demographic, and military) caused by the war. Cultural politics generated fewer power
struggles of this kind, but the accumulating crises on both home and military fronts
could not but drain the utopian colour from cultural initiatives too. 'Plenty of heroic
signing, plenty of beautiful literature: but what is there to eat?', asked the Madrid daily
102 A selection of these were gathered in a leaflet published, with a prologue by Carles Pi i Sunyer, during
the war. See La voz de la inteligencia y la lucha del pueblo español (Barcelona: Comisariado de 
Propaganda de la Generalidad de Cataluña, 1937).
103 For a concise analysis of the events, see Graham, H. '“Against the state”: a genealogy of the Barcelona
May Days (1937)' European History Quarterly, vol 29, no. 4, 485-542. 
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La Voz in November 1937.104 Even so,  the notion of a  radically democratic cultural
regeneration  remained  influential  in  intellectual  circles.  As  an  increasingly  abstract
ideal,  it  is  perhaps  unsurprising  that  it  became  predominantly  a  preoccupation  of
intellectuals, who in their hope for a revitalised Spanish society continued to posit the
'people' and the 'popular' above all other social values. 
Statements expressing collective subordination to the fact of revolution as well
as unity with the 'people' – the one read on behalf  of the Spanish delegation at  the
Second International Congress of Writers for the Defence of Culture in July 1937 may
stand as a representative example105 – have been described as opportunist rhetoric of
little real significance.106 But, if we take them seriously and think about what they could
have meant  had  the  Republic  been  given  more  time,  they were  not  without  deeper
import. As the anarchist-turned-communist writer Ramón Sender had already suggested,
the solidarity engendered by the war also had to produce a new relationship between
artists, writers and their popular audiences. In an article entitled 'The new voice', written
in  December  1936,  Sender  insisted  that  artists  seek  a  creative  position  outside  of
themselves, a position where they 'dissolve' themselves in the popular community and
absorb  its  pain and joy as  their  own.  Following from this  he  envisioned  a  creative
'miracle',  where  the  artistic  self  is  then  'reconstructed'  to  give  expression  to  the
collective truth he or she embodied.107 Sender's vision may seem radical but it was not
unique, nor confined to Marxist thinkers. In his individual contribution to the writers'
congress,  Catholic  writer  and  Alliance  of  Anti-Fascist  Intellectuals  founder  José
Bergamín spoke of the desire and indeed moral obligation to be one with the popular in
Spanish  culture,108 and  the  poet-turned-commissar  Miguel  Hernández  introduced  his
seminal war-time poetry collection with a letter to Vicente Aleixandre (the surrealist
writer – later Nobel Prize winner – of the generation of ’27), stating that as poets, they
104 Monleón, J. “El Mono Azul”, 118.
105 E.g. '...declaramos aquí […] que como escritores y artistas y como hombres jóvenes, luchamos, 
disciplinada, serena y altivamente […], allí donde el pueblo español, del que lo esperamos todo, nos 
diga...' and '...somos distintos y aspiramos a serlo cada vez más, en función de nuestra condición de 
escritores y artistas, pero tenemos de antemano algo en común: la Revolución española que […] nace 
y desarrolla simultáneamente con nuestra propia vida. O mejor: nacemos y nos desarrollamos 
simultáneamente con el nacimiento y desarrollo de esa Revolución.' Gamonal Torres, M. Arte y 
Política, 239, 233.
106 The anarchist intellectual José Peirats claimed in 1938 that the 'revolution' had been ruined by the 
'nonsense' and empty talk of intellectuals. See Gamonal Torres, M. Arte y Política, 22. Gamonal 
himself stresses that most artists would have adopted the language and codes of the moments mainly 
for pragmatic reasons (28).
107 Sender, R. 'La nueva voz' in León, M. T. (ed.) Crónica general, 107f.
108 Reproduced in Nueva Cultura, 4-5 (June-July 1937), 17f. 
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were but  Viento del Pueblo.109 Here then, the deep-rooted national preoccupation with
the popular essence of culture meshed with the symbolic (if often not real) post-coup
elevation of popular power to generate a logic whereby artists and writers were simply
spiritual aides of a historical agent carrying Spain on its path to cultural salvation. The
primacy  of  the  people  appeared,  from  this  perspective,  to  be  a  supreme  principle
guiding not only radical politics but artistic endeavours too. 
Accusations  of  opportunism  also  suggest  insincerity,  but  again  it  would  be
wrong  simply to dismiss the tone of wartime cultural debates as either cynical or empty.
For  beyond  questions  of  ideological  commitment,  intellectuals'  relationship  to  their
environment was deeply conditioned by the psychological impact of the war (something
that was true, of course, for most people). By visiting trenches, military hospitals, and
other places along the front, or when volunteering, as some did, to fight in regular units,
artists and writers got first-hand knowledge of life in extreme conditions and many were
impressed by the camaraderie and fortitude that soldiers often displayed.110 Those who
volunteered or were conscripted often found, like Vicente Salas Viu, a new sense of
belonging among their frontline companions.111 Like many observers of modern wars,
they  noted  how  shared  exposure  to  violence  and  life-threatening  situations  created
powerful  interpersonal  bonds  –  bonds  that  would  in  turn  become  central  to  their
understanding of the war as a profoundly transformative experience.112
Shared experiences of life-threatening danger were not exclusive to the military
front,  however.  The  war  in  Spain  was  the  first  modern  conflict  where  the  civilian
population was deliberately targeted en masse, and massive and sustained bombardment
of urban centres had a similar effect on relationships between the people exposed to this
overwhelming danger. In a 1979 interview, Rosa Ballester, Manuela Ballester's younger
sister, described how she was convinced that the first bomb to fall on Valencia would
fall on her, and when this did not happen, her fear was transformed into a new sense of
community with others around her, even though she did not know them individually.
The war, she said, 
made me feel a strong love for people; it made me see that there are
109 Viento del Pueblo (Wind of the people) was also the title of the collection, published in 1937. Cf. 
Vicente Salas Viu suggesting that his war diaries were written by a collective author. Diario de 
guerra, 20. 
110 See Zambrano, M. Los intelectuales en el drama de España (Madrid: Trotta, 1998), 148f. Cf. León, 
M. T. La Historia Tiene la Palabra, 37-39.
111 Salas Viu, V. Diario de guerra.
112 For a good description and analysis of this phenomenon during the First World War, see Eksteins, M. 
Rites of Spring, esp. 180, 229f.
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values... For example, if you have money or not, it does not matter; if
you have a house or not, it does not matter; because there is something
above all this, which is death.113
Naturally  enough,  reactions  would  often  be  directed  against  the  perpetrators  of
indiscriminate violence. We have already seen how rebel air raids on Madrid stiffened
the resolve to resist.  The destruction unleashed on civilian populations  would affect
intellectuals too, and in some cases strengthen their active support and willingness to
sacrifice for the Republic. In June 1938 the philosopher Maria Zambrano, in a letter to
writer  Rosa  Chacel,  stressed  how  the  war,  and  above  all  the  suffering  caused  by
indiscriminate bombing, had made her more 'patriotic' (i.e. Republican) than ever. Every
air  raid  only  increased  her  desire  to  see  Spain  freed  from  the  foreign  'invasion'
orchestrated by the rebels.114 To be sure, Zambrano may be an unusual example among
Republican Spain's more privileged circles. In contrast to those, like Chacel, who left
the Republic as the situation got worse,  Zambrano and her husband returned from a
diplomatic assignment to Chile on 19 June 1937, a day when the chances of outright
Republican victory were drastically reduced as a result of the fall of Bilbao and soon of
the industrial north in its entirety. Asked why they went back when the war seemed all
but lost, Zambrano had simply replied, 'That's why...'115 While this was an extraordinary
declaration of solidarity with the Republican cause, it did not, of course, in itself entail
support for a popular revolution. However, from her posting in Chile, Zambrano had
already published a long pamphlet stressing how the struggle in Spain was ultimately
about  the  creation  of  a  'new morality'  and  a  'new man',  opposed  to  fascism and  a
stagnant bourgeoisie.116 Just like many of her colleagues, then, Zambrano saw the war as
an opportunity to lay the foundations of a new life, a life that would be shaped not only
by abstract ideals but above all by the concrete example of those fighting to defend the
Republic.
But  even  if  sympathy  and  solidarity  with  the  radicalised  defenders  of  the
Republic  was  in  many  cases  deeply  felt  and  genuine,  intellectuals’ proclamations
placing the people at the centre of cultural development did not necessarily amount to a
willingness  to  abandon  the  cultural  establishment's  privileged  position.  Rather,  by
identifying the 'people' with 'Will' and intellectuals with 'Reason', statements like the
113 CDMH (Salamanca) Fuentes_Orales-Mexico, no 10, 16.
114 Zambrano, M. Los intelectuales,  210-212.
115 See José Luis Arco's 'estudio preliminar' in Zambrano, M. Islas (Madrid: Verbum, 2007), L.
116 Zambrano, M. Los intelectuales,  96f, 180-183.
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one made collectively at the writers' congress in July 1937 would reinforce a categorical
division that in turn compromised the democratic potential of a cultural environment
open to popular participation.117 The authors of the collective congress statement were
even explicit on this point; they did not want to 'monopolise' the will of those fighting
for the Republic, but they did see it as their 'duty' to interpret those fighters' thoughts
and feelings. In fact, José Bergamín had given poignant expression to this idea already
in the opening lines  of  the inaugural  issue of  El Mono Azul (27 August  1936);  the
magazine  presented  itself  before  its  readership,  Bergamín  had  suggested,  'ready  to
clothe its body like the word does the thought: in order to give it reason [razón] and
meaning.'118 El Mono Azul,  named after  the blue boiler  suit  that  virtually became a
revolutionary uniform in the immediate aftermath of the July rebellion, was a literary
magazine devoted to egalitarian politics, yet in an important sense – and despite its short
spell as an outlet for amateur wall ballads – it was still the product of a structure that
underlined the interpretative authority of a cultural elite. Seen from this point of view, it
is undeniable that intellectuals' proclaimed unity with the 'people' was also a strategy to
legitimize  their  speaking  for the  'people'.  But  again  it  would  be  unfair  to  point  to
cynicism by way of explanation. Rather, at work here was a deep-seated paternalism,
present, as we have seen, throughout the Republican period as a whole and consistently
serving as a counter-weight to the emancipatory implications of progressive cultural
reform. They wanted to democratise culture,  but  were,  again,  reluctant  to relinquish
control.119 The 'people' were granted a voice, but intellectuals retained the last word. 
Defining revolutionary art
If established artists and writers ultimately perceived themselves, rather the 'people', as
occupying  a  leading  position  in  the  cultural  revolution  triggered  by  the  military
rebellion, what demands did they place on their own artistic production? How did they
envision, more concretely, their own responsibilities in the elaboration of a new art for
Spain?
A useful place to start an analysis of this question would be a lecture that Josep
Renau delivered in the Aula Magna of Valencia University in December 1936 (later
117 Gamonal Torres, M. Arte y Política, 232-239 (esp. 236.).
118
'Presencia del Mono Azul'  El Mono Azul, 1 (August 1936), 3. The first issue did not show the date of 
publication, which is taken from Monleón, J. '”El Mono Azul”', 17.
119 Cf. Labanyi, J. 'Propaganda Art: Culture by the People or for the People' in Graham, H. and Labanyi, 
J. (Eds.) Spanish Cultural Studies, 165f.
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published both in article and book form through Nueva Cultura).120 Entitled 'The Social
Function of the Publicity Poster', the lecture was concerned, in the first instance, with
the history and future potential  of poster art,  but  commented,  en route, on virtually
every issue that preoccupied progressive artists and writers at the time. That the poster
should stand at the centre of an analysis of this kind may also be seen as indicative of its
ambiguous status  in the wartime Republic.  For a number of reasons the poster  was
considered by many, among them Renau, as central not only to immediate mobilisation
campaigns but also to the long-term development of a revolutionary popular culture.121
By its very form it challenged a number of romantic bourgeois conventions concerning
fine art (i.e. the value of the unique original, the importance of individual genius, etc.)
and offered great potential as a cultural medium in an age of mass-politics. Still, the fact
that  Renau,  speaking  in  his  capacity  as  General  Director  of  Fine  Arts,  chose  to
commence his lecture with a quote from French poster designer Cassandre, effectively
calling on lifeless traditional easel painting to be 'cast into the sea', must have raised a
few eyebrows, to say the least.122 It is a statement that on the one hand reminds us of
Renau's youthful reaction to the Levante exhibition in 1929, in response to which he
penned  his  'Yellow  Manifesto,'  but  on  the  other  highlights  how  new  expectations
entertained  in  relation  to  poster  design  more  generally  came  to  reflect  a  series  of
conflicting demands placed on art as a whole. As Renau's lecture illustrated, art was
variously, and often simultaneously, required to be utilitarian yet universal, topical yet
transcendental, while still synthesising, in form as well as content, the essential living
spirit of a profoundly transformative era. How art was to accomplish this remained an
open question, yet tentative answers may be glimpsed in Renau's theoretical exploration
of the poster and the reactions it provoked from his colleagues.
Renau  began  his  analysis  by  focusing  on  the  historical  development  of  the
commercial poster, but soon addressed the broader question, touched on above, of the
role and responsibility of the artist. In this regard, Renau was anxious to dismiss any a
priori or  socially  disconnected  notion  of  artistic  autonomy.  The  artistic  dream  of
120 The lecture was delivered before a big audience and was, according to Pérez Contel, very well 
received.  Artistas en Valencia, 471,473. The lecture text was published in two Nueva Cultura 
installments, no.2 (April 1937), 6-9, 18f, and no.3 (May 1937), 6-11, 16f. The book was originally 
printed by Ediciones Nueva Cultura but also exists in a 1976 edition published by Fernando Torres 
(Valencia). References below will primarily cite the 1976 edition. 
121 An observation also borne out by the numerous public poster exhibitions organised more or less 
throughout  the war period in galleries and squares by organisations like AIA, Altavoz del Frente, 
Cultural Popular, and various regional authorities (e.g. the Comissariat de Propaganda of the Catalan 
government). See, for example, Cabañas Bravo, M. Josep Renau, chapter 3.
122 Renau, Josep. Función Social del Cartel (Valencia: Fernando Torres, 1976), 29.
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unconditional liberty was, he maintained, an idealistic myth. Artists had always been
dependent on patronage and worked to satisfy a specific need. (Even attempts to create
'pure' art entailed a form of servitude to the 'select minority' that could appreciate such
works.) Yet if all artists were in some sense restricted by their circumstances, poster
artists (serving, by contrast, the broad majority) were even more so. Poster artists were
typically called upon to solve concrete problems. They were given specific missions and
responded to particular and immediate, even urgent, needs. More than any other artist,
they worked in what Renau called 'disciplined liberty.'123 There was, that is to say,  a
difference between the creator of 'fine art'  and the creator of posters, yet  this was a
difference  of  degree  rather  than kind.  All  art,  in  Renau's  view,  is  tied to  the social
conditions in which it is created.
The lecture's emphasis on discipline was one of the factors provoking a prompt
and  subsequently  much  discussed  response  from  Ramón  Gaya,  a  painter  who  had
previously been active with the travelling museum of the Misiones Pedagógicas.124 In an
open  letter  to  Renau,  published  in  the  January  1937  issue  of  Hora  de  España,  a
prestigious cultural magazine, Gaya first of all argued that the Republican poster had to
take inspiration from the great artists of the nineteenth century – Daumier, Delacroix,
and above all Goya – if it was to succeed in inspiring the Spanish people.125 But, Gaya
also stated, in what was effectively a defence of the artistic philosophy of the Institución
Libre  de  Enseñanza,  whose  influence  had  been  foundational  in  the  creation  of  the
Misiones Pedagógicas, Gaya also stated that no art could offer a valuable contribution to
the Republican struggle unless it were 'free, authentic y spontaneous, without shackles
or  demands,  without  worries  regarding  practical  value  or  efficacy[...].'126 The  latter
statement in particular drew a strong reply from Renau, who in the following issue of
the same magazine insisted once more on the poster artist's limitations and stressed that
Gaya's  approach  was  dangerous,  if  not  downright  irresponsible,  considering  the
123 Ibid., 60f.
124 The ensuing letter exchange between Renau and Ramón Gaya is discussed to some extent in virtually 
every exhibition catalogue included in the thesis bibliography. For an extensive analysis, see, for 
example, Tomás Ferré, F. Los Carteles Valencianos, 96-101. See also Gómez, M. El largo viaje, 267. 
For Gaya's own account of the debate, as well as comments on his work with the Misiones 
Pedagógicas, see Dennis, N. (Ed.) Ramón Gaya de viva voz: entrevistas, (1977-1998) (Valencia: Pre-
Textos, 2007). 
125
'Carta de un pintor a un cartelista' Hora de España, 1 (January 1937), 56-58. Also in Gamonal Torres, 
M. Arte y Política, 174-176. In later interviews Gaya  suggested that this open letter was never 
directed to Renau but to the painter José Gutiérrez Solana. This is a highly implausible post-hoc 
construction, however, especially since no one – especially not Gaya, who deeply admired Solana – 
would call Solana a 'cartelista.' Moreover, Solana is, in fact, mentioned in the letter as a potential (but 
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126 Ibid. 
187
concrete challenges – military, economic, and political – facing the Republic as a result
of the war. Poster creation, he stated, must start with the recognition of an 'objective'
problem, not individual whim, and proceed to solve this problem methodically.127 At one
level,  then,  the  disagreement  between  Gaya  and  Renau  clearly  concerned  urgent
questions  of  practice,  critical  when  Republican  artists  had  to  contribute  to  the
dissemination  of  a  single  coherent  mobilisation  programme.  Yet  beyond  such
considerations,  the  position outlined  by Renau  was  equally founded  on  a  matter  of
principle.  Even  if  Renau  did  not  say so  explicitly,  his  argument  suggested  that  for
'objective' problems to be correctly understood at all, the work of the artist had to be
informed by politics.
If the exchange between Renau and Gaya has been widely commented on in the
historical literature, it is precisely because their disagreement went deeper than specific
recipes for effective propaganda and posed bigger questions about the role of politics in
art.128 To begin with, it seems correct to suggest, as historian Mayte Gómez does, that
Gaya wanted above all to distinguish the social from the political and thus maintain a
space  for  art  of  more  lasting  value,  while  Renau,  by  contrast,  insisted  that  this
distinction had collapsed as a result of the war.129 Yet beyond the immediate context of
the Spanish conflict, it  also appears that Renau and Gaya set out from incompatible
conceptions of artistic creation as such. Gaya's rejection of politics may be traced to an
Idealist notion stating that artistic creation of real value is only possible by adopting a
position of disinterest. It can only emanate from an individual who suspends any desire
for domination in his or her confrontation with the world.130 Although such disinterest
had been ascribed an indirect socio-political value by foundational Idealist thinkers like
Hegel and Schiller, who glimpsed in the suspension of dominance an absolute form of
freedom, it could hardly constitute, in the minds of activists like Renau, a progressive
force in the ideologically charged twentieth century.131 The 'free play' between subject
and object had to be abolished, as we have seen, for a more resolute way to interact with
the  world.  Hence  Renau  adopts  Malraux's  view that  art  is  born as  a  response  to  a
127
'Contestación a Ramón Gaya' Hora de España, 2 (February 1937), 59-62. Gamonal Torres, M. Arte y 
Política, 176-179.
128 See footnote 125 above.
129 Gómez, M. El largo viaje, 267. This interpretation is clearly borne out by the rest of the exchange, as 
well as later interviews with Gaya (see Dennis, N. (Ed.) Ramón Gaya). 
130 For a particularly clear explanation of this position, where Gaya talks about creation as coming out of 
nothingness, see 'Cartas bajo un mismo techo a J. G.-A. Hora de España, 6 (June 1937). Also in 
Gamonal Torres, M. Arte y Política, 217-223 (see esp. 220).
131 See also Rancière, J. Aisthesis: Scenes from the Aesthetic Regime of Art (London, Verso, 2013), 
chapter 2.
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collective need, which is to say that art is first and foremost an intervention and a means
to shape collective experiences of reality.132 The war may thus have generated especially
urgent needs, in the sense that it demanded immediate unity in action, but it did not
fundamentally change Renau's view on the conditions for artistic creation in Spain. The
fundamental paradigm explaining the function of art remained intact across the divide
that  was  the  military  rising  of  July  1936,  as  a  discourse  of  national  war  simply
substituted – where it did not overlap with – a discourse of class war. In both cases art
sought  to  mobilise  people  around  an  integrated  vision  and  shared  plan  of  action
addressing  a  collective  desire  or  deficiency,  and  in  both  cases  politics  was  an
inescapable component of its mission. 
The idea that distinctions between the social and the political had collapsed as a
result of war was shared also by an increasing number of artists and writers outside of
radical political circles. In contrast to French writer Julien Benda's assertion, made in
1927, that explicit political commitment had resulted in a 'treason of the intellectuals,'133
María  Zambrano,  for  example,  former  FUE  activist  and  one  of  the  most  noted
philosophical students of José Ortega y Gasset, saw direct engagement in social and
political battles as a return to the Greek origins of western philosophical tradition which
had involved 'intellectuals' using their faculties to improve the life of the community.134
Even Gaya's  close friend and colleague Juan Gil-Albert,  a poet  who rarely included
overt political statements in his writing, found it hard to accept a categorical division
between the social and the political. In an open letter exchange with Gaya, published in
the June 1937 issue of Hora de España, Gil-Albert suggested that the the social and the
political must rather be seen as inextricably interlinked in a dynamic developmental
process.135 Thus understood, politics could be a positive and unifying element benefiting
artistic creation as much as society as a whole. For how, Gil-Albert asks in the same
exchange, may future peoples achieve the collaboration that is expressed in the Gothic
Cathedrals or the Parthenon – works not so much of 'collective art' as a form of 'spiritual
132 Renau, Josep. Función Social, 57f. Malraux thesis was presented at the First International Congress of
Writers for the Defence of Culture in Paris in June 1935, and cited in Nueva Cultura, 5 (June-July 
1935), 3.
133 See Timms, E. 'Treason of the Intellectuals? Benda, Benn, and Brecht.' in Timms, E. and Collier, P. 
Visions and Blueprints, 18-33. Benda's position came to represent a camp opposing 'propaganda art' 
but Benda himself would not remain completely aloof from socially engaged debates and was present 
at the Second International Congress of Writers for the Defence of Culture in war-time Spain.
134 Zambrano, M. Los intelectuales, 109.
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'Cartas bajo un mismo techo a J. G.-A. Hora de España, 6 (June 1937). Also in Gamonal Torres, M. 
Arte y Política, 217-223 (see esp. 221)
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unity' – if not through politics?136 Art too needed a new social order, conducive to the
creation of  harmony and  beauty.  To Gil-Albert's  mind,  this  order  was 'undoubtedly'
socialism.137 Such comments, coming from someone who was still excluded from the
Hora de España group for  'excessive aestheticism' in 1938,138 indicate  the extent  to
which progressive Spanish artists and writers accepted, at least on paper, the idea that
politics was an inescapable part of war-time artistic production.
If the ideas presented by Renau and Gaya in relation to poster production drew
on two different conceptions of artistic creation, they were, however, entirely united in
their critique of the quality of posters produced in Spain at this time. In his December
1936  lecture,  Renau  commended  Spanish  artists  for  quickly  adapting  to  the  new
conditions obtaining after the July rebellion. Although the majority had, according to
Renau, been caught unawares by events, city walls had 'vibrated' with colour within
only a few days. But from there on progress had stopped, if not reversed as a result of
the work of 'amateurs' of all kinds.139 What was particularly grating – and here Renau
would be seconded by Gaya – was that the style used for revolutionary posters was
effectively the same as that seen in commercial advertising.140 As noted in the previous
chapter, virtually all poster artists were free to portray their subject matter any way they
choose, and many professionals did, in fact, continue to use a style first elaborated in
advertising. In Renau's view, such overlaps between commercial and political practices
severely limited  political  posters'  efficacy.  War  was  not  a  car  brand  or  a  luxurious
perfume, he said, and to use sterile marketing conventions associated with such products
to portray a heroic historical moment was to deprive it of all human drama. Moreover,
the plethora of symbolisms seen in early poster production threatened to 'asphyxiate' the
living memory of this moment, thus further reducing its lasting psychological impact.141
What was needed, then, was a new direction for poster production, and above all a new
form, capable of adequately representing the reality of the 'popular' revolution. 
Similar  observations  were  later  made  at  the  aforementioned  International
Congress  of  Writers  for  the  Defence  of  Culture  in  July 1937,  where  the  collective
136 Ibid., 221.
137 Ibid.
138 Salaün, S. La poesía, 364. Salaün does not give a more precise idea of the timing or circumstances of 
this exclusion. He only say that it happened when Hora de España moved to Barcelona, which was in 
January 1938.
139 This comment is in itself indicative of the tension inherent in progressive intellectuals' – or at least 
Renau's – endorsement of amateur art production as a progressive phenomenon in principle.  
140 Renau, Josep. Función Social, 66-69. See also Gaya, R. 'Carta de un pintor a un cartelista'.
141 Ibid.
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statement presented by the Spanish delegation maintained that it was not enough for
artists simply to include a particular set of political symbols for their work to qualify as
revolutionary.  New works  of  art  had  to  reflect  the  deepest  essence  of  the moment,
capture its inner meaning, and achieve in both content and form a vivid correspondence
with the values that guided the popular energy now released.142 How exactly this would
be achieved was not explained. In his lecture on the poster, Renau had pointed to what
he believed to  be a  magisterial  example in this regard:  the poster  art  of  the Soviet
Union. Using innovative designs by the Stenberg brothers and montage artist Gustav
Klucis  as  reference  points,  he  suggested  that  Soviet  posters  had  superseded  their
commercial past and played a central role in the construction of a new society.143 Renau
furthermore – if somewhat dubiously – credited Soviet poster artists with the invention
of the 'photographic poster,'  which may have been imitated,  he said,  in  commercial
contexts  but  'proved'  that  the  political  poster  could  develop  independently  of
capitalism.144 Soviet poster design certainly offers an empirical basis for such a claim,
but then there is never, regardless of what society we consider, a simple determining
correspondence  between  aesthetic  innovation  and  socio-economic  development.  As
Renau recognised elsewhere in his talk, more or less independent factors relating to
culture and technology invariably come into play too. At any rate, the importance of
new technology was stressed again in Renau's exchange with Gaya, who had remarked
that photomontage as a rule was too 'cold' to stir the feelings of fighters defending the
Republic.145 In  his  reply  Renau  suggested  that  the  masters  of  the  art  form  clearly
demonstrated how it offered expressive potential comparable to the paintings admired
by Gaya, and that artists needed to update the form as well as content of their work if
they  were  to  remain  relevant  to  their  own  times.  'Yesterday  Goya,  today  John
Heartfield', he declared to sum up his position on the matter, returning once more to the
modernist dictum that a new life must be accompanied by a new art.146
Regardless of technique used, the only aesthetic appropriate to revolutionary art
was, Renau affirmed once more, a form of realism. He also made more explicit than
142 Gamonal Torres, M. Arte y Política, 232-239, esp. 234f. 
143 Renau, Josep. Función Social, 62-65. The examples of Soviet posters are taken from the second of the
Nueva Cultura instalment (May 1937, 16f), since a note accompanying the 1976 book edition states 
that the posters appearing in the book are not the same as those originally used to illustrate the 
argument (whereas it is reasonable to assume that the one appearing in Nueva Cultura are).
144 Ibid. The claim that Soviet artists were definitely the first to incorporate photography in posters seems
difficult to verify, since photomontage was developed by different but unconnected groups in Europe 
at the same time. See Ades, D. Photomontage.
145 Gaya, R. 'Carta de un pintor a un cartelista'.
146 Renau, J. 'Contestación a Ramón Gaya'. Cf. Rancière, J. 'The Aesthetic Revolution and its Outcomes'.
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before that the realism he had in mind did not signify superficial fidelity to visual reality
or a return to nineteenth-century schools of painting. Drawing on ideas which had been
prevalent in progressive European debates throughout the interwar period, and in the
1930s became associated above all with modernist Marxist writers like Bertholt Brecht,
Renau  stated  instead  that  realism,  deriving  from  an  'impulse  to  analyse  reality',
essentially meant adopting an 'active position before the world'.147 Again, as discussed in
relation to the documentary photograph and photomontage, the task was to transform
the world as much as to know it.  And it was only within a realist aesthetic,  Renau
continued,  that  art  could  actually  meet  the  multiple  demands  now  placed  on  it;
'authentic' realism operates within the constraints of historical necessity but within those
constraints  achieves  a  'cosmic  eloquence'  carrying  a  value  beyond  the  momentary
satisfaction of specific needs.148 
This  was not  the language of exclusionary Stalinist  dogma, nor was Renau's
lecture unrepresentative of the attitudes informing the work of other artists and writers
supporting the Popular Front. The importance of realism – at least in the general sense
of  adhering  to  an  'objective'  concept  of  reality  –  was  underscored  by non-Marxist
authors too. In Zambrano's view, outlined in the pamphlet published in Chile in early
1937 and later echoed in the collective statement made at the International Congress of
Writers that summer, a disregard for reality was precisely the critical ideological factor
making the alliance between the bourgeoisie and fascism possible in the first place. This
alliance,  she  maintained,  was  a  product  of  the  frustration  and  anxiety  felt  as  the
bourgeoisie  failed  to  realise  the  untenable  ideals  it  had  claimed  to  embody.  The
idealisation of life, which had eventually led to 'man' proclaiming himself identical with
his ideal (the masculine pronoun is undeniably an accurate reflection of the historical
conception referred to here), had begun with the Renaissance but taken on particular
importance for the bourgeoisie, which considered itself an unrivalled force of progress.
For this reason the inevitable clash between ideals and reality – that is, between ideals
and the 'contradictory wealth of life', as Zambrano puts it – produced in the bourgeoisie
acute dissatisfaction. Once this tension became unbearable, the stage was set for fascism
to emerge. To its followers, fascism presented itself as a new beginning, but in reality,
Zambrano maintained, it was merely an expression of bourgeois impotence to address
an unsustainable social situation. Indeed, as a solution relying on authoritarian control,
147 Renau, Josep. Función Social, 52. Cf. Bertolt Brecht's response to literary conceptions of Georg 
Lukács in Various authors. Aesthetics and Politics, 68-86 (esp. 82).
148 Ibid., 60.
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fascism only highlighted the ruling classes' historical limitations. Even so, the effect was
that the bourgeoisie's inability to develop as class now halted the development of all.149
To escape this ideological trap, anti-fascist politics had to replace myth with fact, and
roundly accept, as Zambrano insisted, that only through a recognition of the constraints
of reality can humanity find its freedom.150 
The  wider  currency of  the  ideas  that  Renau  was  disseminating may also  be
detected in  his  description of  the place of tradition in revolutionary art.  Elaborating
further on 'new realism,' Renau departed from his critical pre-war stance on the Spanish
cultural heritage and suggested that national precedents must exert a central formative
influence in the development of a new aesthetic. This represented perhaps the greatest
shift  in  Renau's  cultural  vision  during  the  1930s,  and  meant  that  the  revolutionary
ambition to elaborate entirely new cultural values was replaced by a more moderate
vision allowing for greater preservation of tradition in coming cultural transformations.
In his retrospective account of his work as General Director of Fine Arts, published in
1980, Renau suggested that his wartime endorsement of a canon that he and his Nueva
Cultura  colleagues  had  previously rejected  was a direct  consequence  of  the  attacks
launched on Spain by the rebels and their international backers. Just as one can have a
heated discussion with a friend but feel strong affection for the same friend should he or
she be found bleeding in the street, he said, so did the threat of physical destruction,
evident not least in the bomb damage suffered by the Prado Museum, produce in him a
greater sense of appreciation for that artistic heritage.151 And if the situation forced a re-
evaluation  of  these  works,  it  also  generated  a  new awareness  of  their  relevance  to
contemporary culture.152 Unsurprisingly, considering the nature of pre-war reforms, such
comments harmonized with the predominant mood in progressive cultural circles. The
collective statement at the International Congress of Writers, again, seconded the view
that an art of the new must build on tradition. There was, the authors hastened to add,
much  in  the  past  that  was contaminated  with  'utopianism',  'pacifism',  and  'puerile
idealism,' yet the bourgeois humanist heritage could still, in large parts, be appropriated
for a progressive cause and serve as a component in a dynamic process fomenting a new
149 Indeed, the actual fascist salute is in itself 'a sign to order a halt', she observed. Zambrano, M. Los 
intelectuales, 98.
150 Zambrano, M. 'Los intelectuales en el drama de España' in Los intelectuales, 88-108 (see especially 
90-95, 98).
151 Renau, J. Arte en Peligro, 15f.
152 Ibid.
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humanism in Spain.153
To Renau, it was the Golden Age painters, and Velázquez above all, who could
teach an important humanist lesson to contemporary artists. In Velázquez’s portraits of
jesters  and  court  servants,  painting departed  from idealised  conceptions  of  classical
beauty to offer in their  place a realistic image affirming the inviolable value of the
individual.154 Here  was  Spanish  realism  in  its  most  'heroic'  form,  disregarding
convention and daring to 'paint and live without dreaming, but with eyes open to the
faintest palpitation, to the most profound meaning of reality.'155 It  was a 'naked foot'
treading  the  'rough  and  concrete  terrain'  of  the  real  world.  Crucially,  this  art  was
powerful enough to transcend the decadence of subsequent centuries to teach artists of
the twentieth.156 In the view of Renau and his creative colleagues, the revival of such
painting would be incompatible with the fantasies that underpinned fascism. Moreover,
although Renau does not himself emphasise the distinction, we should note that as an
aesthetic this also contrasts significantly with other doctrines of representation in other
'revolutionary' societies. Renau’s realism would celebrate a 'new man' emerging from
the trenches, but rather than presenting an ideal celebrating super-human abilities (as
seen in the Soviet Union as well as under various forms of fascism), it sought to foster
solidarity  and  compassion  through  a  holistic  portrayal  of  human  characteristics,
including imperfections and flaws. 
As the debates highlighted above show, Renau's analysis of the poster contained
several ideas that were broadly representative of progressive Republican conceptions of
art in war-time Spain. First of all, such art could not be divorced from politics. To work
towards  a  social  goal,  art  had  to  engage  with  politics  in  a  process  of  constructive
collaboration. This did not mean that Republican cultural producers suddenly adhered to
prescriptive programmes deriving from political dogma. Rather, what guided their work
was a greater degree of political awareness, an abstract vision, and a sense of the values
that  had  to  underpin  a  future  Republican  society.157 Second,  to  communicate  these
153 Gamonal Torres, M. Arte y Política, 232-239, esp. 237f.
154
 Renau, Josep. Función Social, 70-75. Renau stated that much of his reading of Spanish Golden Age 
painting was taken from the Spanish art historian Enrique Lafuente, who was an expert on Velázquez, 
above all. If the stress on the individual seems to break with the otherwise dominant concern in 
Renau's writing with the collective, see page 115 above for André Gide's thesis concerning the relation
between the collective and the individual, as explained at the Paris congress of 1935. 
155 Ibid., 73. 
156 Ibid., 74.
157 Serge Salaün has also emphasised, with further reference to the literary scholar Juan Cano Ballesta, 
that the majority of Spanish artists and writers engaging with progressive politics during the 
Republican years were primarily moved by humanist and humanitarian sentiments, not ideological 
doctrine. See Salaün, S. 'Las vanguardias políticas: la cuestión estética' in Pérez Bazo, J. (Ed.) La 
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values,  artists  had  to  adopt  some  form of  realism.  Again,  the  ambition  was  not  to
produce reductive accounts of contemporary life, but to give adequate expression to the
many complexities of historical reality. Realism was moreover perceived to counter the
mysticism underpinning reaction and to represent, in its portrayal of the 'richness' of
life, a 'humanist' aesthetic. Both aspects carried critical weight during the war, when the
Spanish civil population was the target of military attacks of unprecedented brutality
and inhumanity. In such circumstances, artists and writers were naturally moved by a
desire to bear witness, to denounce the perpetrators of violence, and to foster sympathy
for the victims. To adopt a realist language in the face of tragedy was, in other words,
itself  an  act  of  resistance.  As  such,  realist  art  conveyed  hope,  too;  it  constituted  a
recognition of human values in defiance of faceless power. And if the redemptive vision
outlined  was  in  some  cases  (as  in  Renau  and  Zambrano)  recognisably  modernist,
especially in its celebration of a 'new man' making new forms of living conceivable, it
did not, like modernist cultural projects pursued in totalitarian states, subordinate this
'new  man'  to  any  supreme  doctrinal  categories  of  History  or  Nation.  Rather  than
preaching conformity as  a  means  of  overcoming the discontents  of  modernity,  they
advocated solidarity in response to an imperfect reality and envisioned an art sensitive
to the irreducible value of human diversity. 
Depictions of a modern and progressive Republic
The art form arguably best placed to encapsulate Renau's conception of 'new realism',
not least because its indexical qualities rendered it uniquely faithful to unadorned visual
reality,  was photography.  It  is  significant,  then,  that  where Renau did have a direct
influence on state-sponsored graphic production, he favoured photo-based visual work
above  others.  As  most  state-sponsored  cultural  initiatives  were  shaped  by  external
organisations operating with a great degree of creative freedom, however, the specific
instances where his preferences  are consistently visible are restricted to leaflets and
posters produced in the name of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Public
Instruction and Fine Arts, as well as the elaborate photomurals that were included in the
Republican pavilion at the important  Exposition Internationale des Arts et Techniques
dans  la  Vie  Moderne,  held  in  Paris  in  1937.  This  exposition  was  fundamentally
conceived as a celebration of human knowledge, especially as expressed through the
Vanguardia en España, 223. See also Cano Ballesta, J. La poesía española entre pureza y revolución 
(1920-1936) (Madrid: Siglo Veintiuno de España Editores, 1996).
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union of art and technology. But the climate of the time, marked by the rapid demise of
the  idea  of  progress  and  the  hostile  posturing  of  totalitarian  regimes,  turned  the
commercial  show  into  a  propaganda  competition  where  different  nations  primarily
aimed to project a distinct political and cultural image.158 In this context, the Republican
government sought to use its participation as an opportunity to portray the Republic as a
modern and progressive state. To further this ambition, Renau based his contribution to
the Republican pavilion on photography, an art form which he deemed uniquely placed
to illustrate both aspects of  the message thus projected.  But  before considering this
work in more detail, we should first note that photography was not only prominent in
propaganda campaigns abroad, but used in various publications at home too.
When working on governmental leaflets and posters for domestic consumption,
Renau typically collaborated with the Polish-born typographer Mauricio Amster. Amster
had come to Madrid in 1930, directly after having finished his studies in Berlin, where
he had been exposed to the influence of artists like George Grosz and John Heartfield.
His  relocation  resulted  from  an  invitation  from  his  childhood  friend  and  likewise
graphic designer Mariano Rawicz, who had worked for various progressive publishing
houses  in  Spain  since 1928 (especially Hoy and Cenit,  which  sought  to  follow the
model set by Malik, the German publishing house founded in 1917 by John Heartfield
and  his  brother  Wieland Herzfelde).  Together  Amster  and Rawicz  introduced to  the
Spanish capital the design language of magazines like USSR in Construction and A-I-Z.
In autumn 1936, Amster was sent to the front but was soon discharged because of his
short-sightedness. During the same period he had joined the PCE, and after his military
discharge was offered work in the Ministry of Public Instruction, first in relation to the
Prado evacuations, and then as Director of Publications.159
Photography was the preferred medium of illustration for Amster as much as
Renau.  In  terms  of  the  work  Amster  was  commissioned  to  do  by  the  Republican
authorities,  this  can  first  be  seen  in  the  richly  illustrated  leaflet  describing  the
agricultural  decree of  7  October 1936 (mentioned in chapter  6),  where some of the
photography displays unusual angles of the kind first associated with Soviet avant-garde
artist Alexander Rodchenko.160 Similar photo-based leaflets were later published by the
158 Rosón, M. 'Fotomurales del Pabellón Español de 1937. Vanguardia artística y misión politica' GOYA, 
319-20 (2007), 282f. See also Ades, D. (Ed.) Art and Power: Europe under the Dictators, 1930-1935 
(London, Thames and Hudson, 1995).
159 Various authors. Mauricio Amster: Tipógrafo (Valencia: IVAM, 1997).
160 Rodchenko would often use extreme bottom-up or top-down perspectives. For an analytical account of
contemporary Soviet photography, see Tupitsyn, M. The Soviet Photograph, 1924-1937 (Yale 
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culture and education ministry – a good example would be the one made in conjunction
with  Children's  Week  (Semana  del  Niño),  the  Christmas-related  propaganda  event,
organised in January 1937, highlighting the Republic's concern for children (mentioned
above).161 Amster would also be responsible for the design of a graphically original set
of posters announcing the creation of the Worker Institutes and children's colonies, a set
where each poster included a series of photographs showing the viewer different aspects
of everyday life at the particular institution (a feature which may well have had huge
practical significance as thousands of parents took the agonising decision over whether
or not to send their children to an unknown destination for the remainder of the war).
The most important work published by the wartime culture and education  ministry,
however, and the one which allegedly made Amster most proud in his later years, was
the 'anti-fascist' primer used by the Cultural Militias in their front-line teaching.  Here
illustrations  consisted  of  photomontages,  to  which  one  or  two colours  were  added.
According to art historian Patricia Molins, the colouring is indicative of the influence of
Renau [Fig. 25].162 But, as Molins also notes, more unequivocal evidence of Renau's
involvement can be found in the inclusion of photographs from Nueva Cultura's special
issue on the politicised 1937 version of the Valencian  Fallas – photographs taken by
Renau himself and in all likelihood handed over to Amster in person.163 At any rate, the
montages provide clear visual reinforcement of the slogans that readers were asked to
interpret, and moreover introduced them to the faces of key political figures of that time.
Seen  from  this  perspective,  the  decision  to  use  this  particular  technique  for  the
illustrations no doubt owed a lot to its accessibility and pedagogical value. Yet placed in
the  context  of  Amster's  and  Renau's  artistic  backgrounds,  as  well  as  the  latter's
theoretical endorsements of photography as a progressive art form, it is equally clear
that the inclusion of photomontage was also informed by a more generalised desire to
link the Republican state to an idea of cultural modernity.
The  most  elaborate  manifestation  of  this  desire  is  found  in  the  Republican
pavilion constructed for the Paris Expo in summer and autumn 1937. Several scholarly
studies have shown how both the building and its contents constitute landmarks in the
University Press: New Haven, 1996). 
161 See, for example, Ministerio de Instrucción Pública y Bellas Artes. Luchamos por una infancia feliz. 
Amster's name does not appear on the leaflet, but looking at the style and considering that he was the 
main graphic designer for the ministry, there can be no doubt that he was responsible for the lay out. 
162 Although Molins does not say so explicitly, she is presumably thinking of the montages Renau 
produced for Estudios before the war. Various authors. Mauricio Amster, 196.
163 Ibid. Molins does not speculate on whether Amster got the images straight from Renau, but 
considering that this would have been easily arranged, it must be considered likely.
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history of modernist architecture and art in Spain.164 The functional structure designed
by Josep Lluís  Sert  and Luis  Lacasa met the need for  a cost-effective building that
emphasised the modernity of the Republic, while the collaboration of renowned artists
like Joan Miró, Julio González, and Alexander Calder, as well as Pablo Picasso (who
painted  Guernica  for  the  occasion)  ensured  that  the  Republic’s  contribution  would
receive the public  attention that  the Popular  Front government   was counting on to
support  its  vital  ongoing  diplomatic  efforts  to  break  the  Republic's  international
isolation.165 Less frequently discussed by that scholarship – at least until recently – are
the  numerous  photomurals  designed by a team led  by Renau.  Covering  two of  the
pavilion’s three floors, they constituted, as art historian Jordana Mendelson has pointed
out, the greatest visual mass of the exhibition.166 The murals provided the backdrop to
two  of  the  Pavilion's  five  thematic  sections,167 contextualising  and  guiding  visitors'
reading of  the  exhibition materials.  The  first,  considered  the  most  important  by the
pavilion's chief curator, university rector José Gaos, showcased different folkloric crafts
from Spain's  rural  regions.  Renau's  photographic  compositions  were  here  relatively
simple, involving mainly maps, landscapes and portraits of rural 'types'. This focus on
rural  culture  was  criticised  by  some  Spanish  observers  at  the  time,  not  least  for
seemingly undermining the Republic's claim to modernity. Yet in terms of their content,
such  images  carried  clear  references  to  a  typical  and  eminently  modern  twentieth
century nation-building project – especially prominent in the 1920s and 1930s – which
saw the state increasingly map out and define its population according to ethnographic
categories.  That  photography,  as  a  form widely associated with objectivity,  was the
dominant medium used to present such ethnographic knowledge further underscored the
link between the folkloric presentation and modern science. But it is also important to
note that the organisers of the Pavilion, Renau among them, placed this section within a
larger  political  narrative  highlighting  the  Republic's  progressive  and  modernising
164 See, for example, Freedberg, C. The Spanish Pavilion at the Paris World's Fair of 1937 (New York: 
Garland, 1986); Martín Martín, F. El pabellón español en la Exposición Universal de París en 1937 
(Sevilla: Universidad de Sevilla, 1983); and Alix Trueba, J. Pabellón español, Exposición 
Internacional de París, 1937 (Madrid: Ministerio de Cultura, 1987). Bibliography as listed in 
Mendelson, J. Documenting Spain, 125.
165 In addition to literature in the footnote above, see also Cabañas Bravo, M. Josep Renau, and Cabañas 
Bravo, M. 'Renau y el pabellón español de 1937 en París, con Picasso y sin Dalí' for extensive detail 
on the particular administrative tasks co-ordinated by Renau. 
166 Mendelson, J. Documenting Spain, 126.
167 The five sections making up the Spanish Republican exhibition were centred on: folklore, Popular 
Front politics, contemporary art from Spain, contemporary art by internationally renowned Spanish 
artists residing in Paris (centre piece being Picasso's Guernica), and performance and film (located on 
the patio).
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intentions.  In  this  way  the  Republic  could  distance  itself  from  its  conservative
opponents and celebrate a plurality of regional traditions without ascribing to these a
timeless national identity.168
The second thematic section shaped by Renau's photomurals introduced visitors
to  aspects  of  the  Republic's  war  policy  and  reform  programme.  Topics  like  land
distribution, educational reform, and the protection of the artistic heritage (the latter also
a topic of two detailed talks by Renau169), were explained through a complex series of
visual illustrations, combining texts, images, and statistical graphs. In contrast to the
folkloric section, many of the compositions used for these murals count among Renau's
most formally advanced. His illustration of the Misiones Pedagógicas – of questionable
actuality since the organisation had virtually ceased its  activities all  together by this
point170 – was singled out for praise in article by photographer and critic Gisèle Freund,
published on 15 March the following year.171 Again, as Freund also pointed out, the very
use of photomontage for propaganda purposes was in itself a quintessentially modern
state practice.172 Though first exploited by the Soviet Union, it was quickly adopted by
states of various ideological hues, and the Paris Expo as a whole effectively became a
showcase of photo-based exhibition techniques. In theory this meant that Renau could
use it to pay homage to Soviet pioneers like El Lissitzky without the form of his work
necessarily carrying a clear – and in the event, diplomatically damaging – ideological
charge tying the politics of the Republic to international communism.173 But here again
we must return to the fact that the goal of Renau's representation of Spanish Popular
Front reforms was not only to highlight the Republic's credentials as a modern European
state,  but  also to  link its  modernity with an ideological  commitment  to  progressive
liberal politics with a strong humanist content. This coupling of modernity and humanist
values constituted the foundation of the image that the Republican government sought
to convey. To Renau, this ambition squared perfectly with the unique representational
168 Both Rosón and Mendelson discuss how rural images were used by Republicans and Francoists in 
different ways. See Rosón, M. 'Fotomurales del Pabellón Español', 291f, and Mendelson, J. 
Documenting Spain, 172-183.
169 The first was delivered at the end of July and the second the end of November 1937. For Renau's 
account of these, as well as extracts from one of the texts prepared, see  Arte en Peligro. 
170 Mendelson, J. Documenting Spain, 164f.
171 Ibid., 144. The article was entitled 'La photographie à l'Exposition' and originally appeared in Arts et 
metiers graphiques, 62 (1938), 37-41.
172 Ibid., 143.
173 Ibid., 125-183. Mendelson's chapter on the Republican Pavilion focuses to a large degree on the 
political ambiguities that resulted from Renau's use of styles and imagery that may be linked to his 
political pre-war oeuvre. For contemporary statements highlighting the importance of not being linked
to the Soviet Union, see Ángel Ossorio's comments in Cabañas Bravo, M. 'Renau y el pabellón 
español de 1937 en París, con Picasso y sin Dalí', 156.
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qualities of photography. As his artistic practice and thoughts on 'new realism' would
suggest, photography was, in his mind, intrinsically suited to the task of synthesising the
modern and humanist aspects of the progressive Republican vision.
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8. EPILOGUE: PROPAGANDA AGAINST ALL THE 
ODDS (1938-1939)
From the end of 1937, as a result of material shortage and the demoralisation of the
civilian population which was well aware of the Republic’s international isolation, this
progressive  vision  of  the  Republic  became  increasingly  difficult  to  sustain.  Rebel
advances meant that  refugees  swelled urban centres, and in addition to housing and
sanitation problems resulting from overcrowding, larger  cities (especially Barcelona)
began to suffer acute food shortages. The Republic was unable to make up the lack
through imports, partly because sea connections were cut off by Franco, partly because
Non-Intervention meant that  the Republic,  with few exceptions, had to pay over the
odds for military materiel, leaving it short of funds for anything else. Non-Intervention
was also the deep cause of a military situation that had become increasingly dire. The
North had fallen to Franco in summer of 1937, and with it vital industrial resources.
This  prompted  a  government  move (including Renau  and  his  family)  to  Barcelona,
where Juán Negrín, Prime Minister from May 1937, tried to exert greater control over
the  Republic’s  remaining centre  of  war  industry.  But  the arms  embargo  and  erratic
French border policy entailed severe limitations for Republican defence. This became
particularly clear at Teruel, which was taken by Republican forces on 7 January 1938,
after intense fighting in some of the worst winter conditions that Spain had ever seen.
The town was lost again less than two months later, together with precious materiel and
nearly 15,000 troops. What happened at Teruel encapsulated the problems from which
the Republic could never break free. Despite having built a competent fighting force in
record time, the material inferiority imposed by a one-sided arms embargo placed the
Republic at  an insurmountable disadvantage.  It  could not win the war militarily,  by
1938 that  much was absolutely clear;  and hope even for Republican survival  in the
medium term began to be eroded with every new setback.
Events in spring 1938 made the situation increasingly desperate on all fronts.
Barcelona, which had been target of mass-bombing in December 1937, saw a second
wave of saturation bombing by Italian planes in March. No part of the city was spared –
even hotels with foreign correspondents and wealthy areas were hit – though poorer
areas, crammed with refugees, bore the brunt of the attack and thus of the suffering.1 For
1 Graham, H. The Spanish Republic at War, 351.
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the first time in the war, Catalonia would also be directly threatened by the rebel armies,
as Franco amassed all available fire power to break through the Aragon front shortly
after  the  recapture  of  Teruel.  The  northern  wing  of  the  rebel  advance  reached  the
Catalan town of  Lleida at  the beginning of  April,  then the power station at  Tremp,
temporarily  blacking  out  Barcelona  and  reducing  industrial  output  thereafter.
Meanwhile its central forces continued towards the coast of Castellón province in the
Valencia region (then Levante).  On 15 April  they reached Vinaroz (Vinaròs)  on the
Mediterranean coast, cutting the remaining Republican territory in two.
The worsening situation inevitably strained political collaboration at all levels.
Negrín’s public war policy was one of  resistance and a widened 'national unity' against
foreign  intervention  in  Spain,  since  only  continued  military  resistance  might  force
Franco to treat, thus enabling the conditions for a meaningful negotiated peace for the
Republic (as was Negrín's plan, for which he was already attempting to negotiate in
secret). The PCE supported Negrín resistance policy as the only available strategy, other
than outright surrender. The PCE was the only party which by virtue of its discipline
managed to  display a  relative  united front  here,  at  least  among its  ideological  core
members. Most other organisations, including PSOE-UGT and the CNT, were deeply
divided over the issue of continued military resistance, and internal discord would only
intensify as further dislocations and material deprivation ensued. Divisions became very
apparent at cabinet level, too, leading to a cabinet crisis and the formation, on 5 April, of
a new government in which Indalecio Prieto exited and Negrín took over from him the
war  portfolio  (while  still  also  remaining in  his  post  as  Prime Minister).  Prieto  had
become openly pessimistic and defeatist after Teruel, as well as increasingly critical in
public of the PCE and how its organisational proselytism had damaged the PSOE. In the
build-up  to  the  cabinet  reshuffle,  Prieto  had  also  been  publicly  criticised  by  Jesús
Hernández, who had thereby made himself guilty of breaching ministerial protocol. As a
result Hernández too lost his cabinet post in the reshuffle, which in turn meant the era of
Renau and his colleagues at the Ministry of Public Instruction and Fine Arts reached its
end.2
After his resignation was confirmed on 22 April 1938, Renau took up the post of
Director of Graphic Propaganda at the General Commissariat of the Central Group of
Armies (which meant he effectively followed Hernández, who after exiting the cabinet
2 Ibid., 360-367. For an analysis focusing on the PCE's perspective on the cabinet crisis, see Hernández 
Sánchez, F. Guerra o Revolución, 369-379.
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was appointed as the Group's General  Commissar.).  Thus there commenced a phase
when  Renau  was  able  to  focus  more  on  graphic  arts  production.  Very  little
documentation about his activities in this role has survived, but we do have a number of
Renau’s posters produced during this new phase, and published almost exclusively by
the Subsecretariat  of Propaganda, part of the Ministry of the Interior.  Some of them
number  among  the  best  produced  during  the  entire  war.3 Maintaining  such  high
standards was doubly remarkable considering the material shortages now obtaining. But
if conditions were particularly challenging, the need for images that could boost military
and civilian morale was, at the same time, particularly acute. In this period, referred to
by himself as one of the most intense of his life, Renau faced the gargantuan task of
shoring up, against all psychological and material odds, the disintegrating hope of an
exhausted Republican population.4
Renau's initial approach to this formidable task may partly be deduced from an
article  he published a  little  earlier  on 16 February 1938 (that  is,  when he was  still
General Director of Fine Arts) in the Catalan daily  La Vanguardia. Entitled 'Between
life and death' (Entre la vida y la muerte), the article stressed that in the circumstances
they all faced the need for positive art was much greater and pressing than critical art.5
Artists had to remind audiences of the universal values championed by the Republic and
reiterate  that  the  stakes  of  the  conflict  went  beyond  the  survival  of  a  particular
government,   as  they concerned nothing less than the very possibility of  a  just  and
democratic future. To succumb to pessimism in the present was to betray this aspiration
and surrender to the enemy, ideologically as well as practically. 
If there was a moment when an optimistic tone may still have resonated, it was
during the initial stage of the battle of the Ebro in summer 1938,  which is indirectly
referenced in one of Renau's posters from this time. The battle objectives were to defend
Valencia from encroaching Francoist attack, to reconnect the two Republican zones, and
to prove to international observers that the Republic still retained substantial fighting
3 Again Renau's posters were likely, material situation permitting, to be distributed widely in the 
Republic. There is no precise data, but a official decree of 16 August 1938 stated that the Press and 
Propaganda Section of the General Commissariat – of which Renau formed a part – would be free to 
use all the resources of the Interior Ministry's Subsecretariat of Propaganda, and that it should 
distribute all material produced through the channels of the General Staff of the Republican Army. See
Cabañas Bravo, M. Josep Renau, 217. Scarcity of empirical material during this period of Renau's 
career is also noted by Cabañas (218).
4 Archivo Josep Renau (Valencia), 'Apuntes sueltos manuscritos y mecanografiados', 14/4.3. Renau also
comments on the scarcity in Ruipérez, M. 'Renau-Fontseré: Los carteles de la guerra civil', 16.
5 Renau, J. Entre la vida y la muerte' La Vanguardia (Suplemento de Arte y Arqueologia) 16 February 
1938, no page numbers.  
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capacity.  To these ends, a regrouped Republican army launched its  attack on enemy
positions across the Ebro river just past  midnight on 24-25 July.  The operation was
initially  a  success  and  generated  a  great  upswing  in  the  Republican  mood.  In
combination  with  the  mounting  international  crisis  over  German  claims  in
Czechoslovakia,  even  the  Republican  President  Manuel  Azaña thought  that  the  tide
might finally turn in favour of the Republic. Franco's counter attack was ferocious, and
the Ebro campaign turned into the greatest battle of the war. It involved Nazi Germany
and the Soviet  Union testing new weaponry and strategies,  especially in  the air,  as
nearly 3,000 planes participated in air clashes of a scale that would not be witnessed
again until the Battle of Britain in the early stages of the Second World War.6 Renau's
poster of this period, although it does not refer to the Ebro specifically,  was almost
certainly produced with it in mind, as its depiction of the centrality of aircraft to the
Republican  campaign  attests  [Fig.  26].  The  composition  shows  a  pilot  looking  up
towards  a  light  blue  sky in  which  he sees  a  squadron  of  Republican fighter  planes
forming  a  ‘V’ for  ‘Victory’.  The  man's  awe-inspired  expression  and  the  dynamic
formation of the squadron produce a sense of elation in the viewer, while the text 'today
more than ever'  (hoy más que nunca),  placed above the spelling out of 'Victory',  is
written among the clouds in a style which suggests that it is carried by the wind, further
reinforcing the general impression of lightness, optimism, and triumph. 
Another example of the positive propaganda advocated in Renau's  Vanguardia
article can be found in a poster made up of a photo collage of men and women arranged
against a green clenched fist and a red star [Fig. 27]. The poster is unsigned but was
probably made by Renau towards the end of the war.7 Apart from the tone, the form
reminds us of the fact that Renau’s article of February 1938 argued for the journalistic
photograph as the most powerful means to convey the positive values defended by the
Republic, while the absent signature could be explained by the fact that in late 1938 all
artists were told by the Subsecretariat of Propaganda to leave their work unsigned in
order to protect them from future reprisals.8 The people appearing in the poster are all –
6 Graham, H. The Spanish Civil War, 109f. See also Thomas, H. The Spanish Civil War, 813-824 (esp. 
821), and Graham, H. The Spanish Republic at War, 373f, 382.
7 Facundo Tomás Ferré maintains that this poster was indeed made by Renau. See Los Carteles 
Valencianos, 147.
8 Galdón i Casanoves, E. 'La salvaguarda d'un patrimoni per a la protecció ciutadana' in Aznar Soler, M.
(ed) Valencia, capital cultural de la República, 128. It should be noted, however, that Renau did sign 
other work made at the very end of the conflict. See reproductions in Cabañas Bravo, M. Josep Renau,
230-234. Another possible explanation of the absence of any signature is that it was made by a team. 
Either way, Renau's direct influence is highly likely, which is enough to make the poster relevant for 
the purposes of the argument here.
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with the exception of two nurses, a peasant, and three youths of undefined profession –
part of the armed forces. All are smiling, if not laughing. They seem relaxed, confident,
proud. Beneath the portraits, a text reads 'The popular army fights for the well-being,
happiness, and liberty of the Spanish people' (Por el bienestar, la felicidad y la libertad
del pueblo español, lucha el ejército popular).
However,  if  the  exuberance  of  the  'Victory'  poster  corresponded  to  a  brief
moment of optimism afforded by the early stages of the Ebro offensive, it is likely that
the undeniably kitsch celebration of the Popular Army in the unsigned poster jarred with
the feelings  of  many Republican civilians.  The relationship between army and rural
communities had been strained by increasing food requisitions, sometimes amounting to
plain theft, especially during the panicked flight of Republican troops from the Aragon
front. To compensate for military losses, the Republic also had to step up conscription.
This  meant  calling up  ever  younger  and older  drafts,  as  well  as  using increasingly
intrusive methods to track anyone trying to avoid military service.9 Tension between the
civilian population and army may well have been the reason for publishing the 'Popular
Army' poster in the first place, but considering the increasingly desperate situation faced
by a war-weary Republican citizenry, the message likely rang hollow.
At one level the Republic’s loss of credibility affected the communists most of
all, since they had largely built their wartime mass-support on the premise that the party
would guarantee victory.  Hence the PCE's rigid discipline and stoic adherence to an
apparently  inflexible  policy  of  resistance  could  only  be  maintained  at  increasing
political  cost.  'I  no  longer  believed  in  the  communists.  Their  language,  everyday
familiar language, was completely stereotyped; they reminded me too much of priests,
the same slogans day after day', Alvaro Delgado, an art student living in Madrid, later
recalled.10 Those who had joined during the war because of the party's military virtues
now  left  in  droves.11 But  the  political  crisis  also  affected  the  legitimacy  of  the
Republican  project  as  a  whole.  The  increasing  militarisation  of  daily  life  was
undermining the  Republic's  democratic  raison d'etre,  and its  legitimacy was further
eroded by the failure adequately to protect its population from the multiple pressures
and dislocations caused by war. Death, hunger, and disease did not only diminish hope,
but also signalled that the state was no longer able to fulfil its obligations – in the sense
9 Graham, H. The Spanish Republic at War, 352f, 375.
10 Fraser, R. Blood of Spain, 487.
11 See figures in Hernández Sánchez, F. Guerra o Revolución, 246. The PCE was losing members fast 
already from the end of 1937, as membership figures in January 1938 were down by 46.8% (from 
339,682 to 180,821) compared to November 1937.
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of providing a minimum level  of welfare – towards those who had sacrificed in its
defence. It became increasingly difficult, as a result, to continue to present the Republic
as the embodiment of a credible progressive project.12
A tacit recognition of this erosion of legitimacy can be seen in another set of
posters that were also anonymous but in clear ways linked to Renau. Once again the
composition are, in the main, made up from montage, but what is particularly striking –
and  what  clearly  indicates  Renau's  involvement,  either  as  the  sole  designer  or  as
member  of  a  design  team –  is  that  the  constituent  photographs  are  combined  with
precisely  the  same  kind  of  statistical  graphs  that  could  be  seen  in  the  Republican
pavilion in Paris.13 One poster purports to display the mood of rural workers 'before' and
'after' the proclamation of the Republic, and explains the illustrated shift from misery to
joy  through  a  graph  indicating  the  scale  of  land  re-distribution  [Fig.  28].  Another
highlights the increase in the number of Republican maternity ward beds during the
reformist  years  of  1931-1933,  and  from  1936  onwards.  Together,  the  images  and
numbers thus aimed to remind the population of the real potential of a new social order
by pointing at concrete changes that the Republic had already achieved. Rather than a
passionate exultation of popular unity, they present a reasoned appeal for support. As
such, they effectively constitute a tacit admission of the distance now separating large
parts of the population from their leaders – a distance that would no doubt continue to
grow as the prospects of Republican survival faded. 
Renau's most eloquent celebration of the Spanish Republican project, produced
sometime in summer and/or autumn 1938, was also, in many ways, his most subdued. It
was conceived as a set of illustrations for the Republican government’s 'The Thirteen
Points of Victory',  proclaimed on 1 May 1938. 'The Thirteen Points'  was essentially
Negrín’s liberal constitutional blueprint with nationalist overtones aiming to broaden the
Republic's support domestically, especially among conservatives and Catholics uneasy
about the extensive influence Germany and Italy in Francoist Spain, while also, and
most  importantly,  serving  as  starting  point  for  renewed  diplomatic  efforts  to  force
Franco to consider a  negotiated peace.  The international  projection of  'The Thirteen
Points' was thus crucial, and in this context it is significant that Renau’s illustrations
were  intended  for  another  international  exhibition,  this  time  the  World  Fair  to  be
12 Graham, H. The Spanish Civil War, 106f.
13 The Hungarian photographer Francois Kollar photographed the contents of the Pavilion and 
reproductions of his images can be consulted in the library of the Museo Centro de Arte Reina Sofia in
Madrid. See also images reproduced in Mendelson, J. Documenting Spain, chapter 5 (especially 154).
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inaugurated in New York in summer 1939.14 The official ending of military hostilities in
Spain on 1 April meant that 'The Thirteen Points' would never be shown there, but they
were  nonetheless  reproduced  earlier  for  a  domestic  Republican  audience  and  still
constitute an important part of Renau's oeuvre.15 Moreover, although they were not the
last images he made during the war, they may be considered, for various reasons, to
represent an end point in the specific political and artistic journey charted in this thesis.
As we shall see, they marked the point when his radical politics found, as a response to
the encroaching violence of fascism, its most moderate and inclusive expression. 'The
Thirteen Points' was moreover the first work showing the full potential of Renau's skills
as a montage artist, even if those skills were here deployed, paradoxically, to an effect
that complicates the images' claim to realism.
If Renau's graphic work during the first stages of the war had aimed to foster a
broad  alliance  between  the  disparate  and  in  many cases  antagonistic  constituencies
making up the fractured social base of the Republican polity, 'The Thirteen Points' took
this  inclusive  strategy  to  its  logical  if  polemical  conclusion  [Fig.  29].  The  images
contain no party symbols or slogans.  Strictly speaking they are no longer necessary
because the meaning of each illustration is already encapsulated in the 'point' to which it
refers, and of course the inclusion of overtly ideologically combative images or texts
would have done little good in New York. Nevertheless the omission is still significant
in relation to the purely visual impression produced. As a result, despite illustrating a
concrete  political  blueprint,  the  images  acquire  a  universal  dimension.  Themes  like
democracy,  justice,  and  independence  are  represented  in  an  international  symbolic
language that would have appealed to a wide, heterogeneous audience both at home and
abroad. Through this open-endedness the 'Thirteen Points'  achieves a communicative
reach beyond the conventional confines of propaganda.16 
In technical terms, the illustrations for 'The Thirteen Points' contain some of the
most accomplished photomontages produced during the Republican period, and as a
whole the series can be said to represent, as Albert Forment claims, Renau's first work
14 For an investigation into the preparations that were made, see Murga Castro, I. 'El pabellón español de
1939: un proyecto frustrado para la Exposición Internacional de Nueva York' Archivo Español de Arte,
lxxxiii, 331 (July-September 2010), pp. 213-234. The initial proposal to make a set of montages for 
the occasion apparently came from Renau himself. See Forment, A. Josep Renau, 172. 
15 For a domestic audience he also produced produced a poster with small illustrations of each of the 
points, and a cover drawing for leaflet outlining the programme. See Cabañas Bravo, M. Josep Renau,
218-224, and Basilio, M. M. Visual Propaganda, 58-63. The reproductions shown here are from 
photographs of tests made with silver bromide, which are the only surviving copies of the images 
destined for New York. See Forment, A. Josep Renau, 172.
16 Cf. Forment, A. Josep Renau, 173.
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of full maturity.17 Much of the imagery is familiar from previous works, but there is a
sense in which the iconographical, technical, and rhetorical elements of Renau's first
years as a montage artist come together to produce a more refined result. Formative
foreign  influences  are  still  visible,  but  they have  been  incorporated  into  an  artistic
expression that is now genuinely and fully Renau's own. Ironically, perhaps, considering
the artist's  advocacy of realism, 'The Thirteen Points'  also reproduce,  albeit  in more
understated form, the oneiric quality seen in some of his pre-war work. The visual cues
– skies, seas, voting under the rainbow, the sheer fact that everything appears distant –
are all subtle but together generate an impression that the montages portray a series of
tranquil dreamscapes, surrealistic visions of an imagined future, rather than any actually
existing  reality.  But  then  again,  unrealised  desire  was,  of  course,  precisely  what
remained of the Republican attempt to create a more democratic and egalitarian Spain.
Whether this ties Renau's illustrations to the moment of impending defeat is an open
question;  in  essence  the  Republic  was  always  more  'real'  as  a  symbol  than  as  an
accomplished fact. 
After Spain: Renau in Mexico and Berlin
Despite the tenacity of the Republican forces, the Ebro offensive would end in another
defeat,  this  time  more  devastating  than  any  preceding  it  because  it  was  not  solely
military. For the retreat back across the river in November 1938 was not so much the
result of a final blow on the battlefield – though a shortage of arms and adequately
trained  men  had  once  again  placed  Republican  forces  as  a  massive  material
disadvantage – but rather the diplomatic blow incurred in September as  Britain  and
France signed the Munich agreement and thus opted to allow Hitler to dismember the
last  functioning  democracy  in  Europe  rather  than  take  a  stand  against  Nazi
expansionism. In so doing, they showed that they were willing to go to any lengths to
appease Hitler, which in turn deprived Negrín's policy of open-ended resistance of its
fundamental rationale, counting, as it did, on Britain and France soon being forced to
confront fascism's imperial intent as a threat to the continent as a whole.18
While the Ebro offensive did successfully block Franco's attack on Valencia, it
did not prevent the fall of Catalonia,  which occurred swiftly across the January and
February  of  1939.  Intense  war  weariness  and  loss  of  hope  had  left  the  civilian
17 Ibid., 172.
18 Graham, H. The Spanish Civil War, 110f.
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population  utterly  demoralised.  Resistance  to  advancing  rebel  troops  continued  but
could  do  nothing  to  halt  their  eventual  advance,  and  soon  hundreds  of  thousands
civilians, as well as military personnel, turned to flee across the Pyrenees into France.19
Among those fleeing were Renau and his family, more numerous since the birth
of his daughter, Julia (in March 1937). According to his own account, the artist had been
in his Barcelona studio working on a poster during the last days of January 1939 when
his third brother, Alejandro,20 a sergeant working for the Air Force, had come to look for
him. Renau was allegedly unaware of the fact that the rebels were just about to enter the
city, and the 'rescue mission' initiated by Alejandro, who had access to a pick-up truck,
managed to get the family, plus parts of Renau's library and archive, out of Barcelona at
the very last minute.21 In the second week of February, they crossed the border at Portús,
where Renau would commence a period of uninterrupted exile lasting 37 years. He was
first  interned, together with his brothers Juan and Alejandro, and thousands of other
Republican  refugees,  at  Argèles-sûr-Mer,  one  of  the  camps  set  up  on  the  freezing
beaches of France’s south east coast. About a month later, after receiving help from a
certain Miss Palmer of the Carnegie Institute, he was able to leave the camp and travel
to  Toulouse,  where  like  many  other  exiled  Republican  intellectuals,  he  received
financial aid from Pablo Picasso.22 Shortly thereafter, and as a prominent Republican
artist,  he  was  able  to  arrange  papers  to  go  with  his  immediate  family,  as  well  as
Manuela's  sister  and her  two children,  to  Mexico,  which had  opened  its  borders  to
Republicans and became one of the primary destinations for the Spanish intellectual
community in exile.23 
The Republic resisted militarily for another couple of months. The government
had also been forced into France after the fall of Catalonia, but Negrín flew back to the
Republican centre-zone with the intention of directing residual military resistance in a
safe zone until either the international climate changed, or, at the very least, to gain time
for an orderly evacuation of those most at risk of reprisals.  Negrin was also holding out
to force from Franco a a guarantee of no reprisals against the civilian population, a hope
that  was brutally quashed  with  Franco's  adoption of  the  so-called  'Law of  Political
Responsibilities in February 1939, and which provided the legal framework for blanket
19 Ibid. Thomas, H. The Spanish Civil War, 844-858.
20 Alejandro was the second child of José Renau Montoro and Matilde Berenguer Cortés.
21 Forment, A. Josep Renau, 175. See also Bellón, F. Josep Renau, 265-279, for further details on the 
Renau family's exit from Catalonia. 
22 Ibid. 176-179.
23 Boat departed from St Nazaire 6 May 1939. 
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repression  in  the  post-war  period.  Then,  in  March,  the  desperation  caused  by war-
weariness and material deprivation led a group of military leaders in Madrid to rebel
against Negrín in the mistaken belief that they would stand a better chance at getting
Franco to the negotiation table – a rebellion which sparked, in effect, a civil war within
the civil war. The negotiation attempt came to nought, and the impossible situation thus
facing the Republic led its commanding officers to surrender. Franco declared the war
officially over on 1 April 1939, though the vanquished would still suffer persecution and
discrimination for several decades to come.24 
Once in Mexico, Renau would embark on new political art projects, especially in
the form of mural  paintings,  while  continuing to make a living through commercial
poster  production.25 From  1949,  he  would  also  work  on  a  montage  series,  only
completed  twenty years  later,  called  The American  Way of  Life.  The  series  may be
considered his magnum opus, yet Renau found no publisher for it in Mexico. Instead, it
would first be partially published in 1954 in East Germany, where Renau also moved
after being offered, in 1958, a job as an illustrator for East German state television. That
he was prepared to leave his life, including his family, in Mexico, has to be explained
with reference to a number of factors, including the unsatisfying nature of his poster
work and a deteriorating relation with Manuela (who, together with their two youngest
children, nonetheless reunited with him in East Berlin in 1959).26 Renau would engage
in a series of film and mural based projects in East Germany, but acclimatisation proved
difficult both professionally and in terms of private life – partly because of cultural and
linguistic  barriers,  partly  because  of  the  East  German  Communist  Party's  dogmatic
approach to art.27 Even so Renau would remain in a resident of the country until his
death in 1982.28 From 1976, one year after Franco's death, he started making occasional
return trips to Valencia, where he was warmly welcomed by a progressive generation
trying to recover a repressed past. Yet his engagement with cultural life within Spain
would not be resumed in any form comparable to that of the Republican years. His exile
24 For a recent and detailed analysis of the Casado rebellion, see Viñas, A. & Hernández Sánchez, F. El 
desplome de la República: la verdadera historia del fin de la guerra civil (Madrid: Crítica, 2010). For 
an analytical overview of the repression that followed the war, see Graham, H. The War and its 
Shadow. See also Preston, P. The Spanish Holocaust, Part 6.
25 The mural work was first done in collaboration with the Mexican realist painter David Siqueiros, as 
well as other artists. See Forment, A. Josep Renau, and Bellón, F. Josep Renau, 281-367. A concise 
overview of Renau's entire artistic career can also be found in Cabañas Bravo, M. 'Josep Renau y la 
recuperación de una belleza comprometida'.
26 Cabañas Bravo, M. 'Josep Renau y la recuperación de una belleza comprometida', 14f.
27 It seems Renau never managed to acquire a real proficiency in German.
28 Renau died in a Berlin hospital on 11 October 1982. His ashes lie buried in the Friedrichfelde 
cemetery in the German capital.
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in 1939 had marked a definite end to the cultural project envisioned in relation to his
native country.
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CONCLUSION 
The content of Renau's cultural vision was, as we have seen, coloured both by artistic
and political conceptions of progressive social change. The extent to which the one or
the other would influence his activity varied with the historical circumstances in which
he  operated.  Both  aspects  –  the  artistic  and  the  political  –  were  always  present,
continually  remoulding  each  other  in  a  dynamic  relation  constantly  unsettled  by
tensions. To conclude the work presented here, it seems appropriate, then, to provide a
summarizing analysis of how these tensions found expression in the work of Renau and
his colleagues during the period of the Spanish Second Republic. Such an analysis must
first return to the theoretical roots of these tensions before considering their impact on
two broad areas: the first concerning the relation between the artistic and political avant-
garde, and the second the relation between the avant-garde as such and the 'people'.
The artistic and political avant-garde shared an aspiration to find new ways of
framing and organising a future social community. That art could play a decisive role in
the elaboration of new ways of living was initially suggested in the work of German
Idealists  in  the  late  nineteenth  century.  Kant  first  set  the  stage  by  describing  the
experience of Beauty as a conceptually distinct way to relate to the world, which led
Hegel to proclaim that art had a special ability to convey the Truth. In addition to this
ability, Schiller proposed that the aesthetic experience, conceived in Kantian terms, also
carried a lesson that could form the basis for a more peaceful and harmonious society –
a  society  where  oppositions  between  subject  and  object,  activity  and  passivity  are
dissolved in a universal totality based on co-operation and equality.  This vision has,
consciously or otherwise, clearly influenced utopian visions during the nineteenth and
twentieth  centuries,  and  must  be  seen  as  part  of  the  intellectual  heritage  shaping
collectivist visions during the interwar period. For the German Idealists and their heirs,
aesthetics was not simply a visual language, but also a reflection of the defining values
of  the community.  But  to  inspire new ways  of  living,  then,  art  had  to  innovate,  to
explore new aesthetic forms. This innovation would take increasingly radical forms at
the beginning of the twentieth century, which gradually gave rise to accusations that art
had  retreated  into a  subjective world of  fantasy.  The formal  experimentation of  the
avant-garde  led  its  critics  to  claim that  art  had ceased  to  reflect  any shared reality
beyond the surface of the image itself.
Such voices grew stronger as the Great War and its aftermath shattered European
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self-perceptions  and  intensified  demands  for  social  change.  Art  had  to  engage with
social issues in a more direct way, radical critics maintained. This demand related not
only to content,  but  would also concern questions  of  form.  Social  engagement  thus
became one of  the reasons why many artists  returned to  some kind of  realism.  But
realism  was  not  necessarily  imposed  on  artists  from external  political  quarters.  Its
political value, particularly at a time of burgeoning mass-democracy, was perceived by
many artists to reside in its inherent qualities. Among these were its concern for a shared
reality, its accessibility, and its ability to communicate messages on an emotive level.
For these reasons, realism appeared the natural aesthetic choice for artists who wanted
to act as witnesses to social conditions and contribute to political mobilisation processes
against worsening manifestations of social injustice.
As a result of this trend there emerged a closer collaboration between the artistic
and political avant-garde – a collaboration where the role of the artist was to increase
political awareness by providing critical portraits of social life. This was the role that
Renau would adopt after his first solo show of December 1928 had contributed to a
personal and creative crisis. Rather than imagined landscapes, the focus was now on
existing social phenomena. Artistic commitment to change was to be directed towards
the task of conveying social knowledge, which would, in theory, underwrite a consensus
guiding united collective action. This function was particularly evident in the increasing
interest shown during the 1930s, in Spain as well as Europe as a whole, in documentary
modes of representation. In combination with progressive politics, such forms played an
important part in social change, even if they did not in themselves indicate a vision of
an alternative. By claiming to establish the truth, the documentary image delineated the
realm of the possible.
As art forms based on modern technology, however, photography and film also
represented, in and of themselves, a progressive alternative to traditional painting. They
offered  a  new  aesthetics,  a  modern  visual  language  associated  with  science  and
rationality. They conferred on representations of visual reality an objective dimension,
and  were  thus  powerful  instruments  in  progressive  struggles  against  traditional
mysticism. For all these reasons Josep Renau saw a particular potential in photography
and film as visual languages in which a new national self-image could be formulated.
Through  the  photographic  arts  a  new  national  myth  could  be  established:  a  myth
constituted, essentially, by fact.
From this perspective it is clear that the Idealist aesthetic vision was present in
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Renau's  work also after  his entry into politics.  It  was the political  weakness  of the
Spanish Communist Party,  which he had joined after being deeply impressed by the
theoretical teachings of Marx and Engels, that allowed affiliated artists to play such a
prominent  role  in  the  formulation  of  an  alternative  social  vision  for  Spain.  The
constructive role played by artists in this regard was metaphorically mirrored in Renau's
use of montage, a principle that Renau took from film and applied to still photography.
Montage represented a form of innovative realism, where the persuasive power of the
photograph was combined with the freedom to create new meaning. In his adoption of
this technique, using reality fragments in compositions where truth could be given a
new form,  Renau  arguably reconciled  the  conflicting  priorities  of  the  political  and
artistic avant-gardes. 
The onset of the war in July 1936 altered the dynamic once again, and led Renau
to insist that artistic production be guided more rigorously by political strategy. This
shift also corresponded to the phenomenal transformation of the Spanish Communist
Party, which as a result of its war policy and the vital aid provided to the Republic by
the Soviet Union rapidly turned into one of the most influential political forces within
the Spanish Republic. To some extent, then, the more imposing presence of the party
affected cultural production too,  or at least it  did among its own members. But in a
broader context the shift towards  a stricter adherence to strategies shaped by political
and military concerns  must primarily be understood as  a  response to the war itself,
which immeasurably raised the stakes of Spanish social conflict and obliged cultural
workers of all political persuasions to focus on making a direct contribution to the war
effort. 
We have  also seen  that  Renau  was not  the only one  who granted  politics  a
greater role in artistic production during the war. Most progressive artists and writers
chose to subordinate their work to the political demands of the moment. In so doing,
they were not  driven,  in  the first  instance,  by any specific  or  clearly defined party
political programme, but rather by a broad loyalty to the Popular Front coalition and to
some form of  anti-fascism.  It  would be similarly misguided to  consider  Republican
artists' widespread adherence to realism during the Spanish Civil War as anything other
than  a  generic  response  to  the  war  and  their  understanding  of  fascism  as  resting
fundamentally  on  a  dangerous  denial  of  reality.  As  already  indicated,  realism  was
perceived by progressive cultural producers to have a number of qualities that made it a
natural aesthetic for those who wanted to bear witness and convey an image of human
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suffering. In addition to this, Josep Renau, together with other commentators within the
Republican cultural elite, described realism as an aesthetic tied to democratic values, to
pluralism and humanism – values that were all considered to be antithetical to fascism.
Exactly how artists understood realism varied, but as long as the anti-fascist coalition
agreed on fundamental points in a collective war vision, such differences did not cause
any significant internal rupture. What united the Republic's progressive artists was anti-
fascist strategy, not artistic vision. 
This did not mean, however, that artistic visions were irrelevant. Many artists
and writers saw, just like Renau and his nearest colleagues did, anti-fascism as more
than a defence of constitutional rights. In order to secure a lasting victory over fascism it
was  necessary,  they  maintained,  to  seek  greater  social  change  and  alter  the  very
conditions that had made the emergence of fascism possible. In these circumstances,
many cultural workers continued to see a central role for art, in the formulation of new
modes of co-existence.  As a result, aesthetic dreams were revivified, even when the
political and military task of securing the Republic's survival became an inescapable
priority  for  all.  Calls  for  political  discipline  and  artistic  innovation  were  equally
intensified, which in turn meant that the tensions between the perspectives of the artistic
and  political  vanguard  became more  marked.  This  is  seen  clearly  in  Renau's  1936
lecture on Republican war posters and the debates that followed. But these tensions
were not as dramatic as the plain contradictions that often arose when the progressive
cultural and political elite had to contend with the fact historical agency was no longer
theirs alone, but had to be shared with many groups of other social and political actors
(‘the people’), as a result of the revolutionary changes following the July 1936 coup in
much of the territory where the military insurgents were defeated.
In the eyes of Renau and many other radical activists within the cultural left, the
'people'  had  long  been  seen  as  a  necessary participant  in  the  elaboration  of  a  new
Spanish culture. The 'people' was both a guarantor of authenticity and a historical force
destined to shape the future. According to Renau it was not enough, then, to increase
access to culture and democratise its consumption. Rather, the 'people' had to be placed
in a position where it could creatively shape the community to come. Concrete steps
towards this goal were taken by Renau's flagship project during the Republican period,
the magazine  Nueva Cultura,  and was furthermore given clear expression during the
war, when popular cultural production was encouraged both by the Republican army
and  the  PCE-led  Ministry  of  Public  Instruction  and  Fine  Arts.  This  was  the  main
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difference  between  the  policy  developed  during  the  war  and  that  pursued  by  the
reformist liberal government in the period 1931 to 1933. The 'people' would now be
active participants in the formation of a new Republican order.  
Yet celebrations of popular cultural production on both military and home fronts
quickly made apparent one of the problems inherent in Renau's project: beginners in
poetry and visual  arts  tended to imitate the traditional  forms with which they were
familiar, which in turn minimised the effect that art would have as a force of innovation.
In response to this dilemma, most radical left-wing artists and writers, including Renau,
ended  up  adopting  the  same  paternalistic  approach  which  liberal  intellectuals  had
displayed prior to the war – an approach that Renau himself had criticised. A thorough
popularisation of Republican cultural production was consequently postponed for the
future.  For  the  moment,  art  and  literature  would  exist  on  several  levels,  allowing
amateur productions to be included as valid parts of a national cultural heritage but with
the works of the cultural elite retaining their authority and prestige.
But  practical  (as  opposed  to  theoretical)  stances  vis-a-vis  'the  people'  also
revealed  deeper  contradictions  in  Republican  cultural  politics.  Many  cultural
progressives supported, in principle, the idea of radical social change, not least in order
to make a future resurgence of fascism impossible,  but in practice they opposed the
uncontrolled (as they saw it) violence and destruction caused by the unfolding of the
popular revolution in Republican territory. Above all, they would not support political
demands for the decentralisation of power,  demands which weakened the Republic's
ability to defend itself. In accordance with this conviction, they contributed to efforts to
reconstruct centralised government authority and strengthen the overall co-ordination
perceived  necessary  to  build  a  viable  war  effort  against  an  internationally-backed
military  enemy.  However,  such  centralisation  went  counter  to  revolutionary
conceptions, propagated particularly within anarchist and libertarian circles, which saw
local empowerment of grass-roots organisations as an essential part of an anti-fascist
order.  Local  committees  and  collectives  were,  according  to  defenders  of  the
decentralising  revolution,  the  only  guarantee  of  genuine  popular  rule.  The  internal
political  tensions  that  followed  led  to  several  clashes,  which  in  turn  damaged  the
Republic’s international standing and thus its war effort. One of the critical challenges
facing  the  Republican  government  was,  then,  to  legitimise  central  rule  and  unite
multiple political wills without resorting to an excessive use of coercive force. In this
task, cultural mobilisation strategies inevitably became an indispensable tool.
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In  order  to  shape  and  deliver  such  strategies,  the  Republican  cultural  elite
collaborated closely with the Ministry of Public Instruction and Fine Arts – led, for most
part of the war, by a team that included Renau. They shared a desire to revitalise the
Republican  reform programme,  which  had  now become a  cornerstone  in  efforts  to
legitimise  the  wartime  Popular  Front  government.  To  further  these  efforts  and  to
highlight a governmental commitment to egalitarian politics – crucial given influential
revolutionary groups were claiming that the government was hostile to the egalitarian
society that  the  revolutionaries  wanted  to  build  –  the ministry and  its  collaborators
formulated a cultural policy that expanded access to education and emphasised every
citizen's  right  to  participate  in  the  cultural  construction  of  a  new  Spain.  Even  if
independent  worker  committees  would  be  increasingly  rare,  the  popular  revolution
would still prevail on a cultural level.
As  a  consequence  of  this  policy,  the  'revolution'  was  aestheticised  and
transformed into a unifying cultural project. For artists and writers eager to engage with
social  and  political  developments,  aestheticisation  became,  besides  a  means  to
contribute  to  mobilisation  efforts,  a  way to  resolve  the  tensions  that  arose  in  their
attempts combine artistic and political commitments. Artistic visions could not always
be reduced to concrete political strategy, and to minimise the opposition between the
two, politics was to be fused with art.  Thus artists  would play a central  role in the
shaping of the now differently defined revolution, while politics would be ascribed the
unifying qualities widely ascribed to aesthetics. Politics became another form of artistic
self-expression, another way to innovate with the real. 
The question remains how this could be squared with the progressive artists'
commitment to a vision purportedly defending pluralist democracy. To aestheticise the
revolution – that is, to equate it with manifestations of unity – was to limit the register
of sanctioned cultural expression, which in turn entailed a reduction of pluralism. But in
the Republican case it is unclear to what extent a reduction in pluralism corresponded to
an  impoverishment  of  democracy.  Aestheticisation  was  not  only  a  product  of  the
cultural elite but also of ordinary conscripts and other citizens who participated in the
Republic's expanded cultural programme. We cannot disregard the possibility that many
opted voluntarily to adapt to the limited register that corresponded to the aestheticisation
process, especially when the enormous challenges that the Republic faced potentially
had a strong unifying effect on the population's outlook (at least until the intensification
of desperate material and international circumstances divided opinions on how the war
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should best be ended).  If  the most radical  aspects of the revolution were eventually
contained, it was because of a complex development shaped by grass-roots actors as
well  as  by leadership  figures.  In  the  final  analysis,  it  was  a  development  that  was
shaped, more than anything else, by the war itself.
Given more time, the changes introduced by the wartime cultural programme
might nonetheless have had radical effects. A recognition of peoples' right to  participate
fully in processes of  social  formation are not easily erased from historical  memory.
Radical  democratic  changes  were  undoubtedly  something  that  Renau  would  have
supported,  even if they would have obliged him to compromise on his own cultural
vision. Of course, such visions took various forms among the progressive cultural elite
too. Nevertheless, the absence of any sharply defined plans ultimately makes it easier to
identify certain common strands. Among these, the most noteworthy may be that Renau
and his colleagues – who in their vast majority were not ideological communists – often
used a hybrid political language to suggest that a collectivist utopia could be achieved
without sacrificing liberal democratic freedoms. Exactly how this might have come to
pass remains unclear. The possibilities of progressive social change opened up by the
Republic and, more traumatically,  by the civil war, were ultimately buried under the
myriad ruins that a triumphant fascism left in its wake.  
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